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iABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether
the Registered Land Act 1963 of Kenya has established
an effective system of law and practice governing
titles to land registered under the Act. Several key
issues are addressed. First, how effective has been
the process of land adjudication which brings onto the
register land that was formerly subject to customary
law; moreover, how successful has been the process of
converting land that was subject to one of the pre-
existing systems of registration. Secondly, how
effective is the conveyancing machinery provided by the
cUrC
Act. Thirdly, Athe rights of registered proprietors,
including those registered jointly or in common, as
well as persons with third party interests in land
adequately protected by the Act? Fourthly, to what
extent have the provisions of the Magistrates'
Jurisdiction (Amendment) Act 1981 undermined the
provisions of the Registered Land Act 1963?
In answering these questions the relevant
provisions of the Registered Land Act 1963 are compared
with those of the English Land Registration Act 1925.
This thesis considers the extent to which judicial
interpretation of the provisions of the Land
Registration Act 1925 can assist in solving some of the
problems created by the provisions of the Registered
Land Act 1963. It is contended that the Registered
Land Act has failed to provide a truly effective system
of registered land.
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1Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
I.	 Background
"Are we encouraging the registration of titles
under the Acts of 1875 and 1879? Well, what do
you think? Are we likely to do anything that
would bring about professional suicide? Don't you
understand that when once a title is registered as
'absolute' all future conveyances will be effected
without the aid of a solicitor ... No, no; we are
doing our level best to thwart registration of
title ... And if the registration of title in the
present compulsory area is made as inconvenient,
troublesome and expensive as possible, there will
be little likelihood of the area being extended.
Our view is, that every solicitor owes a duty to
the profession, and also to the public, to throw
every o4tacle in the way of registration of
titles."-
The welcome that was accorded by the English legal
profession to the Land Registry Act 1862, which introduced
land registration in England was, at best, lukewarm and
insipid. 2 Despite the general consensus in the 19th century
that the substantive law of property and conveyancing in
England was in dire need of reform, there was no stampede to
have titles registered under the one Act that was designed
to reform conveyancing in England. The complacency and the
reluctance amongst conveyancers to heartily embrace the new
system was a by product of the deep seated attachment to the
system of private conveyancing by the use of deeds. This
method of conveying land had been in existence for
1	 Chats With a Young Solicitor, (1899) 16 Law Notes 341.
2	 See Report of a Select Committee of the House of 
Commons on Land Titles and Transfer (1879), pp. iv, v,
quoted in Second Report of the Royal Commission on the Land
Transfer Acts (1911), Cd. 5483, para. 20.
2centuries, and although it was anachronistic, the legal
profession had enough vested interest in its continued
existence.3
The disinclination by conveyancers to encourage
voluntarily registration under the Land Registry Act 1862
meant that very few titles were registered under the Act.
The failure of the Act was also a direct consequence of the
inherent deficiencies of the Act itself. Despite the
correction of these faults by the Land Transfer Acts of 1875
and 1897, there was no surge in the number of titles
registered. Indeed, the introduction of compulsory
registration by the Land Transfer Act 1897 provoked a level
of histrionics and rhetoric from solicitors against this
move, as illustrated in the quote above. This level of
opposition played a role in preventing the rapid spread of
land registration in England and Wales; even after the
enactment of the Land Registration Act 1925, the extension
of land registration was not expedited. Hence, it has taken
close to 130 years for land registration to be extended
throughout England and Wales.4
Of what relevance is this to land registration in
Kenya? Simply put, the teething problems that were
afflicting land registration in England during its formative
3	 See the discussion in Avner Offer, Property and
Politics, 1870-1914. Land Ownership, Law, Ideology and
Urban Development in England, (Cambridge 1981), pp. 23-87.
4	 Compulsory registration was to extend to the last few
remaining counties by 1 December 1990 - The Registration of
Title Order 1989, S.I. 1347. Hereafter, the term 'England'
will be used to refer to England and Wales, unless otherwise
stated.
3years, and the general opposition to the system, which
prevented it from being quickly established and accepted in
England, helps to explain why the British government did not
initially apply the English model of land registration in
Kenya when it established colonial rule there in 1895. Part
of British colonial policy was to introduce English law in
the territories it colonised; in Kenya, although the English
common law and the statutes of general application in force
in England were made to apply in the colony, the Land
Transfer Act 1875 which was still in force in England was
not made applicable, neither was the Land Transfer Act 1897.
Instead the substantive property law was imported from India
through the Indian Transfer of Property Act 1882 and made to
apply in Kenya; further, an Act was enacted, known as the
Registration of Deeds Ordinance 1901, which created a simple
system of deeds registration. Later, land registration
based on the Torrens system was introduced through the
Registration of Titles Act 1919. Several parallel and
competing systems of registration were introduced which
resulted in a confusing and complicated system of
registration.
In the meantime, land law in England was undergoing a
revolution, culminating in the legislative reforms of 1925.
The Land Registration Act 1925, the Land Charges Act 1925
and the Law of Property Act 1925 were the main pillars of
that reform. The Land Registration Act 1925, essentially
consolidating the Land Transfer Acts of 1875 and 1897, was
to have a profound influence not only on land registration
in England, but in other jurisdictions too.
4The Land Registration Act 1925 had an important impact
in Kenya; the Registered Land Act 1963, which was enacted to
alleviate the confusion in land law and registration and to
unify the disparate systems, was based on the 1925 Act. The
Registered Land Act 1963 can be said to be one of the most
important pieces of legislation in Kenya today; it has
thoroughly revolutionised land law and conveyancing there as
well as having been responsible for transforming in a
remarkable way land tenure and custom among African
societies within the country. Traditional methods of
holding and conveying land amongst Africans have been swept
away by the rapid spread of land registration. Indeed,
Government policy can be said to be responsible for this
swift metamorphosis, which has resulted in giant strides
having been made in the spread of land registration in
Kenya.
The Registered Land Act 1963 therefore set out to do
three things: to unify the multifarious systems of land
registration in Kenya; to convert land that was subject to
African land tenure into the system of land law and
registration that was introduced by the 1963 Act; and,
eventually, to replace the Indian Transfer of Property Act
1882 and African customary Land law, with the substantive
law of property contained in the 1963 Act.
It was the conversion of land subject to African land
tenure that was to prove difficult and complicated. Amongst
African societies, land was conveyed orally in the presence
of witnesses. There were no documents to record these
transactions, since reading and writing was not a feature
5within African societies. 5 Hence, transfers of land were
made in the presence of witnesses, their memory being relied
upon to ascertain what the true position was at the time of
the transaction. Objects such as an axe, spear, or even a
goat or a ram were handed over as symbols of the act of
transfer. 6 Since the proprietors of such land had no
documents of title to prove their ownership to the land, nor
did those who had third party rights to the land, the
registration of such land under the Registered Land Act 1963
was to prove to be a challenge. What made this process
formidable was the fact that African land tenure was being
converted to a system based on English law, since the 1963
Act was modelled on the Land Registration Act 1925.
Therefore, the questions that this thesis addresses
itself are these: first, how effective has the Registered
Land Act 1963 been in uniting the systems of registration of
land that have been in existence in Kenya, and in converting
land that was formerly under customary tenure into the
system under the Act? Secondly, how effective is the
conveyancing machinery that is introduced by the Act?
Thirdly, how effective are the provisions of the Act in
5	 Western type education started to be introduced amongst
African societies in Kenya by missionaries towards the end
of the 19th century and the beginning of 20th century. See
J.N.B. Osogo, Educational Developments in Kenya 1911-1924 
(with particular reference to African Education), Hadithi 3,
edited by Bethwell A. Ogot, (Nairobi 1971), p. 103.
6	 This process was similar to the method of transfer of
land in England centuries ago known as livery of seisin,
where transfer was effected by the symbolic act of handing a
twig, stick or a piece of turf to the purchaser - see Sir
Ernest Dowson & V.L.O. Sheppard, Land Registration, (London
1956), p. 4.; S.E. Thorne, Livery of Seisin (1936) 52 L.Q.R.
345.
6protecting the rights of registered proprietors and those
with third party interests in the land? In answering these
questions, it will be seen whether the Registered Land Act
1963 does live up to its stated object, which is outlined in
its preamble as being an Act designed,
11 00. to make further and better provision for the
registration of title to land, and for the
regulation of dealings in land so registered... .11
In answering these questions, this thesis compares the
provisions of the 1963 Act against those of its model, the
Land Registration Act 1925. The object is to identify the
deficiencies within the provisions of the 1963 Act, against
the background of the comparable provisions in the Land
Registration Act 1925.
In determining how these deficiencies can be remedied,
it will be shown the extent to which English common law and
principles of equity can apply to fill the gaps that are
found in the provisions of the Act, in view of the fact that
section 163 of the 1963 Act specifically applies such law
and equity subject to the provisions of the Act. Moreover
it will be shown to what extent English caselaw on
provisions of the Land Registration Act 1925 can be used to
help interpret comparable provisions in the Registered Land
Act 1963.
But what makes the system of registering titles to land
far more advantageous than any other system of conveyancing
generally? The Privy Council in Gibbs v. Messer 7 identified
7	 [1891] A.C. 248, at p. 254.
7one important advantage. They highlighted that purchasers
of registered land are saved,
II ... from the trouble and expense of going behind
the register in order to investigate the history
of [the vendor's] title and to satisfy themselves
of its validity."
Under unregistered conveyancing, a purchaser has to satisfy
himself about the validity of the title offered by making a
careful and detailed examination of the documents of title.
Since land can be the subject of successive transfers over a
period of time, the purchaser has to search to a good root
of title, or a document which adequately identifies the land
and shows a disposition of the whole legal and equitable
estate. Successive purchasers of the land have to undertake
the same elaborate and retrospective examination of the
documents of title to ensure that they take free from the
interests of third parties. Hence, this method of
investigation is slow and repetitive. But in the system of
registered title, the Land Registrar makes an examination of
the documents of title to a good root, and once he is
satisfied about the validity of the title, registers that
title in a register of title and issues a registration
number and a land certificate. The register becomes the
final authority on the state of the title. The purchaser
need no longer examine the documents of title, these now
becoming redundant, and only needs to make a simple search
of the register. 8 Therefore the problem whereby documents
8	 Nevertheless, the existence of overriding interests,
which are interests that need not be entered on the
register, are a feature of land registration which can cause
problems for purchasers. For the discussion of these
interests, see Chapter Six.
8of title become misplaced, lost or suppressed no longer
arises.9
This factor also makes registration of title more
advantageous than the registration of deeds; the
registration of deeds does not eradicate the necessity of
examining the documents of title because the registration of
a deed does not confer validity on it, nor does it make it
proof of title. Kenya still retains deeds registration
which is found in the Registration of Documents Act 1901 and
the Government Lands Act 1915, and a hybrid system of deeds
and land registration found in the Land Titles Act 1908.10
Moreover, the effectiveness of the system of land
registration is augmented by the fact that the State
warrants or guarantees the register by undertaking to
indemnify a person who suffers loss or damage by virtue of a
mistake or omission on the register, or where loss is
suffered as a result of a fraudulent transfer.
These factors make land registration or registration of
title a superior system. It was for these reasons that
registration of title was chosen as the system that would
9	 Although unregistered land in England is governed by a
system of registration of charges under the Land Charges Act
1972, whereby charges and interests in unregistered land are
registered in a register of charges and any that are not
registered are not binding on a purchaser, the purchaser
still has to examine documents of title to a root of at
least 15 years - Law of Property Act 1969, s. 23.
10 See Chapter Two for a discussion of these Acts.
England also had a system of deeds registration contained in
the Yorkshire Registries Act 1703 and the Middlesex Registry
Act 1708, establishing deeds registration in Yorkshire and
Middlesex.
9govern land in England and in other jurisdictions such as
Kenya.
II. Research Objectives 
There are four key objectives in pursuing this research
into the Registered Land Act 1963 of Kenya:
1)	 To determine how effective the spread of land
registration in Kenya under the Registered Land Act 1963 has
been. This meant considering three areas: first, the
process known as land adjudication. This process involves
the adjudication of land that was formerly subject to
African customary law, and the registration of such land
under the 1963 Act. The process of land adjudication is
governed by the Land Adjudication Act 1968. What is
significant about land adjudication is the method that has
been used to bring in this type of unregistered land onto
the register, a process which involves the use of lay people
making up the adjudication committees determining the rights
and interests that exist over the land that is to be
registered. The success of land adjudication has been
crucial to the pace at which land registration under the
Registered Land Act 1963 has been extended throughout the
country.
Secondly, considering the conversion of those titles
that are registered under the pre-existing registration
systems in Kenya, that is, the Registration of Documents Act
1901, the Land Titles Act 1908, the Government Lands Act
1915, and the Registration of Titles Act 1919.
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Thirdly, analysing the system that has been set up for
the registration of flats and horizontal units in Kenya.
The extent to which land registration has been
successfully extended in Kenya is measured against the
progress that has been made in registering land in England
under the Land Registration Act 1925.
2.	 The second objective is to determine how effective the
conveyancing machinery introduced by the Registered Land Act
1963 is. This has meant looking at the organization of the
register under the 1963 Act, the provisions on searching the
register, and principally, how easy it is for a purchaser to
undertake a transfer of land on his own behalf without the
benefit of legal advice. This is important because in
Kenya, the Government has encouraged people to undertake
their own transactions, and it has meant that by and large,
the majority of transfers of land registered under the 1963
Act are undertaken by parties to a transaction on their own
behalf. Indeed, the fact that many people are registration
literate is an important strength of land registration
policy in Kenya, when compared with the position in England.
However, in determining how effective the conveyancing
machinery under the 1963 Act is also depends on the
safeguards that are provided by the Act in protecting a
purchaser of land acting on his own behalf. It will be
argued that many purchasers of registered land in Kenya
acting on their own behalf are prejudiced by the lack of
implied covenants for title under the Registered Land Act
1963, and that such covenants do play a role in registered
land.
11
	3.	 The third objective is to consider how effective the
provisions of the 1963 Act are in protecting the rights of
registered proprietors and those with third party interests
in land. Four areas will be considered here.
First, in view of the process of land adjudication whereby
land is converted from customary tenure, to what extent does
the Registered Land Act 1963 give protection to those who
held customary rights or interests in the land but, for
various reasons, failed to have those rights protected on
the register during land adjudication? This will involve
the consideration of the mechanisms to restrain dispositions
of registered land and the question of overriding interests.
Secondly, the provisions in the Act that set up the
structure for co-ownership of land are examined and whether
these provisions are really adequate for the multiple
ownership of land registered under the Act.
Thirdly, the rectification and indemnity provisions in
the 1963 Act are also considered. The prevention of
rectifications of any first registration by the 1963 Act
means that the title of a first registered proprietor is
virtually unimpeachable. But this causes problems,
particularly where the first registered proprietor has
obtained title by fraud. It will be shown to what extent
the courts in Kenya have sidestepped this prohibition in
order to transfer titles to those who have been defrauded.
	
4.	 The fourth and last objective is to consider to what
extent the creation of the panels of elders by the
Magistrates Jurisdiction (Amendment) Act 1981 has undermined
the provisions of the Registered Land Act 1963. These
12
panels are composed of lay members who determine certain
disputes over land, but their jurisdiction also covers land
registered under the 1963 Act. The question that needs to
be answered is whether the creation of the panels of elders
was indeed a big mistake.
The overall purpose of this thesis is to show that
• i
despite some of the strengths of land registration policy in
Kenya, such as the decision to methodically and
systematically bring in unregistered titles onto the
register under the Registered Land Act 1963, resulting in a
rapid spread of land registration in Kenya, together with
the fact that people are registration literate, the
provisions of the 1963 Act do not, in certain key areas, and
when viewed against the comparable provisions in England,
provide adequate protection for proprietors of registered
titles, hence undermining the effectiveness of the Act.
The thesis identifies the problems that arise in
connection with the Act and proposes remedies, which help to
eliminate the problems if not cushion their impact. The
length of this thesis would be considerable and interminable
if one were to consider all the provisions of the 1963 Act
which contain not only conveyancing provisions, but
substantive law provisions as well. Hence, the provisions
on leases 11 and charges 12 will not be analysed, although
reference will be made to them where relevant. However, the
failure to discuss these two areas for example, does not
11 Registered Land Act 1963, Part V, Division Two.
12	 Ibid., Part V, Division Three.
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detract from the attainment of the objectives outlined
above, and it is felt that these provisions are sufficiently
detailed to form the basis of further research.
III. Research Methods 
In determining the effectiveness of the Registered Land
Act 1963, a programme of research covering a period of three
years was undertaken by the writer. Between September and
October 1989 the writer was able to work in the Kiambu
District Land Registry, the busiest land registry in Kenya.
There, the writer not only observed first hand but was also
personally involved in the processes of land registration.
This included assisting parties involved in the sale of
registered land by undertaking searches, making entries on
the registers of title and issuing land certificates
(referred to as 'title deeds/ 13 ). The writer also had the
opportunity of accompanying the Land Registrar when
proceeding to solve boundary and partition disputes over
registered land and attending Registry hearings too.
Extensive interviews were conducted with the District Land
Registrar and other officials in the Land Registry. A wide
ranging interview was also conducted with the Deputy Chief
Land Registrar in Nairobi. The writer also spent time in
the Land Adjudication Department in Nairobi observing the
process of bringing land that was formerly under customary
tenure onto the registers under the Registered Land Act 1963
and was able to interview officials in the Department.
13 As to why see Chapter Four.
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The Survey of Kenya, a Government department situated
in Nairobi, plays a crucial role in the process of land
registration by surveying the boundaries of the land to be
registered. This is undertaken through a combination of
aerial photography and ground surveys. The writer was able
to observe how cartographers in the Department translate the
information obtained from these surveys onto maps on which
are drawn the boundaries of the individual plots of land,
and which become the Registry maps.14
The writer also had the opportunity of working in the
conveyancing section of a large law firm in Nairobi and was
able to conduct transactions on behalf of clients as well as
assisting in litigation involving registered land.
To compare the procedure used in registering titles
under the Land Registration Act 1925, a visit was made to
the Nottingham District Land Registry in England to observe
the process of registering English titles and, while there,
had the opportunity of interviewing a senior official of the
Land Registry.
The analysis of decided cases from the law reports is a
sine qua non of legal research and, a fortiori, for the
purpose of this thesis. English caselaw is well documented
in a series of up-to-date law reports while unreported cases
can be obtained from LEXIS, the computer database and
retrieval system. However, the history and development of
law reporting in Kenya has not been altogether too happy.
Since 1980 there has been no publication of the Kenya Law
14	 See Chapter Three, infra.
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Reports, the official law reports of Kenya. This makes it
difficult for a researcher to track down developments in the
law and in discovering what the present state of the law is.
Unfortunately, it also has the effect of creating conflict
in the law, whereby a decision may be given per incuriam
because the court and even counsel were unaware of an
unreported case binding on the court. The writer therefore
spent a considerable length of time in the High Court
Library in Nairobi, and in the libraries of law firms and
the University of Nairobi, in an attempt too uncover as many
unreported cases as possible that had a bearing on the
Registered Land Act 1963. However, there always exists the
danger of an unreported decision lurking somewhere
undiscovered which may put a different gloss on the law.
The library of the National Assembly proved to be a fruitful
source of material on Parliamentary debates on land
registration in Kenya. Through the above research methods
the writer was able to determine the strengths and failures
of the system of land registration under the Registered Land
Act 1963.
IV Organization of the Thesis 
The organization of this thesis is based around the
four objectives outlined earlier. Before the analysis of
the Registered Land Act 1963 is embarked upon, the
historical background of land registration in England and in
Kenya is looked at in Chapter Two. The chapter is divided
into two parts: Part I outlines the history of land
registration in England from the enactment of the Land
16
Registry Act 1862 to the Land Registration Act 1925. The
history of land registration in England was to have an
indirect effect on the history of land registration in
Kenya, a history that was wholly shaped by the influence of
British colonial rule.
Part II of Chapter Two looks at the convoluted and
chequered history of land registration in Kenya. Several
differing systems of registration of deeds and of land were
introduced in relatively quick succession by the colonial
government in Kenya, which had the effect of bringing about
confusion in the land law. This was compounded by the fact
that the African societies already in existence in the
country had differing customary laws governing the land they
occupied. The method of conveying land among the Kikuyu is
used as an example to illustrate the methods of conveyancing
among African societies. However, the failure on the part
of the colonial government to recognise African titles over
the land they occupied, coupled with the refusal to
introduce any of the systems of land registration in the
lands that the Africans occupied, contributed to the
outbreak of civil war in the 1950s and the introduction of
another system of land registration. Each of the systems of
registration introduced by the colonial government will be
briefly considered as a prelude to understanding why the
Registered Land Act 1963 was enacted. It will be shown that
although the enactment of the Registered Land Act 1963 was
heavily influenced by political and economic factors, it was
more of an attempt to bring order to the chaos of land law
and registration in Kenya.
17
Chapter Three considers the procedure of bringing in
titles onto the register, showing how effective the
Registered Land Act 1963 has been in extending registration
to land in Kenya. It will be shown that the systematic
registration of unregistered titles in Kenya has resulted in
a rapid increase in the number of titles registered when
compared with the method of sporadic registration in
England. The method of land adjudication in Kenya has had
an important bearing on the mapping of registered land and
the preparation of the Registry Index Map. Although the
method of systematically registering land has advantages,
for example in the preparation of the Registry Index Map, it
has generated problems. The land adjudication process is
analysed and the problems created by the use of lay people
on the adjudication committees to undertake the bulk of land
adjudication in Kenya examined.
This chapter will show that the Registered Land Act
1963 has not been successful in unifying the disparate
systems of land registration still in existence in Kenya.
The last section of Chapter Three considers the registration
provisions of the Sectional Properties Act 1987 which was
introduced in Kenya to provide for the registration of flats
and horizontal units. This is contrasted with the position
in England where efforts are still being made to introduce
similar legislation.
Chapter Four begins to consider the second objective,
that is, the effectiveness of the conveyancing machinery
introduced by the Registered Land Act 1963. The Kiambu
District Land Registry is the focus of this chapter. This
18
involves looking at the organization of the register of
titles, to what extent personal attendance by parties to a
transaction is a feature of registered conveyancing, and the
extent to which inspection of the register is open to the
public. A surprising amendment to the Registered Land Act
1963 was the change that was made to land certificates;
under the Act they are no longer termed as 'land
certificates' but are now referred to as 'title deeds'. It
will be shown whether this change has elevated the status of
the document so that it can now be viewed as evidence of
title thereby reducing the importance of the register.
Chapter Five will show that the conveyancing machinery
is defective in several ways, and has the effect of
prejudicing purchasers who are acting on their own behalf.
This is noteworthy because many purchasers of land in Kenya
do act without the benefit of legal advice. In particular,
the absence of implied covenants for title may leave a
purchaser without a remedy, in view of the limitations on
rectification of the register. This situation is compared
with the position under the Land Registration Act 1925 and
to what extent English caselaw highlights the benefits of
implied covenants for title.
A piece of legislation that is important where land is
concerned in Kenya is the Land Control Act 1967 which
provides a mechanism for the sanctioning of contracts for
the sale of agricultural land; failure to comply with the
provisions in the 1967 Act may result in such a contract
being declared null and void. It will be shown to what
19
extent provisions of the Land Control Act 1967 do conflict
with those in the Registered Land Act 1963.
Having discussed the problems which have been created
by the process of land adjudication in Chapter Two,
attention is turned in Chapter Six to a problem that
continues to afflict proprietors of registered land, that
is, the status of unregistered customary rights. Land
adjudication was designed to identify all the customary
rights claimed by individuals and have them protected on the
register of title. However, many rights were ignored or
undetected for a combination of reasons which are outlined
in Chapter Two and, as a result, were never protected on the
register. One line of thought is that these unprotected
customary rights are extinguished for all time once the land
is brought onto the register. However, it will be shown in
Chapter Six that there is a category of customary rights
that are not extinguished and indeed can be protected on the
register by the entry of a caution, or subsist as overriding
interests under section 30 of the 1963 Act, and the extent
to which equitable principles are applicable to make this
possible. Moreover, how can a purchaser ensure that he
takes free from such overriding interests under the Act? It
will be shown that additional mechanisms need to be inserted
in the Registered Land Act 1963 to protect such a purchaser.
Although the equitable doctrine of notice has generally no
role to play in the law of registered land, it has a minor
role to play under the Registered land Act 1963. This
chapter will show the role the doctrine plays in the Act
where licences are concerned.
20
Chapter Seven will show that the provisions on co-
ownership of registered land under the 1963 Act are
inadequate and fail to protect the interests of numerous
joint owners. It will be argued that the Land (Group
Representatives) Act 1968 which was enacted to fill the gap
in the co-ownership provisions in the Registered Land Act
1963 and which set up a structure for the ownership of land
by large groups of people is a failure. Several solutions
are put forward in an attempt to find a remedy to this
problem.
Section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963 has the
effect of severely restricting the power of the court and
that of the land registrar to rectify the register.
Although this has the effect of almost rendering the title
of a first registered proprietor unimpeachable, it has
caused enormous complications, particularly where titles
have been obtained by fraud. How have the courts been able
to circumvent this problem? This is addressed to in Chapter
Eight. Moreover, when compared with the provisions relating
to rectification under the Land Registration Act 1925, the
rectification provisions in the 1963 Act may unduly
prejudice an innocent registered proprietor in possession.
The indemnity provisions are also restrictive and may have
the effect of limiting the amount of indemnity a person can
recover, if that person has suffered 'damage'.
Chapter Nine analyses the effect of the Magistrates
Jurisdiction (Amendment) Act 1981 which confers jurisdiction
on newly created panels of elders, made up of lay
individuals, to hear certain disputes over registered land.
21
It is intended to show that the decisions of the panels of
elders are tending to undermine the provisions of the
Registered Land Act 1963 by the application of customary law
to the provisions of the Act, and in this way may undermine
the security of title offered by the 1963 Act.
Chapter Ten is the concluding chapter and considers the
proposals for reform that have been considered by the Kenya
Law Reform Commission to improve the system of land and law
and registration in Kenya, as well as proposals considered
by the Law Commission in England to overhaul the system of
land registration in England.
All in all, although this thesis will highlight the
deficiencies of the Registered Land Act 1963, the writer
will show how these deficiencies can be eliminated or at
least be minimised, thus making the Act more effective in
regulating registration of title in Kenya.
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Chapter Two
THE HISTORY OF LAND REGISTRATION IN ENGLAND AND KENYA
1.	 Introduction
"In all civilized countries ... there should be a
General Register. "-L
Egypt may be credited as the nation which first
introduced the concept of a registered title.
Archaeological findings revealed that a form of land
registration was in existence there around 3,000 B.C.
A tomb of a certain high official showed that his
property was registered in the Royal Registry of
Egypt, while another tomb revealed information that
the register was kept in duplicate, one in the
Treasury and the other in the department of the
granary of Pharoah. 2 Further information was
uncovered which showed that there was a land court in
which the Chief Minister of Egypt determined disputes
over land ownership and titles that were certified as
valid were registered, whereas unregistered claims
were declared invalid. 3 This evidence shows that the
concept of a title registered in a register maintained
by the State, from which proof of title can be
1	 Second Report of the Royal Commission on Real
Property (1830), p. 3.
2	 Sir Ernest Dowson & V.L.O. Sheppard, Land
Registration (London 1956), p. 3.
3	 Ibid.
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determined, originates way back in time. The system
has spread and today there are many forms of land
registration around the world.
This chapter initially discusses the problems
that faced the early Land Registration Acts that were
enacted in England, that is the Land Registry Act 1862
and the Land Transfer Acts of 1875 and 1897. The
inherent difficulties with these Acts together with
the sustained opposition by the legal profession to
land registration in general meant that it took a long
time before registration of titles became widely
accepted in England.
These factors help to explain why the British
Government did not introduce the English system of
land registration when it established colonial rule
there towards the end of the 19th century. Although
the colonial administration introduced English common
law and equity, as well as the statutes that were in
general application in England , in 1897 ,4 the Land
Registry Act 1862 and the Land Transfer Acts of 1875
and 1897 were not applied. Instead, a system of deeds
registration was adopted and which still exists today.
Part II of this chapter goes on to discuss the
turbulent history of land registration in Kenya. It
will be shown how the colonial government introduced
two forms of deeds registration, a hybrid system of
deeds and registered title and the Torrens system of
4	 East Africa Order in Council 1902, art. 15(2) as
amended by the East Africa Order in Council 1911.
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land registration all in the space of 20 years.
Amazingly, no attempt was made to phase out a
previously established registration system when
introducing a new one, a problem that was symptomatic
of a lack of clear policy on land registration.
What aggravated the situation further was the
government's policy towards the indigenous Africans.
To facilitate European settlement in Kenya, the
colonial government confined African societies, which
had inhabited the country long before colonial rule
was established, to certain areas known as Reserves,
thereby providing more fertile land for European
settlement. The imported English law and the systems
of land registration did not apply in these Reserves.
Instead, dealings in land among the Africans, for
example, were to be governed by customary law. Part
II of this chapter considers the nature of
conveyancing among the Kikuyu and the types of
interests created over land. The background on the
customary land law of this tribe, as an example, helps
one to appreciate the problems that were faced when
land that was under customary tenure was brought onto
the register. 5 Land registration was eventually
introduced in the African lands as a result of the
outbreak of the Mau Mau civil war. This war was a
consequence of the pent up frustration and anger felt
by Africans over the colonial government's land
5	 See Chapter Three.
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policy. A new system of land registration was
therefore introduced in the Reserves or the 'Native
Lands', as they were later called, designed to have
registered titles issued to those who could prove
rights of ownership under customary law.
As a result, there were five different systems of
registration in Kenya by 1960. This unsatisfactory
situation led to the move to simplify and unify land
registration there, hence the enactment of the
Registered Land Act 1963. This Act was far reaching
because not only was it designed to convert titles
registered under the other registration Acts, but it
also provided for the extension of registration to
areas that were still under customary tenure.
Part I
Initial Problems Facing Land Registration in
England 
The Land Registry Act 1862 which introduced
registration of title nationally was enacted as a
result of the recommendations of the Registration of
Title Commissioners. In their 1857 Report 6 they
considered at length the failings of the existing
method of private conveyancing. They highlighted, for
example, that the risk of fraud was high due to the
6	 Report of the Commissioners appointed to consider
the subject of the Registration of Title with
reference to the sale and transfer of land, 1857, C.
2215. (Hereafter 'Report of the Commissioners of
Registration of Title.')
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suppression or destruction of deeds, while there was
always the possibility that deeds would get lost; all
these factors contributed to insecurity of title.7
Moreover, the investigation of the history of a title
each time it was transferred caused "expense ...
delay, annoyance and disappointment, sickening to both
buyer and seller."8
Accordingly, theCommissioners recommended that a
system of registration of title should be established,
the object of which was to avoid the "retrospective
inquiry into the former dealings and transactions"
while at the same time simplifying title and the forms
of conveyance and without at the same time impairing
the security of trusts. 9 The registered ownership
would only be subject to other registered interests
while unregistered interests would have no effect,
thereby excluding the doctrine of notice. 1° The
result would be a title that was single, complete and
indefeasible thereby making it marketable.11
The Land Registry Act 1862, according to its
preamble, was designed "to give certainty to the Title
to Real Estates, and to facilitate the proof thereof,
and also to render the dealing with land more simple
7	 Ibid., pp. 258-262.
8	 Ibid., p. 260.
9	 Ibid., para. XLII.
10	 Ibid., paras. LXII, LXXIII.
11	 Ibid.
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and economical". The Act established a Land Registry
the business of which would be conducted by a Land
Registrar. 12 An application could be made for the
registration of a title as 'indefeasible' by any owner
of a fee simple estate, such application being purely
voluntary. 13
However, the Act got off to a bad start; by 1868
only 507 applications for registration were made. 14 A
Land Transfer Commission was appointed in 1868 to
discover why the Act had failed. In their report15
they identified two main problems which had afflicted
the Act. First, they pointed out that the examination
of titles by the Registrar was done too strictly and
consequently only perfect titles were registered, with
the result that many titles were failing the test due
to defects in title. 16 Secondly, all boundaries to
land had to be accurately defined and guaranteed.17
12	 Land Registry Act 1862, ss. 2, 108.
13	 Ibid., ss. 4. 5.
14 Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed to
inquire into the operation of the Land Transfer Act, 
and into the present condition of the Registry of 
Deeds for the County of Middlesex, (1870) C. 20, para.
10, (hereafter 'Report of the Land Transfer
Commission'.)
15	 Loc. cit.
16 Section 5 of the Land Registry Act 1862 had
provided that a title would be accepted for
registration as indefeasible if it would appear "to be
such as a court of Equity would hold to be a valid
marketable title."
17 Section 10 of the 1862 Act had provided that the
Registrar had power to ascertain the accuracy of the
description and the quantities and boundaries of the
land through such inquiries as he thought fit.
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This was an expensive process and it discouraged many
landowners from seeking to have their land registered
under the 1862 Act.18
The Commission recommended that the principle of
a possessory title should be included in a new Act so
that minor defects in title should not be a barrier to
registration. 19 The recommendations of the Commission
were accepted and led to the enactment of the Land
Transfer Act 1875. A new Land Registry in London was
created and power given to the Lord Chancellor to
create district land registries, 20 and the Registrar
and other officials appointed under the 1862 Act were
transferred to serve in the Land Registry created by
the 1875 Act. 21 Although the Land Registry Act 1862
was not repealed no further registrations were to be
made under it. 22 Significantly, the 1875 Act provided
for the first time the division of titles into
classes. Apart from absolute titles two new classes
were created: possessory and qualified titles. A
possessory title was subject to interests or rights
subsisting or capable of arising at the time of
18	 Report of the Land Transfer Commission (1870),
paras. 40-45, 53.
19	 Ibid., para.75.
20	 Land Transfer Act 1875, ss. 106, 118.
21	 Ibid., s. 123.
22	 Ibid., s. 125. To this date the Land Registry
Act 1862 has remained on the statute book.
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registration. 23
 A qualified title, which was granted
if it appeared to the Registrar that the title could
only be established for a limited period or that there
were certain reservations to it, was not to "affect or
prejudice the enforcement of any estate, right, or
interest appearing by the register to be excepted. "24
What was important was that defects in title
would no longer be a barrier to registration. If the
Registrar, when examining a title, was of the opinion
that a title was open to objection, but was
nevertheless a title, the holding under which would
not be disturbed, he could approve of such a title.25
Moreover boundaries were no longer meant to be
accurately defined.26
However, despite these improvements, the Act
turned out to be more of a failure than the Land
Registry Act 1862. By 1886 only 113 titles had been
registered under the Act with the Land Registry making
a loss that exceeded £100,000. 27 A House of Commons
Select Committee appointed in 1878 to inquire into the
working of the 1875 Act identified the apathy and
opposition of lawyers to registration of title as one
23	 Land Transfer Act 1875, s. 8.
24	 Ibid., s. 9.
25	 Ibid., S. 83.
26	 Ibid.
27 Second and Final Report of the Royal Commission
on the Land Transfer Acts (1911), Cd. 5483, para. 21.
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of the main factors of the Act's failure. As they put
it,
"the public or their professional advisers
have deliberately made up their minds that
the advantages offered are too speculative
and remote to compensate for the immediate
and certain outlay and trouble."2°
This apathy was caused by an "almost superstitious
reverence for title deeds" and,
"the preference which Englishmen, as a rule,
feel for managing their own affairs in their
own way, and the dislike of more or less
stringent official scrutiny upon every fresh
dealing with their property, aggravated in
the case of applications for the
registration of an Absolute Title by the
fear of its resulting An the detection of a
flaw in their title."2'
However, the Committee identified that
legislating for the registration without, as a
preliminary step, simplifying the titles to be
registered was "to begin at the wrong end."" But it
was the failure to provide a method of compulsory
registration of titles that contributed to the failure
of the Act. As long as registration remained
voluntary, the opposition of the legal profession
would ensure that registration of title would never
get off the ground because of their fears that
registration would wipe out the conveyancing business
28 Report of a Select Committee of the House of 
Commons on Land Titles and Transfer (1879), p. iv.,
quoted in Second Report ... on the Land Transfer Acts,
op. cit, para. 20.
29	 Ibid., p. v.
30	 Ibid., p. vi.
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the fees of which had been based on the length of
deeds. 31 Interestingly, before the 1875 Act was
passed, Bills had been brought before Parliament which
introduced provisions for the compulsory registration
of titles, but these were rejected.32
It was in the late 1880's that further attempts
were made to introduce compulsory registration of
titles. In 1887, 1888 and 1889, Lord Halsbury, the
Lord Chancellor, introduced Bills which provided for
the compulsory registration of titles but nothing
became of them. In 1893 another attempt was made,
this time by Lord Herschell, whereby he introduced a
Bill which provided for the compulsory registration
with Possessory Title on sale only, with power to the
Privy Council to introduce compulsory registration to
any district. Although the Bill was introduced before
Parliament for three successive years it was not
passed.33
Attempts to introduce provisions for compulsory
registration were eventually successful when the Land
Transfer Act 1897 was passed. The Act made numerous
amendments to the Land Transfer Act 1875.
Significantly, not only did it make provision for
31 For an interesting discussion of the opposition
of the legal profession to registration of title, see
Avner Offer, Property and Politics, 1870-1914. Land
Ownership, Law, Ideology and Urban Development in
England, (Cambridge, 1981).
32 See Second and Final Report of the Royal
Commission on the Land Transfer Acts (1911), Cd. 5483.
33	 Ibid., para. 22.	 n
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compulsory registration of title on a sale, 34 but it
made provision for persons to be indemnified where
they had suffered loss due to errors or omissions in
the register. 35 However, the legal profession was
implacably opposed to the Act because they feared that
the introduction of compulsory registration would ruin
their conveyancing business. Therefore they were
determined to prevent the Act from becoming effective.
The following quote from the editors of Law Notes in
1899 highlights the depth of hostility to the statute
and the reason for such opposition:
"As we have said over and over again in the
interests of the public, it is the duty of
the profession to make the registration of
title so unpalatable to those who register
in the parts where registration is
compulsory that ... there will be no chance
of the compulsory area being extended."36
However, the Act did not itself make registration
compulsory in any part of the country but merely
empowered the Privy Council to declare that in any
specified county or part of a county registration of
title should be compulsory on a sale. Compulsory
registration was initially applied in London and was
confined there for a number of years. County Councils
had the power to introduce compulsory registration in
their areas but none outside London did so.
34	 Land Transfer Act 1897, s. 20(1).
35	 Ibid., s. 7.
36	 (1899) 16 Law Notes 335.
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A Royal Commission was subsequently appointed to
investigate the working of the Land Transfer Acts and
to make recommendations for the amendment of the
system. In its second report in 1911 the Commission
made several and wide ranging recommendations to
improve the system such as improving the rectification
and indemnity provisions in the Land Transfer Act
1897. 37
Due to the intervention of the First World War,
no further consideration of the matter was made
although parallel attempts were made to reform the law
of real property and conveyancing such as the
presentation of the Real Property and Conveyancing
Bill 1915 by Lord Haldane which was not passed.
It was not until 1919 that the Acquisition and
Valuation of Land Committee was appointed to consider,
among other things.
"the present position of Land Transfer in
England and Wales, and to advise what action
should be taken to fac44itate and cheapen
the transfer of land."J°
The Committee was of the unanimous opinion that
"the existing law of real property is
archaic and unnecessarily complicated (and]
that no great improvement in the existing
systems of transfer of land, whether
registered or unregistered, can be effected
37 See Second and Final Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Land Transfer Acts (1911), Cd. 5483.
Chapt IV.
38 Fourth Report of the Acquisition and Valuation of 
Land Committee on the Transfer of Land in England and 
Wales (1919), Cd. 424, (hereafter 'Fourth Report of 
the Acquisition and Valuation of Land Committee').
34
until the law of Real Z•Koperty has been
radically simplified."' (italics mine)
The Committee therefore requested Mr. B. L.
Cherry, a conveyancing counsel of the Court, to
prepare a Bill which would incorporate the suggestions
made by Mr. Arthur Underhill, a Senior Conveyancing
Counsel of the Court, on improving the law of real
property in England."
The Committee itself made numerous
recommendations on improving land registration in
England. For example, they recommended that
registered possessory titles should ripen into
absolute titles after a period of 15 years with the
Registrar having the discretion to convert the title
after this period; that all land charges affecting
registered land should be noted on the register; that
compensation or indemnity should not exceed, where the
register is not rectified, the value of the estate or
interest at the time when the error or omission which
caused the loss was made; that registered land should
be described by reference to a plan showing the
general boundaries of the property. 41
39	 Ibid, para. 23.
40 The suggestions made by Arthur Underhill were
contained in a pamphlet entitled The Line of Least
Resistance. An Easy but Effective Method of 
Simplifving_the Law of Real Property. This pamphlet
was attached to the Fourth Report of the Land
Valuation Committee, op. cit. The suggestions
contained in the pamphlet had a far reaching effect on
the law of real property in England and Wales and were
to form the basis of the Law of Property Act 1925.
41 Fourth Report of the Acquisition and Valuation of 
Land Committee, op. cit. para. 32.
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The recommendations made by Arthur Underhill on
improving the law of real property and the
recommendations made by the Land Committee were
incorporated into the Law of Property Bill drafted by
B. Cherry. The Bill was massive and described as "the
biggest Bill ever introduced into Parliament" .42 The
Bill combined two principles; a simplified system of
private conveyancing and a national register of title
that was to be compulsory with its extension being
controlled by central rather than local government.
Tenure was simplified by the abolition of copyhold and
other customary tenures. Legal estates were reduced
to freehold and leasehold while trusts and other
equitable interests were removed from the legal title.
The Bill was enacted in 1922 to become the Law of
Property Act 1922 but before it came into force it was
itself amended and sub-divided into the seven Acts of
1925, that is, the Law of Property Act, Settled Land
Act, Trustee Act, Land Charges Act, Administration of
Estates Act, Land Registration Act, and the University
and College Estates Act. The extensive reforms of the
1925 legislation rationalised English property law
significantly and still form the basis of English
property law today.
The Land Registration Act 1925, part of the 1925
property registration, was a consolidation Act,
consolidating the provisions of the Land Transfer Acts
42	 154 H.C. Debs. (5th ser.), 90 (1922).
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of 1875 and 1897. Unlike the Kenyan Registered Land
Act 1963, the 1925 Act is essentially a conveyancing
Act, containing provisions facilitating the transfer
of registered land and the protection of interests in
such land while the substantive law on real property
is contained in the Law of Property Act 1925.
The Land Registration Act 1925 not only was to
have a tremendous influence on land registration in
England but it had affect in other jurisdictions.
Kenya was one country where it had an impact on the
spread of land registration. The basic structure of
land registration in the Registered Land Act 1963
identifies with the structure under the Land
Registration Act 1925.
With the background of English land registration
in mind, Part II of this chapter now proceeds to
consider the historical background and the events that
led to the introduction of the Registered Land Act
1963.
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Part II
The Influence of Colonial Rule on Land Registration
in Kenya 
A.	 Establishment of Colonial Rule43
The advent of British colonial rule in Kenya was
to have profound political, economic, social and legal
consequences for the country and its inhabitants.
Colonial rule began on 15 June 1895 when a
protectorate was established by the British government
over the East Africa Protectorate, most of which later
became known as Kenya. The reason for the
establishment of colonial rule in Kenya primarily lay
in the international politics and diplomacy of the
19th century. At the heart of the 19th century
European power struggle for the domination of the
lucrative trade routes with India and the Far East was
the need to control the Suez Canal. This meant that
it was vital to achieve control over Egypt, through
which the canal ran. Since the River Nile was Egypt's
lifeblood, it was in turn thought expedient to
maintain total control over the river which could be
guaranteed if the river's headwaters in the south, in
Uganda, were also in control of the power that ruled
Egypt.
43 For a detailed account of the establishment of
colonial rule in Kenya see Roland Oliver & Gervase
Mathew, History of East Africa, Vol. I (London 1963);
M.P.K. Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement in
Kenya (Nairobi, 1968).
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Britain was firmly in the race to achieve such
domination and succeeded in maintaining control not
only over Egypt but also over Uganda. However, Uganda
was deep in the East African hinterland, over 400
miles from the sea. The British government therefore
found it necessary to annex all the land that lay
between Uganda and the sea in order to secure access
to Uganda, hence the establishment of the East Africa
Protectorate in 1895, which is illustrated on the map
O1 page- -4 / .
To facilitate access and communication to Uganda,
a railway was built from Mombasa on the coast to
Kisumu, along the shores of Lake Victoria. However,
the railway consumed a large amount of the British
taxpayer's money and to recoup this cost it was
considered vital that the railway should begin to pay
for itself. 44
 Revenues could be generated if there
were sufficient raw materials that could be
transported to the coast for export. However, Kenya
was not blessed with an abundance of minerals nor was
the agriculture practiced by the indigenous peoples of
such large scale to enable the production of cash
crops for export to the international markets.
It was Sir Charles Elliot, appointed Governor of
the East Africa Protectorate in 1901, who advocated
the policy of encouraging large numbers of Europeans
44	 See J.W. Harbeson, Land Reforms and Politics in
Kenya,  1954-70, (1971) J.M.A.S. 231 at p. 232; M.P.K.
Sorrenson, op. cit., pp 19-25.
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to come and settle in the country and engage in large
scale farming, growing cash crops such as tea, coffee,
sisal and pyrethrum which could be exported, thereby
generating income which would help pay for the
railway. The highlands of the protectorate had a
temperate climate favourable to Europeans. They
covered a large swathe of land from the west, through
the Rift Valley, and to the central parts of the
country. They formed the most fertile part of the
country and therefore were potentially very
productive. Elliot saw the highlands as an area where
Europeans could come and settle and engage in
productive agriculture. In a report on the
Protectorate he described the highlands as "pre-
eminently a white man's country" 45 and the
Protectorate as an area over which a white colony
could be founded." The official encouragement of
European settlers resulted in the arrival of large
numbers of people wishing to settle in Kenya,
primarily from Britain and South Africa.
The arrival of the settlers was to sow the seeds
of what became known as the dual policy, 47 a policy
that was primarily based on race. Before the settlers
45 Report on the East Africa Protectorate, (1901),
Cd. 769 P. 8. The highlands were later dubbed the
'White Highlands.'
46 Sir Charles Elliot, The East Africa Protectorate,
(London 1905), p. 103.
47 For a detailed discussion of the dual policy see
H.R. Dilley, British Policy in Kenya Colony, 2nd ed.
(London 1966), pp. 181-190.
40
arrival there was already in existence a large
indigenous African population that had already settled
in the country for hundreds of years. They had a
culture that was distinctly different from European
culture, social and political institutions that were
dissimilar to European ones, and customary laws that
were influenced by African culture and society. 48
However, the Africans were viewed as a primitive and
uncivilized race; 49 even the British Foreign Office
was of the opinion that they were "practically
savages" who had not even developed an administrative
or legislative system. 50 The doctrine of Social
Darwinism was called in aid to support the belief that
Africans were backward and inferior, in other words,
that African societies were backward because they were
in the early stages of human development and were, in
effect, at the bottom rung of the evolutionary ladder
48 For a general discussion of the culture and the
social and political institutions of the various
societies in Kenya, see B.A. Ogot (ed.), Kenya Before
1900, Eight Regional Studies, (Nairobi 1976).
49	 See F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tropical 
Africa (London 1922), p. 280. It is of interest to
note the view of the Privy Council in Re Southern
Rhodesia (1919] A.C. 211 at p. 233 where Lord Sumner,
delivering the judgment of the Privy Council, said;
"Some tribes are so low in the scale of
social organisation that their usages and
conceptions of rights and duties are not be
reconciled with the institutions or the
legal ideas of civilized society. Such a
gulf cannot be bridged."
See also Muhena bin Said v. The Registrar of Titles 
(1948) 16 E.A.C.A. 79 at p. 81 per Edwards C.J.
50	 M.P.K. Sorrenson, op. cit., p. 51.
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of humans. 51 This view was due to a lack of
understanding of African society and the preconceived
ideas of many Western scholars. However, this view
was to have an important effect on British policy in
Kenya. It was felt by the British government that
rather than integrate the Africans into European
society or vice versa, the interests and structures of
the Africans and those of the European settlers should
be allowed to exist and develop separately, hence the
dual policy, that is, separate policies for Europeans
and Africans.
Consequently, the European settlers and the
Africans were administered separately by the colonial
government. For example, Africans were not allowed to
become members of the Legislative Council and
therefore could not vote in elections; only Europeans
could be members of the Council and later Indians and
Arabs. 52 African interests, on the other hand, were
governed by a separate department known as the Native
Affairs Department within the colonial administration.
Moreover, there was a separate judicial system for
Africans53 and for Europeans, 54 separate labour laws55
51	 B.A. Ogot, op. cit., pp. vii & ix. See also H.H. 
Johnston, Britain Across the Seas: Africa (London
1910), pp. 12-13. It is for this reason that Africans
were derogatively referred to as 'natives' to reflect
their less civilized nature.
52 It was not until 1944 that the first African was
nominated as member of the Council.
53 Native Tribunals (later referred to as African
Courts) exercised jurisdiction among the Africans in
accordance with the local customary law.
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and a separate land policy. 56 It was the land policy
that was partly responsible for the complex system of
land registration in Kenya.
In order to facilitate European settlement the
colonial government had to formulate a land policy
that was attractive to incoming settlers. Nearly 75%
of Kenya is comprised of arid or semi arid land which,
at best, is suitable for ranching. Naturally this
area was sparsely populated, with the bulk of the
African population having settled in areas of the
country that were fertile and productive, such as the
highlands. It was this area that was found suitable
for European settlement. But how could the colonial
government issue secure titles over land that was
already occupied by the Africans and to which they
claimed title either through purchase, 57 or by virtue
of their being the first occupants and having already
54 The Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction over the
Europeans in conformity with English common law and
the statutes in force in England on 12 August 1897 -
Kenya Colony Order in Council 1921, S.R.O. 1921, Art.
2 ( 3 ) •
55	 See M.R. Dilley, op.cit., pp. 213-238.
56 The dual policy is linked with the British
doctrine of indirect rule under which traditional
chiefs or traditional councils of elders were given
judicial, legislative and executive powers by the
colonial governments in order to continue to exercise
authority over the Africans. However, the chiefs and
the councils owed their allegiance to the colonial
government - see Report of the East Africa Royal 
Commission on Land and Population, Cmd. 9745 (1955),
para. 7, p. 348.
57 Such as the Southern Kikuyu who claimed to have
purchased land from the Ndorobo.
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cleared the land and putting it to use in accordance
with the ancient principle which John Locke called
acquiring property rights 'by mixing one's labour with
the soil' and 'appropriating it from the state of
nature'?
First, it was asserted that the Africans did not
have a valid title to the land they occupied. Sir
Arthur Hardinge, the first Commissioner of the
Protectorate, expressed his view in a report that "the
conception of absolute ownership of land and of the
right to sell it, or exclude other cultivators ...
does not yet exist ..." (italics mine), and it was
only a few chiefs as distinct from their commaity who
had the right to alienate any land. 58 This view was
also reflected by the Foreign Office in an opinion to
the Law Officers of the Crown, where they said that
African occupation of land was merely seasonal and
temporary and if there was any private ownership it
was merely related to the crops that they grew on the
land. 59 This view also found acceptance in the
English courts when considering the nature of tenure
in other African societies. For example, in
Amodutijani v. Secretary, Southern Nigeria" the Privy
Council was of the opinion that Africans had, at best,
58 Report of Sir Arthur Hardinge on the Condition
and Progress of East Africa Protectorate from its 
Establishment to the 20th January, 1897, Cmd. 8683,
P.P. 1898, p. 263.
59	 M.P.K. Sorrenson, op. cit., p. 51.
60	 [1921] A.C. 399 at pp. 402-404.
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the mere right of enjoying the use of the land and its
produce as opposed to having a title equivalent to
that of a freehold owner. In the words of the court:
"Such a community may have the possessory
title to the common enjoyment of a usufruct
with customs under which its individual
members are admitted to enjoyment, and even
to a right of transmitting the individual
enjoyment as members by assignment inter
vivos or by succession."
Such a view paved the way for the Crown to assert
title to land in the East Africa Protectorate by the
mere fact of having declared a protectorate. 61 This
61 Since the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890 had
provided that the Crown could acquire jurisdiction
over foreign territory by "treaty, capitulation,
grant, usage, sufferance and other lawful means" (see
preamble), it had been the practice of the British
government to acquire rights over foreign land by
making treaties with local rulers and indigenous
chiefs. The aim was to have title of such land
granted to the Crown through those treaties in return
for certain stipulated benefits. An example was the
agreement concluded between the British government and
the Sultan of Zanzibar in 1895. The Sultan had
maintained sovereignty over a strip of land that was
ten miles wide and stretched along the whole of the
East African coast (see map 2). The agreement
provided that officers of the British government
would, inter &Zia, have control over public lands and
would regulate questions affecting land and minerals,
and in consideration the British government was to pay
the Sultan an annual sum of £11,000. For an account
as to how the Sultan came to control the East African
Coast and details of the agreement, see A. Salim, The
Swahili Speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast 1895-1965,
(Nairobi, 1973).
However, no similar treaties could be made with
local chiefs or rulers in the Kenyan interior because
there was no form of centralised political authority
through which the British government could deal with.
Moreover, the numerous ethnic groups that occupied the
interior had forms of decentralised political
institutions so that no one individual could claim to
be the ruler or representative of the group - see
M.P.K. Sorrenson, op.cit., pp. 47-52. The declaration
of a protectorate therefore obviated any need to make
agreements with people in the interior.
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was made through the East Africa (Lands) Order in
Council 190162 which defined Crown lands as "all
public lands within the East Africa Protectorate which
for the time being are subject to the control of his
Majesty by virtue of any Treaty, convention or
Agreement, or of His Majesty's Protectorate ..." The
Commissioner was also empowered to sell or lease Crown
lands on such terms as he thought fit. In exercising
this power the Commissioner promulgated the Crown
Lands Ordinance 1902 which provided that the
Commissioner could make grants of land or leases for
99 years. 63 Significantly, the Ordinance provided
that "in all dealings with Crown land regard shall be
had to the rights and requirements of the natives, and
in particular the Commissioner shall not sell or lease
any land in the actual occupation of natives."64
Through these provisions, the government gave itself a
legal basis for acquiring for itself title to land in
the Protectorate. Notably, Crown land included land
in occupation of Africans, and their rights over such
land were relegated to merely being rights of
occupation. Although the Commissioner was empowered
not to sell or lease land in the occupation of the
Africans, this protection was slender as the Africans
could merely be given notice to move from the land
62	 S.R.O. 661.
63	 Section 10.
64	 Section 30.
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they were occupying if the Commissioner wanted to
alienate such land.65
The assertion of title over land occupied by
Africans would also prevent settlers from entering
into transactions with Africans and purchasing land
from them, as some early settlers had already done
when they bought land from the Kikuyu living around
Nairobi and the surrounding country. 66
 It would
ensure that the colonial government had control over
all land and enable it to determine which land could
be issued to the settlers.
To maximise the amount of land that could be
granted to the settlers, the government created
Reserves of land to which the Africans were confined.
These Reserves had definite boundaries and were
65 A good example was the initial movement of the
Masai by the colonial government from the land they
occupied in the Rift Valley, which had been desired by
the settlers, to Laikipia in the north. When the land
in Laikipia was in turn desired by the settlers, the
Masai were moved again, this time to Loita in the
south. To prevent the movement to the south some
Masai brought an action in the High Court. However,
the action failed, the court holding that it could not
intervene because the movement of the tribe was an Act
of State that was not cognizable in a municipal court
- Ole Njogo v. Attorney General 5 E.A.L.R. 70. For an
illuminating discussion of the movement of the Masai
by the colonial government see M.P.K. Sorrenson, op.
cit., pp. 190-209. Other groups that were moved from
their land to pave the way for European settlement
were the Kamba, some of whom were moved from the
fertile Mua hills, and the Nandi - M.P.K. Sorrenson,
op. cit., Ch. XIII.
66	 See M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu
Country, A Study in Government Policy, (Nairobi 1967),
p. 17; M.P.K. Sorrenson, Origins of European
Settlement in Kenya, (Nairobi 1968), pp. 176, 177.
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scattered around the country. 67 They were created in
an attempt to confer some kind of security to the
Africans in occupation of these Reserves and to
prevent their land from being alienated to the
settlers. When the Crown Lands Ordinance 1915 was
passed, repealing the Crown Lands Ordinance 1902, its
definition of Crown land included "all lands occupied
by the native tribes of the Colony and all lands
reserved for the use of the member of any native
tribe" 68 The effect of this provision was discussed
in Isaka Wainaina v. Murito wa Indagara69 where it was
held that Africans were merely tenants at will of the
land they occupied. In the words of Barth C.J.,
"native rights, whatever they were ... disappeared and
natives in occupation of such Crown land became
tenants at will of the Crown."7°
The policy of setting up Reserves for the
Africans set the scene for the separate development of
land law and registration in the colony. The land
granted to the European settlers was to be subject to
the system of land law and land registration that was
not applicable in the Reserves. Land law and tenure
67 The boundaries of these Reserves were outlined in
the Official Gazette, 13 October 1925 (Special Issue),
Government Notice No. 417, pp. 967-996.
68	 S. 5. See also Art. 2(3) of the Kenya Colony
Order in Council 1921 which repeated the definition of
Crown lands in the 1915 Ordinance.
69	 9 K.L.R. 102.
70	 Ibid, at p. 104. Followed in Kahabu v. Attorney
General, 18 K.L.R. 5.
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in the Reserves would continue to be governed by
African customary law. However, African
dissatisfaction with the manner in which they were
treated by the colonial government resulted in
continuous agitation by them for secure titles, which
the government at first refused to recognise. It was
only much later that the government caved in and
introduced a system of land registration in the
African Reserves.
In the following discussion, the systems of land
registration that were set up to regulate land owned
by the Government and land granted by it on freehold
or leasehold terms, and the peculiar situation in the
Coast Province which resulted in the creation of a
different system of land registration are now
considered.
B.	 Creation of Systems of Registration Between 1901
and 1919
The first twenty years of this century saw the
creation of four systems of registration of land in
Kenya. An unsatisfactory feature of this development
was the fact that these were competing though parallel
systems and no attempt was made to phase out the
previous system when a new one was enacted. These
four systems of registration can be divided into three
groups; the first group has two statutes which made
provision for a system of deeds registration namely
the Registration of Documents Ordinance 1901 and the
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Crown Lands Ordinance 1915; the second group is
comprised of the Land Titles Ordinance 1908 which
established what can be termed as a hybrid system of
land registration and deeds registration; the third
group is comprised of the Registration of Titles
Ordinance 1919 which established a 'Torrens' type
system of land registration.
1.	 Deeds Registration
Registration of deeds can be described as a
process where documents affecting land or interests in
land are copied into a register. The principle
underlying it is that registered deeds take priority
over unregistered deeds or subsequent registered
deeds. However, the deeds in themselves do not prove
title but are records of transactions that have taken
place. A person therefore has to ascertain the
validity of the deed by retrospective examination of
deeds to a good root of title.
In Kenya, there were two statutes that
established deeds registration and it is these that we
turn to.
a.	 The Registration of Documents Ordinance 190171
Due to the initial doubts about whether the Crown
had acquired title to the land in the Protectorate
grants of freehold land were not at the outset issued
to the European settlers. Instead, regulations known
71 This Ordinance is now referred to as the
Registration of Documents Act 1901.
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as the East Africa Land Regulations 1897 were issued,
and under these the Commissioner offered certificates
of occupation for a term of 21 years which could be
renewed for a further term of 21 years if certain
conditions were fulfilled. To provide for the
registration of these certificates the East African
Registration Regulations 1901 were passed. These
registration regulations were adopted from Zanzibar
where there had been established a simple system of
registration of deeds.72
Once it was made clear that the Crown
automatically acquired title to all land in the East
Africa protectorate by the mere declaration of a
Protectorate73 the Crown Lands Ordinance 1902 repealed
the 1897 Regulations and provided that grants of
freehold and leasehold land could be made. The
Registration of Documents Ordinance 1901 was passed
and it established a simple system of deeds
registration. Grants of freehold and leasehold land
which were issued under the Crown Lands Ordinance 1902
were to be registered in the register created in the
1901 Ordinance and any document which conferred an
interest in the land was to be registered.74
Penalties were imposed if registration was not made
72	 Krishan M. Maini, Land Law in East Africa 
(Nairobi 1967), p. 23.
73 By virtue of the East Africa (Lands) Order in
Council 1901.
74	 Registration of Documents Ordinance 1901, s. 4.
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within two months from the date of execution.75
Registration was effected by filing a copy of the
document or deed in the register and each copy
numbered consecutively.76
However, the system under the Act was defective
in several respects. For example, no provision was
made for the priority of registered documents over
unregistered ones or even subsequent registered
documents. In addition, an unregistered document
could have effect, although if it was being tendered
as evidence in court, leave of the court had to be
obtained. 77 Moreover, there was no means of
identifying parcels of land since no provision had bee
made for plans to be attached to the document
evidencing the grant. Furthermore, registration of
documents was haphazard and uncoordinated because the
register did not have a separate folio that was
devoted to each parcel of land that was granted.
Since registration of the documents was not in itself
proof of title investigation of the documents by a
purchaser would prove to be a difficult process.
This coincided with a period of time when the
Land Office in Nairobi was inefficient and
understaffed. Inadequate surveys were made and
settlers were often allowed to choose land that was as
76	 Ibid., s. 24.
77	 Ibid., s. 18.
75 Ibid., ss. 9,10.
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yet unsurveyed. 78
 This meant that African rights over
the land were often overlooked or ignored and this was
to cause difficulties later as the need to compensate
those who were dispossessed arose. 79 It therefore
became evident that new legislation was needed to
establish a better method of land registration.
b.	 The Crown Lands Ordinance 191580
This Ordinance repealed the Crown Lands Ordinance
1902. The purpose of the 1915 Ordinance, as stated in
its preamble, was to "make further and better
provision for regulating the leasing and other
disposal of Crown land." It contained clearer
provisions for grants of Crown land to individuals and
the conditions which determined those grants.
Provision was also made for the proclamation of
Reserves for Africans. Importantly, the 1915
Ordinance established a new system of registration of
deeds that was superior to that contained in the
Registration of Documents Ordinance 1901. A new
Registration Office, which would regulate the
78	 M.P.K. Sorrenson, Origins of European Settlement 
in Kenya (Nairobi 1968), p. 88. Memo from the
Surveyor General to the Colonial Secretary:
Organisation of the Survey Branch - Survey and
Registration Department, 14 April 1928, K.N.A. Ref.
No. BN.7/6.
79 For an account of the difficulties arising over
compensation, see M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the
Kikuyu Country, A Study in Government Policy (Nairobi
1967), p. 18.
80 This Ordinance was renamed and is now referred to
as the Government Lands Act 1915.
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registration of Crown land under the Act, and a new
register of Crown land were created.81
There were several improvements; for example, the
register was of a better structure than under the 1901
Ordinance - it had a separate folio for each
conveyance, lease or licence that was granted, making
a search for the documents of title for a particular
parcel much easier. 82 Provision was also made for
identification of parcels of land. A document could
not be registered unless it had a plan or a map which
identified the property and which had an accurate
description of the property and a clear and precise
definition of the boundaries and their extent.83
Moreover, clear provision was made for the priority of
registered documents; unregistered documents were
void84
 and could not be used as evidence in court.85
While these provisions were an improvement on
those under the Registration of Documents Ordinance,
the system was essentially one of registration of
deeds. 86 Registration of a document was not proof
81	 Crown Lands Ordinance 1915, ss. 91, 97.
82	 Ibid, s. 97.
83	 Ibid, ss. 110,110.
84	 Ibid, s. 101.
85	 Ibid, s. 100.
86 Notably, an amendment in 1959 provided that a
person could register a caveat against the land
registered which would put a stop to dealings with the
land until the caveat was withdrawn. See now
Government Lands Act 1915, s. 116.
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that the document was valid and a purchaser would have
to investigate the documents going back to the grant
of the land by the Crown in order to satisfy himself
as to the validity of the title offered.
Nevertheless, it was an advanced form of registration
of deeds in view of the provisions for accurate
definition of boundaries by survey. 87 Inexplicably,
no provision was made for the repeal of the
Registration of Documents Ordinance 1901, nor was
there provision for the conversion of land on the
register under the 1901 Ordinance to that under the
1915 Ordinance. Section 129 of the Crown Lands
Ordinance 1915 merely stated that the Registration of
Documents Ordinance 1901 was not to apply to land
registered under the Crown Lands Ordinance. This
meant that there were two competing systems of deeds
registration. However, no new registrations of
documents of land were to be made under the
Registration of Documents Ordinance 1901, and the
importance of the register under this Act decreased as
other systems of registration were established.
2. The Hybrid System: The Land Titles Ordinance
1908
Prior to the enactment of the Crown Lands
Ordinance 1915, a new system of land registration was
87	 See also Registration of Documents Act 1901, s.
4(vii).
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established under the Land Titles Ordinance 190888
which was confined to land situated in the Coast
Province. The Act created what can be classed as a
hybrid system of land registration, that is,
registration of titles combined with registration of
deeds. How did this come about?
As mentioned earlier89 the British government
entered into an agreement with the Sultan of Zanzibar
over the ten mile strip of land along the East African
coast over which he exercised sovereignty. The
agreement created, in effect, a lease whereby the
British government would exercise executive and
judicial administration over public lands in the strip
and, in return, would pay to the Sultan a sum of
£11,000 per annum.
The people who resided on this land were mainly
Arabs who had settled on the land for hundreds of
years as well as African tribes such as the Pokomo,
Mijikenda, and the Giriama. People within the ten
mile strip owed their allegiance to the Sultan and
were governed on the basis of Mohammedan or Islamic
law. Islamic law recognised the concept of individual
ownership of land and title analogous to a freehold
title in English law." Accordingly there were many
Arabs along the coast who held land as private owners
88 Now referred to as the Land Titles Act 1908.
89	 Supra, n. 61.
90 Mtoro Bin Mwamba v. Attorney General (1952)
E.A.C.A. 108.
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under Islamic law. When the British government
acquired the lease of the ten mile strip, it intended
to alienate public land to would be settlers.
However, there was no way of distinguishing private
from public land since the Sultan had not kept a
record or a register of title. Moreover, many of
those who claimed ownership of the land did not have
documents to prove such ownership and often unfounded
claims were made. 91 Although the British government
had acquired jurisdiction over the strip, the lex loci
rei sitae was to remain Mohammedan law.92
Accordingly, if the British government was to alienate
public land it had to ensure that there was no
conflict with the rights of private owners, and this
meant finding a way of distinguishing private and
public land.
It was for this reason that the Land Titles
Ordinance 1908 was enacted. As stated in its
preamble, the Act was to "make provision for the
removal of doubts that have arisen in regard to titles
to land and to establish a Land Registration Court."
The Land Registration Court was to be presided over by
a Recorder of Titles whose function was to determine
claims to land. 93 Therefore all persons "being or
claiming to be proprietors" or having an interest in
91	 See A.M. Jivanjee v. Land Officer 6 E.A.L.R. 183.
92	 Secretary of State v. Charlesworth, Pilling & Co. 
[1901] A.C. 373.
93	 Land Titles Ordinance 1908, s. 6.
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land were to bring their claims before the Recorder of
Titles within a period of six months from the date of
the application of the Act to the area where the land
was situated. 94 The claimants, who could be
represented by an advocate 95 had to satisfy the
Recorder of Titles that they were the proprietors of
the land in question, and if title to the land could
be proved they were then issued with certificates of
title. 96 A surveyor, who was attached to the court,
would then accurately survey the land and place
boundary marks showing the demarcation and the
delimitation of the land and such boundaries would be
shown on the plan. 97 A register of certificates of
title was to contain copies of all the certificates
granted with each certificate granted constituting a
separate folio of the register. 98 Therefore all land
that was the subject of a successful claim was
registered in this manner, and the issue of a
certificate of title merely confirming a pre-existing
title. It was provided in section 17 that all the
land for which no certificate of ownership had been
granted was deemed Crown Land.
94	 Ibid, s. 15.
95	 Ibid, s. 20(1).
96	 Ibid, s. 20(1).
97	 Ibid, s. 22.
98	 Ibid, S. 26.
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Interestingly, the full concept of land
registration with all its ramifications was not
introduced by the Act. The certificates of title were
not declared by the Act to be indefeasible 99 and no
provision was made for indemnity where there were
mistakes, omissions or entries obtained by fraud that
could not be rectified; this meant that the titles
confirmed by the Act were not guaranteed by the State.
The reason why these titles could not be guaranteed
was because the government felt that the expense
involved in setting up an insurance fund and employing
officials of sufficient legal knowledge was too great
and could never be recovered from the fees that could
be charged from transactions. 100 Instead, a system of
registration of deeds was introduced for dealings with
the land. 101
 All documents affecting the land were to
be registered and these documents were to be
accompanied by a plan which clearly described the
property. 102 Initially, the Registrar had no power to
inquire into the validity of the document and merely
had it registered. It meant that a person wanting to
purchase land registered under the Act had to make a
retrospective search of all the documents registered
99	 But see Alibhai v. Alibhai (1938) E.A.C.A. 1,
where it was held that the certificates of title
issued under the Act were indefeasible.
100 S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration,
(Cambridge 1976), p. 444.
101 Land Titles Ordinance 1908, Part III.
102 Ibid, ss. 57, 65, 66.
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and examine their validity, and could not simply rely
on the certificate of title. 103
 Moreover, no
provision was made for the priority of the documents
that were registered)- 04
 which created an anomalous
situation whereby a subsequently registered document
could have priority over a previously registered
document.
These deficiencies were responsible for the
enactment of the Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919
which introduced a more complete system of land
registration based on the Torrens system in Australia,
and which introduced the third group of land
registration.
3.	 The Torrens System : The Registration of Titles
Ordinance 1919105
The Torrens system l" was first introduced in
South Australia in 1858 by Sir Robert Torrens and the
system rapidly spread to other parts of Australia and
New Zealand. It had several distinguishing features.
103 An amendment to the Act in 1959 enabled the
Registrar to inquire into the validity of the document
presented for registration - see now s.64 of the Land
Titles Act 1908.
104 This was later rectified by an amendment to the
Act- see now s. 60.
105 Now referred to as the Registration of Titles Act
1919. .
106 For works discussing the Torrens system see J.E.
Hogg, The Australian Torrens System (1905); T.B.F.
Ruoff, An Englishman Looks at the Torrens System
(London 1957); S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and 
Registration, (Cambridge, 1976).
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In Australia, for example, the Crown granted land on
the assumption that all land belonged to the Crown, a
situation that was to be similar to that in Kenya when
the Crown assumed title to all the land. In Australia
all land that was granted was registered. Therefore,
the Torrens register was composed of Crown grants that
were registered automatically. Moreover, land that
was the subject of a grant was accurately surveyed and
the boundary demarcated by official marks that were
placed on the ground, and in this way, the boundary
became guaranteed.
In comparison, the English system was governed by
the 'general boundary' whereby boundaries were marked
by walls, fences or hedges which have no official
status, and the precise line of the boundary may be
unknown. The Torrens register was composed of bound
volumes in folios containing all the entries from the
time of the first registration thereby conserving the
history of the title from the beginning, whereas the
English register consisted of loose cards which were
constantly updated and entries no longer subsisting
could be removed with a new edition. Furthermore, a
person with an interest in the registered land could
register a caveat under the Torrens system which put a
stop to all transactions affecting the registered land
until it was removed, whereas the English caution
merely entitled to the cautioner notice of a projected
dealing. Such a cautioner had no power to put a stop
to all transactions with the land.
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The Torrens system was established in Kenya under
the Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919. This Act
was designed to remedy the deficiencies prevalent
under the Land Titles Ordinance 1908 and in
particular, as stated in the preamble, "to provide for
the transfer of land by registration of titles". This
was to be done by replacing the process of
investigation of title with a simple search of the
register. A new register of titles was created and
forms were provided for the transfer of registered
land. 107 Provision was made for rectification of the
register including entries that had been obtained by
fraud. 108 A person could recover damages from the
Registrar where entries had been obtained by fraud or
were the result of error. 1" A person with an interest
in the registered land could register a caveat which
put a stop to dealings with the land until it was
removed. 110
 New provisions were included concerning
leases, charges and the disposition of land held upon
trust for sa1e.111
However, the Act created a problem; it added a
new registration system without providing for the
repeal of the existing systems. Part III of the Act
107 Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919, First
Schedule, Forms F, G & H.
108 Ibid, ss. 59 & 60.
109 Ibid, s. 24.
110 Ibid, Part XI.
111 Ibid, Parts VII, VIII & XVII.
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contained provisions for bringing land under the Act
and was only to apply in the Coast Province where the
Land Titles Ordinance 1908 was still in operation.112
Section 6 provided that land which had been alienated
by the government in fee or for years, or land in
respect of which a certificate of title had been
issued by the Land Registration Court under the Land
Titles Ordinance 1908 could be brought under the
operation of Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919.
Land situated outside the Coast Province could only be
brought under the Act if it had been granted by the
government whether in fee, lease or licence. 113
 This
created an anomalous situation in the Coast Province
whereby two competing registration systems were in
existence. A person who was issued a certificate of
title by the Land Registration Court under the Land
Titles Ordinance 1908 had the luxury of deciding
whether to have his title governed by the 1908
Ordinance or by the 1919 Ordinance. This situation
created a recipe for confusion and uncertainty.114
This was aggravated by the fact that the Crown
Lands Ordinance 1915 was also applicable in the Coast
since land which was not the subject of a grant of a
112 Ibid, s. 19(2).
113 Ibid, ss. 20 & 2.
114 This was alluded to in the Legislative Council
where there was a debate on a motion on whether the
Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919 should be
repealed - Legislative Council, Proceedings, 2nd
Session, Cols. 44-47, (22 August 1924).
64
certificate of title was deemed to be Crown Land under
section 17 of the Land Titles Ordinance 1908 and
therefore would come under the definition of Crown
land in the 1915 Ordinance.
The mistake lay in not providing for the repeal
of the Land Titles Ordinance 1908 and the conversion
of all the titles created under that Act to the 1919
Ordinance and furthermore, providing for the
systematic conversion of titles issued under the Crown
lands Ordinance 1915 to be registered under the 1919
Ordinance.
However, the Registration of Titles Ordinance
1919 had other deficiencies. For example to obtain an
indemnity, the person who was adversely affected by
the fraud or error had to bring an action in court
against the person who had caused the fraud or error.
Only if he was dead, insolvent or not within the
jurisdiction of the court, could the person bring an
action against the Registrar. 115
 This would naturally
entail considerable expense for a person trying to
make a claim, and failure could be costly. Moreover,
it was doubted by the banking community as to whether
a valid charge could be created under section 66 of
the 1919 Act. That section provided that a lien could
be created by the deposit of title deeds. The
115 Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919, s. 24.
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uncertainty meant that bankers were reluctant to
create charges over land in such fashion--6
These deficiencies resulted in widespread calls
for the repeal of the 1919 Ordinance. In the
Legislative Council a motion for the repeal of the
Ordinance was debated upon but was defeated. Instead,
a Select Committee was established "to examine and
report" on the Ordinance and to see how these
deficiencies could be corrected. 117
 The Committee
recommended that a Bill should be drafted to meet
these objections but nothing became of this Bill as it
was rejected by the Law Society. 118
 Another Committee
appointed in 1927 under the Chairmanship of the
Solicitor General reported that the 1919 Ordinance was
unsatisfactory and it should be repealed. They
suggested that the system under the Crown Lands
Ordinance 1915 and the Land Titles Ordinance 1908
should either be revised or a voluntary system of land
registration should be made to run alongside them;
however, these proposals were never acted upon.119
Eventually the outcome of all these deliberations
was the passing of a Bill which amended section 66 of
the 1919 Ordinance, providing clearly that an
116 See Legislative Council, Proceedings, 2nd
Session, Cols. 44-47 (22 August 1924).
117 Ibid, Col. 52.
118 Legislative Council, Debates, 1925, Vol. II, Col.
793 (20 October 1925); K.M. Maini, Land Law in East
Africa, (Nairobi 1967) 1 p. 33.
119 K.M. Maini, op.cit. p. 33
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equitable mortgage could be created by the deposit of
120documents of title. 	 This was something of a damp
squib because although the Bill when passed removed
the uncertainty which had been created by section 66
of the Ordinance, it did not address the wider
problems which the Ordinance created and other
inherent deficiencies in the Ordinance. Piecemeal
amendments were made to the Ordinance over the years
which tinkered with the basic structure but leaving it
substantially the same, laying the Ordinance open to
continued criticism. 121
C.	 Summary
By 1920, therefore, there were four separate Acts
that governed registration of land in Kenya. Clearly,
this situation was unsatisfactory but it can be said
that this scenario was due to the lack of a clear
policy on land registration by the government. No
committee was established to think through an
effective and comprehensive system of land
registration that would cover the whole country.
Although fears were expressed in Parliament about the
wisdom of having several parallel systems of
registration122 no effort was made to integrate the
120 See Legislative Council, Debates, 1931, Vol. II,
Col. 523 (26 November 1931); & 1933, Vol. II, Col. 695
(29 November 1933)
121 See for example, Adonia v. Mutekanga [1970] E.A.
429 at p. 433 per Spry J.A.
122 See Legislative Council, Debates, 2nd session,
cols. 44-47 (22 August 1924).
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system, or to phase out pre-existing systems. The
Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919, despite its
deficiencies, could have been used as a basis for
extending land registration throughout the country.
However, it received widespread opposition, especially
from lawyers who felt that it would take business away
from them since the forms provided under the Act meant
that people could undertake their own conveyancing. 123
Half hearted attempts to remedy its inherent
shortcomings only brought about limited improvement.
Nevertheless, its provisions were an improvement
on the provisions of the Land Titles Ordinance 1908
concerning dealings with registered land.
Furthermore, registration of title was clearly a
better system than the system of registration of deeds
which was contained in the Registration of Documents
Ordinance 1901 and the Crown Lands Ordinance 1915.
However, the Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919
merely ran alongside the Crown Lands Ordinance 1915
and this was evident because the former provided that
only land that was granted as freehold by the Crown
was to be registered under the 1919 Ordinance124
123 S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration,
Cambridge (1976), pp. 445, 446. Interestingly, no
opposition was expressed by the legal profession
against the introduction of land registration in the
African lands in the 1950's, which was deliberately
designed to keep lawyers out of conveyancing - see
Chapter Four, infra.
124 Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919, ss.
1(3)(a), 20.
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whereas grants for terms of years would continue to be
governed by the Crown Lands Ordinance 1915. Since the
Act did not attempt to convert grants of freehold land
issued before 1919 and which were registered under the
1915 Ordinance, a situation was created whereby there
were grants registered under the 1915 Ordinance and
under the 1919 Ordinance. The situation was
complicated further with regard to leases; by virtue
of section 1(3)(a) and (b) of the Registration of
Titles Ordinance 1919, leases granted by the Crown
could not be registered under the 1919 Ordinance;
these would be regulated by the Crown Lands Ordinance
1915. 125 This resulted in a state of affairs that
was far from satisfactory and confusing, to say the
least, since there was land registered under the 1915
Ordinance, and under the 1919 Ordinance with no
provision being made for land registered under the
Crown Lands Ordinance 1915 to be converted to the
register under the Registration of Titles Ordinance
1919.
Meanwhile, despite the enactment of the 1919
Ordinance to correct the deficiencies of the Land
Titles Ordinance 1908, certificates of title were
still being issued under the latter Act although this
came to a temporary halt in 1922 due to lack of funds
and it was not until 1957 that the process was
125 Crown Lands Ordinance 1915, S. 4.
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resumed. 126 This meant that there were titles that
were still subject to the Land Titles Ordinance 1908
and its provisions. Since the conversion of titles
from the register created by the 1908 Act to the
register created under the Registration of Titles
Ordinance 1919 was purely voluntary, 127 it meant that
there would always be titles registered under both
sets and complete conversion would never take place.
II. Land Law and Conveyancing in the African Reserves
The official view that African societies in
general did not have a system of private ownership of
land because they were too primitive to understand
such a system was erroneous. 128 This view was the
product of inadequate research of African societies by
anthropologists and a failure to understand their
jurisprudence. Later studies showed that many African
societies indeed had complex methods of conveying land
and certainly did recognise private ownership of land.
In Kenya, in particular, studies revealed that
various African societies within the country, in
particular the Kikuyu, Meru, Kamba and Luo among
others, recognised private ownership and the
assignment by land owners of subordinate interests in
126 Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and
Registration in Kenya, 1965-66 (London 1966), para.
119.
127 Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919, s. 6.
128 See Part II, section I, supra.
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land to individuals. Moreover, these societies had
advanced systems of conveying land. This was due to the
fact that they were agricultural societies leading a
relatively sedentary and stable existence and viewed land
as a precious resource since it was the source of their
wealth. This was in contrast to nomadic groups such as
the Kalenjin, Maasai and Samburu who lived in arid or
semi-arid lands with a harsh environment, which caused
them to lead a peripatetic existence, migrating
seasonally in a constant search for pasture and water
for their livestock.
It is vital to consider the methods of conveying
land and the rights that were recognised in these
societies under customary law because it forms a
background to understanding the problems that plagued
the application of land registration when it was
introduced in the African Reserves. It would be
beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to examine
the nature of land tenure and conveyancing of all the
societies in Kenya which number more than 40.
129. 
It is
therefore intended to consider the example of the
Kikuyu who were, and still are, the largest social
group in the country, They had a well developed
system of land tenure that has been documented
extensively. The nature of their land tenure was one of
the factors that led to the initial introduction of
129 For a work that deals with the nature of land tenure
among some African societies in Kenya, see B.A. Ogot
(ed.) Kenya Before 1900, Eight Regional Studies  (Nairobi
1976).
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land registration in the Kikuyu Reserve before it was
introduced in other Reserves occupied by Africans.
A. Conveyancing and Acquisition of Subordinate
Rights Among the Kikuyu
Oral traditions and sources indicated that the
Kikuyu acquired title to some of their estates, which
they termed Ithaka, by a process of settling on
unoccupied land and clearing the bush and forest as
well as purchasing land from a group of people known
as the Ndorobo. 130 The Kikuyu had well defined
methods of transferring land as well as conferring
subordinate interests in land. When the colonial
administration created Reserves to which the Africans
were to be confined, they did not attempt to apply the
Ordinances dealing with land registration to those
areas. The Kenya Land Commission had recommended that
African law and custom should continue to regulate
land within the Reserves so long as these were not
repugnant to any law in the co1ony. 131
 This
recommendation was made part of the Native Lands Trust
Ordinance 1938 which created a structure for the
130 See Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya,(Nairobi
1979 ), pp.20-30; L.S.B. Leakey, The Southern Kikuyu
Before 1903 Vol I (London 1977), pp.93-108; M.P.K.
Sorrenson Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country, A Study
in Government Policy (Nairobi 1967), pp.7-9. But c.f.
the Report of the Kenya Land Commission, Cmd. 4556
(1934),	 p. 93 where they rejected the view by the
Kikuyu that they purchased land from the Ndorobo.
131 Report of the Kenya Land Commission, Cmd. 4556
(1934) paras. 1639, 1796, 2127.
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regulation and control of the Reserves or 'Native
Lands'. Therefore the law that was to continue to
apply in the Reserves was customary law. The Kikuyu
had two types of land transfer recognised by their
customary law: absolute sale and redeemable sale.
1.	 Absolute SaleSof Land
Such sales of land among the Kikuyu transferred
title from the vendor to a purchaser (muguri)
unconditionally in the way an English vendor could
transfer his freehold title to a purchaser. This was
in contrast to redeemable sales of land which are
almost analogous to a mortgage. Absolute sales of
land among the Kikuyu could be grouped into two:
first, the sale by a vendor of land that he had
privately bought from a previous vendor, and secondly,
the sale by a vendor of land which he had received
through inheritance. Outright sales were usually
practiced by the Kikuyu of Nyeri and Kiambu whereas
the Kikuyu of Muranga practiced a system of redeemable
sale of land. Different rules governed these types of
sale as described below.
a	 Sale of Privately Owned Land
A person had the right to sell land that he had
previously purchased either from a fellow Kikuyu or
from any other person, such as a Ndorobo. Although
there were no controls that were imposed by custom on
his power to sell such land such as the need to obtain
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the consent of any individual, 132 such a person was
morally obliged to consult his family to see if they
had any objections, and the elders in the community
(consultation of the elders was prudent since some of
them were asked to be witnesses to the
transaction) 133
Since transactions were conducted orally, it was
important that the transaction was well witnessed by
several individuals; witnesses invariably included
prominent members of the community such as elders.
The presence of witnesses, such as elders, would deter
future misunderstanding or the incidence of fraud.
Both parties therefore arranged to have witnesses, who
were meant to bring with them plants such as lily
bulbs which would be used for marking the boundary of
the land to be sold. 134
 The parties to the
transaction as well as the witnesses would then walk
along the boundary and the bulbs would be planted
along the line the new boundary would run. A ram was
also slaughtered and the contents of its stomach
sprinkled on some outstanding boundary markings such
as rocks. 135 At times big stones were buried along
the boundary in case at later periods, a subsequent
132 L.S.B. Leakey, The Southern Kikuyu Before 1903, 
Vol.I., (London 1977) p. 105.
133 Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, (Nairobi
1979), pp. 31-32.
134 L.S.B. Leakey, op.cit., p. 107
135 Ibid.
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owner dishonestly tried to move the boundary by
replanting the bulbs. Since he would be unaware of
the buried stones his dishonesty could be detected if
a dispute arose.136
Once the boundary was marked the sale was
ratified by the handing over of five objects used to
validate the transaction; these were a sword, an axe,
a branding iron, a small barrel for storing honey, and
a virgin ewe.
These objects could be likened symbolically to
the signing, sealing, and delivery of a conveyance in
English law which formerly made such a conveyance
valid. 137 In addition the purchaser had to provide a
he-goat and the family that sold the land had to
provide either a he-goat or an ox for slaughter.
These sealed the new relationship between the
purchaser and the vendor and their families. The
purchaser was viewed as a relation-in-law (muthoni) of
the family from whom he bought the land.- 38
 The price
was payable in livestock which could be paid at once
or in instalments. 139
 The purchaser became the
absolute owner of the land and could deal with it in
136 L.S. B. Leakey, op.cit, p. 108. The belief that
supernatural intervention would befall those who
attempted to transfer the boundary acted as an
effective deterrent.
137 See now Law of Property (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1989.
138 L.S. B. Leakey, op.cit., p. 108.
139 Ibid, p. 104.
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any way he liked. In the words of the Kikuyu,
'ekwigurira na aathinguria, na aaguraririo; githaka
kiu niu giake o kuria angienda kuhira kana kwendia (he
has bought it for himself, and completed the payment
for it, and having had the transaction sealed and
certified for him, the land is then his alone, and he
may dispose of it and sell it as and when it pleases
him) 140
b.	 Sale of Inherited Land
It was very difficult to sell land that was
inherited. Suppose a person, let us call him Kimani,
became the owner of 50 acres of a githaka either
because he cultivated it from virgin land or he bought
it from a Ndorobo. He is married with two wives and
has six sons and three daughters. If Kimani never
sold the land in his lifetime and died, his eldest son
was appointed muramati (titular head or trustee) in
place of his father, in accordance with Kikuyu
customary law. Kimani's land now belonged to his sons
with each of them having a right to cultivate it.141
The land became family or mbari land under the name of
the original owner, the land now being referred to as
140 Ibid, p. 108.
141 Daughters generally had no right to receive a
share of the land. The widow normally received a life
interest in a portion of the land - for a detailed
discussion of the customary law of succession among
the Kikuyu and other groups, see E. Cotran,
Restatement of African Law, The Law of Succession, 
Vol. II, (London 1969).
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githaka kia mbari ya Kimani (the land of Kimani's
family group). 142 If the land remained undivided the
muramati could not sell the land without the unanimous
agreement of his brothers. However, if the land was
divided up between the sons, and it was the custom for
each son to get an equal share, one could not sell his
share without the agreement of all the other brothers.
Even if they agreed to the sale, the family members
were first given an option to purchase before a person
who was not a member of the family could do so.143
The procedure followed during such a sale was the same
as that of privately owned land.
2,	 Redeemable Sales
Land redemption was practiced by the Kikuyu in
Muranga. This was the only type of sale that was
recognised by them, as opposed to outright sales of
land, the latter being practiced by the Kikuyu of
Nyeri and Kiambu. 144 Land redemption was also
practiced by societies such as the Meru 145and the
Kamba. 146
142 Jomo Kenyatta, op.cit., p. 32; L.S.B. Leakey,
op.cit. p. 110.
143 The Kamba also had a similar procedure - see D.J.
Penwill, Kamba Customary Law, (Nairobi 1951), p. 38.
144 A.J.F. Simmance, Land Redemption Among the Kikuyu
of Fort Hall, [1961] J.A.L. 75.
145 J. Glazier, Land Law and Transformation of 
Customary Tenure. The Mbeere Case, [1976] J.A.L. 39,
at p. 41.
146 D.J. Penwill, op.cit., p. 42.
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In this transaction, the process was initiated by the
vendor who urgently needed some livestock to meet some
customary obligation, such as the payment of bride
price. The vendor would offer a portion of his land
to a purchaser147 for a number of goats, for example,
on condition that the land would be redeemed by him on
the repayment of the purchase price at any future
date. 148 The transaction was comparable to a mortgage
with the important exception that the vendor always
retained the title to his land. The vendor could
redeem the land at any time by paying back the exact
goods and any natural increase that the livestock had.
The purchaser's rights were therefore precarious; if,
for example, he had any buildings on the land he was
obliged to demolish them, although he had a right to
harvest standing crops. 149 Nevertheless, the
transaction was conducted on a friendly basis rather
than a commercial one, with the purchaser accepting
the land as security for a loan to a friend in
need. 150
147 As in the case of inherited land the family of
the vendor had the first option to buy the land on the
redemption terms, and if no one within the family was
interested, he would then look for an outside
purchaser - A.J.F. Simmance, op.cit., p. 76.
148 Ibid, p. 75.
149 Ibid„ pp. 76,77.
150 Report of the Committee on Native Land Tenure in
Kikuyu Province, (Nairobi, 1929), para. 40.
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3.	 Subordinate Rights in Land Subject to Customary
Law
There were various types of subordinate rights
that could be granted to other persons by landowners
in several African societies. A common right was what
could be described in English law as a tenancy. Among
the Kikuyu there was what was known as a muhoi. This
was a person who asked a land owner for permission to
cultivate on his land, but did not normally live on
it. Although the Kenya High Court described a muhoi
as 'a poor person with no land of his own ',151 some
ahoi had other land of their own on which they lived
but which was not sufficient for cultivation. 152
 A
muhoi did not pay a fee for the right to cultivate,
neither did he pay any rent to the landlord. However,
he was obliged to present a portion of the harvest
crop to his landlord, and if he brewed some beer he
was also obliged to give some to his landlord. From
time to time he was called upon to contribute a sheep
or goat to the landlord whenever the latter was in
need such, as when he had to pay bride price for a
member of his family. 153
 The absence of a periodic
rent reflected the fact that the right was granted on
a friendship basis as opposed to a commercial
151 Wainaina v. Murai, (1976) Kenya L.R. 227, at p.
230.
152 L.S.B. Leakey, op.cit., p. 117.
153 L.S.B. Leakey, op.cit., pp. 117, 118; Jomo
Kenyatta, op.cit., p. 34.
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arrangement. The rights of the muhoi were personal to
him; he could not transfer them to a third party.
When he died his family had to make a new agreement
with the landlord to continue to have the same rights
of cultivation. If the landlord sold the same land to
a purchaser, the muhoi had to make a new agreement
with the new owner if he was to keep his rights.154
That the muhoi's rights were limited was reflected in
the fact that he could be evicted at any time with
reasonable notice, so that he had time to harvest his
crops.155
Other societies had the equivalent of a muhoi.
Among the Luo a person who was given similar rights of
cultivation was known as a jadak. He could not
transfer those rights to a third party and neither
could his sons inherit them. His only obligation to
the landlord was to show respect to him and if there
were any disputes between the landlord and other
individuals the jadak was expected to side with his
landlord. 156
 Among the Maragoli, the omunenya was
granted the right to occupy and cultivate on land by
the omwene or owner of it. 157
 Again he paid no rent
154 L.S.B. Leakey, op.cit., p. 121.
155 Report of the Committee on Native Land Tenure in
Kikuyu Province, (Nairobi, 1929), para. 88.
156 Report of the Workinq Party on African Land 
Tenure 1957-8, (Nairobi, 1958), para. 91.
157 Ibid.
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and his obligation was to support his landlord and
occasionally give him presents.
The Kikuyu had another type of tenant known as a
muthami. A muthami had more rights than a muhoi for
he had the right to cultivate as well as to build.158
He had a more secure right of tenure and could only be
evicted if he had committed a serious offence, or the
landowner needed the land to cultivate. Apart from
being obliged to give to his landlord a nominal
portion of his harvest, he paid a number of fees
before he settled on the land, for example a fee (one
goat) for grazing his livestock payable to the
landlord, and a fee (one sheep and one goat) payable
to the clan elders.158
B. Summary
The above discussion highlights the elaborate
nature of land transactions among the Kikuyu and the
fact that they had well recognised rights over their
land that were accepted by all within the community.
A remarkable feature of the customary land law system
was its reliance on oral testimony to prove title to
land. Hence the need for numerous witnesses to be
present when a land transaction was made. Not
surprisingly there were very few disputes since there
were enough people who witnessed a transaction. The
158 Jomo Kenyatta, op.cit., pp. 22, 34.
159 L.S.B. Leakey, op.cit., pp. 116, 117.
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fear of supernatural retribution also played a part in
preventing people from resorting to fraud, such as
moving the boundaries by replanting the bulbs. 160
This arrangement remained satisfactory and
whenever a person and his family felt that the land
they had was not enough and that they could not
purchase surrounding land anymore they simply moved to
an area which was unoccupied and cultivated the virgin
land there and established a new home. However, when
the colonial government established the African
Reserves, such migration became impossible because the
tribes could only move out of the Reserve to settle
elsewhere on stringent conditions.161
As a result, the Reserves slowly began to become
overcrowded, which in turn greatly contributed to the
land becoming eroded and infertile due to the pressure
on it by an increasing population together with poor
agricultural practices. This brought about an
increase in litigation as landowners began to eject
tenants off their land and the latter sought to
protect their interests in the African courts.
Clearly this situation had to be ameliorated. But
this was only one factor that led to the introduction
of land registration in the Kikuyu Reserve. In the
following section, the development of land
160 Jomo Kenyatta, op.cit., p. 39.
161 See Native Lands Trust Ordinance 1938, Part II.
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registration in the African Reserves is now
considered.
III. Factors and Events Leading to the Introduction of
Land Registration in the African Lands 
Although the initial official view was that
Africans had no concept of private ownership,
came to be accepted in certain quarters that they
indeed did have such a concept. A notable example was
Sir Percy Girouard, appointed Governor of the colony
in 1909, who recognised as early as 1910 that private
ownership was recognised by various African societies
as opposed to communal ownership. This was compounded
by studies in 1912 by M.W.H. Beech into Kikuyu land
tenure, whereby he was able to discover that the0
Kikuyu recognised individual land ownership. 163
 Sir
Girouard went on to recommend that 'a record of
existing rights' should be prepared as a first step
toward the Registration of individual African
titles. 164
 Although this was considered to be a good
idea, the outbreak of the First World War prevented
further consideration of the matter. In 1920,
proposals were made by the Chief Native Commissioner,
Sir John Ainsworth, which provided that the boundaries
162 A view that led to the subsequent alienation of
their land, supra.
163 See M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu
Country, A Study in Government Policy, (Nairobi 1967),
p. 20.
164 Ibid, p. 27.
162 it
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of the various ithaka (estates) should be demarcated
and that a register known as the Githaka Register be
established; 165 however, the effect of the titles that
were to be issued under this scheme was to make the
owners licencees rather than owners of a freehold
title. 166 Although a trial scheme of registering
ithaka titles was started in Kiambu, it was abandoned
in 1922.167
Political demands among the Africans continued to
grow fuelled by the insecurity of their precarious
titles. Their land was continually being alienated by
the government. For example, after the First World
War, a scheme was set up by the colonial government in
conjunction with British government that land be set
aside to settle soldiers who had fought for Britain
during the war. A soldier settlement scheme was
therefore set up and thousands of acres were alienated
to them from the African Reserves. 168
The demands for secure titles by the Africans led
to the creation of two committees in 1929 to look into
the question of African land tenure. The first was
appointed to look into land tenure in North Kavirondo
(now Western Kenya) and it recommended that boundaries
165 Ibid, pp. 27, 28.
166 Ibid, p. 28.
167 Ibid.
168 Makhan Singh, The East African Association 1921-
1925, Hadithi, Vol. 3, Bethwell A. Ogot ed., (Nairobi
1971) p. 121; M.P.K. Sorrenson, Origins of European
Settlement in Kenya, (Nairobi 1968), pp. 289-290.
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of land (lugongo) would be demarcated and lugongo
registers set up. 169
 The second committee was
appointed to look into land tenure among the Kikuyu,
and it recommended that ithaka should be registered
and that rules should be drawn up for a register to be
started in Kiambu.170
Nothing, however, came of these proposals because
shortly after, the Kenya Land Commission was appointed
to look into the question of the security of African
land over the whole of the colony and to look into the
grievances expressed by Africans over the way their
land had been alienated by the government. The
Commission recommended that the security of African
land would be guaranteed if it was vested in a Lands
Trust Board acting as trustee, and which would
exercise administrative control over the land. In
this way no alienation of African land could be made
without the consent of the board and the Africans
living on the land. 171
 The Commission did not
recommend the country wide introduction of a register
of right holdings of African land as they thought that
in many areas this would be premature due to their
opinion that African tenure had not evolved to the
169 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure, 1957-8 (Nairobi 1958), paras. 9,10. See also
the Report of the Kenya Land Commission, Cmd. 4556,
(1934), para. 1662.
170 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure, 1957-8 (Nairobi 1958), paras. 11,13.
171 Report of the Kenya Land Commission, Cmd. 4556,
(1934) Chapter V.
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point where individual titles were recognised. 172
However, they recommended the experimental
introduction of a register in part of Kiambu District
because they felt that the Africans in this area had
customs and traditions of land holdings that
recognised an individual form of tenure and that their
aspirations needed to be fostered.173
The Kenya (Native Areas) Order in Council 1939
and the Native Lands Trust Ordinance 1938 were enacted
to implement the recommendations of the Commission
regarding the creation of a Lands Trust Board which
was to have the land in the Reserves (called 'Native
Lands' under the Act) vested in it, and whose function
was to protect the land from alienation subject to
various conditions. 174
 However, no provisions were
made for the registration of African land. The Law
Society felt that the failure to provide for
registration of African land would bring about chaotic
conditions; therefore they recommended that it was
vital that Committees be appointed to look into
African customary laws on land transfer and
inheritance and to codify such laws by statute and
thereafter establish a system of registration of land
titles and transactions. 175
 Nevertheless, the
172 Ibid, para. 1662.
173 Ibid, paras. 1664, 1665.
174 See Native Lands Trust Ordinance 1938, Parts II &
175 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure, 1957-8, (1958), para. 14.
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government was of the view that the time was not yet
ripe to introduce registration of titles. They
realised that a tendency was developing in African
lands towards a form of individual ownership and
people were demanding title deeds but these demands
ought to be discouraged and dampened because it would
"lead to surveys, conveyances and legal action with
heavy expense and complications"(italics mine). 176
Nevertheless, the British Secretary of State for the
Colonies expressed his opinion to the Governor of
Kenya that the question of recording African rights on
a register had to be addressed as soon as possible
because of the growing demand for titles and the
changes that were taking place in the traditional
methods of land holding among Africans.177
A Native Welfare Conference met to consider the
comments that were made by the Secretary of State and
at a meeting, recommended that an investigation should
be undertaken into some of the problems that had
arisen and were continuing to arise "in connection
with the use, holding, transfer, registration and
availability of land in the Central Province of Kenya
176 Report of the Sub-Committee of the Executive 
Council on Native Land Tenture, 20 March 1939, para.
2, K.N.A Lands 1/38. See also Circular letter by S.J.
La Fontaine (Ag. Chief Native Commissioner) to all
Provincial Commissioners, 1 Nov. 1938, K.N.A. Lands
1/38.
177 Confidential Despatch from the Secretary of State
for the Colonies to the Governor of Kenya, 29 Nov.,
1939, K.N.A. lands 1/39.
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as a result of economic and political development, the
increase of population and the improvements in
communications", and it was decided that the District
of South Nyeri would be the most suitable place to
conduct such an investigation. 178
 Almost ten years
were to pass before anything was done there.
Meanwhile, although some form of registration was
introduced among the Kamba in their reserve centred
around Machakos, this form of registration was
confined to the registration of sale agreements.
Concern had been expressed at the way family members
were selling off family land without consultation and
leaving family members landless. This was done by
sons, who on receiving their inheritance of land from
their father in accordance with customary law, would
proceed to sell the land without consulting their
family members and requiring their permission, and, in
some cases, would even sell land belonging to their
brothers. 179
 To prevent this situation the
registration of sale agreements was established in
Machakos in 1945. Africans selling land in the
Machakos area had to post a Notice of Intention to
Sell on the land, at the Local Native Council Hall,
and at the appropriate Native Tribunal Courthouse]-80.
178 The Native Welfare Conference, Report, lo Jar,.
1940, K.N.A. Lands 1/38.
179 D.J. Penwill, Kamba Customary Law, (Nairobi
1951), pp. 39-41.
180 Ibid, p. 41.
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The Notice contained a description of the boundaries
of the land and details as to its ownership, and also
pointed out that anyone who objected to the sale could
register his objection in Machakos. If there were no
objections, an Agreement for Sale containing details
as to boundaries, ownership and price was signed by
the vendor and purchaser and witnessed by not less
than six elders from the area where the land was
situated. 181
 This form of registration was merely to
introduce publicity to sales of land and did not
create a system of registered title. However, the
scheme was a failure because not many people knew
about it and, moreover, many Kamba lived far away from
Machakos making it difficult for them to travel there
to register sales.
Among the Nandi, in Western Kenya, attempts were
made to introduce a form of land registration.
Although the Nandi were a pastoral society, they were
relatively sedentary as they engaged in farming.
Grazing land for their stock was viewed as belonging
to the community and so too was the land which was set
aside for farming known as Kokwet land, which was
allocated by elders to individuals for farming. 182
However, due to economic pressures and official
encouragement individuals within the society began to
enclose land by fencing it off with the idea of
181 Ibid.
182 G.S. Snell, Nandi Customary Law (Nairobi, 1954),
pp. 44-46.
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farming the land profitably and having the power of
disposing it as private owners without the fetters of
customary controls such as requiring the consent of
the elders to a disposition)- 83
 However, the local
administration felt that it was necessary to clarify
the legal position of the holders of individual
estates since the land was ultimately vested in the
Lands Trust Board, and, at the same time, providing
them some security of tenure and forestalling
uneconomic sub-division of land)- 84
 Accordingly, a
local committee was appointed by the District
Commissioner for the area to look into these
aspects.185
In its report the Committee recommended that
individual right holdings should be registered and a
register of applicants for holdings in each kokwet to
be compiled. 186
 Once the holdings had been surveyed
they were to be registered in a Locational Register
maintained by the Chief's clerk and a Master Register
to be maintained by the African District Council
Secretary)- 87
 Once the applicant of the holding was
able to Undertake that he would reside habitually on
183 Ibid, p. 109.
184 Ibid, p. 111.
185 Ibid.
186 Report of the Nandi District Land Tenure 
Committee, 1952, para.15. reproduced in G.S. Snell,
Kamba Customary Law, (Nairobi 1954), Appendix.
187 Ibid, para. 25(11).
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his holding and farm it according to the rules of good
husbandry he would be granted a special title. 188
 The
title, however, only conferred upon the holder rights
of exclusive occupation and usage of the land for a
period of twenty years from the date of registration
which could be renewed for a similar period.189
Nevertheless, he would have the power of
disposing the land by inheritance, gift, sale, or
exchange. 190
 In effect, the title was granting the
holder a 20 year lease rather than a freehold title
since the freehold reversion was vested in the Trust
Board and provision was made for an annual rent to be
paid to the locational counci1.191
These proposals were never put into effect
because they were overtaken by events that took place
in the Central Province at the beginning of the
19501s.
The outbreak of the Mau Mau Civil War in 1952 was
a factor that shook the colonial government out of its
complacency and inertia and brought about the rapid
introduction of land registration over the whole of
Central Province. The war, fought by Africans against
the colonial government and the European settlers, was
centered in the Central Province of Kenya where many
188 Ibid, para. 21.
189 Ibid, para. 25(xviii)
190 Ibid.
191 Report of the Nandi District Land Tenure
Committee, 1952, para. 25(xx).
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Kikuyu, frustrated by the government land policy in
favour of the European settlers, took to arms.192 The
root cause of the war was the deep seated feeling
among many Africans that the colonial government had
stolen their land. This feeling had developed over
many years and several factors were responsible for
the outbreak of the war, all stemming from the
government's land policy.
First, were the consequences of the creation of a
class of squatters amongst Africans. To stimulate
settler agriculture, the government forced many
Africans to provide cheap labour for European farmers.
Many had no choice because they had been made landless
through the alienation of their land by the government
to the European settlers. Moreover, to be able to pay
a poll tax which the government introduced, many had
to find means of earning income to help pay the tax,
192 It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to
discuss the conduct of the war and the political
repercussions. The reader's attention is drawn to
some of the numerous works which discuss the war and
the political consequences - see for example, D.L.
Barnett & K. Njama, Mau Mau From Within (Nairibo
1966); Sir Michael Blundell, So Rough a Wind, (London
1964); C.G. Roseberg & J. Nottingham, The Myth of 'Mau
Mau: Nationalism in Kenya, (Nairobi 1966); Jomo
Kenyatta, Suffering Without Bitterness, (Nairobi
1969); 0. Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, (Nairobi 1968); O.W.
Furley, The Historiography of Mau Mau, Hadithi Vol.4:
Politics and Nationalism in Colonial Kenya, edited by
Bethwell A. Ogot (Nairobi 1972); Maina wa Kinyatti
(ed.) Kimathi's Letters: A Profile of Patriotic 
Courage (Nairobi 1986); B. Kaggia, Roots of Freedom 
1921-1963, (Nairobi 1975); J.M. Kariuki, Mau Mau
Detainee, (Nairobi 1963). For an official account see
Historical Survey of the Origins and Growth of Mau Mau
(F.D. Corfield), Cmd. 1030, (1960).
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ending up working as wage labourers for the European
farmers. 193
Many Europeans allowed their African workers to
cultivate and keep livestock on some of their unused
farmland on condition that they continued to work for
the farmer for a specified period. Through this
arrangement, the Africans (who were termed 'squatters'
since they had no rights on the land) were able to
grow crops and keep livestock for subsistence purposes
and were able to supplement their meagre incomes.
However, with time, the squatters became prosperous
and began to have large numbers of livestock and no
longer found it really necessary to work for the
Europeans. At the same time the settler farmers began
to feel threatened by the burgeoning squatter
livestock, arguing that the African livestock would
spread diseases to their grade cows and wipe them
out. 194
 Consequently, they lobbied the District
Councils to introduce a series of measures which would
restrict the number of stock the squatters could
keep. 195 This was done and bye-laws were passed which
restricted the number of livestock a squatter could
193 Tabitha Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau
Mau	 1905-63, (Nairobi 1987), p.9.
194 Ibid, pp. 40-44.
195 For accounts on how this was done see, Tabitha
Kanogo, op.cit., pp. 44-61; David Throup, Economic and
Social Origins of Mau Mau 1945-53, (Nairobi 1988),
Chapter Five.
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hold. As a result, a large number of squatter stock
was confiscated and destroyed.
The response of the squatters was to engage in
resistance by engaging in strikes, refusing to sign on
for the farmers, and at times resorting to
violence. 196 As a result many were forced to leave
the farms; some tried going back to the Reserve but
found that there was no room for them due to
overpopulation and land shortage there and therefore
they ended up becoming a landless class. Although the
government created the Olenguruone Settlement Scheme
to absorb some of the squatters on land in the
Olenguruone area, the farming conditions that were
imposed by the government were so stringent that many
squatters rebelled and ended up being forced out of
the area by the government. 197
 Many went to Nairobi
to seek employment but found none. As a result of
these developments, the squatters emerged as an
embittered and landless group of people that became a
focus for discontent and unrest.
A second factor was brought about by the
introduction of farming practices by the government in
the Kikuyu Reserve. The Reserve, comprised of Nyeri,
Fort Hall (now Muranga) and Kiambu Districts, was
hilly but fertile. However, an increase in the Kikuyu
population eventually resulted in serious overcrowding
196 David Throup, op.cit., p. 111.
197 see Tabitha Kanogo, op.cit., pp. 105-116; David
Throup, op.cit., Chapter Six.
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in the Reserve. The combination of intensive farming
coupled with poor farming methods resulted in the land
becoming seriously eroded. To prevent this the
government introduced soil conservation measures to
reduce erosion in the Reserve. The most notable was
the terracing of the steep slopes which characterised
the Reserve. The government empowered the local
chiefs to mobilise the people to engage in communal
labour and dig the slopes to create the terraces. The
chiefs zealously enforced terracing in order to gain
official approval and the rewards that came with
it.198 However, this work caused popular opposition
among the peasants, who provided the labour, because
the work was exhausting and it meant that they had
less time to farm their own plots of land: the work
also reduced the amount of land available for
cultivation. 199 Many suspected that once terracing
was completed the land would be alienated to the
Europeans. 2 " As a result opposition among the
peasants against the administration was high and it
resulted in the terracing work having to come to a
complete halt. Government attempts to enforce the
work only resulted in violence.201
198 David Throup, op.cit., p. 141.
199 Ibid., pp. 142,240.
200 Ibid, p. 151
201 See generally David Throup, op.cit. pp. 151-162.
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At the same time as this was going on, pressure
on the land in the Reserve resulted in landowners
attempting to acquire as much land as possible by
buying land from poorer Kikuyu in order to maximise
their own production. However, it had the unfortunate
result of turning families against each other as
individual members tried to grab land from each
other. 202 It also resulted in many of the ahoi
(tenants) being ejected from the land they occupied.
Many ahoi refused to be ejected because they claimed
that they had acquired rights of ownership over the
land. Consequently, bitter disputes arose between the
real owners and the ahoi as each asserted that they
were the true owners of the /and. This Led to an
increase of litigation in the African courts with
heavy legal costs on both sides. Naturally, the poor
peasants who could not support an action ended up
losing their land. 203
 In order to tap this
discontent, political activists within the Kenya
African Union, which was the dominant political party,
began to mobilise the squatters, the peasants in the
Reserves, the disposed ahoi and the unemployed in
Nairobi against the colonial government through a
series of oaths which demanded a commitment to
202 M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu
Country: A Study in Government Policy, (Nairobi 1967),
p. 79.
203 M.P.K. Sorrenson, op.cit., pp. 79,80.
96
opposing the government. 204 The government had by
this time realised that its agricultural policy had
failed and that a change in thinking was necessary.
Roger Swynnerton, appointed as assistant director of
agriculture, spearheaded the change in policy. He
realised that Africans would support the government
conservation policy if the government allowed Africans
to grow high value cash crops such as coffee, and if
the government buried its opposition to the grant of
individual titles to Africans. His plan to intensify
African agriculture became the focus of the new
government policy toward African agriculture and land
tenure. In his plan205 he made several
recommendations notably:
1. That Africans must be provided with security of
tenure by providing them with an indefeasible title
which would in turn encourage them to invest their
labour and profits into the development of their farms
as well as enabling them to offer it as security for
credit. 206
2.	 Many African lands suffered from excessive
fragmentation due to dense population and the
204 David Throup, op.cit., pp. 171,172; Tabitha
Kanogo, op.cit., pp. 5,116-117, 133-5; C.G. Roseburg &
J. Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau: Nationalism in
Kenya, (Nairobi 1966), p. 248; Maina wa Kinyatti (ed.)
Kimathi's Letters: A Profile in Patriotic Courage,
(Nairobi 1986) p. 133.
205 A Plan to Intensify the Development of African
Actriculture in Kenya, (Nairobi, 1954).
206 Ibid, para. 13.
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consequences of customary land tenure and inheritance.
As a result people owned small fragments of land
scattered over a wide area, which was not conducive to
an economic system of farming. Therefore it was
necessary to amalgamate or consolidate the fragments
turning them into economic farming units, while at the
same time ensuring that fragmentation did not take
place by preventing sub-divisions of land below an
economic leve1.207
3. To effect the above two recommendations it was
necessary that accurate surveys of African lands be
made for the registration of titles and the
establishment of District Land Registries to maintain
the registers.208
4. That Africans be allowed to grow high value cash
crops thereby stimulating their income.209
The purpose of these recommendations was to
create a stable middle class of Africans made wealthy
by the adoption of these measures who would remain
politically content and support the government.21°
Although some Africans did benefit from these
measures, they came too late for the majority, many of
whom joined the Mau Mau, a movement that was committed
to armed struggle against the colonial government and
207 Ibid., para. 14.
208 Ibid, paras. 17-20.
209 Ibid, para. 25.
210 Ibid, para. 12
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to bring to an end the exploitation of Africans by the
Europeans. Acts of sabotage, violence and the murder
of several European settlers by the Mau Mau resulted
in the outbreak of the Mau Mau civil war and the
declaration of a State of Emergency by the government
on 20 October 1952.
The government took drastic measures to try and
contain the war. Many political leaders, notably
among them Jomo Kenyatta, were detained as were many
Africans who were suspected of being members of the
Mau Mau or who sympathised with the movement. Kikuyu
peasants were confined to villages which had stockades
built around them to prevent contact with the guerilla
fighters and to enable the government to maintain
control over them. 211
 It was during this period that
the government took the opportunity to rushing through
the programme of land consolidation and registration
in the Kikuyu lands. The detention of the political
leaders and the confinement of the Kikuyu meant that
there would be no opposition to the programme.
Moreover, since the Kikuyu were taken off the land and
confined to the villages it would be easier to survey
the land and consolidate the fragments and have them
registered.212
211 M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu
Country: A Study in Government Policy, (Nairobi 1967),
pp. 110-112.
212 See Chapter Three, infra.
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Prior to the declaration of Emergency, land
consolidation and registration of titles was already
being undertaken in Nyeri due to a decision by
Provincial Commissioners to grant individual titles to
Africans in the Native Lands, a decision prompted by
the inertia of Central government over the issue.213
The Provincial Commissioner for Central Province went
ahead with his own scheme to introduce registration in
Nyeri District and had rules drafted. Under these
rules, known as the Native Lands Trust (Rights of
Occupancy) Rules, applicants for rights of occupancy
had to show before a local land board that they would
engage in good agricultural practices and to certify
that they were the proprietors of the land either by
purchase or through custom. 214
 If no objections were
made within a period of six months of the application,
the applicant was granted a certificate of title
regarded as indefeasible against all previous claims.
All land transactions were to be registered although
the local land board had to approve them. Each
African court would keep a register of titles with the
master register being kept by the District
Commissioner.215
213 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure, 1957-8, (Nairobi 1958), para. 16; see also
M.P.K. Sorrenson, op.cit., pp. 61-66.
214 M.P.K. Sorrenson, op.cit., p. 66.
215 Ibid., pp. 66,67.
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Notwithstanding the advice of the Law Officers in
Nairobi that the Rules were not valid under the Native
Lands Trust Ordinance 1938 because the land registered
under the rules would still be vested in Native Lands
Trust Board, the provincial administration in Nyeri
went ahead with its scheme and began to register land
in Nyeri. 216
 The outbreak of the Mau Mau war resulted
in the District Commissioners of Kiambu and Fort Hall
taking advantage of the situation to introduce land
consolidation and registration in their Districts on
the basis of the same rules.217
It was at this time, in 1953, that a Royal
Commission was appointed to make recommendations,
inter alia, on 'the adaptations or modifications in
traditional tribal systems of tenure necessary for the
full development of the land. ,218
 The Commission
recommended that provision should be made for
scheduling areas for the adjudication of land and
registration of titles to be carried out on a
systematic basis and this to be undertaken by local
officials. 219 It was further recommended that the
interests that were adjudicated upon were then to be
recorded in a Register of Rights maintained by central
216 Ibid., p. 67.
217 Ibid., p. 114.
218 Report of the East Africa Royal Commission on
Land and Population 1953-1955. Cmnd. 9745 p. ix.
219 Ibid., paras. 17,18, pp. 351-352.
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government on a district basis. 220 It was necessary
that the land was accurately surveyed (aerial surveys
being seen as an advantage) so that the boundaries
could be identified. 221
 The Commission saw the whole
purpose of adjudication and registration as being that
of increasing the economic use of land and therefore
there was no need to introduce registration where
there was little prospect of expanding economic
production, such as in arid areas.222
The Commission's recommendations were accepted by
the government in principle and in 1956 a conference
met in Arusha to consider the recommendations of the
Commission and the problems of African land tenure.
The Conference produced detailed recommendations on a
structure of land registration and adjudication to be
applied in African lands. 223
 They stated that
negotiable titles should be granted only in areas
where there was demand for individual titles. 224 To
provide such a title it would be necessary to
establish a properly contrived and efficiently
conducted system of registration.225 Moreover, though
220 Ibid., para. 19, p. 353.
221 Ibid., paras. 20-23, p. 353.
222 Ibid., para. 23, p. 353.
223 Report of the Conference on African Land Tenure
in East and Central Africa, 1956, (1956) J.A.A.
(Special Supplement).
224 Ibid., para. 20.
225 Ibid., para. 27.
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registration was to be a function of central
government, it should be decentralised so that the
register relating to an area be made reasonably
accessible to persons living and claiming title in
that area. 226
 The Conference also recommended that
the grant of titles should be preceded by a process of
adjudication so that "all rival claims to a given
parcel of land can be properly considered and any
subsidiary rights or interests held by persons other
than the person to be registered as owner of the land
can be ascertained and recorded." 227
 Moreover, land
should be surveyed and a programme of consolidation
undertaken where land was excessively fragmented.228
The feeling therefore was that it was urgent to
introduce legislation that would provide a structure
for the consolidation, adjudication and registration
of land. In the Central Province of Kenya, this
process was being undertaken on the basis of rules
which had no legislative sanction and therefore no
legal force, a position that was clearly
unsatisfactory. Due to the long delay by the Governor
in appointing a working party to look into the form
which legislation introducing registration would take,
interim rules known as the Native Land Tenure Rules
were drawn up in 1956 under section 64(1)(e) of the
226 Ibid., para. 31.
227 Ibid., para. 36.
228 Ibid., Parts V and VI.
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Native Land Trust Ordinance 1938 229 which allowed the
Governor to make rules "regulating any matter relating
to the tenure of land in the native lands." The Rules
provided for a committee of five lay members to be
appointed by individuals from the district where the
rules were applied, which would ascertain the
ownership of or rights to land in each unit according
to African law and custom. Claimants were to appear
before the committee to state their claims, and once
adjudication was completed, a Record of Existing
Rights, which was a list of right holders, was made
available for inspection for a period of thirty days.
Provision was also made for the consolidation of
fragments of land belonging to claimants whereby the
claimant would be moved to a new holding approximately
equivalent in area to the sum total of the area of the
fragments of land he previously owned. Once this
process was complete the claimant would be issued with
a certificate which had details about the proprietor
and the number of his holding as well as the interests
that the land was subject to, these details being
recorded in a register.23°
229 M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu
Country: A Study in Government Policy (Nairobi 1967),
pp.123-131; see also Report of the Working Party on
African Land Tenure, 1957-58, (Nairobi 1958), para.27.
230 However, the Rules did not define the nature of
the rights of the certificate holders in view of
section 68 of the Native Lands Trust Ordinance 1938.
The section provided that every individual shall have
all the rights which they enjoy "by virtue of existing
native law and custom." The Government was advised
that no rights which were unknown to the law and
custome of the tribe concerned could be recognized or
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These Rules regulated registration of land until
the enactment of the Native Lands Registration
Ordinance 1959. This Ordinance had been drafted by
the Working Party on African Land Tenure which was
appointed to recommend legislation which would take
into account the recommendations of the Royal
Commission and the Arusha Conference and which would
provide for the adjudication of rights, consolidation
and demarcation of holdings, registration of titles
and transactions, types of title, creation of lesser
interests in land, succession, bankruptcy, and
provision for the creation of land registries.231
The Working Party first recommended in an interim
report that once a holding was registered in the name
of the owner, it should cease to be vested in the
Native Lands Trust Board and become vested in the
registered owner and that the Native Lands Trust
Ordinance 1938 should cease to apply to it. 232
 This
recommendation was accepted and given effect by the
Kenya (Native Areas) (Amendment) Order in Council
1958. Registered titles could now be vested in the
registered proprietors rather than in the Trust Board.
created by rules made under the Ordinance (e.g. a fee
simple in possession) - Report of the Working Party on
African Land Tenure 1957-1958, (Nairobi 1958), para.
27.
231 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
232 Interim Report on Status of Land and Form of
Title - in Appendix A, Report of the Working Party on
African Land Tenure 1957-58, op.cit.
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The Working Party produced a Bill containing
provisions that would establish a system of land
registration in the African lands. In drafting the
Bill, the Working Party looked at various statutes
from other jurisdictions which had introduced land
registration, such as the Tanganyika Land Registration
Ordinance 1953, the Sudan Land Settlement and
Registration Ordinance 1925, the Uganda Registration
of Titles Ordinance 1924, the Nigerian Registration of
Titles Ordinance 1935 and the Singapore Land Titles
Ordinance 1956, and the English Land Registration Act
1925. 233 However, it was the Sudan Land Settlement
and Registration Ordinance 1925 that influenced the
Working Party because it had introduced a land
registration system in the Sudan that was well
established and which had successfully brought about
the registration of titles in African lands there.
The provisions in the Sudan Ordinance were based on
the English Land Registration Act 1925 the Ordinance
thereby establishing land registration on the English
model in Sudan. Since the Sudan legislation was
already tried and tested, having been able to
establish registration in lands under African tenure,
the Working Party felt that it could use its
provisions in their draft Bill. 234
 Although the
233 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure 1957-58, (Nairobi 1957) para 39.
234 Prior to the appointment of the Working Party a
Kenyan official went to Sudan to see how the system
worked and on his return recommended that it should be
adopted in the African lands. Some of the
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Working Party did look at the Registration of Titles
Ordinance 1919 it was felt that it would be unsuitable
for the registration of African titles and hence it
would not apply.235
The Working Party claimed that they were
satisfied that the rights enjoyed by Africans in many
areas had evolved to something like full ownership and
therefore should be recognised as such. However, they
felt that it was inadvisable to attempt to confer
title by way of grant, either by the Crown 236
 or by
the Trust Boards. Instead the adjudication committees
"should list those persons whose rights they
considered should be recognised as ownership and that
subsequent registration should convert that
recognition into a freehold title which would vest in
those persons an estate in fee simple" (italics
mine). 237 This was implemented when the draft Bill
produced by the Working Party was accepted and passed
by the Legislative Council and became known as the
Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959. Section 37
of the Ordinance provided that the registration of a
recommendations were adopted into the Native Land
Tenure Rules 1956 - M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in
the Kikuyu Country, op.cit., pp. 122-135. See also S.
Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration, (Cambridge
1976), pp.198, 466.
235 S.Rowton Simpson, op.cit., p. 446. In view of
its deficient provisions (see above) it was not
surprising that this view was taken.
236 This was the procedure under the Registration of
Titles Ordinance 1919.
237 Report of the Working Party, op.cit., para. 34.
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freehold title vested in the registered proprietor an
estate in fee simple.
The 1959 Ordinance was unique for it not only
made provision for the adjudication and consolidation
of land238 but it also made provision for the
organization and administration of land registries,239
the procedure on a disposition of a registered
title, 240 rectification and indemnity for errors and
omissions on the register, 241 the recognition of
overriding interests242 and the protection of minor
interests. 243 Significantly, the Ordinance contained
provisions on substantive land law which would
regulate land registered under the statute, such as
provisions on leases, charges, easements and profits,
prescription and co-ownership. 244
The Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959 was
the fifth new form of land registration but which only
applied in the African lands. The other four
registration systems remained intact and would
continue to apply in their respective areas. Shortly
238 Part II. For discussion of land adjudication,
see Chapter Three, infra,.
239 Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959, Part
III.
240 Ibid, Parts V, VI.
241 Ibid, ss. 88,89,90.
242 Ibid, S. 40.
243 Ibid, ss. 86,87.
244 Ibid, Part VI.
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after, the Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959
was renamed the Land Registration (Special Areas)
Ordinance 1959 with its provisions unchanged.245
IV. The Registered Land Act 1963 
By 1960, Kenya had five different systems of land
registration which were applied to different parts of
the country. Such an anomalous situation was the
result of a haphazard land policy that failed to
provide for a comprehensive system of land
registration covering the whole country. There were
three main factors that brought this about. First and
most important was the desire of the colonial
administration to stimulate European settlement at all
costs, and to do this, the best land was set aside for
them at the expense of the Africans who had already
inhabited the land. This produced a dichotomous
approach whereby European land was made subject to
English law while land inhabited by Africans was
subject to customary law. This meant that forms of
land registration introduced in European lands were
not applied in the African lands due to the overriding
view that Africans were not yet ready to adopt such
systems and, moreover, their institutions did not
recognise freehold title. The outbreak of the Mau Mau
245 The change in name was probably as a result of a
move to remove references in legislation that referred
to Africans derogatively, in particular the term
'native'. The 'Special Areas' in the renamed
Ordinance were those areas which up to then were
referred as 'Native Lands.'
109
war, which was a result of African anger and
frustration at the way they were treated, caused a
rapid change of policy by the government toward the
grant of titles to Africans and resulted in the
creation of new system of land registration to apply
in African lands which was designed to stimulate
African agriculture.
A second factor was the quirk of history which
affected land situated in the Coast province. The
rule of the Sultan of Zanzibar had resulted in the
application of Islamic law along the coast and the
owners of land were regulated by such law. British
acquisition of jurisdiction over this area meant that
it became important to distinguish land that was
privately owned and therefore subject to Islamic law
from land that was held to unoccupied, and to this end
a method of registering these titles was introduced in
the Coast.
The third factor was the simple failure of the
government to address itself to the issue of providing
a unified structure of land registration that would
uniformly cover the whole country. Successive
registration statutes were passed without providing
for the repeal of preceeding legislation and no
thought was given on how titles registered under the
Registration of Documents Ordinance could be converted
to come under the Crown Lands Ordinance 1915, or how
titles under the latter Ordinance or those registered
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under the Land Titles Ordinance 1908 could be brought
under the Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919.
As Kenya moved towards Independence from British
colonial rule the question of how these systems of
land registration could be replaced by a single system
of land registration covering the whole country began
to be addressed. In 1961 an unofficial committee
looked into this question and came up with a draft
bill which was to provide "for the practical needs of
land owners in Kenya with respect (a) to security and
proof of title and (b) a facility for creating and
transferring interests in land". 246
 In their
commentary on the bill the committee pointed out how
the Bill avoided the deficiencies found in the
Registration of Titles Ordinance 1919. The committee
had looked at various sources while drawing up the
Bill, notably a Bill drawn up by a Working Party on
Registration of Ownership of Land in Lagos to
introduce registration of title in Labos, Nigeria.247
The committee also analysed the English Land
Registration Act 1925, the New South Wales Real
property Act 1900, the Tanganyika Land Registration
Ordinance 1953, the Victoria Transfer of Land Act 1954
and the Singapore Land Titles Ordinance 1956. By
analysing these Acts the committee was able to adopt
some of their provisions in the Bill. Undoubtedly,
246 S. Rowton Simpson, op.cit., p. 447.
247 Ibid., pp. 447-449.
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the committee was greatly influenced by the Land
Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance 1959 which had
been in force and which was seen to be successful in
its application although it too had defects. 248
 The
Bill also contained a code of substantive land law
that would apply to land registered under it.
The Bill was accepted by the new Kenya Parliament
and was passed to become the Registered Land Act 1963.
The Act had two principal objectives; first, to unify
the system of land registration by converting the
titles subject to the Land Titles Act 1908,.
Government Lands Act 1915, Registration of Titles Act
1919, and the Land Registration (Special Areas) Act
1959 onto the register created by the 1963 Act;
secondly, to facilitate the registration of land that
was subject to customary law. Such land first
underwent adjudication whereby all the customary
rights affecting the land were recorded by ajudication
committees, prior to such land being registered. This
process had been provided for in the Land Registration
(Special Areas) Ordinance 1959 but is now governed by
the Land Adjudication Act 1968.
Significantly, the Act contained new substantive
land law provisions that would regulate land
registered under the Act. Land registered under the
pre-existing registration systems was already subject
248 The National Assembly, House of Representatives,
Official Report, Vol.1, Part I, Col. 781, (10 July
1963).
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to the substantive land law contained in the Indian
Transfer of Property Act 1882. The 1882 Act would
cease to apply to land registered under the Registered
Land Act 1963. Therefore, the 1963 Act would not only
unify the system of land registration when all the
titles already registered under the other systems were
converted to the register under the Act, but would
also unify the substantive land law because,
eventually, the Indian Transfer of Property Act 1882
would cease to apply; moreover, customary land law
would cease to apply to land which was subject to
adjudication and brought onto the register.
The registration of land subject to customary
tenure would complete an important transformation: the
rights and obligations recognised by unwritten African
customary law, to which land under customary tenure
was subject to, would be transposed onto rights and
obligations created by the statute and familiar to
English law. Such a change would create new
obligations for those with interests in registered
land. Enforceability of such interests would now
depend on whether they were registered or not.
Unregistered interests would not bind a purchaser of
land for example, unless they came within the category
of overriding interests. 249 A purchaser would
therefore have to search the register of title first
249 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 30.
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before entering into a transfer to ascertain what
interests were binding on the land.
The transfer of registered land would,
undoubtedly be much easier than it was under customary
law. No more would it be necessary to have a large
number of persons witness a transfer of land, as was
the situation under customary law. Such transfers now
merely required the vendor and purchaser to sign the
relevant transfer forms, with proof of the transfer
and hence of title being the entry of the transfer in
the register of title. 25 ° As it will be shown,
personal attendance by parties to transactions at the
land registries and the completion of such
transactions there remains a significant feature of
land registration practice.251
However, as was pointed out in Parliament when
the Bill was being debated, the unification of land
registration was not going to happen overnight but
would take several years. 252
 More than 25 years later
this process is still continuing. Since the enactment
of the Act, the emphasis has been placed on the
registration of land formerly under customary tenure.
With the exception of titles registered under the Land
Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance 1959, which
250 However, as will be shown in chapter Five, there
is more involved in a transfer than meets the eye.
251 See Chapter Four, infra.
252 The National Assembly, House of Representatives,
Official Report, Vol.1, Part 1, col. 782, (10 July
1963).
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were automatically converted onto the register under
the 1963 Act, 253 the conversion of titles registered
under the other registration Acts has been relegated
into the background. It will therefore be a long time
yet before unification of the systems of land
registration in Kenya takes place.
V.	 Conclusion
Despite the fact that the system of private
conveyancing was antiquated and discredited due to its
inherent faults, it took many years before land
registration became established in England and
accepted as a system that was there to stay. As a
result of the opposition of the English legal
profession which had a vested interest in maintaining
the system of private conveyancing which, though
inherently deficient, was profitable to them, together
with the failure of landowners to voluntarily register
their titles,itmeant that from the enactment of the
Land Registry Act 1862 it took nearly a century before
land registration really took hold in England. This
would be a factor explaining why the British
government did not initially introduce English land
registration in Kenya, despite the fact that they had
introduced English common law and the principles of
equity as the general law, in addition to the i ported
law of real property from India, when colonial rule
253 The Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance
1959 was repealed at the same time.
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was established in Kenya at the end of the 19th
century. Land registration was in its infancy in
England and at that time was still viewed as a
discredited system, and though remedies had been
introduced by the Land Transfer Act 1897, these had
not yet taken effect.
Neverthless, it was the reorganisation of the law
of real property together with further improvements to
the system of land registration in 1925 that began to
change the indifference to land registration in
England, and even outside England, in the colonies, it
began to be perceived as an effective system. 254
 It
was to take more than 60 years from the establishment
of colonial rule before the English model of land
registration was introduced in Kenya through the
enactment of the Registered Land Act 1963. By this
time several forms of land registration had been
experimented with in Kenya. The system of deeds
registration introduced by the Registration of
Documents Ordinance 1901 and the Crown Lands Ordinance
1915 was inadequate as titles had still to be
investigated retrospectively by a purchaser, making
the process of conveying land subject to the
registration of deeds a difficult one. The hybrid
system of land registration introduced by the Land
Titles Act 1908 in the coast was only made to apply to
254 However, even after the reforms of 1925 it was to
take a long time before land registration became well
established in England, particularly outside London -
see Chapter Three, infra.
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that area due to the application of Islamic law which
came about as a result of the rule of the Sultan of
Zanzibar. Nevertheless, the system was expensive and
was suspended for over 35 years due to lack of funds
to administer it. Notably, the Registration of Titles
Act 1919 which introduced the Torrens system of land
registration was a failure. It was badly drafted and
when enacted the opposition of the legal profession to
the Act meant that it never was a success. Moreover,
its failure can also be attributed to the fact that
not only was it limited in its application (generally
being confined to freehold titles), but,
significantly, no attempt was made to convert the
other existing systems onto the 1919 Act, which meant
that the other systems continued to run parallel and
in competition with the 1919 Act.
The separate treatment of the Africans by the
colonial government in Kenya, a consequence of the
dual policy, resulted in the application of customary
land law in the African lands, which was different to
the land law applied in the rest of the country.
African titles were ultimately vested first in the
Crown and subsequently in the Native Lands Trust
Boards. The realisation among the Africans that they
were not the real owners of the land brought about the
demands for secure freehold titles and the return of
land that had been granted to the European settlers.
The colonial government's refusal to accede to such
demands contributed to the outbreak of the Mau Mau
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civil war. The response of the colonial government
albeit belated, was to introduce land registration and
the grant of indefeasible titles in the African lands.
However, there was the realisation that the
method of land holding among African societies in the
reserves had to be altered before indefeasible
registered titles could be issued. Land consolidation
was seen as the panacea for the fragmentation of land,
a problem which was brought about by overpopulation in
the Reserves contributing to a land shortage, together
with the customary rules of succession which caused
land to be continually subdivided amongst families.
Those persons who claimed rights of ownership over
land as well as those who claimed customary rights
over land had to have those rights ascertained and
recorded, hence the programme of land adjudication.
Therefore, the enactment of the Registered Land
Act 1963 was meant to bring cohesion to land
registration in Kenya by uniting the disparate systems
of land registration and, notably continuing the
process of registering land in the areas under
customary tenure. This latter task had particular
significance because it was closely tied with the
agricultural development of the African lands.255
Land registration was therefore not only a measure to
improve the method of conveying land simply, safely
255 See R.J.M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the
Development of African Agriculture in Kenya, (Nairobi
1954).
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and economically but was a measure that would bring
economic' development to the region as farmers could
use their registered titles to obtain credit for
agricultural improvements and therefore boost their
incomes.
Plainly, the emphasis of land registration was to
improve dealings in land. The objective of the Land
Registration 1925 was to eventually replace the
laborious investigation of title which was a feature
of private conveyancing, with a method of conveying
land that was meant to be simple and safe. This was
the same objective of the Registered Land Act 1963;
the 1963 Act would eventually introduce a nationwide
system of registration which would facilitate dealings
in land. However, in doing this it had a bigger task
than the English Land Registration Act 1925. It had
to replace the pre-existing registration systems which
were deficient and bring the titles registered under
those systems to the new register under the 1963 Act;
moreover, it had to extend registration to those lands
that were under customary tenure and this was going to
be no easy task because of the nature of customary
law.
The procedure used in bringing land under
customary tenure onto the register and the process of
converting titles registered under the re-existing
registration systems is discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter Three
Bringing Titles Onto The Register
I.	 Introduction
A huge task faced the Registered Land Act 1963
when it was enacted. Titles that were subject to the
Government Lands Act 1915 and those registered under
the Land Titles Act 1908 and the Registration of Titles
Act 1919, were to be converted and transferred to the
new register created by the Registered Land Act 1963.
Secondly, land subject to customary tenure, the Trust
Lands, was also to be brought onto the register. This
latter task was to prove difficult because, as
indicated in Chapter Two, owners of land under
customary tenure could only prove their title and the
extent of the boundaries to the land by relying on the
oral testimony of the witnesses who had been present
during the transfer of the land. Such a method had
potential difficulties when, for example, the passing
of successive generations meant that the exact nature
of the original transfer was forgotten or nobody could
remember the exact line of the boundaries to a portion
of land. The identification of persons with rights of
ownership and those with interests in the land, as well
as the extent of boundaries was to prove to be a
problem when land subject to customary law was being
registered. It meant that before a person could be
registered as the owner of a plot of land it was
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necessary to ascertain such ownership through the
testimony of local people such as adjacent land owners,
local inhabitants or relatives who would have been
aware of his right of ownership under customary law and
the extent of the boundaries to his land.
It is this method of ascertaining such ownership
that is referred to as land adjudication. Also
included in the process of land adjudication is the
identification of persons who hold customary interests
in land. The rights and interests of all these persons
were to be recorded; those with rights of ownership
were registered as proprietors, while those with
interests in the land had those interests protected on
the register of title.
The introduction of land registration in the
African lands was done not only for political reasons
but also as an economic measure. 11
 The Swynnerton Plan
highlighted the fact that agricultural production in
the African lands could be boosted by the consolidation
of fragmented land. Fragmentation of land was brought
about by the combination of the rules of customary
succession, whereby all the sons in a family had to
receive a share of their father's land, and an increase
of the population in the Reserves. Plots of land that
were initially large in size became progressively
smaller. Since some of these plots of land were not
sufficient to support a family, additional plots of
1	 See Chapter Two, Part II, supra.
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land were bought within the vicinity to be used for
subsistence agriculture. Consequently, a family could
have numerous plots of land, all tending to have small
acreage. According to the Swynnerton Plan, if these
plots were brought into one consolidated unit the
result would be an economic holding contributing to
sound 'agricultural development', which would be
accentuated if the titles to this land were declared
indefeasible through registration.2
Therefore, land adjudication was combined with
land consolidation in a process where interests in land
and rights to own land were determined, before the
fragments of land were surveyed and consolidated into
one unit and subsequently registered. The process of
land consolidation was mainly carried out in the
Central Province in the 1950s because that was where
the problem of land fragmentation was acute. The
outbreak of the Mau Mau civil war enabled the colonial
government to execute land consolidation in that area
very quickly.3
Land adjudication and land consolidation form
distinguishing and important features in the process of
bringing titles onto the register under the Registered
Land Act 1963. A significant feature is that the
consolidation of land and the adjudication of interests
2	 R.J.M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the
Development of African Agriculture in Kenya, (Nairobi
1954), paras. 13,14.
3	 See Chapter Two, Part II, supra.
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is undertaken by committees composed of lay people
assisted by administrative officials. This procedure
is not governed by the Registered Land Act 1963 but by
the Land Consolidation Act 1968 and the Land
Adjudication Act 1968. This unique procedure is in
contrast with the method of bringing titles onto the
register under the Land Registration Act 1925. Before
unregistered land can be brought onto the register
under the 1925 Act, the Land Registrar is responsible
for investigating the titles by examining the documents
of title and, in doing this, he is assisted by
experienced conveyancing counsel. However, the Land
Registrar under the Registered Land Act 1963 takes no
part in the investigation of titles of land subject to
customary tenure. All the work is done by the
committees mentioned above. The work of the Registrar
is merely to register the titles that are adjudicated
and investigated by the committees. This however, has
created serious problems as will be shown.
Land consolidation in Kenya has almost come to an
end and no longer has the importance it once had
because almost all the land that was viewed as
excessively fragmented has been consolidated. The most
important procedure remains that of land adjudication
governed by the Land Adjudication Act 1968.
This chapter briefly describes how land
consolidation was undertaken then concentrates on the
present method of land adjudication. Land adjudication
has had several problems, notably the equating of
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customary rights into rights recognised by the
Registered Land Act 1963, the composition of the
adjudication committees and, significantly, the
protection of the rights of those who are absent when
land adjudication was taking place. The latter was a
serious problem in the 1950s when the Mau Mau civil war
was at its height and many landowners were in
detention. This chapter considers how effective the
procedure of land adjudication is and how the problems
presented by land adjudication can be solved. 4 Also
considered is the method used in converting titles that
were registered under pre-existing registration
systems.
The process of land adjudication highlights an
important aspect in the spread of land registration:
the extension of land registration in a systematic
manner. This is a distinguishing feature of land
registration in Kenya compared to the procedure in
England where registration is spread on a sporadic
basis. Systematic registration is a methodical and
coordinated registration of all the plots of land in a
defined area within a period of time; sporadic
registration, on the other hand, is the registration of
4	 The reader's attention is drawn to the research
carried out by Simon Coldham on land adjudication in
Western Kenya. The researcher was able to go into
detail, as a result of his research, on the merits and
de-merits of land adjudication - see S.F.R. Coldham,
Registration of Titles to land in the Former Special 
Areas of Kenya, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of
London, 1977. For this reason, this chapter will
briefly outline the procedure of land adjudication and
the problems created.
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titles within an area in an ad hoc and uncoordinated
manner. The systematic versus the sporadic spread of
land registration is discussed, the advantages and
disadvantages of both methods considered and the
reasons why each country adopted a different method.
The identification of a registered title by its
plan is crucial to the effectiveness of a system of
land registration. A plan identifies the extent of the
boundaries of a registered title in relation to
adjacent properties. The preparation of the Registry
Index Maps which identify the extent of registered
properties in a given area, and from which individual
plans for registered titles are drawn, has to be done
effectively if titles are to be adequately identified.
The method of preparing Registry maps in Kenya is
therefore an important aspect of the process of
bringing titles onto the register. The methods used
for the survey of land and the preparation of the
Registry Index Map in Kenya are designed for the
process of systematic registration of land. The method
used in identifying land in Kenya is considered in the
final part of this chapter and its effectiveness
evaluated.
II. Sporadic Versus Systematic Registration
To describe the registration of titles in England
as compulsory is a misnomer because nobody is forced to
have their titles registered. It is more accurate to
state that registration in England is inducive.
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Section 123(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925
provides that in an area of compulsory registration a
conveyance on sale of freehold or a lease of more than
21 years or with 21 years unexpired not registered
within two months from the date of the conveyance is
void. The effect of non-registration is therefore to
vest the legal estate back to the transferee. The
intended transferee suffers loss by having the legal
estate divested from him, although he can recover it by
making a fresh application. 5 Therefore, the effect of
section 123(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925 is to
induce transferees to register their titles and avoid
the effect of non-registration, and the inconvenience
of having to reapply for registration. No penalty is
faced by a person who fails to register.
In contrast, land registration in Kenya can
accurately be described as compulsory. Once an area is
declared an adjudication area 6 all persons claiming
title to, or interests in land must make their claims
to the adjudication officials who have these claims
recorded and eventually registered. 7 Once all claims
have been adjudicated, recorded, all appeals dealt
with, and the adjudication register handed to the Chief
Land Registrar for registration under the Registered
Land Act 1963, the register becomes final. Anyone who
5	 This issue is discussed further in Chapter Four,
infra.
6	 Land Adjudication Act 1968, s. 3.
7	 Ibid., s. 13.
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has neglected to have his interest or title registered
within the time period has that interest extinguished
for all time as there can be no rectification of first
registrations. 8 The consequences of non-registration
are therefore severe. Moreover, once a title is
registered, a failure to register a disposition results
in the payment of penalty fees on an escalating scale
and, in an extreme case, a criminal prosecution. 9 The
consequences of non-registration and the nature of
sanctions involved make the method of registration of
titles truly compulsory.10
When it comes to bringing titles onto the
register, the compulsory systems of registration in
Kenya and England are essentially different. In Kenya,
first registration of titles is undertaken on a
systematic basis while in England the process of
registering unregistered titles is conducted on a
sporadic basis. In Kenya when an adjudication area is
declared, every claim to title or an interest in land,
as well as the definition of parcels is adjudicated
upon and registered in a methodical and orderly manner.
This means that all titles in an area are registered
simultaneously and all this within a definite period.
Therefore, as parts of the country are progressively
8 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 143(1). The question
of whether unregistered interests can still take effect
is considered in Chapter Six, infra.
9	 Registered Land Act 1963, ss. 40(1), 41.
10 See Chapter Four for the consideration of the
effect of registration.
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declared adjudication sections, all land within those
areas is brought onto the register in a systematic and
comprehensive manner.11
Although land adjudication in the Trust lands is
being undertaken in a systematic manner, this method of
registration has not yet been extended to the
conversion of titles registered under the other
registration systems. The emphasis has been placed on
the registration of land formerly under customary
tenure whereas the conversion of titles has not been
viewed as urgent. 12 The Trust lands were to prove to
be the most difficult areas to register because of the
process of determining and adjudicating over customary
rights.
The decision to have land adjudicated and
registered systematically in Kenya was based on the
recommendation of the East Africa Royal Commission.
The Commission was influenced by the evidence submitted
by Mr. V.L.O. Sheppard, an expert on land registration,
who expressed his opposition to sporadic registration.
He stated:
11 It is important to note that land subjected to
adjudication is primarily land under customary tenure,
now classified as Trust lands. These lands formerly
vested in the Native Lands Trust Boards, are now vested
in the County Councils of the areas concerned. Any
land not classified as Trust land and not registered
under the Registered Land Act 1963 will be governed by
either one of the other registration Acts, that is, the
Registration of Documents Act 1902, Land Titles Act
1908, Government Lands Act 1915 and the Registration of
Titles Act 1919.
12 See the discussion on the conversion of titles
registered under the other registration Acts,infra.
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"Sporadic introduction of registration of
title is vicious in principle, as it means
that each property is given isolated
consideration when it happens to come up for
registration instead of conflicting claims of
neighbours all being thrashed out at the same
time. Uncoordinated work of this character
is considerably less worthy of confidence, as
well as being much slower and vastly more
expensive than investigation and settlement
of boundaries and titles systematically
conducted 14ot by plot through the
district."1'
The Commission felt that considerable time and
expense would be saved if the examination of all
interests within an area selected for adjudication was
done at once and those interests registered. 14 This
could only be achieved if adjudication was done
systematically. Nevertheless, the Royal Commission
pointed out that systematic adjudication could not be
rigidly adhered to and that there should also be a mix
of sporadic compilation, especially in an area where
there existed a few progressive African farmers. These
were to have the benefit of registration so that other
less progressive farmers in the same area would
endeavour to emulate the more progressive, thereby
warranting the subsequent introduction of systematic
registration.15
However, the Working Party on African Land Tenure
which reported three years after the Commission report,
13 Report of the East Africa Royal Commission on Land
and Population 1953-55. Cmnd. 9475, para. 17.
14 mid, para. 18.
15 Ibid., para. 17. See also Report of the 
Conference on African Land Tenure in East and Central
Africa (1956) J.A.A. (Special Supplement), para. 40.
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rejected the notion that sporadic registration should
be introduced in certain areas. They felt that it
would not be practical or just to confer registration
to a few applicants. Instead adjudication and
registration should be applied equally to all in a
systematic manner. This principle was accepted and was
provided for in the Native Lands Registration Ordinance
1959. Sections 9-20 of the Ordinance outlined the
procedure used in the systematic adjudication and
registration of rights. Once an area was declared an
adjudication section all claimants of land and
interests in land were to present their claims before
the adjudication committee, and once the claims were
confirmed, they were to be recorded on a Record of
Existing Rights which formed the Register of Title.
The adjudication procedure in the 1959 Ordinance
was replaced by the procedure introduced by the Land
Adjudication Act 1968 which was essentially the same as
that in the 1959 Ordinance. 16 However, the systematic
nature of the operation has been made more explicit.
Section 3(1) of the 1968 Act lays down the criteria for
the extension of land adjudication to a given area; it
provides that the Minister17 is responsible for
applying the Act to an area of Trust land if:
"(a) the county council in whom the land is
vested so requests; and
16 Discussed infra.
17 This comes under the portfolio of the Minister for
Lands, Settlement and Physical Planning.
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(b) the Minister considers it expedient
that the rights and interests of persons in
the land should be ascertained and
registered; and
(c) the Land Consolidation Act does not
apply to the area."
The provisions of section 3(1) of the Land
Adjudication Act 1968 now apply to over half the
country as the map overleaf shows. Only the northwest,
northern, and northeastern parts of the country remain
to be adjudicated and registered. These parts cover
only a total of 9 out of 41 districts. The reason why
these northern areas remain the last to be adjudicated
is due to their arid and semi-arid nature. As a result
they are sparsely populated, inhabited primarily by
nomadic societies leading a peripatetic existence.
Consequently, over many years, there never was demand
for registered titles in these areas, hence it was not
seen viable to extend land registration there.
Nevertheless, over recent years there has been
settlement and farming in small pockets of areas that
are habitable, such as around Marsabit, and it is
planned to extend adjudication and registration to
these areas. 18
The systematic registration of unregistered titles
in Kenya contrasts with the method of sporadic
registration in England. As mentioned earlier,
unregistered titles in a
18 Interview with Mr. J. Kibe, Land Adjudication
Official, Land Adjudication Department, Nairobi, 3
October 1989.
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compulsory area in England can only be brought onto the
register when they are conveyed on sale. 19 Titles are
therefore registered in piecemeal fashion and in an
uncoordinated manner. The absence of a systematic
method of registering titles means that each title that
comes up for registration must be considered in
isolation in relation to adjacent properties.
Therefore, the length of time it would take to register
all unregistered titles in a given area would be
indefinite and undetermined.
The snail's pace in the extension of land
registration in England can be attributed to the
reactionary opposition by the legal profession to a new
system of conveying land. The House of Commons Select
Committee Report on the working of the Land Registry
Act 1862 highlighted the strong attachment to the
antiquated method of private conveyancing. 20 However,
even prior to the opposition of the legal profession
there never had been support for compulsory
registration in official circles. For example, the
Registration of Title Commissioners stated in their
1857 report that registration should be made compulsory
in the sense that once land was "voluntarily put on the
register subsequent dealings ... should always be put
on the register." 21 (italics mine) Their view
19	 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 123(1).
20 See Chapter Two, supra.
21 Report of the Commission on the Registration of 
Titles, (1857), C.2215, para. XLVII.
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therefore was that landowners should have the option of
deciding whether or not to have their titles
registered.
That voluntary registration was a failure is
indicated by the fact that between 1862 and 1895 there
were only 4,236 registered titles, many of these being
subdivisions of the original registered titles'22
Repeated attempts in the late 1880's and early 1890s to
pass bills introducing compulsory registration ended in
failure. 23	When compulsory registration was
finally introduced by the Land Transfer Act 1897, it
was to be on an ad hoc basis, section 20(1) providing
that in a compulsory area, a title was to be registered
when conveyed on sale. Since sales of land can never
be coordinated, registration of titles on this basis
would always be haphazard. Initially, this form of
compulsory registration was introduced in London by
Order in Council. Outside London, county councils had
the option of introducing registration but none did so.
The Royal Commission on the Land Transfer Acts pointed
out that the spread of Land Registration would be
faster if registration was a national rather than a
local question, in other words, central government
rather than the county councils should be responsible
for introducing registration to an area.24
22 Second Report of the Royal Commission on the Land
Transfer Acts (1911), Cd. 5483, para. 21.
23	 See Chapter Two, supra.
24	 Second Report of the Royal Commission ..., Cd.
5483, op. cit., para. 95.
134
The Acquisition and Valuation of Land Committee
agreed with the recommendation of the Royal Commission.
However, they proposed that when a county council
received an Order in Council they should hold a public
enquiry to ascertain if there were any reasons why
compulsory registration should not be extended to the
county concerned. If an enquiry was held and a
majority were in favour of registration, or after six
months no demand for an enquiry was made, then
Parliament was to approve of the draft Order in Council
extending registration to the county' 25 This
recommendation became part of section 120 of the Land
Registration Act 1925. However, even after 1925, the
extension of registration was excruciatingly slow.
Between 1925 and 1951 registration had only been
extended to the county boroughs of Eastbourne,
Hastings, Middlesex, Croydon and Surrey, covering 14%
of the population. 26 However, the next 38 years were
to see a rapid extension of land registration over
England and Wales. Registration has finally been
extended to the whole of England and Wales, the
Registration of Title Order 1989 having extended
compulsory registration to the last ten remaining
25 Fourth Report of the Acquisition and Valuation of
Land Committee on the Transfer of Land in England and 
Wales (1919) Cd. 424, para. 47.
26 H.M. Land Registry, Explanatory Leaflet, No.9,
(February 1989); H.M. Land Registry, Registrations of 
Title to Land, A Brief Guide, (London 1988) p.l.
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counties. 27 Map 4	 c, is reproduced from
the Report on the work of H.M. Land Registry for the
year 1989-90, which shows the progressive extension of
compulsory registration in England Wales. The
subsequent rapid spread of compulsory registration in
England can be attributed to the removal by the Land
Registration Act 1966 of the need to hold a public
enquiry by the county councils concerned and the
greater control by central government over the spread
of land registration.
What are the merits of systematic and sporadic
registration of titles? The systematic method as
applied in Kenya has one important advantage: every
title in an area is brought onto the register within a
determined length of time. Map ,57	for
example, shows the parts in Kenya (shaded) where every
adjudicated title is registered under the Registered
Land Act 1963. In contrast, when one compares this map
with the previous map showing the extent of coverage of
land registration in England and Wales the previous map
belies the fact that no one Borough has every title on
the register. This means that in Kenya, the
registration of every title will take place in the
foreseeable future.
Initially it had been optimistically hoped that it
would take 10 years from the enactment of the
Registered Land Act 1963 before all land that was
27 With effect from 1 December 1990.
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subject to adjudication was registered. However, the
difficulty of adjudicating over customary rights and
the expense involved has meant that the adjudication
process has taken longer than expected and is in fact
still going on. Nevertheless, the systematic
compilation of the register has resulted in the
dramatic spread of registration in Kenya. When maps 4
and 6 are taken together, it is evident that the spread
of registration in Kenya is impressive in view of the
fact that systematic compilation has been going on for
more than 35 years.
-
The method of systematic adjudication meant
that with time, the amount of land being registered
would start to fall as each title was methodically
registered, thereby proportionally reducing the amount
of land left unregistered. Yet, in comparison, even
though land registration has been established in
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England and Wales for a little under 130 years, there
is no one area where all the titles are registered as a
result of the sporadic compilation of the register.
Registration of unregistered titles in England will
therefore continue long into the foreseeable future.
Systematic registration enables resources and
staff to be marshalled effectively and targeted at the
area undergoing adjudication and registration. It also
enables the survey of plots to be undertaken
systematically as all the boundaries are determined at
the same time. This remains a great strength of
systematic compilation of the register as will be
considered in the final part of this chapter.
However, the relative disadvantage of the
systematic method is that outside the'registration
areas, a person cannot voluntarily seek to have his
title registered. This is posble under sporadic
registration outside the comp sory areas under the
Land Registration Act 1925, albeit in certain limited
.
circumstances. Before 19 :vat was possible for anyone
outside the compulsory areas to voluntarily have their
titles brought onto the register. But, section 21(2)
of the Land Registration Act 1966 provided that no
voluntary applications for registration outside
compulsory areas would be entertained except in such
classes of cases as the Registrar would specify. He
has now specified28 the classes of titles which can be
28 Pursuant to a notice issued on 20 October 1987.
See [1987] Corm.
140
registered voluntarily: where the title deeds have been
destroyed by enemy action, natural disaster or criminal
acts, or where they are lost while in the custody of a
bank, solicitor, et al; where a building estate
comprised of 20 or more houses is being developed; or
an application by a local authority. Nevertheless,
voluntary applications for registration have the
disadvantage of making it impossible to ascertain and
determine the frequency and rate of applications.
III Land Consolidation
Land consolidation has nothing to do with
conveyancing. It is an agricultural reform measure
designed to unify parcels of land scattered over a wide
area, forming parts of one farm into a single unit.
The aim is to enable the single unit of land to be
farmed more effectively than if the farm had been
fragmented into several pieces. By replanning the
proprietary land units (usually averaging small
acreages) and consolidating them into a single unit,
the farmer is able to plan more effectively, for
example in the use of machinery and farm inputs such as
fertilizers and irrigation. The result is more
agricultural output from the single unit than from
several scattered units amounting to the same size.
Land consolidation in Kenya was part and parcel of the
process of bringing titles, onto the register,
particularly in areas that had suffered from over
population.
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The Reserves in the Central Province of Kenya were
an area that had been adversely affected by
overcrowding. Natural population increase, together
with the customary rules of succession resulted in the
decrease in the size of land that an individual could
hold. To illustrate this problem, suppose a family
head called Kamau had 18 acres of land, and he had six
sons. Under Kikuyu customary rules of succession29
each son was to get an equal share of the land, in this
case 3 acres, on the death of their father. If one son
had a large family by this time, he may have felt that
the 3 acres were not sufficient to maintain his family
and at the same time earn an income. Therefore, he
would usually purchase a plot of land elsewhere to
supplement his existing plot and later, buy another
plot to support his growing family and to provide an
inheritance for his sons. If the other five brothers
were each doing the same, there would come a time when
they would be having several plots of land scattered
within the locality. It was reported that some
families had between 10 to 29 minute plots of land
dispersed over a wide area." The Swynnerton Plan
recognised that such a system of land holding was not
an economical system of farming because it would be
29 See generally, E. Cotran, Restatement of African
Law, Kenya : The Law of Succession Vol. II, (London
1969).
30 R.J.M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the 
Development of African Agriculture in Kenya, (Nairobi
1954), para. 14.
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difficult to practice sound farming rotation,
application of fertiliser, manage and feed livestock or
tend cash crops effectively. 31 Therefore, before
farmers could be granted indefeasible registered titles
it was vital that these fragmented plots be
consolidated or merged by a system of exchanging land
so that farmers could have single units of land and be
issued with one title.32
Meanwhile, in Nyeri, groups of farmers were
proceeding to consolidate their holdings directed by
the local administration. This process was undertaken
under the aegis of the Native Lands Trust (Rights of
Occupancy) Rules which had been drafted by D.J.
Penwill, a Provincial Court Officer, but had no legal
force. 33
 The rules were superseded by the Native Land
Tenure Rules 1956, followed by provisions in the Native
Lands Registration Ordinance 1959, the Land
Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance 1959 and the
Land Adjudication Act 1964 which was later renamed the
Land Consolidation Act in 1968. 	 central feature of
land consolidation is that the process is undertaken by
a committee of lay people of not less than 25 appointed
31	 Ibid.
32	 Ibid.
33 See M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuu
Country : A Study in Government Policy, (Cambridge
1967), pp. 113, 114.
34 For convenience this Act will be referred to as
the Land Consolidation Act 1968.
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by the Adjudicating Officer. 35
 The committee is
assisted by a Demarcation Officer whose function is to
measure all the fragments of land in the area. The
number and sizes of the fragments or parcels of land
belonging to an individual are recorded in the Record
of Existing Rights. 36 The function of the Committee
was then to coordinate the exchanging of land amongst
the landowners. The essence was that a farmer would
give up one or more of his parcels of land in exchange
for a parcel of land adjacent to his remaining plot, to
form one single unit. Eventually, the size of the
single unit was to equal the sum of all the fragments
of land which the farmer had owned. Generally there
was to be "equality of exchange" so that the land that
the farmer received was to be of the same quality in
terms of soil fertility and drainage as the land which
he gave up, and moreover, if he had any interests in
the land that he gave up, those interests were
transferred to the land he received. 37 The Demarcation
Plan prepared by the Demarcation Officer shows what
each landowner should receive when the land is
reallocated. 38
 The boundaries of the new holdings are
35 Land Consolidation Act 1968, s. 9. The minimum
number of committee members was set at a high level to
minimise corruption - Legislative Council Debates, 
Official Report, Vol. LXXX, (1959). Part I, col. 72
(Minister for African Affairs, Mr. Johnston).
36 Land Consolidation Act 1968, s. 15.
37	 Ibid., s. 21(2).
38 Ibid., s. 24.
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set out on the ground by the Demarcation Officer,
normally in the presence of the committee members and
the landowners.39
The consolidation process was operating at the
same time as the adjudication of customary rights. The
adjudication procedure will be considered in the next
section. Land consolidation in Kenya is now virtually
complete and at the present time is being undertaken in
Meru, Baringo and Taita." It has only been undertaken
in limited areas where, as a result of dense population
and good fertility, land has been excessively
fragmented.
Land consolidation in Kenya can be contrasted with
the Inclosure movement in England in the 18th and 19th
centuries. Although both were agricultural reform
measures, the essential difference was that land
consolidation in Kenya is closely tied with
registration of titles. Once land is consolidated and
adjudicated, it as registered. However, the inclosure
of land in England had nothing to do with registration
of title; in fact it was undertaken well before land
registration was established in 1862. Inclosure was
purely an agricultural reform measure. Prior to the
20th century land was farmed in an open field system.
Land surrounding a village, for example, was divided
into two or three unenclosed or open fields. The
39	 Ibid., s. 23.
40 Interview with Dr. Aruka, Land Adjudication
Department, Nairobi, 12th September, 1989.
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fields would be divided into strips of about an acre,
each villager having been apportioned several scattered
strips in order to cultivate on soils of different
quality. However, this type of farming was
unproductive and wasteful, and a farmer would not be
able to farm his fragments as efficiently as he would a
single unit. 41 Through inclosure, these plots were
rationalised and farmers of scattered strips received a
single plot and granted a single freehold title.
Before 1801 inclosures were mainly initiated by
private Acts of Parliament, promoted by various Lords
of Manors. 42 Since this was expensive, the Inclosure
(Consolidation) Act 1801 simplified the procedure by
creating Commissioners who considered petitions for
inclosure. They took evidence from those who either
opposed or approved the petition. If they made an
award, they granted to each person a self contained
freehold estate in place of the scattered strips and
any rights of common he would have possessed. The 1801
Act was replaced by the Inclosure Act 1845 which
created a central body known as the Inclosure
Commissioners. The 1845 Act was eventually replaced by
41 Typical recitals in Private Acts of Parliament
were to the effect that the several lands and grounds
of the proprietors in the open fields lay inter-mixed
and dispersed in small parcels, and that their
cultivation was difficult and expensive because of
their inconvenient situation - see Co-operative
Wholesale Society v. The Parish Council of Twin Rivers,
16 March 1987, LEXIS Transcript (unreported).
42 4,000 were passed in the 18th and 19th centuries.
For a brief history see Searle v. Wallbank, [1947] A.C.
341, at pp. 347-349, per Viscount Maughan.
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the Commons Act 1876. The responsibility undertaken by
the Commissioner now lies with the Secretary of State
for the Environment' 43 Inclosures are rare in England
today due to the strong case a petition to inclose must
make. The growth of towns necessitated the setting
aside of recreational areas for the inhabitants at the
expense of inclosing the land for cultivation. The
rationale was that common lands should be opened to the
public rather than allocated amongst private
individuals.44
The inclosure movement is primarily responsible
for giving the English countryside its chequerboard
appearance with its numerous fields enclosed by stone
walls or hedges. However, as in Kenya, where land
consolidation is on the wane, inclosure is no longer
important as it once was. Nevertheless, land
consolidation in Kenya operated together with the
programme of land adjudication. Apart from the
conversion of titles from existing registration
systems, land adjudication is the most important stage
in bringing unregistered titles under the provisions of
the Registered Land Act 1963. This process is
considered in the next section.
43 The Secretary of State for the Environment Order
1970.
44 Societies such as the Common Preservation Society
have highlighted the need for land for recreational
purposes.
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IV Land Adjudication
Land adjudication procedure is not contained in
the Registered Land Act 1963 but is governed by a
separate Act, the Land Adjudication Act 1968. Prior to
the enactment of the 1968 Act, provisions governing
land consolidation, adjudication, and registration
together with the law on registered land was initially
contained in the Native Lands Registration Ordinance
1959. Later the 1959 Ordinance was reorganised with
the enactment of the Registered Land Act 1963. The
registration provisions of the 1959 Ordinance became
part of the Registered Land Act 1963, whereas the
consolidation and adjudication provisions of the 1959
Ordinance were grouped together and became the Land
Adjudication Act 1964. However, the Lawrance Mission45
recognised that the process of consolidation and
adjudication could not be applied in every part of the
country. There were many areas where the problem of
land fragmentation was not serious and therefore
warranted only the adjudication of customary rights.
Accordingly they proposed the enactment of a new Land
Adjudication Act which would only deal with
adjudication of customary rights. 46 Meanwhile the
existing Land Adjudication Act 1964 would continue to
operate in those areas where land fragmentation was
45 Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and
Registration in Kenya 1965-66, (London 1966). The
mission was chaired by Mr. J.C. D. Lawrance.
46 Ibid, Chapter XI.
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still a serious problem necessitating consolidation
prior to adjudication:4 7
The draft Land Adjudication Bill drawn up by the
Mission was subsequently accepted with some amendments
and enacted as the Land Adjudication Act 1968.
Although the Land Adjudication Act 1964 was renamed the
Land Consolidation Act by the 1968 Act, its provisions
remained intact. The Land Consolidation Act 1968
retained the provisions on consolidation and,
significantly, provisions on adjudication for the land
that was consolidated. This section is primarily
concerned with the adjudication procedure under the
Land Adjudication Act 1968.48
A. The Stay on Land Suits
An important corallary of the process of
systematic adjudication under the Land Adjudication Act
1968 is the stay imposed on land suits when an area is
declared an adjudication section under section 5 of the
Act. Section 30(1) of the Land Adjudication Act 1968
provides:
"Except with the consent in writing of the
Adjudication Officer, no person shall
institute, and no court shall entertain, any
civil proceedings concerning an interest i
land in an adjudication section until the
adjudication register for tht adjudication
47	 Ibid.,
48 Although the adjudication procedure under the Land
Adjudication Act 1968 now plays a far greater role than
the adjudication procedure under the Land Consolidation
Act 1968, reference will be made to the procedure under
the latter Act where there are significant differences.
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section has become final in all respects
under section 29(3) of this Act.
This sub-section had its origins in the African
Courts (Suspension of Land Suits) Ordinance 1956. This
piece of legislation had been enacted to prevent the
litigation over land that was taking place in the Trust
Lands from undermining the land consolidation and
adjudication process. This litigation, prevalent
mainly in the Central Province of Kenya, was a
consequence of political and economic factors. As
described in Chapter Two, many European settlers in
Kenya were allocated fertile land that had formerly
belonged to Africans. To prevent the former African
landowners from encroaching on the land farmed by the
settlers. Reserves were created to which the Africans
were confined. In areas such as the Central Province
where population was dense, the pressure on the limited
land available in the African Reserve became acute,
resulting in an increase in litigation over title to
land. The disputes were over who were the real owners
of plots of land, the arguments founded on details of
past oral transactions, the details of which had been
shrouded in uncertainty over time. There were cases
between those who had always lived in the reserve and
those who were forced to come back and live in the
reserve as a result of their landlessness. 49 For those
who were wealthy and had large plots of land in the
49 See M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu
Country: A Study in Government Policy, (Nairobi 1967),
p. 79.
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Reserve, the increase in population in the Reserve
meant that it became more difficult to purchase
additional land, and to maximise on the agricultural
production from their existing plots, many of them
began to evict ahoi who had been residing on their
land; naturally the latter brought suits against their
landlords in the African Courts.5°
Since adjudication was to enable land rights and
titles over the area to be ascertained, confusion would
reign if the jurisdiction of the Adjudication
committees competed with that of the courts. Moreover,
the speed at which land could be systematically
adjudicated would be hampered as the machinery in the
African Courts was too slow to deal with the
determination of rights.51
Moreover, it was felt that,
If ... it was of the utmost importance
that the occupier should be left in
undisturbed security to develop his holding
on a properly planned basis - this being the
main reason why he had agreed to
consolidation in the first instance - and
this would not be the case if decisions of
the Committee had been open to challenge in
the African courts."
The African Courts (Suspension of Suits) Ordinance
1956, certainly had the desired effect by "placing a
heavy clog on litigation concerning the rights of
native lands" 52 thereby speeding up the consolidtion
50	 Ibid., p. 78.
51 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure, 1957-58 (Nairobi 1958), para. 28.
52 The District Commissioner, Kiambu v. R. ex parte
Ethan Njau [1960] E.A. 109 at p. 128, per Gould J.A.
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and adjudication process. However, the combination of
the African Courts (Suspension of Suits) Ordinance
1956, and section89(1) of the Native Lands Registration
Ordinance 1959 which prevented the rectification of
first registrations, had the effect of completely
pulling the carpet from under land suits in the area
subject to adjudication. The prevention of
rectification of first registrations meant that land
suits could not be continued if ultimately the
determination of the suit involved the rectification of
the register. 53 Moreover, the adjudication committees
determined many of the disputes that had been at the
core of the suits before the courts, as a result of the
adjudication procedure which is described below.
The African Courts (Suspension of Suits) Ordinance
1956 was eventually replaced and its provisions
transferred to what ultimately became section 30 of the
Land Adjudication Act 1968, while section 88(1) of the
Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959 is now section
143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963. The effect,
however, is still the same, as the determination of
rights by an adjudication committee under the Land
Adjudication Act 1968 has the effect of determining
some of the disputes which were at the core of the
53 Government Officials had been concerned that
Ethan Kjau's application was an attempt to go round the
stay on litigation imposed by the 1956 Ordinance. The
fear was that if his case had succeeded before the
Court of Appeal, it would have broken open the flood
gates of litigation which had been dammed up by the
1956 Ordinance - M.P.K. Sorrenson, op.cit., p. 204.
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suits, and if one of the parties to the original land
dispute feels that adjudication has not solved the
dispute, then that party is effectively prevented from
having the register rectified.54
The above procedure is in direct contrast to the
position in England when unregistered land is subject
to registration under the Land Registration Act 1925.
If a plot of unregistered land is the subject matter of
a dispute between the title holder and another party
and the title holder wishes to sell the land, it can be
said that in general, no prudent purchaser aware of the
suit would wish to purchase the land. The purchaser
would probably have been alerted by the registration of
a pending land action in the register of pending
actions under the Land Charges Act 1972.
consequence of such an entry is that the prospective
purchaser is deemed to have 'actual notice' of the
contentious issues relating to the land he wishes to
purchase. 56
 If, on the other hand, there is a failure
to register the pending action, then it is ineffective
against the purchaser if he is "without express notice
of it." 57 Alternatively, if there is a writ or order
54 But see Chapter Eight, infra, for the methods used
by the Courts to evade section 143(1) of the Registered
Land Act 1963.
55 Section 5(1). A pending land action is defined as
"any action or proceeding pending in court relating to
land or any interest in or charge on land" - Ibid.,
s.17(1).
56	 Law of Property Act 1925, s. 198(1).
57	 Land Charges Act 1972, s. 5(7).
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affecting the land, it may be registered in the
register of writs or orders. 58 However, non
registrtion of a writ or order affecting the land is
non-effective against the purchaser.59
Consequently, if the purchaser is aware of the
pending action, or a writ or order affecting the land,
but, nevertheless, decides to go ahead with the
purchase of the unregistered title, then the title,
having been conveyed on sale," would be subject to
examination by the Registrar in order to be registered
on the register of title. 61 If the writ, order or
pending action was protected as an incumbrance under
the Land Charges Act 1972, then they may be protected
by a caution against dealings under section 59(1) of
the Land Registration Act 1925.62
Hence, unlike the position under the Land
Adjudication Act 1968, the registration of a pending
land action under the Land Charges Act 1972 does not
prevent the land affected from being disposed of and
registered in the name of the purchaser on a first
58	 Ibid., S. 6.
59	 Ibid., s. 6(4).
60	 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 123(1).
61	 Ibid., s. 13.
62 If the land was subject to a charge securing a
debt, a creditors notice or a bankruptcy inhibition may
be entered - ibid, s. 59(1) whereas a charging order
may be protected by notice instead of a caution - ibid,
s. 49(1)(g).
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registration under the Land Registration Act 1925.63
In reality, however, a pending land action has the
effect of preventing a landowner from selling the land
to a purchaser since no prudent purchaser would want to
be saddled with a lawsuit or a proprietary right,64
thereby preventing it being brought onto the register.
The contrast between the position in Kenya under
the Land Adjudication Act 1968 and that in England
under the Land Registration Act 1925 and the Land
Charges Act 1972 reflects indeed the contrast between
the systematic and sporadic methods of compiling the
register in Kenya and England respectively. 65 The next
section goes on to consider the composition of the
adjudication team and the procedure followed when
adjudicating land.
B. The Adjudication Team
The adjudication team responsible for determining
and recording customary rights is responsible for
determining first, those individuals within the
adjudication sections who are landowners, and secondly,
63 See Calgary and Edmonton Land Co Ltd v. Dobinson
[1974] 1 All ER 484 at p. 489 where Megarry J. pointed
out that what is registered as a pending land action is
"not an action merely claiming that the owner should be
restrained from exercising his powers of disposition
(italics mine)", but an action which claims some
proprietory right in the land.
64 See for example, Allen v Greenhi Builders Ltd
[1979] 1 WLR 156.
65 Supra.
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those who have interests in land. The team is composed
of the following:
1. The Adjudication Officer
He is a public officer in overall charge of
adjudication in the area concerned and has power to
appoint subordinate officers to assit him. 66 . He is
appointed by the Minister of Lands who has the power to
appoint additional adjudication officers if the
situation so requires. 67 The duties and powers of the
adjudication officer are extensive. He is responsible
for appointing the adjudication committee, 68 hear and
determine complaints in respect of work done by the
other officers, that is the survey, recording or
demarcation officers, 69 determine objections to the
register, 70
 make corrections to the adjudication
register before it is complete, 71 and make a claim or
act on behalf of someone who is absent or is under a
disability. 72 In general, the adjudication officer
exercises general supervision and control over the
adjudication process.73
66	 Land Adjudication Act 1968, ss. 4(1).
67	 Ibid., ss. 4(1), (2).
68	 Ibid., s. 6(1). See infra.
69	 Ibid., s. 9(2)(a).
70	 Ibid., s. 9(2)(b).
71	 Ibid., s. 11(b).
72	 Ibid., s. 11(c).
73	 Ibid., s. 9(1).
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2.	 The Recording Officer
This official records the rights of individuals,
whether these are interests in land or whether they are
ownership claims to land. 74 The recording officer is
responsible for compiling the adjudication record. He
compiles a record for each parcel of land on a farm
(see a copy of the adjudication record overleaf). 75 In
determining the claims, the recording officer
determines persons as owners of land where, under
customary law, those persons have exercised rights in
or over land which should be recognised as ownership,76
or a person entitled to an interest in land not
amounting to ownership, including a "lease, right of
occupation, charge or other encumbrance whether by
virtue of recognized customary law or otherwise,"77
3. The Demarcation Officer
His function is to identify and demarcate the
boundaries to land, those boundaries having been
pointed out to him by the landowner who, at the same
time, would have made his claim of ownership to the
recording officer. 78 The demarcation officer has the
power to lay a fresh boundary if he considers that the
74	 Ibid., s. 13(1).
75	 Ibid., ss. 19(1), 23(1).
76	 Land Adjudication Act 1968, s. 23(2)(a).
77	 Ibid., s. 23(2)(c).
78	 Ibid., s. 13(1).
Fig. 1
ORIG/NAL
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
THE LAND CONSOLIDATION/ADJUDICATION* ACT A d53940(Cap. 283/No. 35 of 1968')
ADJUDICATION RECORD
1 District 	
2. Adjudication area 	
3 Adjudication section 	
4 Parcel No. 	 5 Approximate area in hectares 	
6. Name of Landowner 	
7. Residential particulars, address, etc. 	
8. Any other information required by section 23/24* of the Act
9. I, the above-named landowner, have been informed 	 10. Certified that the signature at (9) was made in my
	
of the contents of this form, and accept the details
	
presence.
as COLTett.
Signature of the Witness
Mints
	
Signature or Thumb-print
Address 	
11. Certified that the particulars contained in this form	 12. Certified that I have caused the contents of this form
are acceptable to the Committee. •	 to be explained to the landowner'.
Certified that I am satisfied with the accuracy of the
details recorded on this form*.
Chairman	 Executive Officer
Date 	 	 Data 	
13, Certified that the landowner *cannot be traced to sign the form.
has withheld his signature.
1,.
158
existing boundary is irregular or inconvenient, 79 to
demarcate a right of way for a parcel to have access to
a road or water, and to realign parcels adjoining a
public road."
4. The Survey Officer
He is an officer from the Survey of Kenya, the
government department responsible for the survey of
land in Kenya. The Survey Officer is responsible for
preparing the demarcation map of the adjudication
section showing the position of all the parcels of land
within the adjudication section which are identified by
numbers. 81 The demarcation map is prepared by plotting
the sketches of the parcels onto an aerial photograph,
and this map is eventually known as the Registry Index
Map. 82
 As the functions of the demarcation and the
survey officers do overlap, they are sometimes carried
out by one person.
5. The Adjudication Committee
This committee is made up of local residents
within the adjudication section. They are appointed by
the adjudication officer in consultation with the
District Commissioners of the district within which the
79	 Ibid., s. 18(1)(a).
80	 Ibid., ss. 18(1)(b)(c). See also s. 18(1)(d).
81	 Ibid, s. 16.
82 For a further discussion, see infra.
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adjudication section lies. 83 The members normally
consist of prominent individuals within the locality,
many of them having their own farms. 84 Under the
section 6(1) of the Land Adjudication Act 1968, the
committee should not consist of less than ten
members. 85 This means that the number of committee
members may vary in size. Significantly the members
are nominated by members of the public resident in the
location at public meetings or barazas convened by
administration officials, particularly by the chief of
the area. 86 Many of these members are also traditional
clan elders who have been involved in resolving land
disputes in their societies. They are well versed in
customary law hence their appointment to the
committees.87
The function of the committee is to consider and
adjudicate in accordance with customary law any
83	 Land Adjudication Act 1968, s. 6(1).
84 See S.F.R. Coldham, Registration of Title to Land
in the Former Special Areas of Kenya, unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, University of London, 1977.
85 The adjudication committee appointed under section
9(1) of the Land Consolidation Act 1968 consists of not
less than 25 members. The number was set high to daunt
landowners from attempting to bribe the members in
order to get a decision in their favour - see n.35,
supra.
86 See Report of the Working Party on African Land 
Tenure 1957-58, (Nairobi, 1958), para. 24.
87 See Simon Coldham, The Effect of Registration of 
Title Upon Customary Land Rights in Kenya, [1978]
J.A.L. 91 at 96, et. seq.: Simon Coldham, The
Settlement of Land Disputes in Kenya - an Historical 
Perspective, (1984) 22 J.M.A.S. 59, at p. 63, et.seq.
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question referred to it by the demarcation and
recording officers, 88 and to advise the adjudication
officer where the latter has sought its guidance.89
Moreover, the committee can act on behalf of absent
members or those under a disability, and generally
assist in the adjudication process."
The adjudication committee therefore acts in an
advisory role, deciding questions for example where
there are conflicting claims. 91 Nevertheless, the
committee members play an active role in the
adjudication process. Some members normally accompany
the recording, demarcation and survey officers when
recording the rights and boundaries over a parcel of
land. Each committee has an executive officer whose
role is that of a secretary, recording the decisions of
the committee.92
C.	 Appeals
Suppose two parties who have had an ownership
dispute over a plot of land subject to adjudication,
each claims before the recording officer that they are
the owners of the land. The recording officer may
submit the dispute to the adjudication committee to
88	 Land Adjudication Act 1968, s. 20(a).
89	 Ibid., s. 20(b).
90	 Ibid., ss. 20(c)(d) & (e).
91	 Ibid., s. 19(2).
92	 Ibid., s. 6(2).
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consider and determine it. 93
 Proceedings before the
committee tend to be informal and inquisitorial, the
committee not being bound by rules of evidence or
procedure. 94
 Since the committee will determine the
issue on the basis of customary law, the disputing
parties, who invariably will represent themselves,95
will have to show how they each acquired the land under
customary law. A party dissatisfied with the decision
of the adjudication committee may appeal to the
Provincial Arbitration Board." The members of the
Board are appointed by the Provincial Commissioner of
the Province in which the adjudication area lies,
appointing not less than six and not more than 25
persons resident within the district; from this panel,
the adjudication officer appoints not less than five
persons to form the arbitration board to hear a
particular dispute. 97 The members of the Board are,
like the adjudication committees, comprised of lay
93	 Ibid., s. 19(2).
94 Simon Coldham, The Settlement of Land Disputes in
Kenya - an Historical Perspective, (1984) 22 J.M.A.S.
59 at p. 64.
95 Lawyers are not involved in the adjudication
process. As to why see Chapter Four, infra.
96	 Land Adjudication Act 1968, ss. 21(3),(4), 22.
97	 Land Adjudication Act 1968, s. 7(1). If the land
is situated near the boundary of a district and both
persons claiming an interest in the land come from
different districts, the Minister may appoint a special
arbitration board of 8 persons to hear the dispute -
ibid, s. 7(1)(ii). C.f. section 10(1) of the Land
Consolidation Act 1968 under which the Minister is
responsible for appointing the arbitration board under
that Act.
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persons. 98 No further appeal lies from the arbitration
board.
Any further objections lie when the adjudication
register is complete. Any person named in or affected
by the adjudication register who considers it to be
incorrect or incomplete may object to the adjudication
officer in writing within 60 days from the date of
completion of the adjudication register. 99 The
adjudication officer can either alter the register if
the objection is valid, or if he considers that
altering the register would "incur unreasonable
expense, delay or inconvenience" may recommend to the
Minister that compensation be paid to the objector. 100
A person aggrieved by the determination of the
objection, such as the level of compensation for
example, may appeal to the Minister within 60 days. 101
In determining the appeal, the Minister is assisted by
assessors who advise him on the customary law of the
area. The proceedings are conducted informally without
legal representation for the parties; in reaching a
98 Land Adjudication Act 1968. See also Simon
Coldham, The Settlement of Land Disputes ..., op. cit,
p. 65.
99	 Land Adjudication Act 1968, s. 26(1).
100 Ibid., s. 27(2). It was disclosed to the writer
that compensation is rarely awarded, if at all, because
of a lack of funds - interview with Dr. Aruka, Land
Adjudication Department, Nairobi, 12 September, 1989.
101 Ibid., s. 29(1). Under s. 19 of the Land
Consolidation Act 1968, no further appeal lies from the
determination by the Adjudication Officer.
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decision, the Minister is not bound to follow previous
decisions. 102
Once all objections have been dealt with and the
time for appeals has expired, the adjudication officer
sends the adjudication register - which consists of the
demarcation plan and the adjudication record - together
with particulars of all the objections which have been
determined, to the Director of Land Adjudication who is
then responsible for forwarding the adjudication
register to the Chief Land Registrar together with a
list of appeals that are before the Minister)-03
It is at this stage that the Land Registry becomes
involved in the process of registering the titles that
have been adjudicated. Under section 11(2A) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 the Chief Land Registrar
towards the adjudication register to the Land Registrar
or his assistant in charge of the relevant district
who,
11 ... shall prepare a register for each
person shown in the adjudication record as an
owner of land, and every person shown in the
adjudication record as being entitled to an
interest which does not amount to ownership
of land shall be registered as being so
entitled ..."
Once a person is registered as proprietor,
registration vests in him "the absolute ownership of
102 Makenqe v. Nqochi (1979) Kenya L.R. 53. The power
of the Minister to hear and determine appeals has been
delegated to special District Commissioners. This
delegation was made as a result of a colossal backlog
of appeals which the Minister was unable to reduce.
103 Land Adjudication Act 1968, s. 27.
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that land together with all rights and privileges
belonging or appurtenant thereto" .104 Thus, the
transition from customary land tenure to a title
registered under the Registered Land is complete.
D. Land Adjudication - A Critique
A remarkable feature of land adjudication in Kenya
is its committee system. Its uniqueness lies in the
fact that it is wholly composed of lay members of the
public who are responsible for resolving disputes that
arise during the adjudication process. The provincial
arbitration boards which hear appeals from the
adjudication committees are also made up of lay
members. Nevertheless, the members tend to be well
versed in customary law. This is particularly
important because they have to identify the customary
rights and interests held by individuals. Since these
rights and interests have generally not been
documented, and can only be determined by oral means-05
individuals claiming such rights have to prove their
claims to ownership by calling witnesses who were
present when those rights were acquired and who are
aware of their validity. By cross examining the
witnesses, the adjudication committees are able to
ascertain the rightful ownership of the land and those
with interests in it.
104 Registered Land Act 1963, S. 27(a).
105 See Chapter Two, Part II, supra.
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This process is not an easy task when compared
with the task of the English Land Registrar when
examining unregistered titles prior to their
registration. According to rule 20 of the Land
Registration Rules 1925 the following documents must be
submitted with an application for first registration:
i) original deeds and documents relating to
the title, including opinions of counsel,
abstracts of title, contracts for or
conditions of sale, requisitions, replies and
other like documents.1"
ii) sufficient particulars, by plan or
otherwise to enable the land to be fully
identified on the Ordinance map or the Land
Registry General Map.
iii) a list j,n triplicate of all documents
delivered.i0'
The applicant and his solicitor or licensed conveyancer
may be required to make an affidavit or declaration
that to the best of their knowledge and belief all
documents and incumbrances have been disclosed.'"
Thus the function of the Land Registrar in this regard
is to examine the documents of title. If in the course
of examining title exceptional and difficult questions
106 The production of original documents is not
usually required if they are in the custody of a
mortgagee under a subsisting mortgage entered into
prior to the conveyance to the applicant, or they
affect also other land, or their production would
entail the applicant having to pay a fee to the holder.
107 See further H.M. Land Registry, Practice Leaflet
No. 5., January 1987, p. 3.
108 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 14(1). If the
solicitor or licensed conveyancer failed to disclose an
encumbrance, which becomes unenforceable against the
registered proprietor (unless it falls within the class
of overriding interests in section 70(1), Land
Registration Act 1925), he may be liable in damages
against the encumbrancer - see Midland Bank Trust Co. 
Ltd., v. Hett, Stubbs & Kemp (a firm) [1979] Ch. 384.
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of title arise, the Registrar may refer the matter for
the opinion of special conveyancing counse1.109
Nevertheless the task of the English Land Registrar is
simplified by the existence of documents of title.
It has been pointed out that the provisions of the
Land Adjudication Act 1968 110
 lead to the questionable
assumption that it is possible to equate customary land
rights with the rights recognised by the Registered
Land Act 1963 and it was concluded that it only leads
to the making of "spurious correlations. n111 This is
indeed a serious problem that has continued to face the
land adjudication teams, and has only led to people
being granted greater or lesser rights than they
previously had. For example, as indicated earlier,
Kikuyu customary law recognised several subordinate
rights in land, such as those held by a muhoi: 112 A
muhoi though his period of occupation on the land was
indefinite, could be evicted at any time under
customary law.- 13
 However, a tenancy at will is not
capable of protection under the Registered Land Act
1963. The only tenancy capable of protection is a
109 Land Registration Rules 1925, r. 26. See also r.
303(1).
110 See for example s. 23(2)(e).
111 Simon Coldham, The Effect of Registration of Title
Upon Customary Land Rigths in Kenya [1978] J.A.L. 91 at
p. 98.
112 See Chapter Two, Part II, supra.
113 Ibid, Kimani v Gikanga [1965] E.A. 735: Wainaina v
Murai (1976) Kenya L.R. 227.
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periodic tenancy, Section 11(3) of the Registered Land
Act 1963 provides that a right of occupation under
customary law recorded in the adjudication register is
deemed a tenancy from year to year. This would mean
that a recording officer could only record the right of
a muhoi as a right of occupation on the adjudication
record. However, this would mean that a muhoi would be
getting a greater right than he already had because a
tenancy from year to year may be determined by not less
than six months notice expiring at the end of a year of
the tenancy, whereas a tenancy at will can be
determined at any time no notice to quit being
necessary. 114
 Under customary law, a muhoi could have
been evicted at any time; under the 1963, if his right
is protected on the register, he receives a minimum of
six months notice.115
What about the redeemable sale? 116 Prima facie,
it has the appearance of a mortgage or charge. But
there is a significant difference because the vendor of
land subject to a redeemable sale retained the title to
the land and could redeem it at any time. To record
such a right as a mortgage would fundamentally alter
114 Sidebotham v Holland [1895] 1 QB 378 at 383.
Crane v Morris [1965] 1 WLR 1104 at 1108. See
Registered Land Act 1963, s.163. The same argument
would apply in relation to the jadak under Luo
customary law - see Chapter II, Part II. supra.,
115 One could counter by arguing that under the 1963
Act the muhoi receives greter protection, since a
minimum notice period is created than he would have had
under customary law.
116 See Chapter II, Part II, supra.
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the nature of the customary right because a mortgagee
or chargee under the Registered Land Act 1963 retains
the legal title to the land. 117
 Therefore, if the
vendor was registered as chargor, he would, in effect,
be receiving a lesser right than he had.
These illustrations highlight a fundamental
problem: that it is extremely difficult to equate
customary rights with the rights recognised by the
Registered Land Act 1963. Applying English law
terminology to rights recognised under a totally
different system only results in inaccurate equivalents
which either have the effect of conferring on some
people more extensive rights than they had while
depriving others of some of their rights. 118
 Even
legal commentators are divided on how to equate some of
these rights. For example, G. Wilson equates a jadak
to a sub-lessee. 118
 With this in mind, such complex
legal questions are, with respect, beyond the ability
of the adjudication committees to cope with. They are
ill-equipped to handle this task in view of the fact
that many on the committees are poorly educated and
often semi-literate. Even the recording officer is not
a trained lawyer and to expect the members of the team
117 Registered Land Act 1963, ss. 76,77.
118 See other examples given by Simon Coldham, The
Effect of Registration of Title Upon Customary Land
Rights in Kenya [1978] J.A.L. 91, at p. 98 et.seq.
119 G.M. Wilson, Luo Customary Law and Marriage Law
Customs (Nairobi 1961), p. 57; K.M. Maini, Land Law in
East Africa (Nairobi 1967), p.11.
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to distinguish sophisticated legal concepts would be
expecting a lot.
Not surprisingly, the Lawrance Mission reported
that committees were neglecting to record lesser
interests in land, and that, for instance not much use
was being made of section 22 of the Land Adjudication
Act 1964. 120 Consequently, an adjudication register
presented for registration under the Registered Land
Act 1963 is, at times, seriously inaccurate. Clearly,
the situation cries out for an official who is a
trained lawyer to assist the recording officers and the
Adjudication committee in making these correlations.
However, when the writer put this solution to a senior
official of the Land Adjudication Department in
Nairobi, he rejected the idea on the ground that this
would slow down the process of adjudication and
increase the cost at the same time. 121 While this may
be true, it is respectfully submitted that it is better
to slow down the process and add the extra expense of
having trained lawyers to ensure the adequate
protection of the rights of individuals, since, in any
event, this is the ultimate aim of land adjudication.
There are other serious problems which face the
committees. Tribalism is one of them. Since most of
120 Now s. 22 Land Consolidation Act 1968. Report of
the Mission on Land Consolidation and Registration in
Kenya 1965-66, (London 1966). para. 163. Section 22
provides for the protection of interests not amounting
to ownership.
121 Interview with Dr. Aruka, Land Adjudication
Department, Nairobi, 12th September, 1989.
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the adjudication areas cover areas occupied by one
tribe, naturally most, if not all the committee
members, will be members of one particular tribe. The
problem arises where a landowner within the
adjudication area belongs to another tribe. It has
been the case that the interests of these are not
recorded or are given to someone else. The Lawrance
Mission reported that this had been a serious problem
in Ngong, Kajiado District. There, some Kikuyu had
exercised rights of ownership over land. However,
despite this, ownership of the land was adjudicated in
favour of members of the Masai, the dominant tribe in
the area. Others found part of their farms adjudicated
in favour of Masai. 122
 This resulted in many having to
buy their farms back from those who were allocated the
same land. 123
 It is most unfortunate that land
adjudication would come to this and it highlights the
danger of appointing committee members who all come
from one tribe.
Corruption has been an endemic problem. A good
example is what took place in Fort Hall (now Muranga)
in the late 1950 1 s. It was discovered, when
consolidation and adjudication were complete in that
area, that individuals had acquired bigger portions of
land as a result of bribing the recording and survey
122 Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation, op.
cit., para. 161.
123	 Ibid.
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officers, 124 This meant that the whole of Fort Hall
had to be readjudicated at vast expense. 125
 However,
rather than amend section 89(1)(a) of the Native Lands
Registration Ordinance 1959 - which provided that first
registrations should not be rectified - it was decided
instead to enact the Lands Registration (Fort Hall
District) (Special Provisions) Act 1961. 126
 Two
safeguards, that is, having large committees 127 , and
providing that any committee member who has a direct or
indirect interest in a matter before the committee
should disqualify himself from taking part of the
deliberations/ 128 have not helped much. A probable
reason is that for many years the committee members
were not paid for their work. The Lawrance Mission
considered that paying the members, even a small
allowance, would considerably increase the cost of
adjudication; instead they recommended that committee
members should continue to work unpaid. 129
 The
124 Legislative Council Debates, Official Report, Vol.
LXXXVI, cols. 1052-1055 (Mr. Wainwright).
125 About £75,000 was wasted as a result of temiln to
start all over again - Ibid., col. 1054.
126 To have allowed rectification of first
registrations would have caused an avalanche of claims
from those who lost out. See further Chapter Eight,
infra.,
127 Land Consolidation Act 1968, s. 9(1); Land
Adjudication Act 1968, s. 6(1).
128 Land Consolidation Act 1968, s. 14(1); Land
Adjudication Act 1968, s. 8(1).
129 Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and
Registration in Kenya, 1965-1966. (London 1966), para.
170.
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rationale for this view is based on the fact that
people pay a small count in fees to have their land
adjudicated and registered. 	 The Government bears the
bulk of the cost of land adjudication and, therefore,
the adjudication committees should not expect a
salary. 130 This shows that land adjudication has been
undertaken very cheaply by the Government, and its
success partly lies in the fact that landowners pay
very little to have their titles registered, hence
their enthusiasm for the scheme. However, the absence
of renumeration for the committees means that they will
always be susceptible to bribes under the guise of
hospitality. 131 It also creates a lack of motivation
among the committees when undertaking the work. It was
pointed out to the writer that it is difficult at times
to convene the committees to determine cases, which in
turn contributes to delay.132
It is significant that neither the courts nor
lawyers are involved in land adjudication. The whole
process is controlled by administrative officials
assisted by the lay members on the committees. This
was a deliberate policy on the part of the Government,
primarily to speed up the spread of land adjudication.
It was felt that the courts would not be able to cope
130 Interview with Dr. Aruka, Land Adjudication
Department, Nairobi, 12 September 1989.
131 This was conceded by the Lawrance Mission, see
Roost, op. cit., para. 170.
132 Interview with Dr. Aruka, op. cit.
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if they were involved in the land adjudication
programme because they already had a large backlog of
cases, and, moreover, the existing rules of evidence
and procedure would have been disposed of)- 33
 It has
also been suggested that another reason why the courts
were avoided was to prevent political agitators and
their lawyers from gaining access to the courts during
the Mau Mau Civil War who would have used the courts as
a forum for exposing the Government's policy of
detaining activists and herding the Kikuyu community
into villages in order to rush through land
consolidation and adjudication. 134
 Committees on the
other hand, unencumbered by rules of evidence and
procedure could quickly deal with objections, avoiding
delay. However, as discussed above, the committee
system is not without its problems. A significant
problem is the inadequate identification and protection
of subordinate interests. Once the adjudication
register is final, there can be no further redress
since rectification of a first registration is
precluded)- 35
 This is prejudicial to a person who
failed to have his interest registered because he was
not present during adjudication, or neglected to
133 Simon Coldham, The Settlement of Land Disputes in
Kenya - an Historical Perspective (1984) 22 J.M.A.S. 59
at p.63.
134 Ibid., at pp. 63, 64.
135 Registered Land Act 1963, s.143(1)
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register his claim for some other reason. 136
 The
Lawrance Mission reported that this situation is
'unsatisfactory' and 'dangerous' because there is no
power of putting right what can be proved wrong.137
Accordingly they recommended and made provision in the
draft Land Adjudication Bill that any person aggrieved
by a final entry in the adjudication record may apply
to the High Court for its revision "in such manner as
may be prescribed."-38
However, this recommendation was rejected. The
Government felt that the High Court should not be
involved in considering such applications; rather, the
Minister for Lands would be the appropriate forum to
determine such appeals. 139
 Although no reason was
given for the rejection of this recommendation, it is
136 Although the adjudication officer and the
adjudication committees can act on behalf of absent
persons (ss. 11(c), 13(4) Land Adjudication Act 1968),
a frequent claim in the 1950s and 1960s was that the
interests of persons who were detained by the colonial
government for being Mau Mau sympathizers were ignored,
and their land was adjudicated in favour of others.
Despite claims that every effort was made to protect
the interests of such persons (see R.G. Wilson Land
Consolidation in the Fort Hall District of Kenya (1960)
J.A.A. 144 at 147 et. seq. 	 See also Legislative
Council Debates, Official Report, Vol. LXXX (Part I)
1959, col. 65 (Mr. Johnston, Minister for African
Affairs), it was conceded that the rights and interests
of ex-detainees were indeed ignored - Report of the 
Mission on Land Consolidation .., op. cit., paras. 176,
273.
137 Ibid, para. 176.
138 Report of the Mission on Land Consoldiation ...,
op. cit., para. 176.
139 National Assembly, Official Report (1968), Vol.
XIV, col. 1943.
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in line with the policy of preventing the judiciary
from being involved in the adjudication process.
V. Conversion of Titles 
In the context of the Registered Land Act 1963,
the conversion of titles relates to the transformation
of titles subject to the Land Titles Act 1908, the
Government Lands Act 1915 and titles registered under
the Registration of Titles Act 1919, into titles
registered under the Registered Land Act 1963. There
are presently two methods of converting such titles
under section 12(1) of the 1963 Act.
The first relates to titles registered under the
Registration of Titles Act 1919. Section 12(1)(a)(i)
of the Registered Land Act 1963 provides that "the
grant or certificate of title shall be deemed" to be a
'title deed' and the folio of the register of titles
kept under section 25 of the 1919 Act shall be deemed
to be a register under the 1963 Act. The effect of
this provision is to automatically convert all titles
registered under the 1919 Act into titles registered
under the 1963 Act whenever the 1963 Act is applied to
any area.140 This deeming provision, however, belies
the reality; the title is to be viewed as if it is
already registered under the Registered Land Act 1963,
even though no actual conversion has taken place.
However, the proviso to section 12(1)(a)(i) states that
the Registrar
140 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 12(1).
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"may at any time prepare a register ...
showing all subsisting particulars contained
in or endorsed on the folio of the register
of titles ... and substitute such register
for such folio and issue to the proprietor a
title deed or certificate of lease as the
case may be ..."
The problem, however, is that in areas where the
1963 Act has been applied, the deeming provisions have
not in any way altered the practice of conveying and
dealing with land registered under the Registration of
Titles Act 1919. While attached to the conveyancing
department of a large law firm, the writer observed
that titles which would have been deemed to have been
registered under the 1963 Act, were still being treated
as if they were registered under the Registration of
Titles Act 1919, and continuing to be conveyed on that
basis. Moreover, certificates of title are still being
issued by the Registrar of Titles under the 1919 Act
rather than under the 1963 Act. 141 Certificates of
title are still being issued under the 1919 Act rather
than under the 1963 Act.
More significantly, even though section
12(1)(a)(ii) of the Registered Land Act provides that
the 1919 Act shall cease to apply to a parcel and
instead the 1963 Act will apply thereto, there are
examples of court decisions which continue to apply the
Registration of Title Act 1919 to titles which, by
141 For example, the copy of the plan infra is part of
a certificate of lease that was issued under the
Registration of Titles Act 1919 and yet is in an area
that comes under section 12(1)(a) of the Registered
Land Act 1963.
177
virtue of sections 12(1) and 2 of the Registered Land
Act 1963, are meant to be subject to the Registered
Land Act 1963. A good example is the Court of Appeal
decision in Kiseu Maweu v. Kiu Ranching & Co-operative
Society Ltd 142 The land which was the subject matter
of dispute in that case, lay in an area to which the
Registered Land Act 1963 applied. 143 The land,
however, was registered under the Registration of
Titles Act 1919. One of the issues was whether the
certificate of title should have been interpreted
subject to the Land Titles Act 1908 or the Registration
of Titles Act 1919. It was held that the certificate
should be read subject to sections 23 and 36 of the
Registration of Titles Act 1919. Section 23, for
example, provides that the certificate of title issued
under the 1919 Act is conclusive evidence of
proprietorship but the proprietor is "subject to the
encumbrances, easements, restrictions and conditions
contained therein ... and the title of that proprietor
shall not be subject to challenge, except on the ground
of fraud or misrepresentation to which he is proved to
be a party."
In such a case, if the title is being treated as
if it was still subject to the Registration of Titles
Act 1919 rather than being deemed subject to the
Registered Land Act 1963, it would mean that the court
142	 .	 .Civil Appeal No.2 of 1983 (unreported).
143 By virtue of section 2(c) of the Registered Land
Act 1863.
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did not appreciate the significance of section 12(1) of
the 1963 Act. There are other cases where the courts
have not applied the provisions of the 1963 Act to
titles registered under the 1919 Act even though the
title would have come under the deeming provision of
section 12(1)(a)(i) of the Registered Land Act 1963 .144
This can only mean either one of two things:
i) conveyancers and the judiciary are not aware of
the deeming provisions in section 12(1)(a)(i) of the
Registered Land Act 1963, or have not appreciated the
significance of the provision or,
ii) the Land Registry does not intend section
12(1)(a)(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963 to take
effect until the Registry is ready to start to prepare
registers for titles registered under the 1919 Act.
The latter view represents the position ever since
the enactment of the Registered Land Act 1963. Due to
the emphasis that has been placed on registering land
formerly under customary law through the Land
Adjudication Act 1968, little priority has been given
to the conversion of titles registered under the
Registration of Titles Act 1919 or those subject to the
Land Titles Act 1908 or the Government Lands Act 1915.
The Lawrance Mission even decried the slow pace of
conversion of such titles.145
144 See for example Mayers v Akira Ranch (No.3) [1973]
E.A. 431; Moya Drift Farm v Theuri [1973] E.A. 114.
145 Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and
Registration in Kenya 1965-66, (London 1966), para.
238.
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Nevertheless, the conversion of titles registered
under the 1919 Act does take place when registered
proprietors voluntarily bring them for conversion at
the Land Registry. The procedure is simple; a new
green card is prepared for the title, 146
 with the
entries on the folios of the register of titles kept
under section 25 of the Registration of Titles Act 1919
are transferred to the green card. The grant or
certificate of title is handed in at the Registry and
marked with the words "Title brought under the RLA 1963
(Cap.300). No further entry to be made. Now see Title
No ..." The grant or certificate is not destroyed but
placed in the parcel file of the new title, which
already has a new registration number. 147 A new 'title
deed' or certificate of lease, as the case may be, is
then issued to the proprietor.
Section 12(1)(a) of the Registered Land Act 1963
does not state on what basis the converted titles are
to be registered, that is, whether to be registered
under the 1963 Act when there is a sale as is the case
under section 123(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925,
or whether they are to be systematically registered as
are titles subject to customary law. It is the
intention of the Land Registry to prepare registers for
titles previously registered under the Registration of
146 Individual titles registered under the Registered
Land Act 1963 are represented on green cards. For a
copy, see Chapter Four infra.
147 Practice Instruction: Chief Land Registrar to all
Land Registrars, 11th March 1982.
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Titles Act 1919. The pace however, has been slow,
particularly in Nairobi where there are a large number
of titles registered under the Registration of Titles
Act 1919.
The second type of conversion relates to titles
registered under the Government Land Act 1915 and the
Land Titles Act 1908. Section 12(1)(b) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 provides that where the Act
has been applied to an area the titles to which are
registered under the 1908 and the 1915 Acts, then the
Registrar shall -
(i) as soon as conveniently possible, cause the title
to be examined:
(ii)prepare a register in the prescribed form showing
all subsisting particulars affecting the parcel
which are capable of registration under [the 1963]
Act;
(iii)serve on the proprietor ... a notice of intention
to register; and
(iv)issue to the proprietor if he so requires a title
deed or
certificate of lease ..."
Titles under the 1908 and 1915 Acts have to be
examined because such titles are unregistered. The
1908 and 1915 Acts establish a deeds registration
system. 148
 Consequently, registration of the documents
of title under those Acts is not in any way proof of
title. The Registrar therefore has to examine the
registered deeds back to a good root, usually back to
the grant in relation to titles subject to the
Government Lands 1915, and for titles subject to the
Land Titles Act 1908, back to the initial first
148 See Chapter Two.
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registration. In contrast, no such examination is
carried out for titles registered under the
Registration of Titles Act 1919. Such titles are
indefeasible once registered, and the fact of
registration and the issue of a certificate of title is
proof of title.149
As in the case of titles registered under the 1919
Act, there is no systematic conversion of titles
subject to the Land Titles Act 1908 and the Government
Lands Act 1915, into titles registered under the
Registered Land Act 1963. Since there is no provision
for the registration of these titles when there is a
sale, then conversion can mainly be undertaken when
proprietors voluntarily subject them for registration.
The conversion of titles registered under the
1919, 1915 and 1908 Acts, into titles subject to the
Registered Land Act 1963 conveys benefits on them not
available under the other Acts. For example, for a
title converted from the 1919 Act, a proprietor has the
advantage of obtaining an indemnity from the State for
mistakes or omissions on the register, apart from
mistakes or omissions on a first registration; 150
 under
the Registration of Titles Act 1919 he would have had
to bring an action in damages against the person
causing the mistake or error, or against the Registrar
as nominal defendant. 151
 Such a cause of action would
149 Registration of Titles Act 1919, s. 23(1).
150 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 144(1).
151 Registration of Titles Act 1919, s. 24.
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have entailed expense on the part of the applicant: if
the latter was penurious, it would have been difficult
to bring such an action. For land formerly subject to
the Land Titles Act 1908, and the Government Lands Act
1915, such titles, once registered under the 1963 Act
become guaranteed by the state; therefore, no further
examination of title is necessary since the register of
title replaces the documents of title; moreover, a
proprietor suffering damage from mistakes and errors in
the register may claim an indemnity from the State)-52
However, for a title converted from the 1919 Act
to the 1963 Act, there may be disadvantages. For
example, under the Registration of Titles Act 1919,
unregistered interests are not binding on a
proprietor. 153
 However, under the Registered Land Act
1963, the class of interests known as overriding
interests are binding on a proprietor, notwithstanding
their non-registration. 154
 Moreover, a first
registration cannot be rectified by virtue of section
143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963, whereas such
registrations are rectifiable under the Registration of
Titles Act 1919.155
152 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 144(1).
153 Registration of Titles Act 1919, ss. 23,32.
154 Registered Land Act 1963, S. 30. For the
significance of overriding interests, see Chapter Six,
infra.,
155 S. 60(1).
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Under the Land Registration Act 1925, a registered
title can be graded into four possible classes: an
absolute title, which can be awarded to an applicant
with the full legal fee simple absolute in
possession156 or to an applicant for first registration
of a leasehold estate157; a good leasehold title158; a
possessory title 159 and; a qualified title.160
Conversion, in relation to the 1925 Act relates to the
upgrading of such titles into higher classes. For
example, an absolute title is the highest form of title
that can be obtained. However, if an applicant for
first registration with freehold title cannot produce
enough documentary evidence of title because, for
example, he has obtained title through adverse
possession, then the Registrar may grant a possessory
title to the applicant. Such a title is of a lower
quality than an absolute title because it is subject to
all adverse interests affecting the land which may be
shown to have been in existence at the date of first
registration.161 However, the Registrar may, and on
application of the proprietor of the possessory title,
shall convert the title to an absolute title if he is
156 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 5.
157 Ibid., s. 8(1).
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid, ss. 6, 8(1).
160 Ibid., s. 7.
161 Ibid., ss. 6,11.
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satisfied as to the title or if the land has been
registered with possessory title for 12 years and the
proprietor has been in possession.162 The same applies
if a qualified title has been awarded to the proprietor
with his consent.163 Such a title is insecure because
it is subject to adverse interests which were in
existence at the time of first registration.
Nevertheless, it can be converted to an absolute title
if the Registrar "is satisfied as to the title".164
In Kenya, the conversion of all the titles
registered under the Registration of Titles Act 1919,
the Land Titles Act 1908 and the Government Lands Act
1915 will take an undetermined length of time. Only
when all such titles are registered under the
Registered Land Act 1963 will there be a unified
registration system' It is submitted that it may have
been prudent to insert a provision in the Registered
Land Act 1963 that the conversion of titl.es subject to
the 1908, 1915 and 1919 Acts would take place when
there was a transfer, whether voluntarily or for value,
of the land. This compares with the requirement of
registration for unregistered titles in compulsory
registration areas under section 123(1) of the Land
Registration Act 1925, whenever there is a sale of such
a title.
162 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 77.
163 Ibid., see s. 7(1).
164 Ibid., s. 77(3). If the land is leasehold then it
can be converted to a good leasehold title.
185
VI Identification of Registered Land 
A register of title is effective if each title can
be identified without ambiguity. Boundaries on the
ground naturally delimit the extent of the land.
However, how accurate should the plans that show the
extent of the boundaries be? The answer depends on
what registration system has been adopted. In this
respect, the Kenyan experience is of interest. Under
the Torrens system of registration boundaries are
accurately and precisely defined by survey. Boundary
pegs are emplaced at the turning points of the
boundary, the actual boundary being a line joining
these corners. On the plan, the exact extent of the
boundaries can be drawn to scale using the computed
data. This is the method of title identification that
was adopted by the Registration of Titles Act 1919.
The plan overleaf illustrates the precise extent of
boundaries of a parcel of land registered under the
Registration of Titles Act 1919. Such boundaries are
therefore guaranteed since they have been fixed.
Interestingly, the Registered Land Act 1963 did
not adopt this method of boundary identification.
Rather the general boundaries rule in use in England
under the Land Registration Act 1925 was adopted.
Section 21(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963 provides
in part that,
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... the registry map and the filed plan
shall be deemed to indicate the approximate
boundaries and the approximate situation of
the parcel." (Italics mine.)
Although the phrase 'approximate boundaries' is
not defined within the Registered Land Act 1963, an
explanation is supplied by section 15 of the Land
Adjudication Act 1968 while defining the duties of the
demarcation officer. It states:
"Provided that where the boundary of a piece
of land is already demarcated by a physical
feature it need not be determined whether the
exact line of the boundary runs along the
centre of the feature or along its inner or
outer wide." (Italics mine.)
A major factor accounting for the adoption of the
approximate boundaries rule was cost. It was
considered that the accurate plans required under the
Registration of Titles Act 1919 would have been too
expensive to adopt as a method of identifying titles
during the land adjudication process. 165
 Instead, the
method used in mapping parcels which were registered
was to prove to be unique. The East Africa Commission
had recommended that cadastral survey on the basis of
aerial photography should be tried out. 166 This method
was tried and the results were positive, and was
subsequently used to form the basis of mapping land
that was undergoing adjudication.
165 Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and
Registration in Kenya 1965-66, (London 1966) paras.
246, 247.
166 Report of the East Africa Commission on Land and
Population, Cd. 9475, paras. 20,21.
187
The Registry map is prepared from a combination of
ground and aerial survey by the Survey of Kenya. On
the ground, the demarcation officer and his assistants
plot the position of boundaries on sketches, having had
their extent pointed out to them by the landowners.
Land owners are then encouraged to grow hedges along
the boundaries so that these may be visible on air
photographs. 167
 Once demarcation is complete, the
whole area is photographed from the air by a specially
equipped aeroplane. Photos are taken from the air on a
scale of 1:50,000. The photograph overleaf is an
aerial photograph taken over Waswete adjudication
section in Migori District, Western Kenya, on a scale
of 1:50,000. On the ground, the photograph is enlarged
to a scale of 1:2,500, which is sufficient to identify
the property boundaries clearly. 168
 Cartographers of
the Survey of Kenya trace these boundaries on the
enlarged photo, and from this, the Preliminary Index
Diagram, in effect the Registry map, is prepared. A
copy of part of the Registry map drawn from this photo
is in the Appendix. 169
 As the map shows the plot
167 See Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation,
op.cit., para. 206.
168 Initially, the photographs were reduced to a scale
of 1:12,500. However, the Mission on Land
Consolidation and Registration, op.cit., felt that this
scale was too small resulting in inaccurate maps. They
recommended, in response to a proposal from the Survey
of Kenya, that the scale of photo-enlargements should
be reduced to 1:2,500 - paras. 210,211.
169 Unfortunately, the copy of the Registry Index Map
was too large to be reproduced on this page.
187(a)
AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OVER WASWETE ADJUDICATION
SECTION
Fig. 3
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numbers of all the parcels are indicated and, from this
map, the plot of a registered proprietor is easily
identifiable. However, unlike the plan shown on the
previous page, the precise definition of the boundaries
is not shown on the map, a consequence of the above
method of survey.
Two criticisms can be made against the Registry
map maintained under the Registered Land Act 1963.
First, the map is often inaccurate. This was pointed
out by the Chief Land Registrar in a Practice
Instruction where he warned Land Registrars not to
place undue reliance on the Registry Index map because
the map was "not an authority on boundaries" as it was
inaccurate due to discrepancies between the map and the
aerial position on the ground. 170
 A District Land
Registrar said that this was often a frequent cause of
boundary disputes. 171
 On occasion, a proprietor on
obtaining a copy of the Registry Index Map would find
that it did not agree with the position on the ground,
especially if the map showed him as having more land
than he actually did and he set out to correct this
having the boundary resurveyed. This could
occasionally spark off a dispute with the neighbouring
proprietors, particularly if the latter were of the
170 Practice Instruction: Use of Registry Index Maps 
in the Determination of Boundary Disputes and the Role
of Surveyors in the same, from Chief Land Registrar to
all Land Registrars, 8th March 1985.
171 Interview with the Kiambu District Land Registrar,
Miss R.N. Mule, Kiambu Land Registry, 19th September
1989.
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view that the former was acquiring the land
unscrupulously. In consequence, an application to the
Registrar to determine the suit would result.-72
Accordingly, in determining the dispute the Registrar
has to rely on the direct evidence of persons who knew
the position of the boundary such as neighbours or even
surviving members of the Land Adjudication committee,
as well as obtaining the original photo enlargements of
the area. 173
 What started off as a basic error becomes
an involved problem taking a long time to solve.
A second criticism is that no individual title
plans are prepared for registered proprietors from the
Registry Index maps. A proprietor has to obtain, on
the payment of a fee, a large copy of a section of the
Registry Index Map showing the position of his plot
from the Survey of Kenya in Nairobi. 174
 The land
certificate or 'title deed' has no title plan which
identifies the property. In contrast, a land
certificate issued under the Land Registration Act 1925
contains a title plan prepared from the Ordnance Map,
showing the extent of the registered parcel in red
172 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 21(2). See for
example Rahab Nieri Kinuthia v. Nganga Kirogo, H.C.C.C.
No. 404 of 1982 (unreported). For a discussion of this
case, see Chapter Nine.
173 Practice Instruction: Use of Registry Index Maps 
... op.cit., Between 1988 and 1989 the Kiambu District
Land Registrar received 74 applications to hear
disputes of a similar nature.
174 For a copy of the Registry Index map, see
Appendix.
190
edging. 175 The lack of a title plan means that a
purchaser, for example, will be unaware of the extent
of the registered land unless he applies for a copy of
the Registry Index Map showing the extent of his
property. 176
However, the unavailability of title plans is
attributable to the fact that the present Registry
Index Maps are only interim being, in reality, the
Preliminary Index Diagrams prepared from the aerial
photographs. The Survey of Kenya intends in the near
future to replace the present series of Registry maps
with more accurate maps. These will be prepared by
what is known as 'refly', a term used to denote the
aerial re-photographing of the areas which had been
subjected to aerial survey during adjudication. The
purpose of the refly procedure is to enable the
discrepancies between the ground and the registry maps
to be corrected. However, this undertaking is subject
to the availability of funds and personnel)-77
175 A person may also obtain a plan issued on request
with the result of an official search of the public
index map. This plan is based on the Ordnance Survey
Map - H.M. Land Registry Applications for Official 
Searches of the Index Map, Practice Leaflet No.15, June
1988, para.11. See also Land Registration Rules 1925,
r. 286.
176 This is an extremely large copy. See Appendix for
the illustration of the copy that a person would
obtain.
177 See A.K. Njuki, Cadastral Surveys in Kenya, The
Nairobi Law Monthly, September 1987, 13, at p. 17.
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The method of preparing the Public Index Map
maintained under the Land Registration Act 1925178
showing the extent of all registered land in England
and Wales is at variance with the Kenyan method. The
Public Index Map is based on the Ordnance Survey map
which is a large scale topographical map prepared for
the whole country representing physical details such as
fences, walls and hedges, and other physical features
in a standard form. In contrast, the Registry Index
Map maintained under the Registered Land Act 1963 is an
example of a cadastral map. This is, a map showing the
units of land rather than physical features such as
rivers, valleys, ridges, and so on, unless such
features, such as a river, happens to form part of a
boundary.
The Public Index Map, maintained by H.M. Land
Registry does not show the precise line of boundaries,
but merely the general boundaries of the registered
titles. 179
 This rule was adopted as a result of the
failure of the method of parcel identification
initiated by the Land Registry Act 1862. The Act
required a map or plan to be deposited as part of the
description of a registered title showing the exact
position of the boundaries. 180 This requirement made
registration very expensive. The exact line of many
178 Land Registration Rules 1925, r. 8.
179 Land Registration Rules 1925, r. 278.
180 Ss. 3, 10, 16, 25(3).
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boundaries was often unknown. A proprietor wanting to
register his title under the 1862 Act therefore had to
issue notices to neighbouring proprietors in order to
determine the line of the boundary. If a proprietor's
boundaries adjoined several properties, determining the
position of one's boundaries was an expensive and
protracted business. The 1870 Royal Commission
appointed to inquire into the working of the 1862 Act
highlighted that one of the main reasons for the
failure of the Act was the requirement of plans showing
the precise lines of boundaries. 181
 As a result, the
Land Transfer Act 1875 reduced the requirement of
precision fixing, section 83(5) providing that the
registered description should be as accurate as
possible but should not be conclusive as to the
boundaries or to the extent of registered estates.
Nevertheless, both the Registered Land Act 1963
and the Land Registration Act 1925 provide for
applicants to have their boundaries fixed. Rule 276 of
the Land Registration Rules 1925 provides that if a
proprietor desires to have indicated on the Index Map
or the General map the precise position of the
boundaries, notice is given to the owners of adjoining
properties of the intention to ascertain and fix the
boundary. The corresponding provision in the
Registered Land Act 1963 is section 22. Interestingly,
181 Report of the Royal Commissioners appointed to 
Inquire into the operation of the Land Transfer Act ..,
c. 20, pp. 1870, Vol. XVIII, 595, para. 45.
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the Registrar under section 22 has power to order the
fixing of a boundary on his own motion. During this
reserach, it was noted that although in the Kiambu
District Land Registrar, received no applications to
fix boundaries between 1988 and 1989, it was observed
that the determination of boundary disputes for the
Registrar under section 21(2) of the Registered Land
Act 1963 often resulted in the precise fixing of
boundaries. During these disputes, the Registrar
travels to the location of the disputed boundary
together with a surveyor from the Survey of Kenya. In
determining the dispute, the parties are cross
examined, together with their witnesses and other
individuals who would have witnessed the demarcation of
the boundary during adjudication. Using other evidence
such as the Registry Index Map and the original photo
enlargements of the area, the surveyor is able to fix
the position of the boundary accurately.
VII The Registration of Flats 
A significant legal development in Kenya in recent
years is the enactment of the Sectional Properties Act
1987. This Act provides for the registration of flats
or 'sectional properties' and the creation of a
structure to provide for the establishment of
corporations to manage such flats on behalf of the
owners. According to the preamble, the Act is:
"to provide for the division of buildings
into units to be owned by individual
proprietors and common property to be owned
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by proprietors of the units as tenants in
common and to provide for the use and
management of the units and common property
and for connected purposes."
This Act is analogous to the type of legislation
found in North America dealing with the ownership of
flats, popularly known as 'condominiums'.
	
Similar
legislation is found in Hong Kong, Malaysia and
Australia. 183
 In Kenya, the 1987 Act was enacted in
response to the ever growing needs of a rising
population. Escalating land values in recent years
meant that people could no longer afford to build or
buy their own houses. Consequently, property
developers began to construct an increasing number of
flats and high rise tower blocks. However, the
individual units of these buildings were invariably
leased or rented to individuals while a developer or
the landlord retained the freehold titles to the land
on which the buildings stood. Parliament felt that it
was necessary to make provision for individuals to
purchase flats; this would make the purchase of a
freehold title affordable in contrast to the high
prices commanded by houses.184
The issuing of freehold titles in flats raises
important questions; for example, who owns the common
183 See Multi-Storey Buildings (Owners Incorporation)
Ordinance 1970; Malaysian National Land Code 1965; New
South Wales Strata Titles Act 1973.
184 See Hansard, Unpublished Transcripts of 
Parliamentary Proceedings, Vol. LXXIII, 1 December,
1987, (Minister for Lands and Settlement).
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parts of the property, such as the stairs, lifts,
rubbish areas and the land on which the building
stands? How should the flats be maintained,
particularly the outer structure, and who should bear
the cost? Moreover, who should represent the flat
owners if, say, a lift falls killing a passenger and
legal proceedings are brought against them.
In Kenya, as is the case in England, no
legislation existed which provided a legal framework
for the ownership of flats. Although the definition of
'land' in section 3 of the Registered Land Act 1963
includes buildings 185 , therefore making it
theoretically possible for freehold titles to be issued
to individual flat units, in reality, the provisions of
the Act made it impractical to do so. For example, the
Act merely provides that restrictive agreements noted
on the register are binding on proprietors of land and
their successors in titles, 186 but is silent on whether
agreements in the nature of positive covenants in
English law are binding on successors in title.
Therefore, this merits the application of English
Common law to fill the lacuna.187
185 However, section 3 does not expand on the nature
of buildings, unlike section 3(viii) of the Land
Registration Act 1925 which provides that 'land'
"includes, buildings or parts of buildings (whether thedivision is horizontal, vertical or made in any other
way) ..." (Italics mine.)
186 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 95.
187 Ibid., s. 163.
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However, under common law the burden of a positive
covenant (such as an undertaking to contribute to the
upkeep of a road or maintain a wall) cannot run with
servient land as to bind subsequent owners 188
 even if
the covenant is noted on the register.'" Hence, it
would be difficult to have covenants to maintain the
common parts of flats, for example, to bind successors
in title under the Registered Land Act 1963.
Legislation was therefore necessary to provide a legal
framework for the effective management and control of
flats and other buildings by unit owners.
Accordingly, the Sectional Properties Act 1987 was
passed, making it not only possible to enfranchise
existing leasehold flats, but also enabling newly built
flats to be directly bought with freehold titles.
Section 2 of the 1987 Act therefore provides that the
Act applies to land held on freehold title- 90 or on a
leasehold title where the unexpired residue of the term
is not less than 45 years. Part III of the 1987 Act
made provision for the creation of corporations made up
of all the owners of the units, which would be
responsible for the control of the common property and
188 Austerberry v. Corporation of Oldham, (1885) 29
Ch.D. 750 at pp. 781-785.
189 Cator v. Newton [1940] 1 K.B. 415.
190 This would cover land that is about to be
developed with the construction of flats, such land
held on a freehold title. Consequently, the completed
flats would be bought with freehold titles.
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management of the flats outlined in the sectional
plan. 191
Part II of the Act provides for the method of
registering units in sectional properties. The
registration of units in sectional properties is on the
basis of the sectional plan. 192
 The plan, which must
describe two or more units in it ,193 contains several
particulars of and concerning the units registered;
these include the delineation of the external surface
boundaries of the parcel and the location of the
building in relation to them 194 , a description of
particulars necessary to identify the title to the
parcel 195 , a drawing illustrating the units and
defining their boundaries, 196
 as well as the
approximate floor area of each unit.197
191 The English Law Commission proposed a similar
arrangement, whereby a 'commonhold association' would
be responsible for the management of flat units with
control of the common property - Law Commission, Report
of a Working Group on Commonhold: Freehold Flats and
Freehold Ownership of Other Interdependent Buildings,
Cm. 179, Part VIII.
192 Sectional Properties Act 1987, s. 3(1), 4(1).
193 Ibid., S. 4(2)(a).
194 Ibid., s. 9(1)(b).
195 Ibid., s. 9(1)(c).
196 Ibid, ss. 9(1)(d), (e). Such boundaries are
described by reference to a floor, wall or ceiling -
Ibid., s. 10(1)(a).
197 Ibid., S. 9(1)(f). Before the plan can be
registered it must be endorsed with or accompanied by a
certificate of a surveyor, and a certificate of
approval by the local authority of the area in which
the land is located. Ibid., s. 11(1).
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Once the sectional plan is presented for
registration, the Registrar is meant to close the
register of all the land on which the building or
sectional property is constructed and open a separate
register for each unit described in the plan)- 98 The
title to a unit is then deemed to have been issued
under the Registered Land Act 1963. 199
 A special
certificate, known as the certificate of sectional
property is issued in respect of each unit. 200 The
register includes particulars of the share in the
common property apportioned to the owner of the
unit. 201 'Common property' is the property which does
not form part of any unit but is used communally by the
owners of the units within the building. 202
 These
include areas like the staircases, lifts, rubbish
areas, and so on. Section 6(2) provides that the
common property shall be held by the owners of all the
units "as tenants in common in shares proportional to
the unit factors for their respective units." The
rights attaching to the common property and each unit,
necessary for enjoyment by the owner include rights of
support, shelter and protection, and easements of water
198 Ibid., ss. 5(1)(a),(b). The Registrar is required
to submit to the local authority of the area in which
the parcel is situated a copy of the registered
sectional plan.
199 Sectional Properties Act 1987, s. 5(5).
200 Ibid., s. 5(1)(c).
201 Ibid., S. 6(1).
202 Equivalent to the common law term 'common parts'.
199
passage, sewerage, drainage, gas, electricity, garbage,
telephone television and radio services by the use of
pipes, cables, wires or ducts. 2 " Also reserved for
each unit and the common property is the right to the
free, full and uninterrupted access and use of light to
or for any windows, doors or other apertures existing
at the date of registration of the plan. 204
The effect of registration of a flat or sectional
property is to make it subject to the Registered Land
Act 1963. 205 Although the title is deemed to have been
issued under the Registered Land Act 1963 in reality,
the registration is made under the Sectional Properties
Act 1987. The 1987 Act creates a new register that
only applies to sectional properties. Since the
sectional property title is deemed to be issued under
the 1963 Act the registered proprietor of a unit, if
the title is freehold, is vested the absolute ownership
of the unit and his rights are not liable to be
defeated except as provided in the Registered Land Act
1963, but subject to encumbrances shown in the register
and overriding interests. 2 " It would also mean that
the first registration of a sectional title would not
be capable of rectification.207
203 Sectional Properties Act 1987, s. 7(1).
204 Ibid.,s. 7(2).
205 Ibid., s. 5(5).
206 Registered Land Act 1963, ss. 27(a),28. For
leases see ibid.,s. 27(b).
207 Ibid., s. 143(1).
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The registration of flats is another mammoth task
that faces the Kenya Land Registry. Consequently, the
Sectional Properties Act 1987 will not be brought into
force until the Land Registry is ready to undertake
such registrations. At present, the Land Registry is
not yet prepared to undertake this task. A lot of work
remains to be done. The statutory forms have to be
printed, and the registers for the sectional properties
have to be prepared together with the certificates.
This has proved to be an expensive undertaking and the
lack of sufficient funds has meant that it will be a
while yet before the Land Registry starts the
Registration programme. 208
The Sectional Properties Act 1987 has also
implications for the conversion of titles. Land which
is already subject to the Land Titles Act 1908, the
Government Lands Act 1915 or the Registration of Titles
Act 1919 is capable of conversion and registration
under the Registered Land Act 1963. 209
 However, if
such land contains flats, and it is desired that they
be registered under the 1987 Act, it is unclear whether
the parcel of land itself, which is registered either
under the 1908 or 1919 Acts or is subject to the 1915
Act, should first be converted to be registered under
section 12(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963 and then
208 Interview with the Deputy Chief Land Registrar,
Land Registration Department, Nairobi, 2 October 1989.
209 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 12(1). See Section
V, supra.
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registers made for the units in the sectional plan, or
whether registers can be made for the units directly
under the 1987 Act without the title to the parcel
having to be necessarily converted first under the 1963
Act. It would appear, by virtue of sections 5(1)(a)
and (b) of the Sectional Properties Act 1987 that it
would be possible to directly convert the title to a
parcel into registers made under the Sectional
Properties Act 1987. This is done by merely closing
the register of the parcel and then opening a separate
register for each unit. However, if the former was
subject either to the Land Titles Act 1908 or the
Government Lands Act 1915, then the title would have to
be examined first before the register can be closed.210
Titles subject to the Registration of Titles Act 1919
need not be examined due to the fact that they are
already registered and therefore their conversion can
take place directly.211
Although legislation similar to the Sectional
Properties Act 1987 has not yet been passed in England,
there does exist some protection for the tenants of
flats. For example, the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987
confers on such tenants rights of first refusal on
disposals by the landlord, 212 the right to apply to
court for the appointment of a manager in respect of
210 See Section V, supra.
211 Ibid.
212 Part I.
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the block213
 certain rights of compulsory acquisition
of the landlord's interest214 and protection in
relation to the service charge. 215
Nevertheless, recommendations have been made for
'strata' legislation to be adopted in England.
	 A
committee set up to consider positive covenants
affecting land looked at the 'special problems of
blocks of flats and other multiple units', and studied
the system introduced in New South Wales by the
conveyance (Strata Titles) Act 1961216
 They came to
the conclusion that such a system would supply "a ready
made and effective scheme for implying all necessary
easements and covenants and for providing an effective
machinery of management and enforcement" and a similar
system should be made available by statute.
Twenty two years were to pass before another
report was published, this time by the Law Commission,
which recommended the creation of a new system of land
ownership known as commonhold. 217
 Under this system
213 Part II.
214 Part III.
215 Part V.
216 Report of the Committee on Positive Covenants 
Affecting Land, Cmnd. 2719.
217 Law Commission Report of a Working Group on
Commonhold: Freehold Flats and Freehold Ownership of 
Other Independent Buildings, Cm.179. In 1984 the Law
Commission published the Report on Positive and
Restrictive Covenants (Law Comm. No. 127) where they
set out proposals for reforming the law of positive and
restrictive covenants. However, in that report the
Commission recognised that 'condominium' legislation
has advantages but decided not to enact comprehensive
218
219
cit.
220
221
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the owner of a unit within a block of flats for
example, would be the freeholder with exclusive
ownership of the unit but with a proportionate share of
the site itself. 218
 The emphasis of the commonhold is
on co-operation between the owners of the unit. To
this end once the commonhold is registered at the Land
Registry a management or commonhold association would
be created, the members being the unit owners, which
would own the common parts of the property and be
responsible for their maintenance and repair.218
For the purposes of registration, only an absolute
title could be available to a commonhold. The Working
Group designed a register that would be identical to
that normally issued under the Land Registration Act
1925 in that it would be subdivided into three
registers: the property, proprietorship and charges
registers 220 a commonhold declaration would also be
registered which would contain information on the
votes, ownership shares and contributions of the
proprietor of a unit.221
condominium legislation: instead they thought it
preferable to provide a legal framework "within which
people can in effect create condominium regimes of
their own" (para.22.13). However, it was subsequently
seen as necessary to put forward a scheme which would
form the basis for condominium legislation in England
Preface, Report of a Working Group on Commonhold,
supra.
Ibid., paras. 1.10,1.18.
Report of a Working Group on Commonhold ..., op.
Ibid., Appendix B, Form IV.
Ibid., Form I(a).
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The proposals of the Working Party have not yet
been implemented. The Lord Chancellor stated that
although the Government had no plans to introduce
legislation on commonhold in the 1989 Parliamentary
session, the Law Commission was preparing a draft
bill.222
VIII Conclusion
That the land registration programme in Kenya is
ambitious goes without saying. The systematic
adjudication of land formerly subject to customary law
has been extended to cover half the country and has
resulted in the registration of over 1.5 million titles
covering more than 6.6 million hectares of land. As
map 5 shows, large sections of the country have had all
the titles systematically registered.
Consequently, the cost of the land registration
programme has been huge, running into millions of
pounds. 223 As a developing country, there is no way
the Kenya Government would have borne the cost of land
registration without having to seek external sources
222 Parliamentary Debates, (H.L) 5th ser., Vol. 513,
col. 841, written answer (5 December 1989). In the
House of Commons, a Bill was presented to the House by
Mr. Dudley Fishburn M.P. entitled 'The Leasehold Reform
(Commonhold) Bill: The Bill provided for the
conversion of all leasehold flats into commonholds and
enable unit owners to have freehold titles of their
units. The Bill was presented to speed up the process
of providing legislation to provide for commonholds.
However, nothing became of this Bill - Parliamentary
Debates (H.C.) Official Rep., 6th ser., Vol. 15, col.
341 (19 April 1988).
223 Exact figures are unavailable.
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of finance. The British Government, primarily, has
contributed a significant amount of finance towards the
programme. 224 Although it may have been prudent to
recoup the cost of adjudication by setting high fees,
this would have been counterproductive, particularly in
view of the fact that virtually all landowners whose
land was being adjudicated were experiencing
registration for the first time, hence the public
campaign on the part of the Government to increase
awareness. Therefore, to encourage support for
adjudication of land, the registration fees were
pitched low. 225
 It must also be remembered that land
adjudication was initially introduced at the height of
the Mau Mau Civil War in the mid 1950's by the colonial
government in an attempt to redress the social and
economic imbalances which contributed to the outbreak
of the war. In view of its forceful introduction,
landowners were naturally resentful at the whole idea,
suspiciously viewing it as a plot by the colonial
government to take away their land. Hence, it would
have been imprudent politically to have set a high fee
at all. The suspicions began to abate when the
benefits of adjudication began to trickle through.226
224 See Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation
and Registration in Kenya 1965-66, (London 1966),
paras. 2-4.
225 See Registered Land Act 1963, Fifth Sched.
226 See Chapter Two, supra. See generally M.P.K.
Sorrenson, Land Reform in the Kikuyu Country, A Study
in Government Policy, (Nairobi, 1967).
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In the post-independence era, the low adjudication
and registration fees makes registration attractive and
affordable for the majority of landowners engaged in
subsistence farming whose disposable incomes are low.
However, major savings in registration costs have
been made by the use of the lay adjudication committees
responsible for the examination of titles initially
subject to customary law. The members of the
committees, who have undertaken the work unpaid, have
borne the burden of the adjudication process.
Nevertheless, the policy of not paying the committees
has created serious problems. Corruption is evident
and has resulted in people giving some members favours
in return for favourable decisions. Although the
committees were deliberately created to be large in
order to deter people from trying to influence or
corrupt members, this has not necessarily been an
effective deterrent. The lack of a salary or some
payment of a fee to the committee members has had an
effect on the motivation of many committees. Since the
members usually have their own farms or businesses to
run, there is often reluctance to attend committee
hearings; the result is a backlog of objections and
appeals that continue to build up. This in turn
reduces the pace of adjudication because no land can be
registered under the Registered Land Act 1963 until all
the objections have been dealt with.227
227 Land Adjudication Act 1968, s. 27(3); Registered
Land Act 1963, s. 11(2).
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The solution therefore would seem to lie in
providing that a fee for services rendered be paid to
individual committee members. This would go a long way
towards eliminating the temptation to receive a bribe
and, moreover, would boost the motivation of those
serving on the committees. However, those who oppose
the payment of fees would argue that the system, as it
is, has been successful, in any event, since the
committees have been responsible for assisting in the
spread of registration of title systematically to
nearly half the country in only 35 years. While this
is true, it is also arguable that the process can be
speeded up even more if members are paid.
The other problem - the failure adequately to
correlate customary rights with rights recognised by
the Registered Land Act 1963 - can be partly
attributable to the fact that the committee members
have no legal training. However, it is submitted that
the problem may be more fundamental. The real problem
lies with the failure of the framers of the Registered
Land Act 1963 to create rights that would comfortably
substitute the rights recorded on the adjudication
register. Customary rights are not accurately
represented by the existing rights created under the
1963 Act. It is arguable that new types of rights
could have been imaginatively created to reflect the
nature of customary rights. For example, a new type of
tenancy known as a customary tenancy could have been
created. The rights of the customary tenant would
208
depend on the nature of the right that he held under
customary law. Therefore a person who was a muhoi
prior to registration would be registered as a
customary tenant, the tenancy being terminable at will
with reasonable notice. A muthami on the other hand
could be registered as a customary tenant, the tenancy
terminable on the failure to fulfil certain conditions,
with reasonable notice.
Such a scheme, however, poses its own problems.
Firstly, there is the danger that it would perpetuate
customary law which the Registered Land Act 1963 is
trying to replace. If there is a dispute it causes one
to have to look at the customary law to determine what
were the rights of such a tenant. Secondly, the
multiplicity of tribes in Kenya means that there are
customary rights with differing obligations and it
would be difficult to represent them all on the
register.
To overcome these objections, it would be easier
to create several categories of customary tenancies
which would broadly reflect the variety of customary
rights that are in existence. It would, however,
entail the compilation of all the customary tenancies
excercised by all the tribes within the country, in
order to create effective categories of tenancies which
would be recognised by the Registered Land Act 1963.
This is not as difficult as it sounds since the
customary laws of succession and marriage of the major
209
tribes in Kenya have already been compiled. 228 Such a
scheme would come closer in accurately portraying the
customary rights that are being recorded during the
adjudication process.
The prime advantage of systematic registration is
the speedy registration of titles in orderly fashion
throughout the country. By contrast the sporadic
compilation of the register in England means that the
spread of registration has been slow and uncoordinated.
The success of systematic registration has been partly
aided by the sanctions that affect proprietors who fail
to register. First, the failure to have one's land
adjudicated within the statutory period results in a
person losing his title to land for all time. Once the
adjudication register is handed to the Land Registar
and registers prepared for the titles, no rectification
of the first registration can take place. 229
 Many
proprietors lost their titles in this way during the
1950's when, as a result of the Civil War, many were
absent when their land was undergoing adjudication.
Consequently, their titles were adjudicated in favour
of others, mostly family members, who had themselves
registered as first proprietors. 230
 No rectification,
228 See E. Cotram, Restatement of African Laws Kenya 
Vol. I, The Law of Marriage and Divorce, Vol. II; The
Law of Succession, (London 1969).
229 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 143(1).
230 However, it is argued in Chapter Six that the
rights of these ones can be capable of binding the
registered proprietor notwithstanding their non-
registration.
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despite the fraud, could be made. 231
 To have allowed
rectification of such registrations would have
undermined the whole registration programme.232
The Government, however, solved the problem by re-
settling thousands of landless proprietors on
settlement schemes. These schemes were comprised of
land which the Government purchased from European
farmers who left the country at Independence as well as
land which had been abandoned by farmers who left in a
hurry. It also included land already owned by the
Government.233
The second sanction is criminal. Any person who,
without reasonable excuse, neglects or refuses to
demarcate his land or assist in the adjudication
process when required to do so may be found guilty of a
criminal offence. 234
 During the barazas or public
meetings where individuals within the locality are
informed about the importance of having their land
adjudicated, they are made aware of the consequences of
the failure to register. The threat of criminal
231 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 143(1).
232 See further Chapter Eight, infra.
233 The most notable settlement scheme was the Million
Acre Programme. Under this scheme 40,919 families were
settled on 484,567 hectares or nearly a million acres
of land. Other schemes are the Harambe, Haraka,
Shirika, 01/Kalou and the Stateland and Trustland
settlement schemes primarily to re-settle landless
people - Department of Settlement Annual Report 1983,
(Nairobi 1983).
234 Land Adjudication Act 1968, s. 33.
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sanctions upon those who fail to cooperate has acted as
an additional deterrent.
These sanctions are draconian. People are robbed
of the freedom of choice as to how they want to deal
with their land. On the other hand, these measures
have contributed to the cooperation that landowners
have provided during the adjudication process.
Interestingly, the enthusiasm that many people have had
for registration particularly after Independence has
meant that hardly any prosecutions have been brought
under these provisions. 235
 In Kenya, systematic
compilation of the register has also facilitated the
mapping of land subject to registration. Mapping is
done systematically thereby making it economical. The
use of aerial photographs undoubtedly makes it easier
to draw the Registry Maps. However, such maps can be
accurate if the boundaries to the land can be properly
identified from the air. Many of these boundaries
cannot be identified adequately, either because the
hedges have not grown and fences not erected properly,
or because the boundaries have been destroyed by
various causes. Consequently, the Registry maps are
often seriously inaccurate and cannot be relied upon
where there is a boundary dispute. The solution lies
in re-mapping the areas which is the intention of the
Survey of Kenya. However, the cost is prohibitive and
235 Interview with the Kiambu District Land Registrar,
Miss R.N. Mule, 2 October 1989.
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the lack of finance means that it will be a long time
before the task is undertaken.
As all available resources have been directed at
registering land under customary law, no programme of
converting titles registered under the Land Titles Act
1908, the Government Lands Act 1915 and the
Registration of Titles Act 1919 has yet been laid down.
Such conversion will require all the titles under the
1908 and the 1915 Acts to be first examined before they
can be registered under the Registered Land Act 1963.
This will be a mammoth job which will require the Land
Registry to recruit teams of lawyers to assist in such
examination. 236 However, such recruitment may be
difficult in view of the fact that many lawyers are
unattracted by Government service. Alternatively, such
work could be contracted out to certain private
practitioners specialising in conveyancing, as is the
case in England where the Land Registrar can refer to
one of the special conveyancing counsel the whole or
any portion of the examination of a title.237
The enactment of the Sectional Properties Act 1987
in Kenya is a significant development, and an
illustration of the progress land registration has made
in Kenya. However, once again, the unavailability of
adequate resources means that the Registry is still
236 A similar suggestion was made at a Law Reform
Seminar - See Briefings: M. E. Aronson, Law Reform
Seminar on Land Law Reform, The Nairobi Law Monthly,
September 1987, 20 at p. 21.
237 Land Registration Rules 1925, ss. 26, 303.
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unprepared for the registration of such properties.
Hence it is unknown when the Act will come into force.
Nevertheless, at least there exists an Act on the
statute book which provides the framework for the
registration of flats. In England, the pace of reform
has been excruciatingly slow in this area, despite the
urgent need for such legislation. Nearly 25 years
since the first report recommending the adoption of
similar legislation, no legislation yet exists.
Nevertheless, the preparation of a draft bill by the
Law Commission means that such an Act may be in place
in the not too distant future.
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Chapter Four
THE REGISTER
•	 Introduction
In a system of registered title "the register is
everything". 1 Consequently, proof of title to
registered land can only be established by inspecting
the register of title. However, for the register to
accurately reflect the state of a title it must be
effectively maintained. In Kenya the register is
maintained by the Land Registry and administered by the
Chief Land Registrar. 2 The Land Registry however, is
decentralised, and each registration district has a
land registry, the registration districts more or less
corresponding with the administrative districts of the
country. 3 In total there are 27 District Land
Registries in Kenya.4
This Chapter looks at the organisation of the
Kiambu District Land Registry, the largest and busiest
district land registry in the country. Also analysed
is the structure of the individual register of title
1	 Waimiha Sawmilling Co. v. Waione Timber Co. [1926]
A.0 101 at p. 106. But see the problem caused by
overriding interests, Chapter Six, infra.
2	 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 7(1), H.M. Land
Registry is responsible for maintaining the registers
of title in England, and administered also by the Chief
Land Registrar - Land Registration Act 1925, s. 126.
3	 Registered Land Act 1963, ss. 5,6(1); Registered
Land (Districts) Order 1981, Schedule.
4	 This compares with 18 in England and Wales.
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maintained by the Registry. The Kiambu District Land
Registry lies in an area where land adjudication and
registration of unregistered titles is complete.
Consequently, the majority of registrations dealt with
by the Registry are connected with dealings in land.
Of interest, therefore, is the procedure that is
normally followed when a plot of land is transferred.
Significantly, transfers and dealings in general are
undertaken at the registry by parties on their own
behalf without employing the services of lawyers. Many
landowners are aware of the importance of land
registration and the need to register transfers of
land. Unlike the large majority of landowners in
Britain who remain unaware of land registration
procedure, public awareness in Kenya has been
heightened by several factors. One of these is the
fact that public access to the register remains
unrestricted. In contrast the English register has
remained closed to the public for many years and it is
only recently that provision was made to open the
register to the public.5
What role should the land certificate have in a
system of registered title? An interesting development
in Kenya was the change brought about by the Registered
Land (Amendment) Act 1987. That Act amended section 32
of the Registered Land Act 1963 by providing that the
5	 Land Registration Act 1988. The Act was brought
into force on 3 December, 1990 by the Land Registration
Act 1988 (Commencement) Order 1990, S.I. 1359.
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land certificate issued under section 32 of the
Registered Land Act 1963 should be replaced by a 'title
deed'. The reason for this somewhat startling
amendment is noteworthy and reflects the effect public
opinion can have in modifying registered land practice.
However, what is the practical effect of having such a
change? Prima facie, the issuing of a title deed may
justify the application of unregistered law principles.
It may also encourage the dispositions of titles off
the register. If such consequences do take place then
such a change signifies a dangerous development, for it
lays the foundation for the undermining of registered
land law. In reality, however, such fears may be
unjustified. The effects of this change are
considered.
Land registration does not come without its
problems. The biggest problem facing the land
registries in Kenya and in England is finance. This is
ironic considering that large surpluses from fee income
are produced by all the registries. The problem is
more acute in Kenya where government control has
prevented the income from being invested, for example
in the building of better facilities, modernising the
system generally and improving staff motivation by
increasing salary scales. If land registration is to
be effective then the key may lie in reducing the level
of government control.
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II The Kiambu District Land RectistrIr
Situated in Kiambu town about ten miles from
Nairobi, the Kiambu District Land Registry serves the
whole of Kiambu District. The illustration overleaf is
a map of Kiambu District showing the principal towns
with Kiambu as the District capital.
With an estimated population of over 800,000 Kiambu
District ranks as one of the most densely populated
Districts in the country. It is a very fertile area
making agriculture the mainstay of the local economy.
Consequently a large section of the population are
engaged in farming and many have their own plots of
land. The dense population has meant that land
holdings are small, on average about 1.2 ha per farmer.
Kiambu ranks as one of the first Districts to complete
the systematic adjudication of land, this having been
achieved by the early 1960s. Therefore, a large
percentage of the land is registered under the
Registered Land Act 1963. New registrations, however,
still take place, these primarily being mainly
subdivisions of existing registered plots. There are
also some pockets of Government land and Trust land
owned by the County Council which is in the process of
being issued to landless individuals and consequently
being brought onto the register. Over 95,000 titles
are now registered and maintained by the Land Registry.
•	 •Limuru
Kiambu
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The Kiambu District Land Registry occupies a small
building that has virtually outlived its usefulness.6
The staff is comprised of the District Land Registrar,
three Assistant Land Registrars, the District and
Assistant District Land Valuer, six clerks whose
function is to search and make entries on the Register
and maintain the parcel files and three clerks who
serve at the public counter, one whose function is to
note on the Presentation Book the documents that are
presented for registration, one to make bookings for
land control board meetings, and the third to assist
members of the public by answering their queries and
generally advising them on procedure. 7 Although the
District Land Registrar was the only member of staff
with a law degree, the members of staff generally have
accumulated a lot of experience, most of them having
worked at the Registry for many years.
A.	 The Register
What can be described as the global register for
the whole of Kiambu District is kept in over 200
Kalamazoo metal binders, each binder containing several
hundred cards, with each card being the register for an
6	 The District Land Registrar stated that the
Registry desperately needs additional space as the
existing facilities have become too cramped. However,
a lack of funds has prevented any expansion programme
interview with the District Land Registrar, Miss R.N.
Mule Kiambu District Land Registry, 2 October 1989.
7	 Support staff include a telephone operator, a
messenger and several cleaners.
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individual title. 8 Freehold titles are represented by
green cards while leasehold titles are on white cards.
Illustrated in Figure 4(a) and 4(b) is a copy of the
actual register of a freehold title registered under
the Registered Land Act 1963. As it indicates, it is
divided into three sections; the property,
proprietorship and encumbrances sections. This
division is similar to the English register with the
exception that the divisions in the latter are also
referred to as 'registers'. 9 Figures 5(a) and s(b)
illustAe by way of comparison a copy of the English4
freehold register of title.
As the Kenya register shows, the property section
contains particulars of the title such as the
registration section, the parcel number, the
approximate area of the title, easements in favour of
the land, i.e. easements over a servient tenement, and
the Registry Map Sheet number. The latter helps one to
identify the title on the Registry Index Map kept in
the land registry. A significant difference between
the property section and the property register on the
English register is that the latter contains a filed
8	 A frequent complaint by some members of staff was
that these binders were so heavy that they could easily
sprain one's back when lifting them! In contrast the
register maintained by the Nottingham District Land
Registry, the largest in England, is arranged on
shelves numbered in sequence. Each card representing
an individual register is placed on the shelf making it
easier for a member of staff to remove any card or
cards whenever they are required.
9	 The English register is also larger in size. See
infra.
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H.M. AND REGISTRY
Mel II
‘	 A. PROPERTY REGISTER
containing the description of the registered land and the estate comprised in the Title
COUNTY	 DISTRICT
The Freehold land shown and edged with red on the plan of the above Title filed at the Registry
,
B. PROPRIETORSHIP REGISTER
stating nature of the Title, name, address and description of the proprietor of the land and any entries affecting the right of disposing thereof
TITLE ABSOLUTE
Entry
number Proprietor, etc.
TITLE NUMBER
C. CHARGES REGISTER
.harges, incumbrances etc., adversely affecting the land and registered dealings therewith
„i Li t each entry is the date on which the entry was made on this edition of the register !Rem arks
Any entries struck through are no longer subsisting
Th e date at
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plan with the title edged in red." Although this plan
is not drawn to scale, it shows, at a glance, the
position and extent of the registered land. On the
other hand, the Kenya register contains no such plan.
The only option for a person wishing to have a copy of
a plan showing the extent of the registered land is to
obtain a copy of the relevant Registry Index Map) -1
However, as pointed in Chapter Three, it is intended to
resurvey all the land that was surveyed during
adjudication in order to produce more accurate and
permanent Registry Index Maps. Although it has not
been stated whether filed plans for each registered
title will be produced, once the new Registry Index
Maps are made, they will form a better basis for the
production of filed plans.12
The proprietorship section on the Kenya register
contains the name and address of the proprietor
together with a note of any entry such as a caution,
inhibition or restriction which affects his right of
disposition. The encumbrances section contains a note
10 See infra. Land Registration Rules 1952, r. 3.
11 As the map in the Appendix shows, a copy can be
huge.
12 Section 10(2) of the Registered Land Act 1963
provides that the property section may contain a
reference to a filed plan. Titles converted from the
Registration of Titles Act 1919 already have their own
filed plans drawn to scale because this was a feature
under the 1919 Act. See the example of the filed plan
in Chapter Three supra, which is part of the register
under the 1919 Act.
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of every encumbrance, such as a charge, and every right
adversely affecting the land.13
B.	 B.	 Inspection of the Register
Section 36 of the Registered Land Act 1963
provides that any person may inspect the register and
the registry map or obtain an official search of the
register. 14 Public inspection of the registers of
title is indeed a feature of land registration in
Kenya. 15 Public inspection of the register under the
Registered Land Act 1963 has facilitated personal
attendance by parties to a transaction at the land
registries in order to conduct their transactions
there. 16 Many of the persons in attendance at the
Kiambu District Land Registry were present to apply for
official searches of the register and, on average, 25
applications were made per day.17
In contrast, the English register has always been
shrouded in secrecy ever since its inception in 1862.
13	 C.f. the English register in Figure 6(a) and 6(b).
14 This is through application on forms R.L. 25 or
R.L.26, Registered Land Act, 3rd Sched.
15 See Land Titles Act 1908, s. 31; Government Lands
Act 1915, s. 127; Registration of Titles Act 1919, s.
79.
16 See infra.
17 Although provision is made for anyone to make a
personal inspection of the register (Ibid, s.36(1),
Form R.L.25), persons are encouraged by staff to obtain
official searches because these confer greater
protection on the applicant. But, see Chapter Five,infra., for the problem this creates.
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This is directly related to the English obsession with
secrecy about the ownership of land and property and
many consider it rude to find out such details. A
columnist described it as equivalent as trying to "find
out the colour of a person's knickers"! 19 The
Registration of Title Commissioners pointed out that
the reason for this obsession lay in "the fear of
unnecessary and uncalled for disclosures" because "no
man likes to make his private affairs public; and one
man has no right to pry into the affairs of another,
except for some object, in which the latter has given
him an interest." 19 Consequently, the Land Registry
Act 1862 provided in section 15 that the register
should only be opened to inspection by the registered
proprietor or under an order of the court. Such a
provision was ironic in view of the fact that in
earlier times, the ownership of land was never made
secret - witness conveyancing by livery in seisin;
moreover, the Domesday survey in the 11th century to
enable all land in England to be valued for taxation
purposes was registered in the Domesday Book and open
for public inspection; 20 furthermore, Parliament
endeavoured to remove the scourge of secret
18 Kevin Cahill, The Strange Secrets of Who owns 
What,  The Independent On Sunday, 11 February, 1990, p.
57.
19 Report of the Registration of Title Commissioners, 
1857, C.2215, para. XX.
20 This can be inspected in the Public Records Office
in London.
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conveyancing undertaken by lawyers to prevent the King
from recovering feudal dues and taxes by enacting the
Statute of Uses and Enrolments.
Nevertheless, the secrecy principle was carried
into the Land Registration Act 1925, section 112(1)
providing that a person could inspect the register but
only on the authority of the registered proprietor or
by an order of the court. 21
 The Law Commission,
however, was able to consider the issue of whether it
was really necessary to keep the register closed to the
public. 22 On the one hand the main argument put
forward by those who opposed an open register was that
it would be an invasion of privacy. 23 Outsiders would
be able to find out whether the land was mortgaged or
what rent was payable under a lease, while there may be
those wishing to inspect the register to ascertain the
identity of the proprietor in order to send unsolicited
commercial ('junk') mail. 24 Still others, such as
journalists, may wish to discover the personal details
of a landowner in order to publicise them in a gossip
column, while a terrorist may want to discover the
21 For the other limited circumstances under which
the register could be inspected, see Land Registration
Act 1925, ss.112(2), (3), 112A, 112AA, 112B, 112C.
22 The Law Commission, Second Report on Land
Registration: Inspection of the Register, Law Comm. No.
148, para.16.
23	 See Parliamentary Debates, (H.L.), 5th Ser. Vol.
490, col. 683 (Lord Templeman).
24	 The Law Commission, Second Report..., op. cit.,
para.16(iii).
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identity of a landowner in order to murder or commit
arson. 25
However, the Law Commission considered that the
arguments in favour of an open register outweighed
those against. 26
 For example many countries operating
registers of title do not restrict public access to the
register; moreover, in England there are numerous other
registers which are not restricted to the public, such
as the companies register, electoral roll, registers
dealing with, probate, wills and births.27
Furthermore, an open register would assist those
engaged in historical research or the study of planning
and estate management or to ensure "the preservation of
footpaths or ancient buildings." 28
 It would assist
tenants in identifying immediate and superior
landlords, and significantly, assist in the
simplification of house transfer. The latter would be
achieved in several ways, first the formality of
obtaining the vendors written authority to inspect the
register would be removed; it would follow that the
vendor's title could be verified earlier in the
process; computerisation of the register could mean
that in the future, a person with a computer terminal
25	 Ibid.
26 In the House of Lords, Lord Templeman, pointed out
that there is no great stigma in having it known that
one has mortgaged a property - Parliamentary Debates,
op. cit.,
27	 Second Report, op. cit., para. 18.
28	 Ibid.
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could inspect the register directly from his home or
office; furthermore, a purchaser could inspect the
register and filed plan of adjoining properties to
discover the burden of restrictive covenants or the
routes or rights of way.29
Consequently, the Land Registration Act 1988 was
enacted to amend section 112 of the Land Registration
Act 1925, section 1(1) providing that any person may,
on the payment of a fee, inspect and make copies of and
extracts from entries on the register and documents
referred to in the register. The Act was a victory for
those supporting an open register. However, it was not
brought into force immediately because the Registrar
argued that the Land Registry was unprepared
administratively for the Act." This was due to the
massive backlog of applications for registration which
built up as a result of the property boom of the
1980'5. 31 The 1988 Act was subsequently brought in
force by the Land Registration (Open Register) Rules
1990.
29	 Ibid.
30 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 5th Ser.
vol.490, col. 684.
31	 Kevin Cahill, op.  cit., p. 57.
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C.	 Personal Attendance at the Registry
The first thing a visitor to the Kiambu District
Land Registry will notice is that the Registry is
always full of people. Many of these are parties to
land transfers who come to have their transfers
registered, or those who have come to obtain official
searches while others are present to collect their
'title deeds'. Indeed, personal attendance at the
registry is a remarkable feature of registered land
practice in Kenya, characterised at the same time tu
the conspicuous absence of lawyers. Individual
proprietors and purchasers of land alike act on their
own behalf throughout the whole transaction.33
Interestingly, many transactions are completed at the
Registry itself.
Where a transfer of registered land was being
undertaken, it was observed that a purchaser would
normally come first to obtain an official search of the
register. Although a search should not take more than
ten minutes, at times an applicant would finally
receive the certificate of search one or even two days
after the date of his application. For an applicant
who had travelled a long distance to the registry this
33 In a period of two weeks the writer observed that
there were 14 transfers of registered land for value at
the Kiambu registry and in every case, without
exception, the parties to the transfers conducted the
transfers without the benefit of legal representation.
Registry officials also confirmed that generally most
individuals attending the registry undertake their
transfers without legal representation.
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was extremely frustrating and wasteful of time. 34 If
the search was clear the purchaser would collect the
requisite forms. These would include the form of
transfer (form R.L. 1), the application for
registration (form R.L. 28) and, if the land is
agricultural, the land control board consent form.35
At times when both the vendor and purchaser were
present at the registry, the forms would be filled on
the spot and they would then be advised to have
execution verified at the offices of a local
advocate. 36 If the land was agricultural the parties
would then have to attend the Land Control Board which
meets several times a month. Only when the Board
granted consent could the parties proceed with
registration of the transfer. 37 Once registration fees
were paid at the office of the District Commissioner38
34 Although staff at the registry were often busy,
there was no real reason why it took so long to make a
search. However, the writer was reliably informed that
poor salary scales has brought about a lack of
motivation among staff, resulting in a corresponding
reluctance to expedite the process. To speed up the
registration process some individuals have resorted to
paying a small 'goodwill' fee to some of the staff. It
is this practice that lays the foundation for
corruption.
35 See Appendix for copies of these forms.
36 For the procedure on verification, see Chapter
Five.
37 For the significance of Land Control Board
consent, see Chapter Five.
38 All government revenue within the District is
collected by this office. At the time of writing the
registration fee had gone up to 100 Kenya shillings
which is payable together with stamp duty on the
purchase price which amounts to 5% per every 1,000
Kenya shillings.
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the registration documents would then be presented to
the clerk in charge of the Presentation Book. The
clerk made a note in the book of all the documents
received, which were then handed to either one of the
three Assistant Land Registrars who would check that
the details on the documents were correct before
stamping them. The name of the transferee would be
inserted on the register of title for the land
concerned and that of the transferor deleted. The
transferor's land certificate or 'title deed' which
would have been handed in with the transfer documents,
is then cancelled and a new 'title deed' issued in the
name of the transferee.
The policy of personal attendance at the Registry,
whereby people conduct their own transfers in the
Registry without having to use lawyers, was a
deliberate policy encouraged by the Government. The
idea was discussed at length by the Conference on
African Land Tenure. The Conference was of the opinion
that personal attendance assisted in the maintenance of
the register because:
i) it avoided correspondence which in turn would
minimise the clerical work involved;
ii) this would result in the volume of work in
relation to total transactions being kept to a
minimum, "thus making the registry less prone to
falling into arrears of work":
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iii) consequently opportunities for errors and
oversights by clerks would be minimised;
vi) payment of fees would be facilitated;
v) the output of work by clerks is increased because
they can "overlook a letter but cannot overlook a
landowner in person";
vi) delay through a failure to use the prescribed
forms or follow the prescribed procedure would be
avoided; and
vii) landowners could be advised on procedure by the
Registry clerks or by the Registrar.39
The Working Party on African Land Tenure went
further and pointed out that Africans should be
encouraged to use the Registry whenever they dealt with
their land because land registration was something
'entirely new' to them, the benefits of which they
would not entirely appreciate at the outset." To
facilitate this Registries were to be decentralised so
that they were never too far away from the people as to
make it unreasonable to insist on personal
attendance. 41
These aims have been largely fulfilled. It is
noteworthy for example that the Registry staff play a
major role in advising proprietors of land of the
39 Report of the Conference on African Land Tenure in
Ease and Central Africa, (1956) J.A.A. (Special
Supplement), para. 32.
40 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure, 1957-58. (Nairobi, 1958), para.41.
41 Supra.
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procedure to follow when engaging in any transaction
and on numerous occasions even help parties fill their
forms. Personal attendance has also meant that
problems are attended to on the spot without the delay
that correspondence entails. As an example, the use of
the wrong form can contribute to delay in completing a
transaction if the forms have been sent through the
post. But, personal attendance means that this problem
can be corrected immediately. Moreover, it was
observed that the Registry deals with less
correspondence since few applications to search are
made through the post, resulting in less paperwork for
the Registry staff to deal with.
Personal attendance in Kenya is in direct contrast
to the position in England. There the bulk of
conveyancing, whether of registered or unregistered
land, is undertaken by solicitors or licensed
conveyancers, despite the fact that, where registered
land is concerned, land registration was meant to
simplify the process of transferring land, making it
possible for a person to undertake the transfer of his
own land without having to engage the services of a
lawyer. Not surprisingly, the legal profession was
able to maintain a sustained campaign of opposition to
land registration42 and, in particular, to the
introduction of compulsory registration. In order to
gain the support of the legal profession concessions
42 A factor which contributed to the failure of the
Land Transfer Act 1862. See Chapter Two, supra.
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were made to them; for example, compulsory registration
was delayed for a period of ten years, while the scale
fees were actually increased. 43 Thus, successful
lobbying by the profession ensured that they did not
lose their conveyancing market as a result of land
registration. At the same time there never has been
any campaign to inform the English public of how simple
it is to transfer registered land. The public have
therefore remained ignorant and mystified about land
transfer procedure. The Law Society has also played a
big role in fostering this state of affairs. A graphic
illustration of this is what took place in the 1970s.
In 1976 Michael Joseph, a solicitor, published a book
entitled, The Conveyancing Fraud. He showed how the
public was being taken for a ride by the legal
profession when it came to conveying land. The
profession had made out that conveyancing was a very
complicated business, and yet, as he showed,
conveyancing was in reality very simple, especially
where registered land was involved, the book became an
instant best seller. In response, the Law Society in
1977 engaged in an expensive advertising campaign in
the press which advised the public, 'don't listen to
Whatsisname, see a solicitor. 44 ' In a well publicised
case a person, who changed his name from Reynolds to
43 A. Offer, The Origins of the Law of Property Acts
1910-1925, (1977) 40 M.L.R. 505 at p. 521.
44	 See A. Offer, Property and Politics 1870-1914. 
Landownership, Law, Ideology and Urban Development in
England, (Cambridge 1981), p. 87.
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Whatsisname, and who had tried to undertake his own
cheap conveyancing, was taken to court by the Law
Society and fined. 45 The Law Society has continued to
stress to the public the necessity of seeing a
solicitor first before moving house. This was evident
when the Law Society in March 1990 launched
TransAction, a national conveyancing protocol designed
to help solicitors speed up the conveyancing process
and save costs. 46 For example, a feature of the
protocol was for a local search to be made by the
seller's solicitor at the cost of the seller, and the
result provided free of charge to the buyer's
solicitor. 47 This would save the buyer costs and time
if, as a result of a search which revealled a defect in
the property, the purchase was aborted. 48
 The Law
Society used this as an opportunity to impress upon
members of the publich, the need to see a solicitor
first before deciding to move house. Indeed, a massive
advertising campaign was undertaken all over the
country to acquaint the public with the new
procuedures. 49 Consequently, in the public mind,
45 This was for being in breach of section 22 of the
Solicitors Act 1974.
46 News:TransAction
 gathers momentum, (1990) 12
L.S.G. 4.
47 Richard Dresner, National conveyancing protocol 
search validation insurance (1990) 4 L.S.G. 20.
48	 Ibid.
49 See Marketing the new conveyancing Protocol,
(1990) 8 L.S.G. 16.
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conveyancing whether of registered or unregistered
land, is something that should be undertaken by
lawyers.
It is not surprising therefore that the Royal
Commission on Legal Services pointed out that it is
only a small proportion of transactions that the vendor
or purchaser acts on his own account. 50 A recent
survey undertaken by the National Consumer Council in
1990 showed that only 13% of people who had been
involved in house purchase had done the conveyancing
themselves. in contrast 84% of those in the survey
used solicitors in their survey while 3% used a
licensed conveyancer. These figures reflect the fact
that solicitors continue to play a huge role in the
conveyancing business and it looks to be the case for
many years to come.
Nevertheless, Consumer Associaitons such as Which
have endeavoured to encourage house buyers to do their
own conveyancing. For example they published an action
pack entitled, 'Do Your Own Conveyancing' which
outlines the procedure to be undertaken when a person
is purchasing registered freehold propety. Relevant
Registry forms are also included in the pack.
The emphasis placed in Kenya on the need for
people to undertake their own registered land
conveyancing can be viewed as part of a wider colonial
administrative strategy to shield Africans from
50 Royal Commission on Legal Services, Final Report,
Vol.1, Cmnd. 7648, para.21.28.
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lawyers. The exclusion of lawyers from appearing in
the Native Tribunals, later the African Courts, 51 on
behalf of Africans, and their exclusion from the land
adjudication and consolidation process all formed part
of this strategy. 52
 Lawyers were viewed with
hostility, as people who would foment corruption due to
a desire to make money, as well as being obsessed with
technicalities, which resulted in delay. 53
 However,
the legal profession in Kenya can also be blamed for
failing to protect its own vested interests. Unlike
the legal profession in England which was successful in
protecting its own interests and therefore maintaining
a large slice of the conveyancing cake, the legal
profession in Kenya lacked cohesion. The profession
failed, as a whole, to seek to play a role in the land
registration process in African lands. This is partly
attributable to the fact that there was only a tiny
number of African lawyers. 54 The profession, mainly
51 See Chapter Nine, infra.
52 The Magistrates Jurisdiction (Amendment) Act 1981
which handed to tribunals composed of elders
jurisdiction over certain disputes over land, was also
designed to prevent lawyers from handling such disputes
- see Chapter Nine, infra.
53 See Y.P. Ghai, Law and Lawyers in Kenya and
Tanzania: Some Political Economy Considerations, in
Lawyers in the Third World: Comparative and
Developmental perspectives, Edited by C.J. Dias, R.
Luckham, D.O. Lynch, J.C.N. Paul (Uppsala 1981), 144.
It is of interest to note that many lawyers in Kenya
today complain that the present Government has
continued to maintain this hostility to the profession,
with the result that lawyers are constantly vilified by
politicians - see Nairobi Law Monthly, March 1990.
54 By 1960 for example there were only five African
lawyers - Y.P. Ghai, op. cit.
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European and partly Asian, was concentrated in Nairobi,
serving European commercial and industrial interests.
African interests had rarely been served by the
profession and consequently when registration was
introduced in the African lands for the first time the
profession's complacent attitude meant that the
Government was not lobbied to ensure that the
profession would play a role in land registration in
the African lands. It is possible that had there been
a greater number of African lawyers at the time the
outcome may have been different. In the face of no
opposition, it was therefore easy for the
administration to ensure that lawyers were generally
shut out from the registration process.55
Nevertheless, personal attendance has incurred
significant benefits for landowners. A consequence has
been to make people registration literate. For
example, many individuals attending the Registry were
aware of the significance of an official search and how
to interpret the certificate of search; others were
aware of what a caution was and what effect it had when
registered against a title. Many were also aware of
the importance of registering a transfer of land under
the Registered Land Act 1963. When one considers that
many of these people are not well educated, it reflects
the high level of awareness that ordinary people have
55	 See Y.P. Ghai, op. cit., pp. 150,151,
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of land registration and its significance. 56 This is
also an indication of how successful the public
campaign by the Government to make people aware of the
importance of land registration and its benefits has
been, a campaign that was started with the introduction
of land registration in the 1950s. The result of this
is that it is now normal for the Registry to become the
focus of dealings and many transactions are actually
completed there.
The second benefit is undoubtedly financial. Many
landowners are able to save legal fees by undertaking
their own transactions. This is a significant benefit
in view of the fact that the average landowner in
Kiambu is not wealthy. 57 It means that the cost of
conveying registered land is cheap. On the other hand
such a situation is decidedly to the disadvantage of
the legal profession!
III The Certificate of Title
As the register of title "is everything" no
additional documents are required to prove title to
registered land. However, land certificates are a
56 The same cannot be said for many homeowners in
England. See Williams & Glyn's Bank v. Boland [1979]
Ch. 312, at 328, per Lord Denning.
57 If parties to a transaction undertake it on their
own behalf, then only fee payable to lawyers is for
verification of execution - see Registered Land Act
1963, s.110 & 4th Sched.
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feature of land registration. 58 The land certificate,
however, is not meant to be proof of title but merely
evidence of the state of the register. It is meant to
contain the entries that are on the register and
therefore must be updated every time there is a dealing
with the land. 59
 Proof of title can only be obtained
by making an official search of the register. In
reality, unless one actually inspects the register
itself, it is the certificate of official search which
is closest to being proof of title, and often the
contents of this certificate determine whether a
transfer of land is to proceed or not." Nevertheless,
the role accorded to the certificate of title in
England is in direct contrast to the certificate under
the Registered Land Act 1963, as the following
discussion highlights.
58 With the exception of Continental systems such as
in Germany and Switzerland - S.Rowton Simpson, Land Law
and Registration, (Cambridge 1976), 165.
59 Section 64(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925
provides that the land certificate must be produced to
the Registrar on dealing with the land. This is also a
requirement under section 33(1) of the Registered Land
Act 1963 but only if a 'title deed' has been issued.
60 An applicant who suffers damage or loss as a
result of errors or omissions on the certificate of
search may be indemnified - s.144(1) (c) Registered Land
Act 1963.
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A.	 The Land Certificate in England
In England the land certificate has been viewed to
a large extent as replacing the title deeds in
unregistered land. 61
The following pages contain copies of two types of
specimen land certificates that are produced by the
Land Registry. Land Certificate A is an example of the
certificate produced for registered proprietors from
the non-computerised Land Registries, while Land
Certificate B is a type produced by computerised Land
Registries. 62 An important feature of these
certificates is the inclusion of a filed plan edged in
red, though not drawn to scale. Such a feature does
not form part of the 'title deed' under the Registered
Land Act 1963 as shown below. This view that the land
certificate is equivalent to a title deed is reinforced
by section 66 of the Land Registration Act 1925 which
provides that a proprietor may create a lien by the
deposit of the land certificate. Such a lien is in
effect, an equitable mortgage created in a similar
manner to an equitable mortgage of unregistered land
through the deposit of title deeds. 63 The elevation of
61 David J. Hayton, Registered Land, 3rd ed., (London
1981), p. 20.
62 H.M. Land Registry, Registration of Title to Land,
A Brief Guide (1988), p. 3. The certificates are
reproduced fromAppendix C of the Guide.
63 Land Registration Act 1925, s.66; Barclays Bank v
Taylor [1974] Ch.137, 144. Thames Guaranty v. Campbell 
[1985] Q.B. 210. See Shaw v. Foster (1872) L.R. 5 H.L.
321 at 339-340. It is also the practice under the Land
Registration Act 1925, s.65, that when a mortgage or
charge is created the land certificate shall be
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the status of the land certificate to a role almost
equivalent to that of a title deed is a reflection of
the 'superstitious reverence for title deeds,'"
There is the question, however, whether the Law of
Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 has
destroyed the creation of equitable mortgages by the
deposit of title deeds and, by extension, the creation
of a lien by the deposit of a land certificate under
section 66 of the Land Registration Act 1925. The
deposit of title deeds had been recognised in equity as
a sufficient act of part performance in the absence of
writing. 65 However, section 2(8) of the 1989 Act
repealed section 40 of the Law of Property Act which
recognised the law of part performance. The general
academic consensus is that by virtue of section 2(8) of
the 1989 Act, equitable mortgages created by the
deposit of title deeds are no longer valid". There is
deposited at the registry. In comparison, the
Registered Land Act 1963 provides in section 33(3) that
where a similar charge is created the 'title deed'
shall be delivered to the chargee. It has been pointed
out that it is undesirable to allow a chargee to retain
the land certificate because it results in the chargee
having a hold over 'unsophisticated proprietors' -
S.Rowton Simpson, op. cit., p. 166.
64 Report of a Select Committee of the House of 
Commons on Land Titles and Transfer, 1879, p.V.
65	 Russel v Russel, (1983) 1 Bro. C.C. 269;
Featherstone v Fenwick (1783), 1 Bro. C.C. 270; Hurford
v Carpenter (1783) 1 Bro. C.C. 270. Thames Guaranty v
Campbell [1985] Q.B. 210.
66 Jean Howell, Informal Conveyances and Section 2 of 
the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) ACt 1989 
[1990] Corm. 441 at p. 444; Lionel Bently and Paul
Coughlan, Informal dealings with land after section 2 
(1990) Legal Studies 325, at p. 341.
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CERTIFICATE
T
HIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE
land described in the property register and shown on
the official plan of the title numbered as stated on the back
page of this certificate is registered at HM Land Registry
with the class of title stated in the proprietorship register.
There are annexed to this certificate office copies of the
entries in the register and of the official plan and, where so
indicated in the register, of documents filed in the Land
Registry.oLSBVR
Under section 68 of the Land Registration Act 1925 and rule 264 of
the Land Registration Rules 1925, this certificate shall be admissible
as evidence of the matters contained herein and, under section 64 of
the said Act, must be
produced to the Chief
Land Registrar on every
entry in the register of a
disposition by the
registered proprietor of the
land and on every
transmission thereof.
WARNING
I. No endorsement, note, notice or entry made in this certificate other than those
officially made at HM Land Registry shall have any operation.
2. All persons are cautioned against altering, adding to or otherwise tampering with
this certificate or any document annexed thereto.
sELBOFt
HM LAND
REGISTRY
LAND
REGISTRATION
ACTS
1925 to 1971
245APPENDIX C
LAND rERTIFICATE 'A'
The most recent date entered below is the latest one on which this land certificate was made to agree with the register.
A land certificate may be sent at any time to the appropriate district land registry to be brought up to date in any respect that
may be necessary. This service is provided free of charge and is usually completed within a day or two of the receipt of the
certificate. By this means, a registered proprietor is provided with conclusive evidence of the current state of the register.
Although the copy of the title plan in the certificate will correspond with the title plan filed at the Land Registry on the latest
date specified below, a later revision of the Ordnance Survey Map may have taken place and in this connection your attention is
drawn to the General Information Notes below concerning 'Inspection of the Land', 'Revision of the Ordnance Survey Map' and
'Boundaries of Registered Land'.
Dates when this land certificate was made to correspond with the register.
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GENERAL INFORMATION
OFFICE COPIES OF THE REGISTER
A registered proprietor may obtain from the appropriate district land registry an office copy of the registered title by applying
on pnnted form A44 and paying the prescnbed fees according to the scale for the various items set out on that form. Form A44
. (like all other printed Land Registry forms) may be purchased from any branch of HM Stationery Office or through a law
bookseller or stationer. Any other person may. with the written authonty of the registered proprietor. likewise obtain an office
copy of the register. Office copies are usually prepared and despatched within two days of the receipt of the application.
SEARCHES OF THE REGISTER
An intending purchaser, lessee or mortgagee who holds the written authority of the registered proprietor to inspect the register
may apply to the appropriate district land registry for an official search to ascertain whether any entnes have been made in the
register since the date of issue of the office copy or. alternathely, the date on which the land certificate was last made to correspond
with the register. The issue of the official certificate of the result of search will automatically confer upon the purchaser, lessee or
mortgagee pnonty for a full period of thirty working days for the lodging of the application to register the disposition. If the
disposition is of the whole of the land in the registered title, application should be made in printed form 94A but, if it affects only
a part of the land in the registered titie pnnted form 94B should be used. The official certificate of the result of search will be
issued in most cases by return of post.
The above is a general outline of the procedure for obtaining an official certificate of search as laid down by the current land
registration rules relating to official searches. The effect of these rules is explained in Practice Leaflet No. 2 which is obtainable
free of charge from any distnct land registry. This deals with the procedures of searching in much greater detail than can be gi‘en
here: It also explains how an application for official search without priority can be made and how solicitors can make official
searches by telephone or teleprinter. Before applying for official searches, applicants are strongly recommended to refer to the
current land registration rules relating to official searches or to Practice Leaflet No. 2.
INSPECTION OF THE LAND
Intending purchasers should inspect the land for the purpose of ascertaining its precise boundaries and disco‘enng whether
there are any rights of way, light, drainage or other overriding interests to which it is subject (see the inside back page of this
cover sheet), Enquiries should also be addressed to any person in occupation of the land or buildings thereon as to their rights
of occupation and to whom rent (if any) is paid.
REVISION OF THE ORDNANCE SURVEY MAP
The title plans prepared by H.M. Land Registry are based on the large scale maps of the Ordnance Survey. The Ordnance
• Survey Map is revised from time to time and a new title plan based on a later rnision may be substituted for the plan filed at
the Land Registry. If this occurs, an entry to that effect will be made in the register and the copy of the title plan in this certificate
will be replaced when the certificate is next lodged at the Land Registry.
ADDRESS FOR SERVICE
The address of any person as entered in the register shall, unless he otherwise directs, be his address for senice (Land
R "istration Rules. 1925. rule 315). Registered proprietors should notify the appropriate district land registry of any o: , nce of
undress and forward the land certificate for amendment. No fee is charged for making the alteration.
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A. PROPERTY REGIS :rel-i -
containing the description of the registered land and the estate comprised in the Title
COUNTY	 DISTRICT
BLANKSH1RE	 BROXMORE
The Freehold land shown and edged with red 	 e plan of the above Title filed at the Registry registered
on 12 October 1934 known as 2 Moon Street
,o11,1
B. PROPRIETORSHIP REGISTER
stating nature of the Title, name, address and description of the proprietor of the land and any entries affecting the right of disposing thereof
TITLE ABSOLUTE
Entry
number Proprietor. etc.
1. JOHN SMITH, Printer and WILLIAM BROWN, Engineer, both of 4 Moon Street, Broxmore,
Blankshire, registered on 1 May 1988.
-s.4. ,A LA
11. '7 1E 1
2. RESTRICTION registered on I May 1988:- No disposition by one proprietor of the land
(being the survivor of joint proprietors and not being a trust corporation) under which capit
money arises is to be registered except under an order of the registrar or of the Court.
•14•LA
4,, •
3. CAUTION in favour of Jesse Turnbull of 30 Park Way, Newtown, Blankshire, Electrical
Engineer, registered on 7 October 1988.
otto•
Any entries struck through are no longer subsisting
Fig. 6(d )
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Page 2
	 TITLE NUMBER
	 00002	
4
--....—....--
C. CHARGES REGISTER
containing charges. incumbrances etc.. adversely affecting the land and registered dealings therewith
Eniry
number The date at the beginning of each entry is the date on which the entry was made on this edition of the register Remarks
I. 1 May 1988 - A Conveyance of the land in this title dated 30 September
1934 and made between (1) Mary Brown (Vendor) and (2) Harold Robins
(Purchaser) contains the following covenants:
"The Purchaser hereby covenants with the Vendor for the benefit
of her adjoining land known as 27, 29, 31, 33 Cabot Road to observe
and perform the stipulations and conditions contained in the Schedule
hereto.
THE SCHEDULE before referred to
A
Q	 l'
1.	 No building to be erected on the land shall be used other than
as a private dwellinghouse.
2.	 No building to be erected as aforesaid shall be converted into
or used as flats, maisonettes or separate tenements or as a boarding
house.
3.	 The garden ground of the premises shall at all times be kept
in neat and proper order and condition and shall not be converted
to any other use whatsoever.
4.	 Nothing shall be done or permitted on the premises which may
be a nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining houses or to the
neighbourhood."
2. 1 May 1988 - LEASE dated 25 July 1935 to Charles Jones for 99 years
from 24 June 1935 at the rent of £45.
Lessee's title
registered
under 00003
	 ,,,,,
3. 1 May 1988 - NOTICE of Deposit of Land Certificate with Mid Town
Bank Limited of 2 High Street, Broxmore, Blankshire, registered on
I May 1988.
A.LA
eisl
	
-
Any entries struck through are no longer subsisting
DANETREE ROAD
I. ANSDOWNE ROAD
Fig. 6(e)
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HM Land Registry
Land Certificate
This is to certify
that the land described within and shown on the official plan is
registered at HM Land Registry with the title number and class of title
stated in the register.
There are contained in this certificate office copies of the entries in
the register and of the official plan and, where so indicated in the
register, of documents filed in the Land Registry.
Under section 68 of the Land Registration Act, 1925 and rule 264 of
the Land Registration Rules, 1925 this certificate shall be admissible
as evidence of the matters contained herein and must be produced to
the Chief Land Registrar in the circumstances set out in section 64 of
the said Act.
1
Fig. 7(a)
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TITLE NUMBER : CS72510
Edition date : 15 July 1988
Entry
No.
A. PROPERTY REGISTER
containing the description of the registered land and the estate comprised in the Title
COUNTY	 DISTRICT
CORNSHRE	 MARADON
1. The Freehold
	 land shown edged with
	 red on	 the	 plan of
filed at the Registry and being 9 Summers Street, Looe.
the above Title
2. The	 mines	 and	 minerals
	 together
	 with	 ancillary
	 rights
excepted.
of working	 are
En try
No.
B. PROPRIETORSHIP REGISTER
stating nature of the Title, name. address and description of the proprietor of the land and any entries affecting the right of disponrig thereof
TITLE ABSOLUTE
1. (2	 October	 1987)	 Proprietor(s):	 GROUP
	 CAPTAIN	 JOSEPH ALLEN MBE	 of
52	 Cadogan
	 Place,	 London,	 SW1
	 and	 THOMAS	 ALLEN	 of
Liskeard, Cornwall.
26	 Moor View,
Entry
No.
C. CHARGES REGISTER
containing charges. mcumbrances etc.. adversely affecting the land and registered dealings therewith
1. A Conveyance of the land in this title and other land dated 17 November
1975 made between
	 (1) The National Trust for Places of Historic Interest
or	 Natural	 Beauty	 (Vendor)	 and	 (2)	 John	 Edward	 Charles	 Brown
	 contains
covenants
	 details
	 of	 which	 are	 set	 out	 in	 the	 Schedule	 of restrictive
covenants hereto.
Item
No.
SCHEDULE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
1. The following are	 details	 of	 the covenants
	 contained in the Conveyance
dated 17 November 1975 referred to in the Charges Register.
"The Purchaser with the
	 intent	 that	 the burden	 shall bind the property
hereby conveyed and each and every part thereof HEREBY COVENANTS with the
Vendor for the benefit of adjoining land retained by the Vendor and under
and by virtue of Section 8 of the National Trust Act 1937 to observe and
perform the	 covenants
	 and	 stipulations
	 set	 out
	 in	 the	 Fourth	 Schedule
Continued on the next page
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HM Land Registry
Item
No.
SCHEDULE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
(continued)
hereto
FOURTH SCHEDULE
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS AND STIPULATIONS
1.	 Not	 to	 erect	 or	 permit	 to	 be	 erected	 any	 building	 exceeding	 two
storeys in height nor any building having a flat roof provided that this
covenant	 shall
	 not	 prevent	 the	 erection	 of	 garages	 with	 flat	 roofs
2.	 Not to erect or permit to be erected any building having at any point
a height	 greater	 than
	 ten	 feet above	 the	 height
	 of	 the	 ground	 on	 the
northern boundary of the property nearest thereto
3.	 Not to erect any flats hotels shops or cafes on the property or use
or	 permit	 the	 use	 of	 any	 buildings	 to	 be	 erected
	 thereon	 for	 such
purposes
4.	 Not	 to	 erect	 or	 permit	 to	 be	 erected	 any	 building	 other	 than
buildings
	
constructed of materials compatible with existing developments
in the neighbourhood."
***** END OF REGISTER *****
NOTE A: A date at the beginning of an entry is the date on which the entry was made
in the Register.
NOTE B: This certificate was officially examined with the register on 15 July 1988.
This date should be stated on any application for an official search based on
this certificate.
Page 2.
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Scale
I/1250 Enlarged from 1/2500
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no evidence that this was Parliament's intention -
indeed the Law Commission in their report 67 did not
advert to the fact that the abolition of part
performance would destroy the creation of equitable
mortages by the deposit of deeds - for if it was,
section 66 of the Land Registration Act would have also
been repealed."
Nevertheless, even where unregistered land is
concerned, the position is still doubtful in view of
the fact that section 13 of the Law of Property Act
1925 provides that the Act,
"shall not prejudicially affect the right or
interest of any person arising out of or
consequent on the possession by him of any
documents relating to a legal estate in land
H
• • •
Had Parliament intended to abolish the crion of
equitable mortgages by the deposit of the documents of
title, then section 13 would have been amended by the
1989 Act.
Where registered land is concerned, the question
is whether section 66 should be read subject to section
2(1) of the 1989 Act so that a deposit of the land
certificate with the mortgagee should be accompanied by
a memorandum incorporating the terms of the contract
and signed by both parties, in view of the abolition of
67 Transfer of Land: Formalities for Contracts for
Sale etc. of Land, Law. Com . No. 164.
68 See Lionel Bently and Paul Coughlan, op. cit., at
p. 341, who argue that by not amending section 66 of
the Land Registration Act 1925, Parliament did not
intend to affect the creation of equitable mortgages by
the deposit of title deeds.
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part performance by section 2(8) of the 1989 Act; 69
 in
the alternative, whether a lien can still be validly
created by a simple deposit of the land certificate
without more.
How should this apparent conflict be resolved?
The view has been expressed that "the role of the judge
is not to reconcile legislative provisions unless it is'
reasonable to infer that this is what the legislator
intended."" Since no intention can be inferred either
from the statutory provisions or from the comments of
the Law Commission, that section 66 of the Land
Registration Act 1925 and section 2 of the Law of
Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 are to be
read together, it would follow that the formalities in
section 2(1) of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1989 need not be complied with if a
lien is created under section 66 of the Land
Registration Act 1925. This interpretation would be in
accord with the decision of the House of Lords in Re v
Barnet London Borough Council ex D. Nilish Shah71 where
69 An argument can indeed be raised as to whether the
law of part-performance has been abolished by section
2(8) of the 1989 Act, Section 40(2) of the Law of
Property Act 1925, which was repealed by section 2(8)
of the 1989 Act, the doctrine of part performance which
had, in any event, been well established and
recognised, irrespective of statutory recognition.
Therefore, the repeal of section 40 of the 1925 Act,
arguably, may not have affected the law relating to
part performance. The words used in section 2(8) of
the 1989 Act could have been more explicit in
destroying part performance.
70 Cross, Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed. by Dr.
John Bell and Sir George Engle (London 1987), p. 94.
71	 [1983] 2 A.C. 309.
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it was considered whether section 1(1) of the Education
Act 1962 should be read subject to the Immigration Act
1971. The Court held that section 1(1) could not be
read subject to the 1971 Act. Lord Scarman expressed
the view that,
"It cannot be permissible in the absence of a
reference (express or necessarily to be
implied) by one statute to the other to
interpret ap earlier Act by reference to a
later Act."
Even if it is accepted that a lien can be created
over registered land following the deposit of the land
certificate with the mortgagee under section 66 of the
Land Registration Act 1925, without having to comply
with section 2(1) of the 1989 Act, it is submitted that
section 66 belies the true status of a land certificate
in registered land. A land certificate is not
conclusive evidence of title. It is the register which
is conclusive as to the state of the title and
therefore, in accord with general registered land law
principles, only the register should form the basis of
transactions. Section 66 is therefore an anomaly in a
system of registered title. It is indeed ironic that
while section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1989 was designed to introduce
formality in the dispozition of land and interests in
land, section 66 of the Land Registration Act 1925
retains the informality in a system of land
72	 Ibid., at pp. 349-349.
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registration that was itself, designed to eliminate
unregistered land law principles.
B.	 The 'Title Deed' in Kenya
In Kenya, during the colonial period, the strong
demand for land 73 was also coupled for a demand for
'title deeds', because, apparently, this was the way
they saw the European landowners prove their title to
land. 74
 Consequently, when land registration was
introduced in the Trust Lands, the land certificates
issued under the Native Land Tenure Rules 1956,
followed by the Native Lands Registration Ordinance
1959 and subsequently by the Registered Land Act 1963
were constantly referred to as 'title deeds'. As the
Attorney General pointed out in Parliament, the phrase
'title deed' was so synonymous with the land
certificate to the extent that mention of the land
certificate would elicit the response, "You mean the
title deed"?75
In response, the President of Kenya, issued to the
Attorney General's office a directive stating that
since the majority of people refer to the land
certificate as a 'title deed, the land certificate
issued under the Registered Land Act 1963 should be
withdrawn and replaced by a document called a 'title
73 See Chapter Two, supra.
74	 S.R. Simpson, op.cit., p.167.
75 The National Assembly, Unpublished Transcripts of
Parliamentary Proceedings, Vol. LXXI, 1 April 1987,
Col. R.1
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deed'. 76 As a result, Parliament passed the Registered
Land (Amendment) Act 1987 to amend section 32 of the
Registered Land Act 1963. References in section 32 to
the 'Land Certificate' were to be deleted and replaced
with 'title deed'. 77 A new document to replace the
land certificate headed 'title deed' was issued.78
Illustrated overleaf is a copy of the land certificate
that was formerly issued to proprietors under section
32 of the Registered Land Act 1963 as well as the new
'title deed'.	 The land certificate containes the
details that are on the property, proprietorship and
encumbrances sections of the register. However, as the
copy of the new 'title deed' shows, the main change is
in the heading of the document. The only other change
is in that the 'title deed' on the front page, has
details of the approximate area of the land and the
Registry Map Sheet number of the title, such details
contained inside both documents in any event. Unlike
the land certificate issued under the Land Registration
Act 1925, the 'title deed', as was the case with the
former land certificate before 1987, contains no filed
plan. As was explained in Chapter Three, the Registry
Index Maps, drawn on the basis of aerial photographs
and ground surveys during land consolidation and
adjudication, were very inaccurate and could not be
76	 Ibid., Col. Q.2.
77	 1st Sched.
78	 2nd Sched.
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relied on conclusively to determine the exact position
of boundaries. It is intended to resurvey all the
areas that were adjudicated and subsequently brought
onto the register. 79 It is uncertain whether the new
Registry Index Maps would be used to draw individual
filed plans for the certificates of title, as is the
case under the Registration of Titles Act 1919.80
What is the practical effect of naming the land
certificate a 'title deed'? Prima facie, it may appear
to create a fundamental change in the practice of
registered land in Kenya. For example, since a title
deed is a document which confers or is proof of title
to land81 there is the danger that purchasers of land
will come to accept the 'title deed' as proof of title
without undertaking a search of the register. Such a
transaction off the register would create serious
problems for the purchaser since he may find himself
subject to adverse registered interests. Such
transactions have the potential of increasing the
incidence of fraud considerably. Moreover, there is
also the danger that the courts may be lulled by such a
change into applying unregistered land law principles
in order to protect innocent purchasers who have
79 A.K. Njuki, Cadastral Surveys in Kenya, The
Nairobi Law Monthly, September 1987, 13 at p. 17.
80 See Chapter Three, supra.
81 See Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 7th ed., by
Roger Bird, (London 1983) p.324.
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transacted off the register by, for example,
introducing the doctrine of notice.
However, such fears are, at present, groundless.
There is no evidence so far that this is taking place.
The 'title deed' has not in fact changed normal
practice. Parties attending the Kiambu Registry were
aware of the need to register dispositions of land
notwithstanding the proprietor having a 'title deed'.
Moreover, as an important safeguard, it was noted at
the Kiambu Registry that title deeds were not updated
whenever there was a transaction or an entry made on
the register. In fact it was not the practice to
update the 'title deeds' at all, notwithstanding the
fact that section 33(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963
provides that on every dealing with the land a note
shall be made on the title deed. 82
 Land certificates
in England, in contrast, are continuously updated every
time a transaction affecting the title is made, and the
requirements in section 64 of the Land Registration Act
1925 rigidly adhered to. Kiambu Registry practice,
which is also followed in other registries, amounts to
an important safeguard even though not complying with
section 33(1) of the 1963 Act, because it has enabled
people to come to rely more on the certificate of
search than the title deed as evidence of title.
Furthermore, there is no evidence as yet that the
82 Nevertheless a new 'title deed' is issued every
time there is a transfer of land.
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courts have begun at all to introduce the doctrine of
notice as a result of this change.
The transformation of the land certificate to
'title deed' is therefore merely a change in form
rather than substance. Such a change, however, is an
indication of the effect the views of the layman can
have in altering standard registration practice. 83
 It
reminds one of the warning made by Dowson and Sheppard
that land certificates, particularly if they were
ornate and impressive looking, may end up being treated
as title deeds among an 'unsophisticated and
illiterate' population. 84
 Kenya is a good illustration
of what can happen when the majority form such a
misconception.
VI CONCLUSION
Personal attendance is a remarkable feature of
registered land practice in Kenya and has been made
possible by several factors. Primarily, the public
campaign by the administration to enable members of the
public to be aware of land registration, its effect and
its benefits, has enabled landowners to have the
confidence of undertaking their own transactions
without having to obtain the services of a lawyer. The
public campaign was part of the process of systematic
land adjudication; before land was adjudicated the
83	 See supra.
84 Sir Ernest Dowson & V.L.O. Sheppard, Land
Registration, 2nd ed. (London 1956). p.79.
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residents and landowners within the adjudication
section were informed through public meetings or
'barazas' of the intention of the administration to
introduce land registration in that particular area,
and how registration would increase security of title
which customary law was failing to do. 85 Public
awareness of land registration however, meant that
lawyers ended up with an exiguous amount of
conveyancing business related to the Registered Land
Act 1963 particularly in the rural areas. Unlike the
average landowner in England and Wales who is generally
unaware of the procedures involved in transferring his
land, largely due to the mystification of conveyancing
by the legal profession, the average landowner in Kenya
displays remarkable aptitude in undertaking his own
transfer.
The Land Registries in Kenya are able to cope with
the personal attendance by landowners and interested
persons primarily because the volume of transfers,
searches and applications for first registration are
relatively low. Kiambu District Land Registry for
example has on its register, a little over 95,000
titles. Between 1988 and 1989 the Registry registered
3,912 first registrations of titles, 4,742 transfers of
land and made 6,489 official searches." In contrast,
85 See Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure 1957-58, (Nairobi 1958), para.24.
86 Kiambu District Land Registry, Monthly Returns,
July 1988-July 1989.
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during the same period, the Nottingham District Land
Registry registered 70,188 first registrations of
title, 283,145 transfers and 675,870 searches of the
register. 87 The difference in figures between the two
registries is all too obvious. The Nottingham Registry
would be unable to cope if individuals involved in land
transactions were all to undertake their transactions
at the Registry as is the practice in the Kiambu
Registry. At present the Nottingham District Land
Registry is barely able to cope with the avalanche of
dealings in land it has been receiving in the 1980's.
Staff there are kept continually busy; the pressure of
work there has increased the need for more staff to be
deployed at the Registry.88
The large volume of dealings with land in England
facilitated the introduction of making searches of the
register by telephone or telex 89 and also by facsimile
87 Report on the Work of H.M. Land Registry 1988-89,
(H.M.S.O. 1989).
88 Interview with Mr. Brown, Senior Land Registrar,
Nottingham District Land Registry, 5th July 1989. The
need for more staff to be deployed at the land
registries in England to cope with the increasing
backlog of registrations has been a frequent demand, in
view of the fact that the Land Registry has been
generating large surpluses from fee income. However
the latest report from the Chief Land Registrar for the
year 1989-1990 indicates that the slump in the property
market has caused a decline in the number of first
registrtions. The Nottingham District Land Registry
recorded 61,311 first registration, a fall of 8,877 -
Report on the work of H.M. Land Registry for England &
Wales 1989-90, (H.M.S.O. 1990).
89 See now Land Registration (Official Searches)
Rules 1990, S>I. 1361, r. 12.
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transmission." An application for an official search
with priority can be made using one of these mediums,
so long as the requirements in rule 3(3)(b) of the Land
Registration (Official Searches) Rules 1990 are
complied with. Alternatively, a search without
priority can be made by telephone or telex. 91 These
means help to cut down the time spent in making a
search of the register, thereby speeding up the
conveyancing of registered land. Even greater advances
will be made when the register is fully computerised; a
person with a computer terminal will be able to make a
direct search of the register itself when the register
if fully open to the public - such a feature would
undoubtedly reduce the time it takes to register a
transfer. 92
Personal attendance on the other hand can be
extremely wasteful of time. Parties attending Kiambu
District Land Registry often travelled long distances
by public transport to reach the registry. Since
searches were not often completed in a day, it meant
that a person would have to make several visits to the
Registry to speed up matters. If the land was
90	 Ibid, r. 3(3)(b)(ii). See also the Land
Registration (Open Register) Rules 1990, S.I. 1362, r.
10.
91 Land Registration (Official Searches) Rules 1990,
S.I. 1361, r. 12.
92 Computerization has been extended to the Plymouth,
Gloucester and Swansea District Land Registries. It
has enabled applications to be processed faster as the
information relating to the title is available on
screen at the touch of a button.
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agricultural, the parties would have to attend the land
control board meetings, which were not held at the
Registry, before returning to the Registry to register
the documents of transfer. Consequently, the cost of
transport and other expenses would inexorably rise,
thus increasing the overall transaction costs for
vendor and purchaser. Although searches by telephone
would save a person time, there are no plans at present
to introduce such a facility. Nevertheless, searches
of the register have been facilitated by unrestricted
public access to it. The time taken to complete a
transaction is reduced, as the need to obtain the
written authority of the proprietor, as has been the
case in England is obviated. Such an advantage will be
evident in England when the Land Registration Act 1988
is brought into force.
The modernisation of the land registries in Kenya
is hampered by the lack of finance. Like the Land
Registry in England whose fee income goes into the
coffers of the Treasury93 , the fee income produced by
the Land Registry in Kenya goes to the Government94.
The Kiambu Registry, for example, is able to generate a
large surplus 95 but hardly anything is ploughed back to
improve services. The facilities are run down and
93 H.M. Land Registry made a surplus amounting to £84
million in 1985/86 and £25 million in 1986/87.
94 The exact figures were not made avalable.
95 Interview with Kiambu District Land Registrar, 2
October 1989.
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dilapidated. The increase in the number of titles
registered has reduced the amount of storage space
available, and consequently the register binders are
piled up on top of each other without any semblance of
order. The official vehicle for the Registrar is
constantly broken down, with the inevitable result that
the Registrar has to cancel trips to resolve boundary
disputes for example. A senior official confided that
at times there is even no money to buy new binders for
the register, due to the shortage of finance.
This situation is deplorable in view of the income
generated by the Registry. However, similar Government
controls over the fee income produced by the Land
Registry in England and Wales has resulted in demands
for the Government to reduce the financial control it
has over the Registry and enable it to invest the money
it generates. 96
 The response to these demands has been
significant. The Lord Chancellor's Department
announced that H.M. Land Registry would become an
executive agency from 2nd July 1990. According to Lord
Mackay, the Lord Chancellor, the resulting management
flexibilities together with the Registry operating a
trading fund would provide overall improvement to the
performance of the Registry. 97 This initiative is part
of a trend by the present Government to hive off parts
96 See National Audit Office, Review of the 
Operations of H.M. Land Registry, July 1987;
Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 5th Ser., vol.
490, cols. 686-7.
97	 (1990) 134 S.J. 409.
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of the civil service in line with its 'Next Steps'
initiative to improve management within the civil
service. Although such a step need not necessarily be
taken with the Land Registry in Kenya, it needs to be
allowed to have control over some of the fee income it
generates.
The amendment introduced by the Registered Land
(Amendment) Act 1987 replacing the land certificate
with a 'title deed' is unprecedented in the
Commonwealth. The potentially damaging consequences of
such a change are twofold: first, it may encourage
dispositions of land off the register, for example,
there may be the tendency to create equitable mortgages
by depositing the 'title deeds' with the chargee,
without having them registered, such deposit made
possible by section 33(3) of the Registered Land Act
1963; secondly, it may encourage the courts to
introduce unregistered land principles into the
Registered Land Act 1963. However, there is no
evidence that this has taken place. The change was
merely one of form rather than substance, designed to
bring to reality the fiction in people's minds that the
land certificate was a title deed. However, the
prudent practice by the Registry not to make entries on
the 'title deed' every time there is a dealing with the
land, has eliminated the danger on people relying on
the 'title deed' as proof of title rather than the
register.
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In England, the land certificate is virtually
accorded the status of a title deed, particularly made
evident by section 66 of the Land Registration Act
1925, which allows the creation of an equitable
mortgage by the deposit of the certificate with the
mortgagee. Doubt has, however, been cast upon this
method of creation by section 2(8) of the Law of
Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. Where
unregistered land is concerned, the rule in Russel v
Russel98 may have been qualified by section 2(1) of the
1989 Act so that an equitable mortgage by the deposit
of title deeds would have to be accompanied by a
memorandum in writing signed by both parties, and
incorporating the terms of the contract. But does
section 2(1) of the 1989 Act extend to the creation of
liens over registered land under section 66 of the Land
Registration Act 1925? It was argued earlier that
section 66 of the Land Registration Act 1925 should not
be read subject to section 2(1) of the Law of Property
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. Nevertheless,
such a construction creates an anomaly between
registered and unregistered land in England. It is
submitted that the best result would be to repeal
section 66, so that focus is laid on the register
itself as the basis for all transactions, despite the
fact that a repeal of section 66 would prevent a
convenient method of creating mortgages.
98	 (1783) 1 Bro. C.C. 269.
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Although it is remarkable that many individuals
undertake their own conveyancing without the benefit of
legal advice in Kenya, the next chapter shows the
dangers of transferring land registered under the
Registered Land Act 1963 without the benefit of legal
advice.
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Chapter Five
TRANSFERS OF REGISTERED LAND
I.	 Introduction
One of the advantages of the system of registered
title, it is claimed, is that it provides for a
'simple' system of land transfer' l The Registration of
Title Commissioners stated that the simplicity of
transferring a registered title would be facilitated by
the provision of simple transfer forms. 2 Registration
of title would obviate the "wearisome and intricate"
process in unregistered land whereby a purchaser had to
undertake retrospective examination of title
originating from a satisfactory root of title of at
least 15 years on each successive transfer. 3 A
purchaser proposing to buy registered land on the other
hand would simply obtain proof of title by obtaining an
office copy of the register and the title plan "without
normally any problems arising from defects in the title
or in the identity or extent of the land." 4 Although
1	 H.M. Land Registry, Registration of Title, A Brief 
Guide, 1988 Ed., p. 1.
2	 Report of the Registration of Title Commission,
1857, C.2215, para. LXXXIX.
3	 Williams & Glyns Bank v. Boland [1981] A.C. 487 at
p. 511, per Lord Scarman. See Law of Property Act
1969, s. 23. However, such claims have not prevented
defects in the extent of registered land conveyed - see
A.J. Dunning Ltd. v. Sykes Ltd. [1987] 1 All E.R. 700 -
discussed supra.
4	 H.M. Land Registry, Explanatory Leaflet No.1.,
para. 8.
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this may be so, registered title is subject to
overriding interests which are not registered and which
may not be easily discoverable. 5 Nevertheless, in
England, it is evident that the main purpose of
establishing a system of land registration was to
simplify conveyancing. It is therefore not surprising
that solicitors in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries were virulently opposed to the introduction
of registered titles since it was felt that it would do
away with their skills.6
Significantly, one of the aims in establishing the
system of land registration under the Registered Land
Act 1963 was not to chiefly simplify conveyancing of
unregistered land under the Land Titles Act 1908 or the
Government Lands Act 1915 7 but more of an attempt to
remove the uncertain methods of land transfer under
customary law, replacing them with the comparatively
easy methods of land transfer under the 1963 Act.
Since this new method of transferring land would be
alien to the Africans, who were only familiar with the
customary methods of land transfer, it was proposed
that the procedure for effecting a sale or other
dealing should be kept as simple as possible to "enable
parties to a transaction to conduct their business
themselves in the Registry with the help of registry
5	 See Chapter Six infra.
6	 See Chapter Two, supra.
7	 Although this came later, see Registered Land Act
1963, s. 12.
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staff." 8 The Land Registries were therefore to be made
accessible to the people to enable dealings to be
registered on personal application only, a design that
was to keep lawyers out of registered conveyancing.9
To a large extent this is one of the most
remarkable aspects of land transfer under the
Registered Land Act 1963, in that lawyers are generally
not involved in acting on behalf of vendors or
purchasers in conveying land registered under the 1963
Act because the system is simple enough for parties to
undertake their own conveyancing. 10
However, one should ask whether it is really
simple to transfer registered land in Kenya? This
chapter discusses the formalities and the pitfalls
involved in the transfer of registered land under the
Registered Land Act 1963 and viewed in the context of
the Land Registration Act 1925. 11 These include the
8	 Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and
Registration in Kenya 1965-66 (London 1966), para. 243.
See also Report on the Conference of African Land 
Tenure in East and Central Africa 1956, (1956) J.A.A.
(Special Supplement), para. 85.
9	 See Chapter Four, supra.
10 This was evident from observation of the procedure
followed in land transfers in the Kiambu District Land
Registry between September and October 1989. In a
period of two weeks there were 14 transfers of
registered land for value, and in all these cases the
parties to the transfers conducted the transactions at
the land registry without the benefit of legal advice.
The writer was also attached to the conveyancing
department of a large law firm in Kenya and it was
significant that very few transfers of land registered
under the Registered Land Act 1963 were dealt with on
behalf of individuals by the firm.
11 This chapter is principally concerned with the
transfer of freehold land.
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significance of a contract in writing for the sale of
registered land and, in this connection, whether
section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1989 does indeed abolish the doctrine
of part performance in England; the relevance of
implied covenants for title in registered conveyancing
and the significance of the fact that the Registered
Land Act 1963 does not imply such covenants; the
procedure involved in searching the register of title
and other searches that a purchaser of registered land
should make; the unusual procedure under the Registered
Land Act 1963 whereby the execution of instruments must
be verified by the Registrar or other persons; and
finally the significance of obtaining land control
consent in Kenya under the Land Control Act 1967,
especially where the transfer involves registered land.
In view of the formalities discussed above what
are the lurking dangers that may affect an unsuspecting
individual acting on his own behalf without the benefit
of legal advice, when transferring land registered
under the Registered Land Act 1963? The absence of
implied covenants for title under the Registered Land
Act 1963 may limit the protection of such an individual
in view of the limits on rectification of the register
and indemnity; 12 moreover, such an individual may be
severely prejudiced if the procedure for obtaining land
12 See Chapter Eight, infra.
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control consent is not observed. These matters and
related issues are discussed.
II. Formalities in the Transfer of Registered Land 
A	 The Contract
Land registered under the Registered Land Act 1963
can only be transferred in accordance with the Act.13
Transfers of land are performed in accordance with form
R.L. 114 A purchaser is registered as proprietor of the
land when he submits a completed form applying for the
registration of the transfer 15 together with the
transfer form. 16 The transfer is completed when the
Registrar enters on the register of title the
transferee as proprietor of the land transferred. In
view of the fact that the statutory transfer forms must
be used for registration to be effective, what is the
relevance, where registered land is concerned, of the
requirement in section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act
1961 17
 that contracts for the sale of land must be in
13	 Registered Land Act 1963 s. 38(1) C.f. Land
Registration Act 1925, s. 69(4).
14 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 108(1), Registered
Land Rules 1963, Third Schedule. For a copy of the
form, see Appendix. Transfers of registered freehold
land under the Land Registration Act 1925 are done in
accordance with form 19 - Land Registration Rules 1925,
r 98.
15 Registered Land Rules 1963, Third Schedule, Form
R.L. 28. For a copy of the form see Appendix.
16 A form that should also be submitted is the
Divisional Land Control Board consent. For a
discussion of land control consent, see infra.
17 C.f. Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 1989, s. 2(1). Section 3(3) of the Law of Contract
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writing? In theory there is no need for the vendor and
purchaser to enter into an express contract for sale)-8
They can simply make an oral agreement regarding the
price to be paid and thereafter sign the transfer
form, -9 which contains a description of the property,
the parties, and the consideration paid, 2 ° apply for
land control consent if the land falls within the Land
Control Act 1967, and subsequently send the form off,
together with the other relevant forms, to the land
registry to have the transfer registered. A similar
view had been expressed by Brickdale and Stewart-
Wallace who reckoned that a contract was not really
necessary in the transfer of land registered under the
Land Registration Act 1925. In their words:-
"A purchaser of land with an absolute title
... has ordinarily only three things to do;
namely (1) to find out who is the registered
proprietor of the land; (2) to obtain a
transfer ... from that proprietor; and (3) to
procure his own registration ... Where the
parties have confidence in one another, and
desire to save expense and delay, there is no
difficulty and practically no risk in
combining the first two of these operations
in one. The vendor produces his land
certificate, the purchaser peruses it, and if
Act had formerly been part of section 39(2) of the
Registered Land Act and, therefore, it had only applied
to land registered under the 1963 Act. However,
section 39(2) was repealed and re-enacted in the Law of
Contract (Amendment) Act 1968. It now applies to the
sale of all land, rather than merely land registered
under the 1963 Act.
18	 See I.R. Storey, Conveyancing, 2nd Ed., (London
1987) p. 25.
19 Once the relevant searches are made, see infra.
20 The transfer form would fulfill the requirement of
writing.
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satisfied, pays the purchase money at once in
exchange for a duly executed instrument of
transfer, and the land certificate.”21
Until the transfer form is registered it may operate as
a contract between the parties' 22
 However, the
transfer form contains only the bare terms that the
parties will have agreed to, that is, the price and the
description of the property to be conveyed by reference
to the title number. 23 The parties may have agreed
upon certain other terms and obligations which, if not
expressly stated in a contract, may not be enforceable
if a party is in breach. For example if a sale
included chattels, fittings or other separate items the
vendor may warrant that he is entitled to sell them
free from any charge or lien. Other conditions may
include the method of payment for the purchase price,
penalties for late payment, as well as covenants for
title. 24 A written contract therefore confers
protection on the parties because if one of them is in
breach of the terms of the contract then the other
21 The Land Registration Act 1925, 3rd ed., (London
1927) P. 28. However, the practice stated by the
learned authors should be qualified in one important
respect: the purchaser should inspect the register
rather than the land certificate since the latter may
be out of date. Unless the parties are preparee to go
down to the Land Registry to personally search the
register and complete the transaction there, it would
be to the purchasers advantage to obtain an official
search. For a discussion of the latter, see below.
22	 Registered Land Act 1963, s.38(2).
23 See form R.L. 1, Appendix. A contract containing
such terms is termed an open contract - Cheshire & 
Burns Modern Law of Real Property, 14th ed. by E.H.
Burns (London 1988), p. 106.
24 For a discussion on covenants, see infra.
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party would be entitled to sue him or rescind the
contract. For example in the English case of Re Stone 
and Saville's Contract 25 the purchaser entered into an
open contract for the sale of registered land and paid
a deposit. After entering into the contract, she
discovered that the charges register referred to a
restrictive covenant, which, unknown to her at the
time, had been released. She successfully rescinded
the contract and had her deposit returned.
The effect of section 3(3) of the Law of Contract
Act 1961 is that an oral contract for the sale of land
will not be void, but simply unenforceable. 26 The
requirement of writing in section 3(3) is almost
identical to the provision in the now repealed section
40 of the Law of Property Act 1925 which required
contracts for the sale of land to be evidenced in
writing. 27 However, the proviso to section 3(3) of the
Law of Contract Act 1961 goes on to define what acts of
part performance will be effective for a purchaser to
enforce an oral agreement. 28 It states that the
25	 [1963] 1 W.L.R. 173.
26	 See for e.g. Leroux V. Brown (1852) 12 C.B. 801;
Britain V. Rossiter (1879) 11 Q.B.D. 123; Maddison v. 
Alderson (1883) 8 App. Cas.467, on the effect of
section 4 of the Statute of Frauds 1677.
27 See now section 2 of the Law of Property
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.
28 In comparison, section 40(2) of the Law of
Property Act 1925 had simply provided that subsection
(1), which required writing, did not "affect the law
relating to part performance." It was left to the
common law to fill in the elements relating to part
performance.
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absence of writing will not be fatal to a suit if the
intending purchaser or lessee who is willing to perform
part of his contract:
"i) has in part performance of the contract
taken possession of the property or any part
thereof; or
ii) being already in possession, continue in
possession in part performance of the
contract and has done some other act in
furtherance of the contract."
The requirement of writing in sections 3(3) of the Law
of Contract Act 1961 and section 40(1) of the Law of
Property Act 1925 had been derived from the Statute of
Frauds 1677 which had been designed to prevent disputes
over oral dealings in land and in particular, to
prevent fraud which was possible when contracts for the
sale of land could be alleged on oral testimony.29
However, the possibility had been open for persons to
repudiate a genuine contract on the ground that there
was no memorandum as required by the Statute, thereby
opening the way for it to be used as an instrument of
fraud."
The equitable doctrine of part performance was
therefore "an invention of the Court of Chancery"31
Sir Robert Megarry & H.W.R. Wade, The Law of Real 
Property, 5th ed., (London 1984) pp. 589 et. seq.
29 Tudor Jackson, The Law of Kenya, 3rd Ed., (Nairobi
1988), p. 146; Kevin Gray, Elements of Land Law,
(London 1987), p. 210; Sir Robert Megarry & H.W.R.
Wade, The Law of Real Property, 5th Ed., (London 1984),
p. 587.
30 See Maddison v Alderson (1883) 8 App. Cas. 467, at
p . 474 per Earl of Selbourne L.C.
31 Steadman v Steadman [1976] A.C. 536 at p. 540 per
Lord Reid.
285
resting upon the principle that "Equity will not permit
the statute to be made an instrument of fraud."32
Selborne L.C. went on to explain that the
"defendant is really 'charged' upon the
equities resulting from the acts' done in
execution of the contract and not (within the
meaning of the statute) upon the contract
itself. If such equities were excluded,
injustice of a kind which the statute cannot
be thought to have had in contemplation would
follow." 3J (Italics mine).
Entry into possession was viewed as a sufficient
act of part performance 34 and so was the deposit of
title deeds with a mortgagee as security for a loan.35
Upon proof of the act of part performance equity
allowed a party to give parol evidence of an agreement
that would have had to comply with the requirement of
writing. Nevertheless, despite the entrenchment of the
doctrine there were some judges who were perturbed by
its growth and application. 36 Section 40(2) of the Law
of Property 1925 statutorily recognised the law of part
performance, the section simply stating that the
requirement of writing in ssection 40(1) "does not
32 Maddison v Alderson (1883) 8 App. Cas. 467 at p.
474 per Earl of Selborne L.C.
33	 Ibid.
34 Morphett v Jones (1818) 1 Swan 172; Brough v 
Nettleton [1921) 2 Ch. 25; Kinqswood Estate Co. Ltd. v 
Anderson [1963) 2 Q.B. 169.
35	 Russel v Russel (1783) 1 Bro. C.C. 269; Shaw v 
Foster (1872) L.R. 5 H.L. 321 at pp. 339-340.
36 See for example, Lord Eldon in Ex p. Whitbread 
(1812) 19 Ves. 209, Ex p. Hooper (1783) 1 Bro. C.C.
270, and Lord Blackburn in Maddison v Alderson (1883) 8
App. Cas. 467 at pp. 488-489.
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affect the law relating to part performance." It is
therefore important to note that section 40(2) of the
1925 Act was simply recognising what was already well
established, and that section 40(2) was not the
foundation of part performance. Any future abolition
of part performance would therefore have to be
explicit.
It is therefore, at this juncture, of interest to
compare section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act 1961
and section 40(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925.
Section 3(3) clearly defined the limits of the doctrine
of part performance. A party could either have 'taken
possession' in part performance of the contract or if
he was already in possession, continue in possession in
part performance of the contract and [do] some other
act in furtherance of the contract. (Italics mine)."
Possession was therefore an important element of part
performance in Kenyan land law. In contrast section
40(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 left it, in
effect, to equity to develop and fashion the law
realting to part performance. This is evident looking
at the high point of the development of part
performance in the House of Lords decision in Steadman
v Steadman37 where the mere payment of a sum of money
was held to amount to a sufficient act of part
performance. Moreover, the preparation of and sending
the deed of transfer to the wife was also a sufficient
37	 [1976] A.C. 536.
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act of part performance as it was sent "in discharge of
any obligation that rested on the [husband] by virtue
of the contract."38
The Law Commission felt that as a result of this
decision, the doctrine of part performance was left in
an uncertain state because it would appear on the one
hand that a purchaser could unilaterally enforce an
oral contract for sale since there was no discussion in
Steadman as to whether the dependant should have
knowledge of, and acquiesce in, the plaintiff's acts
amounting to part performance. 39 The uncertainty was
further heightened by an argument that Steadman had
simply lowered the standard of proof allowing the
payment of money to be an act of part performance."
This led the Law Commission to conclude that part
performance should no longer have a role to play in
contracts relating to land. 41 Their recommendations
were incorporated in section 2 of the Law of Property
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. Section 2(1) of
the Act provides that a contract for the sale or other
disposition of an interest in land must be in writing,
38 Ibid., at p. 554 per Viscount Dilhorne. See also
Lord Simon at p. 563 and Lord Salmon at p. 573.
39 Law Commission, Transfer of Land: Formalities for 
Contracts for Sale etc. of Land, Working Paper No. 92
(1985), paras. 3.23, 3.24.
40 M.P. Thomson, The Role of Evidence in Part-
Performance [1979] Con y . 402.
41 Law Commission, Transfer of Land: Formalities for
contracts for Sale etc. of Land, Law. Com . No. 164,
para. 4.13.
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incorporating all the express terms of the contract in
one document or each of two or more documents, which is
signed by both parties. Failure to comply with these
requirements would render the contract void.42
Hence an important difference now between section
3(3) of the Law of Contract Act 1961 and section 2(1)
of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
1989 is that under the former, an oral contact is
unenforceable but still valid, whereas under the
latter, an oral contract is simply void. Moreover,
section 2(8) of the 1989 Act repeals section 40 of the
Law of Property Act 1925, thereby, abolishing part
performance. Thereby, while part performance is still
part of the law of Kenya within the limits prescribed
by section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act 1961, it is
no longer part of English law.
But it is doubted by the writer whether section
2(8) of the 1989 has explicitly abolished the law
relating to part performance. 43 As noted earlier,
section 40(2) of the Law Property Act 1925 was
statutory recognition of an equitable doctrine that was
created in the 17th century, and which was well
established by 1925. it is highly likely that had
section 40(2) not been enacted, the courts would simply
have continued to apply the doctrine of part
42	 P.H. Pettit, Farewell Section 40 [1989] Cony . 431
at p. 441.
43 See the doubts expressed in Chapter Four in
relation to the creation of equitable mortgages by the
deposit of title deeds or land certificate.
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performance. Therefore, part performance, not being a
statutory creature, would need explicit terms to
abolish it. It is submitted that section 2(8) of the
1989 Act is not explicit enough to abolish part
performance.
In answer to this argument, it may be said that
part performance has no role in view of section 2(1) of
the 1989 Act which invalidates all contracts for the
sale of land which do not comply with the requirements
therein. If, however, there is doubt as to whether
part performance has not been completely abolished,
especially where equitable mortgages are concerned,
then there would be nothing to prevent a court from
introducing part performance through the back door in
an attempt to prevent the 1989 Act from being used as
an instrument of fraud, 44 although it is unlikely that
the courts may go this far.
Such doubts about the effect of section 2 of the
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 can
only be settled either by judicial interpretation or by
further legislation.45
However, where registered land is concerned, the
execution by the vendor and purchaser of a contract for
44 See the novel approach taken by Hoffman J in Spiro 
v Glencrown Properties (1990) 140 N.L.J. 1754 where he
held that the grant of an option to purchase land is"
the contract for the sale or other disposition in land"
within the meaning of section 2 of the 1989 Act because
an option is sui generis.
45 See a similar conclusion reached by Gregory Hill,
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Property) Act 1989, 
Section 2, (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 396 at p. 402.
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the sale of the land is not effective to effect a
transfer of title." The written contract only renders
the agreement enforceable between the parties. This
can be important not only before registration of the
transfer but, a fortiori, post-registration, especially
where the vendor covenants in the agreement that he has
the power to convey the property and that there are no
adverse interests or incumbrances affecting it. The
vendor may be liable in damages if the purchaser
subsequently discovers that the vendor had no right to
convey the land, 47 and the register is rectified
against the purchaser in favour of a third party, or if
the purchaser (now registered as proprietor)
subsequently discovers the existence of undisclosed
overriding interests that are binding on him.48
However, as indicated earlier49 many vendors and
purchasers of registered land in Kenya conduct the
transactions themselves and without the benefit of
legal advice. Consequently, many do not have the
benefit of a written contract for sale, and if they do
have one, it will be very informal containing mainly
46	 See Registered Land Act 1963, s. 38(1); c.f. Land
Registration Act 1925, s. 69(4).
47 It must be stressed, however, that in registered
land it is immaterial that the transferor may have had
no power to convey the land. Registration itself
confers the legal title so that even a forged transfer
from an impostor will, if registered, make the
transferee the legal owner - see Argyle Building
Society v. Hammond (1985) 49 P & C.R. 148.
48 See the discussion infra.
49 See Chapter Four, supra.
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the bare details as to price and the extent of the land
to be conveyed. In view of this, it would be expected
that the law would imply certain covenants for title to
confer protection on the purchaser, just as the law in
Kenya, through the Sale of Goods Act, 50 confers
protection on a purchaser of goods from a seller by
implying certain terms. However, does the Registered
Land Act 1963 imply covenants for title if they are not
expressly included in a contract? In any event, are
covenants for title of any benefit where land is
registered? These matters are considered in the next
subsection.
1	 Covenants for Title
While a purchaser of land is subject to the rule
caveat emptor he has always had a remedy against the
vendor for certain defects in title. In English
medieval times he had the benefit of the law of
warranty which originated from the feudal lord's duty
to protect his tenant in exchange for his services.51
It became customary for a vendor to give an express
warranty of title when tenure between vendor and
purchaser of a fee simple was abolished by the Statute
Quia Emptores 1290. If there was any defect in the
title, such as someone claiming a superior title, then
the purchaser could sue the vendor in damages.
50	 Cap. 31, C.f. the English Sale of Goods Act 1979.
51 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 
Vol. III, 5th Ed., pp. 159-161.
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However, partly because of the inconvenience of the
procedure available to enforce a warranty the law of
warranty fell out of use and was replaced by the
practice of giving express covenants for title.52
During the 16th and 17th centuries covenants for
seisin, the right to convey, for quiet enjoyment, for
freedom from incumbrances, and for further assurance
became the usual covenants on a conveyance of land.53
However, it was in 1881 that the Conveyancing Act
introduced implied covenants into any conveyance.
Section 7(1)(A) introduced four covenants that would be
implied in a conveyance for valuable consideration,
other than a mortgage, namely; the right to convey,
quiet enjoyment, freedom from encumbrance, and further
assurance. These covenants were implied in conveyances
of land registered under the Land Transfer Act 1875.54
However, the Land Transfer Act 1897 limited the
implication of covenants for title allowing vendors of
possessory and qualified titles to imply covenants for
title but not vendors of absolute titles.55
Covenants for title are now implied in a
conveyance of freehold under section 76 of the Law of
Property Act 1925, and by extension to registered
52	 Ibid., p. 161.
53	 Ibid.
54	 Conveyancing Act 1881, s. 17.
55	 Land Transfer Act 1897, s. 16(1).
293
land. 56 If a vendor of registered land expresses to
execute the land with the use of the phrase "as
beneficial owner" 57 four covenants are implied by
him , " which are:
1. That he has a good right to convey;
2. Covenant for quiet enjoyment;
3. Freedom from incumbrances;
4. Covenant for further assurance, that is, that
the vendor will do anything else to vest the property
in the purchaser.
According to rules 77(1)(a) 7 (b) of the Land
Registration Rules 1925 any implied covenant for title
takes effect as though the dispositions were expressly
made subject to all charges and other interests
appearing or protected on the register at the time of
the execution of the disposition and affecting the
covenantor's title and subject to any overriding
interests of which the purchaser had notice and subject
to which it would have taken effect had the land been
unregistered.
However, under the Registered Land Act 1963 no
covenants for title are implied. In contrast several
56 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 38(2); Land
Registration Rules 1925, rr. 76, 77. The distinction
made in section 16(1) of the Land Transfer Act 1897
between vendors of possessor and qualified titles being
able imply covenants for title but not vendors of
absolute titles, (supra), was not maintained in the
Land Registration Act 1925.
57 Land Registration Rules 1925, r. 76.
58	 Law of Property Act 1925, s.76(1)(A), Second
Schedule, Part I.
294
covenants for title are implied where land subject to
the Indian Transfer of Property Act 1882 is conveyed.
Section 55 of the 1882 Act contains a list of these
covenants which are implied in the absence of express
terms to the contrary; for example, the seller is bound
to, inter alia, disclose to the buyer any material
defect in the property of which the seller is aware; to
produce to the buyer on his request for examination all
documents of title relating to the property which are
in the seller's possession; to discharge all
incumbrances on the property then existing except where
the property is sold subject to them; and to covenant
that he has the power to convey the property. These
covenants, however, cannot be implied where land
subject to the Registered Land Act 1963 is being
conveyed because the 1963 Act expressly excludes the
application of the Indian Transfer of Property Act 1882
to land registered under the 1963 Act.59
Nevertheless, section 38(3) of the Registered Land
Act 1963 provides that the Minister, after consultation
with the Law Society may prescribe terms and conditions
of sale which shall apply to contracts by
correspondence, unless otherwise stipulated, and which
may be made to apply to any other case for which the
terms and conditions are made available, where express
reference is made to those terms and conditions."
59 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 164.
60 This provision is comparable with section 46 of
the Law of Property Act 1925 where it is provided that
the Lord Chancellor may publish forms for contracts and
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Although the Minister has yet to prescribe the
conditions of sale, 61 the Kenya Law Society has
prepared a pro forma contract known as 'The Law
Society Conditions of Sale and Agreement for Sale' the
terms of which may be incorporated by the parties to a
contract for the sale of land.62
While the purchaser and vendor in Kenya may have
the benefit of legal advice, resulting in their
contract for sale referring to the Law Society's
Conditions of Sale, no protection, through implied
covenants, is given to parties who transfer their land
without the benefit of legal advice. 63 Such parties
would undoubtedly be unaware of the advantage of
incorporating the Law Society's Conditions of Sale or
conditions of sale of land which apply to 'contracts by
correspondence.' The Lord Chancellor did this in 1925
- S.R. & 0. 1925, No. 779/L. 14. Other forms of
conditions have been drawn up such as the Law Society's
Conditions of Sale and the National Conditions of Sale.
61 P.L. Onalo, Land Law and Conveyancing in Kenya,
(Nairobi 1986), p. 233.
62 Ibid. For a copy of some of the conditions (12-
17) see Appendix. There is no statutory definition of
the phrase /contracts by correspondence' either in the
Registered Land Act 1963 or in the Law of Property Act
1925 where it appears in section 46. However, the
phrase with reference to section 46 was considered in
Stearn v Twitchell [1985] 1 All ER 631, where Warner J.
held that it referred to an exchange of letters.
Therefore, it did not include a contract arising out of
the acceptance by letter of an oral offer to buy or
sell land (even where that oral offer refers to a
written document not itself a letter), since a single
letter does not constitute 'correspondence'.
Similarly, an oral acceptance of an offer made by
letter will not, without more, constitute a contract by
correspondence.
63 The benefits of implied covenants for title in
registered land are discussed below.
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any similar conditions. It would appear therefore that
in these cases the parties do not have the benefit of
any covenants implied by law because no such covenants
are implied by the Registered Land Act 1963 or any
other local enactment.
2.	 Benefits of Covenants for Title
In view of the fact that the Registered Land Act
1963 does not imply covenants for title in a transfer
of registered land," does a purchaser who contracts
with the vendor on the basis of the transfer form
suffer any disadvantage? It is submitted that such a
purchaser may suffer detriment by the lack of implied
covenants for title, in particular where the vendor has
conveyed land to him to which he had no title, or where
the purchaser is bound by undisclosed overriding
interests.
Academic opinion in England has long been divided
as to whether covenants for title are of benefit in
registered conveyancing. There were those who felt
that such covenants were not necessary and, in any
event, would not be effective in the case of an
undisclosed overriding interest because a transferor
can only transfer what he possesses and is registered
64 A vendor expressed to transfer land registered
under the Land Registration Act 1925 'as beneficial
owner' implies the covenants for title. These words
are usually included in the forms for the transfer of
freehold land -
Curiously, however, the forms of transfer prescribed by
rule 98 of the Land Registration Rules 1925 omit any
reference to the vendors capacity.
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with; since the transferee is registered with a fee
simple subject to any overriding interests affecting
the land, he cannot complain under the implied
covenants for title because there is nothing upon which
the covenants can bite. 65 On the other hand there were
those who felt that they were necessary in registered
land transfers, 66
 and although in the vast majority of
transactions they will prove not to have been needed,
there are exceptional and unpredictable occasions when
their inclusion will have been justified.67
65 See H. Potter, Covenants for Title and Overriding 
Interests, (1942) 58 L.Q.R. 356; J. T. Farrand,
Contract and Conveyance, 2nd Ed., pp. 347-352; D.G.
Barnsley, Conveyancing Law and Practice, 1st ed.
(London 1973) pp. 600-602; David J. Hayton, Registered
Land, 2nd ed., (London 1981) pp. 72-74. See also The
Law Commission, Transfer of Land: Implied Covenants for
Title, Working Paper No. 107 (H.M.S.O. 1988), paras.
2.30, 2.31; Meek v Clarke (1982) LEXIS transcript.
David Partington, Implied Covenants for Tite in
Registered Freehold Land  , [1989] Cony . 18 - although
the author personally feels that they are of benefit as
'a longstop remedy' (at p. 19), his conclusion is that
on the basis of Meek v Clarke, supra, they are
redundant.
66 R.E. Megarry, Review of Key & Elphinstone's 
Precedents in Conveyancing, (1941) 57 L.Q.R. 564; Ke y & 
Elphinstone's Precedents in Conveyancing, Vol. 3, 1954,
ed., T.U.. Caswell, p. 128; M.J. Russell, Covenants for
Title: Registered Land, [1982] Cony . 145; P.H. Kenny,
Overriding Interests and Implied Covenants, [1981]
Cony . 32.
67	 T. B. F. Ruoff, R. Roper & E. J. Pryer, Registered
Conveyancing, 5th Ed. (London 1986), p. 337.
Interestingly, in their 4th edition (London 1979) p.
270, the learned authors were of the opinion tht
implied covenants in registered land were unnecessary
and ineffective in the case of undisclosed overriding
interests. However, in their 5th edition, they
reluctantly admit that implied covenants can be
beneficial. See also Meek v. Clarke (1982) C.A. Lexis
Transcript per Oliver L.J. (obiter).
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The recent English decision in A.J. Dunning Ltd. 
v. Sykes Ltd" illustrates the justification for
including implied covenants for title in a transfer of
registered land. In that case the defendants were the
registered proprietors of a certain plot of land. In
1969 they sold part of the land but a portion of the
land sold (described in court as the 'yellow land'
because on the plan it was edged in yellow) was
mistakenly fenced in with the land retained by the
defendants. In 1978 the 'yellow land' was included in
a transfer of part of the retained land (the 'red
land') from the defendants to the plaintiffs. When the
plaintiffs came to register their title under the
transfer they discovered that they had no title to the
'yellow land' because the defendants in turn had no
title to it. Since the 'yellow land' was essential for
the plaintiff's purposes they purchased it from the
true owners. The plaintiffs then brought an action
against the defendants claiming, inter alia, damages
for breach of the covenants for title implied by
section 76 and Schedule 2 of the Law of Property Act
1925. The defendants argued that the transfer could
only refer to so much of the 'red land' as was
comprised in the title number, and therefore it was not
a registered disposition of the 'yellow land' because
the defendant's had no title to the 'yellow land'.
Consequently the beneficial owner covenants could only
68	 [1987] 1 All ER 700.
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be implied qua the land which was effectively
transferred, i.e. the 'red land', and not qua the
'yellow land'.69
However, the majority of the Court of Appeal
rejected this argument. Dillon L.J. held that it was
plain from section 76 of the Law of Property Act 1925
that the implied covenants apply not merely to the
property conveyed by the conveyance referred to, but to
the whole of the subject matter expressed to be
conveyed by it. 7 ° The plaintiffs could not be expected
to inspect the register of the proprietor of the
'yellow land' and had no authority to do so because the
reference in rule 77(1)(a) of the Land Registration
Rules 1925 to charges and other interests appearing or
protected on the register could not extend to matters
the subject of entries which the plaintiffs as
purchasers could not have inspected; 'the register'
referred to in rule 77(1)(a) did not refer to the
global register of all registered title, but to the
register of the individual title. 71 Therefore the
defendant was in breach of the implied covenants and
was liable in damages to the plaintiff.72
This case illustrates the relevance of the implied
covenants for title. The case arose because a mistake
69	 Ibid, at p. 706.
70	 Ibid.
71	 Ibid, pp. 706, 707.
72 In the words of Dillon L.J. "The implied covenant
for title bites", ibid, at p. 708.
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had been made in the filed plan, and that mistake was
discovered too late. 73 As a result of this error the
defendant convenanted that he had the power to convey
not only the 'red land' but also the 'yellow land' in
dispute. But since he had no title to the 'yellow
land' he could not have had the power to convey that
land and therefore he was in breach of this covenant.
However, this case was concerned with rule
77(1)(a) and not rule 77(1)(b) of the Land Registration
Rules 1925, the latter providing that any implied
covenant for title takes effect as though the
disposition was expressly made subject to "any
overriding interests of which the purchaser has notice
and subject to which it would have taken effect, had
the land been unregistered." The latter rule brings
into question the effect of the covenant relating to
freedom from incumbrances with respect to undisclosed
overriding interests. If the plaintiff had discovered
a hitherto undisclosed overriding interest in the
'yellow land', would the defendant have been in breach
of the covenant of freedom from incumbrances? Arguably
he would have been in breach and liable in damages.
Dillon L.J. stated that the covenants implied under
section 76 did not merely apply to the property
conveyed by the conveyance, "but to the whole of the
subject matter expressed to be conveyed by it" (italics
73 In reality the fault was that of the solicitors
who should have been alerted to this error.
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mine). 74 Since overriding interests, whether disclosed
or undisclosed would form part of the subject matter
being conveyed, it would follow that the purchaser,
although bound by all overriding interests, would be
entitled to sue the vendor in respect of undisclosed
overriding interests.75
This remedy is particularly important where a
purchaser takes the land subject to undisclosed rights
of persons in actual occupation. 76 Since an indemnity
is unavailable under the Land Registration Act 1925 in
respect of overriding interests, 77 the only remedy
available to the purchaser would be to sue the vendor
for breach of the covenant.
74	 A.J. Dunning Ltd v. Sykes Ltd [1987] 1 All ER 700
at p. 706.
75 Professor Barnsley, who initially was one of those
who had expressed doubts as to the effectiveness of
implied covenants vis a vis overriding interests (see
n.65), is now of the opinion that "the arguments
advanced by those denying the effectiveness of the
covenants for title in this situation are no longer
sustainable in the light of Dunning". - D.G. Barnsley,
Conveyancing Law and Practice, 3rd ed. (London 1988) p.
612). See also T.B.F. Ruoff, R. Roper & E.J. Pryer,
Registered Conveyancing, 5th ed. (London 1986) p. 342.
The Law Commission in their Working Paper (No. 107,
op.cit., para. 2.31) felt that there was still a
measure of uncertainty. However, a purchaser who had
notice of an overriding interest would clearly be
unable to sue on the convenants by virtue of Land
Registration Rules 1925 r. 77(1)(b).
76 Under section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration
Act 1925.
77	 See Re Chowood's Registered Land [1933] Ch. 574.
However, the Law Commission recommended that an
indemnity should be payable to persons bound by
overriding interests - Third Report on Land
Registration, Law Coin. No. 158. See clause 45(1)(c) of
the draft bill in the Fourth Report on Land
Registration, Law Corn. No. 173.
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But can Dunning be reconciled with the previously,
though unreported, decision of the Court of Appeal in
Meek v Clarke? 78 In that case the plaintiff agreed to
purchase from the defendant his plot of registered land
with absolute title. The defendant, in the transfer,
conveyed as beneficial owner "all the land comprised in
the title." The title, as it appeared in the register,
included the benefit of a right of way. Unfortunately,
the right of way was included as a result of an error
made by the Registry. When the plaintiff attempted to
make use of it, the error was unearthed and a third
party successfully applied to have the reference to the
right of way deleted.
Undoubtedly, the plaintiff would have successfully
obtained an indemnity from the Registry under section
83 of the Land Registration Act 1925, limited to the
value of the right lost, but he wanted to go further
and claim substantial damages against the defendant for
breach of all or any of the covenants for quiet
enjoyment, freedom from incumbrances and good right to
convey. The Court of Appeal held that the vendor was
not liable on the covenants. The plaintiff's main
claim rested on the covenant for good right to convey.
But the court rejected this claim on the ground (per
Oliver L.J.) that since, as is the case in unregistered
78	 (1982) LEXIS Transcript. See David Partington,
Implied Covenants for Title in Registered Freehold Land
[1989] Cony . 18, where this case is discussed.
Unfortunately, the learned author makes no reference at
all to Dunning. But see Editorial Note, [1989] Cony.
26.
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land, the vendor does not warrant or guarantee that he
has good title to land 79 but merely that since the last
investigation of title, neither the vendor not those
claiming under him had done anything which prevented
the vendor from conveying the estate described in the
transfer, and since the defendant never had the right
of way nothing he did had prevented him from
transferring it.
Secondly, since the effect of registration was to
vest that which was described in the registered entry
in the defendant in fee simple, there never was any
question of the defendant not having the power to
convey the estate expressed to be conveyed. In the
words of Oliver L.J., since "the registered entry
itself imports the right to dispose of the registered
estate," there was "very little room for the operation
of a covenant for good right to convey in the case of
an absolute title."
But this reasoning is distinct from that applied
in Dunning v Sykes. In Dunning one of the defendant's
arguments was that they had never undertaken to the
plaintiffs to pass to them more than whatever title
they might have had (the 'red land') because the
defendants never purported to transfer more than
whatever they actually had. But Dillon L.J. with whom
Croom-Johnson L.J. agreed, rejected this argument,
holding that the defendants had indeed purported to
79 David v Sabin [1893] 1 Ch. 523.
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transfer the fee simple in the 'yellow land' because
the transfer treated the yellow land as part of the red
land. Therefore, in the words of Dillon L.J. "the
implied covenant for title bites."
There does indeed appear to be conflict between
the decisions in Dunning v Sykes and Meek v Clarke on
the effect of the covenant of a good right to convey. 80
Meek v Clarke concluded that this covenant had no
effect in the circumstances and, in effect, generally
where registered land was concerned. But Dunning v 
Sykes decided the converse, concluding that in facts
similar to those in Meek v Clarke, 81 the same convenant
had effect and could bite! Nevertheless, the Law
Commission accepts, without argument, the decision in
Dunning v Sykes, and concluded that the covenant of the
good right to convey did have effect in registered
land. 82
 It is submitted that the decision in Dunning v
Sykes is to be preferred. Nonetheless, this is an area
80 Meek v Clarke was not cited to the Court in
Dunning v Sykes probably because the former was
unreported.
81 In Meek v Clarke, the error was made by the Land
Registry, whereas in Dunning v Sykes someone (not
apparent from the report who it was but certainly not
the registry) moved the fence between the two portions
of land into the wrong place and the error was
compounded by the solicitors failure to notice the
discrepancy on the plan. Therefore, in Meek v Clarke
the defendant already had an unanswerable claim against
the Registry for an indemnity, whereas in Dunning v
Sykes the plaintiff's only remedy was against the
vendor on the basis of the covenants.
82 The Law Commission, Transfer of Land. Implied
Covenants for Title, Working Paper No. 107 (1988),
para. 2.30.
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of English law that could benefit from further
clarification and remove the uncertainty.
The Dunning case highlights the danger facing a
purchaser of registered land in Kenya who is not
protected by implied covenants for title. It may be
the case that the register is rectified, as a result of
an error or a double conveyance, against a purchaser
who has been registered as proprietor but is not yet in
possession, 83 but because the registration is a first
registration no indemnity is payable. 84 Since no
covenants for title are implied the purchaser would not
be entitled to sue the vendor for breach of the
covenant of the power to convey, and would therefore be
without a remedy. Moreover, even if a purchaser is
able to obtain an indemnity, the amount payable is only
limited to the value of the land at the time the
mistake was made. 85 This may be inadequate if the
value of the land has risen considerably since the
purchase. In any event, the purchaser would not be
able to sue the vendor on the basis of the covenants
for the residue.
B. Searching the Register of Title
83 As in Natwarlal Chauhan v. Zakaria Omagwa, Civil
Appeal No. 12 of 1980 (unreported). See also T.B.F.
Ruoff, R. Roper & E.J. Pryer, Registered Conveyancing,
5th ed. (London 1986) pp. 337-338.
84	 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 144(1)(b).
85 Ibid., s.145, Cf Land Registration Act 1925,
s.83(6).
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The legal maxim caveat emptor (let the buyer
beware) means that a purchaser of land takes the land
as it is and it is his responsibility to ascertain what
faults exist in the property, and what interests bind
the property. However, a vendor of registered land
would be well advised to disclose overriding
interests" since, as indicated above, the purchaser
may bring an action against the vendor under the
implied covenants for title in respect of overriding
interests of which he had no notice. 87 Apart from
making enquiries of the vendor and making a physical
inspection of the land, a purchaser needs to search the
register of title to discover what interests bind the
land. 88 He can either search the register personally
or obtain what is known as an official search.
1. Searches Under the Registered Land Act 1963
Anyone can make a personal search of the register
under the Registered Land Act 1963 89 Such a search is
not official since it is conducted by the individual
personally, and therefore confers no priority."
86 Especially the rights of those in actual
occupation - Land Registration Act 1925, s. 70(1)(g);
cf. Registered Land Act 1963, s. 30(g).
87 This right of action is not available to a
purchaser of land subject to the Registered Land Act
1963, unless the covenants were express terms in the
contract.
88 For a discussion of how the register of title is
kept, see Chapter Four.
89	 S. 36(1).
90 See section 43(1), Registered Land Act 1963.
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Nevertheless, the written consent of the registered
proprietor is not required when a personal search is
made.
In contrast although section 36(2) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 provides that any person may
obtain an official section, section 43(1) of the Act
provides that a person proposing to deal with
registered land and who wants to have an official
search which confers the benefit of the suspension
period - whereby the registration of any interest is
postponed for 14 days - must have obtained the written
consent of the proprietor. The 1963 Act therefore
makes a distinction between those who do not require
the benefit of the stay of registration and who have
made a personal search of the register, and those,
primarily prospective purchasers, who require the
benefit of the stay of registration the former need not
obtain the written consent of the proprietor while the
latter. In view of the advantage accorded by a stay of
registration to a prospective purchaser under section
43 of the 1963 Act, it is arguable that the requirement
of obtaining written consent from the registered
proprietor is justified. The purchaser has an
advantage over other parties who are endeavouring to
register third party interests over the same land.91
91 It was observed by the writer at the Kiambu
District Land Registry that applicants for official
searches were not supplied with the statutory
application form (R.L. 26) for official searches which
specifies the requirement of written consent from the
registered proprietor, such forms requesting priority
under section 43(1) of the 1963 Act (see Appendix).
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2.	 Searches Under the Land Registration Act 1925
The enactment of the Land Registration Act 1988
was an important milestone in the history of land
registration in England, for it opened for the first
time, the register to everyone. Written authority from
the registered proprietor was no longer necessary in
order to make a search, as had been the case prior to
the Act. Section 1(1) of the 1988 Act provided a new
section 112 for the Land Registration Act 1925
substituting the former sections 112 to 112C. The new
section provided in part:
"(1) Any person may, subject to such
conditions as may be prescribed and on
payment of any fee payable, inspect and make
copies of and extracts from
(a) entries on the register ... ..."
Two sets of rules, the Land Registration (Official
Searches) Rules 1990 92 and the Land Registration (Open
Register) Rules 1990 93 have been prescribed and outline
in detail the procedure on making a search. A
distinction is made by the Land Registration (Official
These forms had been out of stock for a long time.
Instead applications were made on forms which did not
specify the provision of the written consent of the
proprietor. It is submitted that these forms could
cause problems for the Registrar because it lays him
open to an action from a proprietor who discovers that
an official search was granted without his consent, or
even from a person endeavouring to register an interst
but which is postponed to that of the person obtaining
the official search. In the latter situation, however,
a court may be prepared to hold that the purchaser
holds the land subject to the interest of the third
party who had endeavoured to register it but could not
because of the priority accorded to the purchaser.
92	 S.I. 1361.
93	 S.I. 1362.
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Searches) Rules between a purchaser 94 and any other
person; a purchaser "may apply for an official search
with priority of the register,” 95 whereas any other
person "may apply for an official search of a register
without priority. (Italics mine.) This distinction is
similar to that maintained by the Registered Land Act
1963 between purchasers and non-purchasers. Since
purchasers would be prejudiced by the registration of
interests immediately having made their search which
showed a clear title, it is practical to grant them a
priority period within which they can complete the
transfer safe in the knowledge that no adverse
interests have been registered since the search was
made. Non-purchasers have no need for a priority
period since their searches would probably be by way of
ouriosity. 96
 One important difference however between
the position under the 1963 Act in Kenya, and the 1990
Rules is that, under section 43(1) of the 1963 Act, a
purchaser requiring an official search with priority,
has to obtain the written consent of the registered
proprietor. This is not necessary now in England.
94 Defined in rule 2(1) as "any person (including a
lessee or chargee) who in good faith and for valuable
consideration acquires or intends to acquire a legal
estate in land ..."
95 Land Registration (Official Searches) Rules 1990,
s. 3(1).
96 However, such a person may be a mortgagee who
intends to protect his interest by registering a notice
of deposit of the land certificate, T.B.F. Ruoff, R.
Roper, & E.J. Pryer, Registered Conveyancing 5th ed.
(London 1986), p. 767.
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Nevertheless, a personal search of the English register
can be made by anyone using Form 111, 97 thereby
bringing the position in England in line with that in
Kenya.
3. Advantages of an Official Search
An official search has several advantages over a
personal search:-
1)	 An official search confers priority, preventing
the entry of any adverse interest onto the register
before the purchaser has an opportunity to complete the
transfer by registration. Therefore when an official
search is applied for, the registration of any 'entry'
or 'instrument' is 'postponed' or 'stayed' to a
subsequent application to register the instrument
affecting the dealing. 98 Under the Registered Land Act
1963 this period, referred to as the 'suspension
period' lasts for 14 days 99 whereas under the Land
Registration Act 1925 it is for 30 days)- 0° So long as
97 Land Registration (Open Register) Rules 1990, r.4.
For a copy of the form See Appendix.
98 Land Registration (Official Searches) Rules 1990,
r. 6; Registered Land Act 1963, ss. 43(1) & (2).
99	 S. 43(1).
100 Land Registration (Official Searches) Rules 1990,
r. 2(1). However, rule 2(1) provides that the purchase
must be in good faith. It was held in  Smith v. 
Morrison [1974] 1 All ER 957 that a purchaser is in
good faith within the rule if he acted honestly with no
ulterior motive. There is no requirement of 'good
faith' under the Registered Land Act 1963 in respect of
a person obtaining a 'stay of registration' under
section 43. It follows that such a purchaser who
obtains a stay or priority, may act with an ulterior
motive. For example, to purposely defeat the interest
of another intending purchaser who has concluded a
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the purchaser applies within this period to register
the transfer, he is protected from any adverse entries
that may have been made before registration is
completed. 101
 No such protection is granted to a
purchaser who merely makes a personal search of the
register.
2)	 A significant advantage under the Land
Registration Act 1925 is that where an official search
has been obtained by a solicitor or other person in
respect of land registered under the Land Registration
Act 1925, he is not answerable for any loss that may
arise from any error in it. 102
 On the other hand no
contract with the vendor but has yet to obtain an
official search (See Smith v. Morrison supra). The
purchaser in bad faith would therefore be entitled to
be registered as proprietor in priority to the other
intending purchaser.
101 One can envisage a situation where a person with
an interest in the registered land being transferred,
but who has neglected to protect that interest by a
caution, for example, subsequently decides to make an
application to register the caution on learning that
the land is to be sold. This took place in Smith v. 
Morrison, op. cit., where the second defendant was
aware that the plaintiff had entered into a contract to
buy the land from the first defendant but thought that
this was a 'try on' and in view of this took advantage
of the priority period by registering a transfer of the
land from the first defendant (the vendor) to himself.
The plaintiff subsequently tried to register a caution
against the land but it was cancelled. It was held
that the second defendant had acted in good faith and
since they had lodged their application to register the
transfer within the priority period, the plaintiff did
not have a cautionable interest, and therefore his
caution was rightfully rejected. In Elias v. Mitchell 
[1972] Ch. 652 the defendant delayed in presenting the
transfer for registration. In the meantime the
plaintiff was able to register a caution (this taking
place after the 30 day period). It was held that the
interest of the plaintiff was binding on the defendant.
102 Land Registration Rules 1925, r. 295. See Ruoff &
Roper, op. cit., p. 769.
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such protection is conferred by the Registered Land Act
1963. It follows that if an official search
certificate issued under the Registered Land Act 1963
and obtained by the purchaser's lawyer did not disclose
a registered interest the purchaser may be entitled to
sue his lawyer and also join the Registrar as
defendant. 103
3) Any person who suffers loss by reason of an error
in an official search is entitled to be indemnified)-04
No such indemnity is available to a person who engages
in a personal search of the register. The right to
obtain an indemnity is an important one in view of the
fact that officials operating the land registry are
fallible and therefore errors are bound to be made from
time to time.105
103 Unlike the English Land Registrar who is protected
from liability for acts done in good faith (Land
Registration Act 1925, s. 131), the Kenyan Land
Registrar has no such protection and therefore would be
liable for such an omission, notwithstanding that the
error was made in good faith. This, it would appear,
does not affect the right of the purchaser in obtaining
an indemnity. This is important where the value of the
land has risen from the time the mistake was made - see
Registered Land Act 1963, s. 145.
104 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 144(1)(c); Land
Registration Act 1925, s. 83(3).
105 As in Parkash v. Irani Finance  [1970] 1 Ch. 101
where an official search failed to disclose a caution
due to an error made by the Land Registry. It was held
that the caution was binding on the purchaser. Plowman
J., at p. 110, remarked that a personal search would
have revealed the caution. This is ironic in view of
the advantages outlined above that an official search
has over a personal search. Nevertheless, the
purchaser would have been entitled to an indemnity
under section 83(2) of the Land Registration Act 1925.
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C.	 Other Searches
Apart from searching the register of title the
purchaser of registered land has to be aware of the
charges and restrictions which the public authorities,
both local and central, may have imposed on the land
under statutory powers. These impose either a
financial obligation on the property or a restriction
on the use of the property. Examples are charges
levied for the making up of roads, tree preservation
orders, building preservation notices, controls on land
development and so on. In England these liabilities
are discoverable by inspecting the local land charges
registers l" which were introduced by the Land Charges
Act 1925 and reorganised by the Local Land Charges Act
1975. These registers are kept by District Councils,
and in London by the Borough Councils (or the City of
London). 107
 A search of the local land charges
register is imperative for the purchaser in Englandl"
because while a local land charge is binding on a
purchaser whether it is registered in the local land
charges register or not'" compensation can only be
106 Local land charges are defined in section 1(1) of
the Local Land Charges Act 1975.
107 Local Land Charges Act 1975, s. 3(1). The
register need not be kept in documentary form and may
be kept by computer - Local Government (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1982, s. 34.
108 See Law Society General Conditions of Sale, 3(1),
(2).
314
paid to a purchaser in respect of a local land charge
that was not registered so long as he has made a
search, whether personal or official. 110
However, despite the existence of the local land
charges register, a purchaser of registered land in
England has also to make additional enquiries of the
local authority, because the local land charges search
only reveals the information which the local authority
is bound to register and consequently the authority may
have other information it is not obliged to register
but which may affect the land the purchaser seeks to
buy, for example whether there are proposals to build a
motorway or trunk road within 200 metres of the
property, restrictions on permitted development,
whether the property is in a conservation area, whether
the Council has served a Building Preservation Notice
and so on. 111
In Kenya, there is no system for registering local
land charges imposed by the Central and Local
authorities as there is in England. The advantage of a
system of local land charges registration is that a
purchaser can be compensated in respect of unregistered
local land charges even though under the Local Land
Charges Act 1975 they are still binding on the
109 Local Land Charges Act 1975, s. 10(1). Local land
charges are overriding interests - Land Registration
Act 1925, s. 70(1)(i).
110 Local Land Charges Act 1975, S. 10(1).
111 I.R. Storey, Conveyancing, 2nd ed. (London 1987)
pp. 67, 68.
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purchaser. 112 In Kenya, the purchaser has to make
written enquiries to the Local authority in which the
land is situated to discover whether there are any
restrictions imposed by the authority on the land such
as building restrictions, 113 and also whether charges
have been levied on the land such as unpaid rates. The
latter is particularly important because before a
transfer of land can be registered by the Registrar
under the Registered Land Act 1963 the local or
'rating' authority must produce a written statement to
the Registrar that all rates and other charges payable
to the authority in respect of the land for the last 12
years have been paid. 114
 It would follow that if the
written statement is to the effect that the rates have
not been paid, the Registrar will refuse to register
the transfer. 115
 Herein lies an important difference
112 Supra,
113 Made under the Land Planning Act Cap. 303.
114 S. 86.
115 Exceptions are where the land is subject to a
lease the latter being the rateable property, or where
the transfer relates to a lease and the freehold is the
rateable property - proviso to section 86. However,
section 86A of the Registered Land Act 1963 provides
that the Registrar shall not register any interest in
land unless a certificate is produced to him certifying
that no rent is owing to the Government in respect of
the land. This section would apply in particular to
persons who had been granted leases of Government land,
such land being subject to the Government Lands Act
1915. The Conversion of Leases Regulations 1960 and
the Conversion of Leases Rules 1960 made under the
Kenya (Land) Order-in-Council 1960 had made it possible
for leaseholders who had been granted terms of 999
years to purchase that land. Moreover, section
149(3)(a) of the Government Lands Act 1915 also
provided that the Government could alienate government
land as freehold. Once such land was bought, it could
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between Kenyan and English practice in the transfer of
registered land. In England, the Registration of a
charge by a local authority in the local land charges
register that is adverse to the land that is the
subject of a transfer between a vendor and purchaser,
will not prevent the registration of the transfer of
that land. The purchaser may agree to continue with
the purchase, but subject to the vendor first
undertaking to discharge the charge before completion.
However, in Kenya the statement that the land is
subject to a local authority charge acts as a stay on
the transfer of the land and unless the vendor
discharges the charge, no registration will take place.
One of the draftsmen of the Registered Land Act 1963
remarked that section 86 of the Registered Land Act was
inserted in the Act because "the circumstances in Kenya
are such that this type of prohibition probably
represents the last line of defence by a local
authority of its income from rates. "116 With respect,
this opinion is not convincing. Section 30(e) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 provides that charges for
unpaid rates are overriding interests. These
interests, though unregistered, are binding on a
purchaser of land. Therefore if a vendor has not paid
be registered under the Registered Land Act 1963 by
virtue of section 12(1)(b). Section 86A of the 1963
Act would therefore ensure that people who bought
Government land would not escape from their
liabilities.
116 S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration,
(Cambridge 1976), p. 543.
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local authority rates which form a charge on the land,
the local authority can still enforce these rates
against the purchaser, since they are overriding
interests. If the local authority in its written
statement under section 86 had mistakenly declared that
there were no charges payable, and the transfer was
made and the purchaser registered as proprietor, and it
was subsequently discovered that there were some
outstanding charges, they would still be binding on the
purchaser.
The English position is similar. Local land
charges not registered under the Local Land Charges Act
1975 are still enforceable against a purchaser of
registered land because they are overriding
interests. 117
 The difference, however, is that
compensation may be payable to such a purchaser in
respect of unregistered local land charges)- 1- 8
 No such
compensation is payable to a purchaser of land under
the Registered Land Act 1963 with respect to charges
that are not disclosed in the written statement issued
under section 86 of the Act. The purchaser's remedy
may be to sue the vendor for breach of the covenant of
freedom from incumbrances. Where such a covenant
formed part of the express terms of the contract then
117 Land Registration Act 1925, S. 70(1)(i).
Unregistered local land charges would also be
enforceable on a purchaser of unregistered land by
virtue of section 10(1) of the Local Land Charges Act
1975.
118 Local Land Charges Act 1975, s. 10(1).
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there would be no great difficulty in obtaining damages
for breach of the covenant for title. The problem
arises where there are no express terms in the
contract. As discussed earlier, covenants for title
cannot be implied into a contract for the sale of land
registered under the Registered Land Act 1963. A
purchaser without the benefit of the covenants is
therefore at a distinct disadvantage when he finds that
he takes the land subject to undisclosed land charges.
This problem illustrates the need to improve the
position of the purchaser who contracts on his own
behalf and usually will not have contracted on the
basis of the standard conditions for the sale of land
which have, as part of the terms, certains covenants
for title. The position of such purchasers could be
improved if provision is made to enable covenants for
title to be implied in a transfer of registered land.
In Kenya, a purchaser of agricultural land would,
in addition, have to make enquiries of the Ministry of
Agriculture to determine whether the Minister has
imposed a preservation order, a land development order
or a management order under the Agriculture Act119
against the land. The effect of these orders is to
ensure that owners of agricultural land practice proper
farming methods, for example taking measures to prevent
soil erosion and preserve fertility, or effect other
improvements on the land 120 . One of the consequences
119 Cap. 318.
120 Agriculture Act, S. 51.
319
of failure to comply with these orders is that the
Government can undertake the improvements and register
the cost as a charge on the land, 121
 and ultimately the
Minister has power to sell the land. 122
 The purchaser
would therefore be concerned to ascertain whether any
orders have been issued against the land he is
purchasing and if so whether the vendor has undertaken
the necessary improvements. Such enquiry is necessary
because if no charge is registered against the land in
respect of these improvements, the charge can still
take effect as an overriding interest under section
30(e) of the Registered Land Act 1963, and therefore
would be binding on the purchaser.
A type of search peculiar to England which a
purchaser of land123
 (whether registered or
unregistered) would be advised to make is a search in
the register made under the Commons Registration Act
1965. Rights of common such as rights of pasture,
estovers, turbary, and piscary, can be registered
either in the register under the 1965 Act or under the
Land Registration Act 1925, 124
 although under the
latter Act it would appear that the reference to
registration refers to a note on the register rather
121 Ibid, s. 56
122 Ibid, s. 187.
123 Especially where the land has never been built on
or if it ever belonged to the local Lord of the Manor -
I.R. Storey, op. cit. p. 710.
124 Commons Registration Act 1965, s. 1(2)(b).
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than substantive registration.125 The prudent course
therefore would be to search both registers. In the
context of registered land this is important because
rights of common are overriding interests under the
Land registration Act 1925.126
However, a purchaser of registered land in Kenya
or in England cannot expect to be wholly protected from
unregistered interest by relying on the official
certificate of search and by searching the other
registers outlined above. 127
 Physical inspection of
the land to be bought is necessary because of the
binding effect of overriding interests, 128 and in
particular the interests of those in actual
occupation, 129
 and issue considered in the next
chapter.
D. Execution of the Transfer
For a transfer of land to be effective, the
transfer form must be properly executed. The
Registered Land Act 1963 provides an unusual procedure
for the execution of instruments. Section 109(1)
125 Ros Oswald, A Practitioner's Guide to Common Land
and the Commons Registration Act 1965 (London 1989) p.
34.
126 5.70(1)(a).
127 For other types of searches which are uncommon or
less usual in England see Frances Silverman, Searches 
and Enquiries, A Conveyancer's Guide, (London 1985),
Parts IV and V.
128 Registered Land Act 1963, s.30; Land Registration
Act 1925, s.70(1).
129 Registered Land Act 1963, s.30(g); Land
Registration Act 1925, s.70(1)(g).
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provides that the instrument evidencing a disposition
"shall be executed by all persons shown by the register
to be proprietors of the interest affected and by all
other parties to the instrument. This means that the
vendor and the purchaser must both sign the transfer
form 13 ° and the signature of each must be attested by a
witness. It used to be the practice in England for a
deed of conveyance to be sealed and delivered and this
extended to transfer forms of registered land. However,
the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
1989 131 abolished the practice of sealing; 132
 what is
now required for an instrument to be validly executed
is signature, witnessing of the signature and delivery
of the instrument as a deed. 133
 A new form 19 (for the
transfer of registered land) has been designed removing
the requirement of sealing when execution is by an
individual. 134
130 Illiteracy is a big problem in Kenya and
consequently many individuals cannot write, or even
sign their names. Therefore persons are permitted to
place their thumbprints on the transfer forms. Each
Land Registry has an ink pad to enable persons to place
their thumbprints on the documents of transfer. The
writer was able to assist several purchasers of land at
the Kiambu District Land Registry to print their
thumbprints on the transfer form.
131 Section 1(1).
132 This was an implementation of the Law Commission's
recommendation that sealing 	 should be
abolished - see The Law Commission, Deeds & Escrows,
Law. Coin. No. 163.
133 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
1989, s.1(3).
134 Land Registration (Execution of Deeds) Rules 1990.
The rules prescribe different forms of attestation
where execution is by a company.
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Significantly, sections 110(1) and (2) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 provide that a person
executing an instrument shall appear before the
Registrar or such public officer or other person as is
prescribed to enable the Registrar or the public
officer or other person "to satisfy himself as to the
identity of the person appearing before him and
ascertain whether he freely and voluntarily executed
the instrument, and shall complete a certificate to
that effect." The purpose of these provisions was to
prevent a forger from impersonating the registered
proprietor of the land and selling the land to a third
party135 and to prevent a proprietor from selling under
duress. The Registered Land Rules 1963 136
 set out a
list of public officers and other persons who may
verify executions and they are: a judge or magistrate,
the Registrar and Deputy Registrar of the High Court,
the Registrar-General and his deputy and any Assistant
Registrar-General, an administrative officer, a
Superintendent of Prisons, an Advocate or a Bank
official. The transfer form contains the certificate
which is signed by the person certifying the identity
of the parties.137
In Kenya, the identity of individuals is
facilitated by the existence of national identity
135 S. Rowton Simpson, op. cit. p. 394.
136 R.7, Fourth Schedule.
137 See Appendix.
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cards. Every Kenya citizen over 18 years of age must
have a national identity card which contains details of
one's date and place of birth, place of residence, a
photograph of the individual, his signature and his
thumbprint. Both the vendor and purchaser will have an
identity card, and this is used to ascertain their
identity. The person verifying execution normally
looks at the identity cards of the parties, and in
particular the photograph and signature of the
individual, checking this against the individual in
front of him and ensuring that the signature on the
card is identical to that on the form. However,
parties who are unable to sign their names have their
thumbprints placed on the transfer form)- 38
 Although
section 110 of the Registered Land Act 1963 makes
provision for the Registrar to verify execution, it is
rare for him to do so. It was observed at the Kiambu
District Land Registry that the execution of all the
transfers and other dispositions of registered land
were verified by advocates, and whenever parties came
to the Registry to collect transfer forms they were
always advised to have them verified by an advocate,
the Registrar being too busy to do so.
Although this system does hinder forgery, there
are instances where persons have been able to
impersonate the registered proprietor by obtaining a
false identify card and selling the land to a third
138 See n. 130, supra.
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party. For example, in Republic v. Godfrey Kariuki 
Kinvaniui 139 the defendant was the son of the
registered proprietor of the land in question. The
defendant falsely represented himself as Muthunguri
Ndungu, his father's name, and succeeded in obtaining
an identity card bearing that name but with the
defendant's photograph. Armed with this identity card
he was able to obtain a certificate of title of the
land registered in his father's name from the Land
Registry and consequently proceeded to sell the land to
an innocent purchaser. However, his fraud was
subsequently discovered and the defendant was
convicted. This case illustrates that a determined
fraudster can still find ways of entering into
fraudulent transfers, notwithstanding the system of
verifying execution.
Nevertheless, the verification of execution would
discourage all but determined persons from engaging in
fraudulent transfers. In England there is no such
safeguard for the transfers of registered land unless
the execution is unusual, such as where an illiterate,
a person of limited mental capacity or a blind person
marks or signs a deed; 140 the only safeguard exists in
the attestation of the transfer form. Section 75 of
139 Criminal  Case No.35 of 1982 (Kiambu S.R.M.C)
(unreported).
140 In such cases the deed would be read to the
individual and its full legal implications explained to
him, with a solicitor having to attest the document -
T.B.F. Ruoff, R. Roper & E.J. Pryer Registered
Conveyancing, 5th ed., (London 1986), p. 319.
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the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that a purchaser
may at his own expense have the execution of the deed
attested by his appointee, including his solicitor.141
Since this procedure is not compulsory, unlike the
verification of execution under the Registered Land Act
1963, it has been observed that although this power is
rarely exercised, greater use should be made of it in
view of the danger of fraud and forgery. 142
It would certainly be impossible to have the
English Land Registrar verify the execution of
instruments in a manner similar to that under the
Registered Land Act 1963. A phenomenal number of
dealings are registered by the various District Land
Registries in England compared with those in Kenya.
For example, between 1988 and 1989, a total of 283,145
transfers were registered in the Nottingham District
Land Registry, the busiest in England. 143 In contrast,
roughly during the same period, a total of 4,742
transfers were registered in the Kiambu District Land
141 No provision is made on form 19 for the purchaser
to sign the form. The purchaser cannot attest the form
because a party to a deed cannot also be a witness -
Seal v. Claridge (1881) 7 Q.B.D. 516, at 519. However,
if the transfer is accompanied by a plan then the plan
must be signed by the vendor and by or on behalf of the
purchaser - I.R. Storey, op.cit., p. 195.
142 D.G. Barnsley, op.cit., p. 399. However, Barnsley
remarks that unless the clients are actually known to
their solicitors, the risk of impersonation will always
exist - Ibid.
143 Report on the Work of H.M. Land Registry 1988-89 
(London 1989), Appendix I.
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Registry, the busiest in Kenya. 144
 The huge difference
is all too obvious. Nevertheless, to prevent the
increase of forgery or fraud in England in connection
with registered land, it would be beneficial, at the
very least, to make section 75 of the Law of Property
Act 1925 mandatory thereby reducing, but not
necessarily eliminating, the risk of impersonation.
E. Land Control Consent
Obtaining land control consent is an essential
formality in Kenya before certain land, whether
registered or unregistered is transferred. If the land
is registered, the usual practice is that the Registrar
will not register a transfer of land registered under
the Registered Land Act 1963 until land control consent
is granted to the transfer. 145 Obtaining land control
consent is therefore the last formality before a
transfer can be registered under the Registered Land
Act 1963. The procedure for the grant of land control
consent is governed by the Land Control Act 1967.
The Act was enacted as a result of the
recommendations in the Report of the East Africa Royal
Commission l953_55.146 The Commission was concerned
that the change from the traditional system of land
holding among the Africans to individual ownership of
144 Kiambu District Land Registry, Monthly Returns,
July 1988 - July 1989.
145 Land Control Act 1967, Cap. 302, s. 20(1).
146 Cmd. 9475.
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land would result in the accumulation of large land
holdings. 147 This would be caused by wealthy land
owners buying land from poor land owners, resulting in
the emergence of increased numbers of landless
people. 148 To prevent this consequence, it was
recommended that the transfers of land above a certain
size should be prohibited, and that local land boards
could be responsible for checking transactions to
ensure that the above problem was prevented. 149 The
Working Party on African Land Tenure drafted the Land
Control Bill which subsequently became the Land Control
Act 1967. The Act was therefore enacted as a social
and economic measure; it would prevent the creation of
a class of landless people which, if allowed, would
create political problems; moreover it would prevent
fragmentation of land resulting in sound agricultural
practices. 150
The Land Control Act 1967 creates land control
boards whose purpose is to grant or refuse to grant
consent to transactions of agricultural land. The
transactions that are subject to consent are "the sale,
147 Report of the East Africa Royal Commission on Land
and Population 1953-55, Cmd. 9475, para. 35.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 While it would be of interest to discuss the
social and economic consequences of the Land Control
Act 1967, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to do
so. Nevertheless for a general discussion see R.J.A.
Wilson, Land Control in Kenya's Smallholder Farming
Areas, (1972) 5 E.A.J.R.D 123; S. Coldham, Land Control 
in Kenya, [1978] J.A.L. 63.
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transfer, lease, mortgage, exchange, partition or other
disposal of or dealing" as well as the "declaration of
a trust". 151 Agriculture land is simply defined as
land that is not within a municipality, township or a
market, or land with a restrictive covenant that it
shall not be used for agriculture. 152 This wide
definition of 'agricultural land' which is almost
exclusively a geographic definition, 153
 means that
virtually all transfers of land in Kenya are subject to
the grant of consent under the Land Control Act 1967.
An application for land control consent is made by
the vendor and purchaser and if the land is registered
the Land Registrar refers the application to the local
land control board. 154
 The board155 takes certain
factors into account in deciding whether to grant
consent to the transaction or not; these factors are
151 Land Control Act 1967, ss. 6(1)(a), (2).
152 Ibid, s. 2.
153 Contrast the laboured definitions of
'agricultural' in the English Agricultural Holdings Act
1948, s. 1(2), and the Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976 s.
1.
154	 While the
Registrar should submit the form (see the instructions
on the form), it was observed at the Kiambu District
Land Registry by the writer that the parties are
usually advised to present the application forms at the
next land control board meeting which, in Kiambu
District, takes place every two to four weeks (the
dates of the meetings are displayed at the Land
Registry).
155 The Board, like the Land Adjudication Board, is
mainly composed of lay individuals, usually farmers,
who are resident in the area. For the composition of
the Land Control Board, see Land Control Act 1967,
Schedule, para. 1.
329
set out in section 9 of the Land Control Act 1967.
They take into account whether the transaction will be
conducive to the economic development of the land)-56
if the purchaser of the land is unlikely to develop the
land well or profitably, or has sufficient agricultural
land, or that the terms and conditions of the
transaction (such as the purchase price) are unfair
then consent will be refused. 157
 If consent to the
transaction is refused, the decision of the Board is
final and not subject to question "in any court"158
Such a decision has the effect of making the
transaction "void for all purposes". 159
 Such an
agreement therefore cannot be subject to an action for
specific performance)-60
 Nevertheless, the Act permits
the recovery of any consideration from the party to
whom it was paid)- 61
 Failure to make an application
for consent within six months from the date of the
156 Land Control Act 1967, s. 9(1).
157 Ibid, s. 9(2). For a discussion of these factors
see the articles in note 150, supra.
158 Land Control Act 1967, s. 8(2). But see Eli'ah
arap Koross v. Anthony Ovier, H.C.C.C. No.10 of 1980
(unreported, but noted in the Nairobi Law Monthly, Feb.
1989) where it was held that this provision cannot oust
the unlimited jurisdiction of the High Court by virtue
of section 60 of the Constitution of Kenya.
159 Land Control Act 1967, s. 6(1).
160 Gabriel Wamkota v. Sylvester Donati, Civil Appeal
No. 6 of 1986 (unreported); Githire v. Munge (1979)
Kenya L.R. 50.
161 Land Control Act 1967, s. 7.
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agreement for sale will also make the agreement void,
and therefore not capable of specific performance. 162
What is the significance of the Land Control Act
1967 in the formalities for the transfer of
agricultural land registered under the Registered Land
Act 1963? First, under section 40 of the Registered
Land Act 1963, if an instrument is presented for
registration later than three months from the date of
the instrument, an additional fee equal to the
registration fee is payable for each three months which
have elapsed since that date. Although section 8(1) of
the Land Control Act 1967 provides that an application
may be made for consent within six months from the date
of the agreement, a purchaser would want to ensure that
an application for consent is made and consent granted
within three months from the date of making the
agreement in order to register the transfer form,
thereby avoiding having to pay extra registration fees.
Moreover, if the failure to apply for consent is due to
the wilful default of the purchaser, and therefore is
the cause of the failure to present the transfer form
for registration within three months, not only is he
liable to pay any registration fee and any other fee
payable for the delay, whether the form is presented
for registration or not, 163 but if he fails to respond
to the order of the Registrar to present the form for
162 However, the High Court has jurisdiction to extend
the six month period - Land Control Act 1967, s. 8(1).
163 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 41(1).
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registration, he may be found guilty of a criminal
offence. 164
Secondly, if consent is not granted to the
transfer of the registered land by the land control
board, the transfer cannot be registered. Although
section 38(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963 provides
that an unregistered instrument may operate as a
contract between the parties, it would not be capable
of specific performance because it will have been
deemed void by section 6(1) of the Land Control Act
1967. 165 If, in the event, the purchaser has advanced
the purchase money to the vendor, and the latter
subsequently transfers the same land to a third party
who is successful in having the land registered in his
name, the original purchaser would certainly be unable
to sue the vendor for specific performance of the
agreement nor indeed seek rectification of the
register. 166 Nevertheless, he would be able to
164 Ibid, s. 41(2). If the parties fail to obtain
consent or to apply for consent within the required
period, and proceed to enter possession of the land or
pay or receive money in furtherance of the void
transaction, they may also to be guilty of a criminal
offence under section 22 of the Land Control Act 1967.
In Gabriel Wamukota v. Sylvester Donati, op. cit., the
defendant had been charged with an offence under
section 22 of the Land Control Act 1967 and imprisoned.
Unfortunately for the plaintiff, who was a party to the
void transaction, but had nevertheless advanced
purchase money to the defendant, the defendant on his
release transferred the registered land to a bona tide
third party. The plaintiff failed to have the register
rectified in his favour.
165 Gabriel Wamukota v. Slyvester Donati, op. cit.
166 Ibid.
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recover the consideration under section 7 of the Land
Control Act 1967. However, if the first purchaser had
protected his void estate contract by entering a
caution 167 - assuming that the caution is entered
before the contract is declared void - would the
caution have been binding on the third party? It is
submitted that it would not have, since there was no
valid interest that the caution was protecting and the
third party could successfully apply to have the
caution removed. 168
 The result would be the same if
the first purchaser was in actual occupation and
claimed an overriding interest under section 30(g) of
the Registered Land Act 1963. Since the right under
the estate contract is void, the interest is devoid of
validity; therefore, even if it is coupled with actual
occupation of the land it cannot be elevated into an
overriding interest. 169
But suppose the Registrar mistakenly registered
the transfer which had been declared void by the land
control board, or a transfer which had not been
presented to the land control board for consent within
167 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 131(1)(a)
168 Ibid, s. 133(2). However, such a caution would in
reality discourage the third party from proceeding to
purchase the land.
169 That there must be an interest coupled with actual
occupation within section 30(g) was accepted in John
Kiructa v. Mugecha Kiruga, Civil App. No. 52 of 1985
(unreported); for the identical position under section
70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925 see City of 
London Building Society v. Flecm [1987] 2 W.L.R. 1266.
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six months170 and is therefore void, what is the effect
of the registration? This is an area where there
appears to be a conflict of law. On the one hand,
section 6(1) of the Land Control Act 1967 provides that
a transaction for the sale of land that has not been
granted land control consent is "void for all purposes"
(italics mine). On the other hand section 27 of the
Registered Land Act 1963 automatically vests the legal
and equitable estate or 'absolute ownership' on the
person who is registered as proprietor; moreover,
section 28 of the same Act also provides that the
rights of the proprietor shall not be liable to be
defeated except as provided in the 1963 Act.
Therefore, if a person is mistakenly registered as
proprietor by the Registrar, although the transfer had
been declared void, does section 6(1) of the Land
Control Act 1967 extend to such a registration so that
the registration itself is void, or do sections 27 and
28 of the Registered Land Act 1963 prevail so that the
registration can only be defeated by the provisions in
the 1963 Act? The answer to this question depends on
the interpretation of section 4 of the Registered Land
Act 1963. That section states:
"Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no
other written law and no practice or
procedure relating to land shall apply to
land registered under this Act so far as it
is inconsistent with this Act:
Provided that, except where a contrary
intention appears, nothing contained in this
170 Assuming no application is made to the High Court
to extend the period - Land Control Act 1967, s. 8(1).
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Act shall be construed as permitting any
dealing which is forbidden by the express
provisions of any other written law or as
overriding any provision of any other written
law requiring the consent or approval of any
authority to any dealing." (italics mine).
It is evident that the proviso to section 4 was
written with the Land Control Act in mind)- 71
 The
effect of the italicised words would appear to make the
registration of a void transfer void by virtue of
section 6(1) of the Land Control Act 1967 because
section 6(1) provides that the transaction is "void for
all purposes".
There appears to be a difference of opinion as to
the effect of these provisions. 	 Krishan Maini is of
the opinion that notwithstanding section 4 of the
Registered Land Act 1963, registration has the effect
of validating a void transfer because of the basic
principle of registration, that the register proves
title. 172
 However, Land Registry practice seems to
indicate otherwise. The Deputy Chief Land Registrar
narrated to the writer- 73
 an episode where a District
Land Registrar was instructed by a District Officer to
register a charge against a registered title without
171 S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration 
(Cambridge 1976), p. 477. Strictly speaking, the 1963
Act at the time of its enactment was referring to the
Land Control (Special Areas) Ordinance which was
subsequently replaced by the present Land Control Act
1967.
172 K. M. Maini, Land Law in East Africa (Nairobi
1967), p. 167.
173 Interview with Mr. K. Gachiri, Nairobi Lands
Office, 3 October, 1989.
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first obtaining land control consent, because it was
assumed that consent would be granted as a matter of
course. 174 The charge was registered but consent was
never granted to the charge. The proprietor of the
land which was charged subsequently defaulted. The
bank, however, as chargee, was unable to exercise its
power of sale over the land because the charge was
declared void by the Chief Land Registrar,
notwithstanding its registration, because consent had
never been granted to the charge. Registration of the
charge was therefore viewed as not having conferred
validity on the charge. However, the bank was able to
recover an indemnity from the Government in view of the
Land Registrar's mistake.175
The effect of such a mistake has yet to be
considered by the courts. At present it would appear
that the view of the Land Registry is the prevailing
one, that is, a transaction is not validated by its
registration and the registration of that transaction
is void. This would appear to take the effect of
section 6(1) of the Land Control Act 1967 to its
logical conclusion; since a transaction without consent
is "void for all purposes" everything stemming from
that transaction is void, even its registration.
174 Charges are among the transactions that must be
given consent under section 6(1) of the Land Control
Act 1967.
175 Rectification by removing the charge from the
register was made and indemnity paid under section 144
of the Registered Land Act 1963.
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Subsequent dealings would therefore be affected and
they too would be void.
However, there is much to commend to Maini's view
expressed above. Since proof of title in registered
land is the register, registration should, ipso facto,
validate a void transaction. For example, a forged
transfer, if registered, can confer title on a
purchaser of the land, registration acting as a kind of
statutory magic automatically vesting the legal estate
in the transferee. 176 Moreover, as registration "is to
save persons dealing with registered land from the
trouble and expense of going behind the register, in
order to investigate the history of their author's
title and to satisfy themselves of its validity" 177
 why
should the title of a purchaser for value by impugned
by being declared void on the strength of a mistake
committed by the Registrar, a fortiori since the
purchaser himself could have discovered the defect in
the vendor's title had he been allowed to investigate
the same? Declaring a registration void would, in some
cases, cause enormous complications where the rights of
third parties are involved. For example, suppose A is
the registered proprietor of Haraka Farm. B agrees to
purchase the farm and the transfer form is completed.
However, while land control consent is pending, the
transfer is registered by mistake and B becomes the
176 Subject to rectification. See for example, Argyle
Building Society v. Hammond, (1985) 49 P & C.R. 148.
177	 .Gibbs v. Messer [1891] A.C. 248 at 254.
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registered proprietor and receives a 'title deed'.
Meanwhile land control consent is refused to the
transfer from A to B. Before the mistake is
discovered, B has transferred the land to C who obtains
consent to transfer and is registered as proprietor and
subsequently charges the land to D. If the first
transfer from A to B is void, it would follow from the
argument of the land registry that the registration of
B is also void. If that is so, does it follow that the
transfer from B to C is void, notwithstanding the
subsequent consent by the land control board to that
transfer, or does the subsequent consent of the B to C
transfer validate that transfer, and have retrospective
effect? It is submitted that the better result is that
advocated by Main!, that is, registration should
validate a transfer even if it is void. section 4 of
the Registered Land Act 1963 is a saving section178
 and
its real effect is to provide that the procedure of
transferring registered land under the Registered Land
Act 1963 should be read subject to the Land Control Act
1967, so that a transfer of agricultural land should
not be registered until land control consent is
obtained. It would follow that although section 38(1)
of the Registered Land Act 1963 provides that an
unregistered transfer operates as a contract, such a
contract cannot be capable of specific performance
unless land control consent is obtained. But if such a
178 See S. Rowton Simpson, op. cit., p. 477.
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transfer is registered by mistake, then it is submitted
that the registered proprietor should obtain a valid
title that can only be defeated by the rectification
provisions in section 143 of the Registered Land Act
1963. 179
III CONCLUSION
The transfer of registered land under the
Registered Land Act 1963 and the Land Registration Act
1925 is simplified by the use of simple transfer forms
together with the straight forward procedure of
obtaining an official search of the register. The
search prevents a purchaser from having to undergo the
tedious process of retrospectively deducing title from
deeds, and clearly shows whether there are any adverse
interests affecting the register. Moreover, the
elaborate procedures in the transfer of land subject to
customary law in Kenya no longer have to be undertaken
by a prospective purchaser. 180 The relatively simple
procedure of transferring registered land has enabled
individuals in Kenya to undertake their own
conveyancing, where transfers of freehold land are
concerned, without the benefit of legal advice.
179 The proprietor would be protected if he is in
possession - Registered Land Act 1963, s. 143(2).
However, if the registered proprietor has been partly
responsible for the failure to obtain consent, for
example, not submitted the consent forms within the
limitation period, then he may be held to have
substantially contributed to the mistake by his neglect
or default and therefore lose his protection - ibid,
section 143(2).
180 For a discussion of some of these procedures, see
Chapter Two, supra.
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Doubts have been raised in this Chapter as to
whether the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions)
Act 1989 has really tightened up the formalities for
contracts for the sale of land in England. It was
argued that section 2(8) may not have completely
abolished the doctrine of part performance. This
aspect does not so much affect parties who are legally
represented, as those who inter into a transaction on
their own behalf to purchase land, whether registered
or not. If their contract does not comply with section
2(1) of the 1989 Act, then it is clearly void and not
merely unemforceable.
However, if the view is taken that section 2(8) of
the 1989 Act has not completely abolished part
performance, and the purchaser has paid a deposit to
the vendor and entered possession, a court may take the
view that to prevent the vendor from using the Act as
an instrument of fraud, the purchaser having acted in
part performance, should have the contract specifically
enforced. While it is the writers view that it is
highly unlikely that a court may undermine the intent
of Parliament in this manner, 181 nevertheless, a doubt
still remains as to the effect of the Act. It remains
to be seen how a court would interpret these
provisions.
As further highlighted in this chapter, there are
certain pitfalls which may affect those who transfer
181 Applying the mischief rule may avoid this result.
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land registered under the Registered Land Act 1963
without the assistance of a lawyer. The absence of
implied covenants for title in the Registered Land Act
1963 may prejudice a purchaser contracting with a
vendor for the sale of registered land. For example,
if a third party was able to have the register
rectified against the purchaser (now registered as
proprietor), because the vendor had no right to convey
the land registered in the proprietor's name, the lack
of implied covenants for title would prevent the
purchaser suing the vendor for breach of the covenant
of the power to convey. 182
However, in view of the lack of Kenyan authorities
in this area, the discernible effect of implied
covenants for title in registered land can only be
viewed in the context of English authorities. But it
has been shown that there is still a measure of
uncertainty, in view of the conflicting Court of Appeal
decisions in Meek v Clarke183 and A.J. Dunning v
Syke q184 in this area. The writer takes the view that
the latter decision is to be preferred. In Kenya,
suing on the implied covenants for title, such as the
good right to convey, would be the only remedy open to
a plaintiff who fell victim to the provisions in the
182 A.J. Dunning Ltd. v. Sykes Ltd. [1967] 1 All E.R.
700 highlights the usefulness of implied covenants for
title in registered land.
183 LEXIS Transcript (1982).
184 Op. cit.
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Registered Land Act 1963 preventing rectification and
indemnity for first registrations. 185
 Meek v Clarke186
could probably be supported, if at all, on the basis
that the plaintiff already had an unanswerable claim
against the Land Registry, although this was limited to
the value of the lost right.187
In additions, the covenant of freedom from
incumbrances may be useful if the purchaser finds
himself subject to overriding interests that were
undisclosed by the vendor. 188
 The lack of such an
implied covenant would also prevent the purchaser from
suing the vendor for breach of that covenant. The
possibility of suing the vendor on the covenants is a
valuable remedy if the proprietor had no right to an
indemnity, or if the amount of indemnity awarded does
not cover the value of his interest. 189
 But a
purchaser who has had the conveyancing undertaken by a
lawyer in Kenya will have had the benefit of the Kenya
Law Society's Conditions of Sale having been
incorporated into the contract with the vendor and
therefore will have the benefit of the express
185 Ss. 143(1), 144(1)(b).
186 Op. cit.
187 However, this argument is tenuous since a claim
for an indemnity and a claim against the vendor on the
covenants are mutually exclusive.
188 In Meek v Clarke, op. cit. Oliver L.J., albeit
obiter, expressed the view that such a covenant could
have an operation against overriding interests.
189 Registered Land Act 1963, S. 145. However, this
remedy is valueless if the vendor is a man of straw.
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covenants upon which he could sue the vendor in damages
if the latter was in breach of them. This highlights
the danger that a purchaser may face if, as is usually
the case in Kenya, he undertakes the transfer himself.
Although the official search of the register
prevents a purchaser from having to deduce title by
other means, this does not preclude him from having to
undertake other equally important searches, such as
finding out whether the local authority has registered
a charge against the land. In England, this search is
facilitated by the existence of a local land charges
register. In Kenya, the absence of such a register
means that a purchaser has to enter into correspondence
with the local authority to ascertain whether all rates
have been paid, for example. No transfer can be
registered until a clear written statement is received.
This procedure may cause unnecessary delay in a
transaction if the authority is slow to reply, or if an
unrepresented purchaser was unaware of this requirement
and only discovered it at the last minute.'" A
solution to this problem would be to permit local land
charges to be registered as charges on the register of
title similar to the way a charge for improvements
under the Agriculture Act can be registered as a charge
on the register. 191
 However, this would not absolve
190 Such a purchaser would have to be careful tht he
did not lose his suspension period under section 43(2)
of the Registered Land Act 1963. If he did he would
have to obtain another official search of the register.
191 Agriculture Act Cap. 318, s. 56.
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the need to make further inquiries of the local
authority in respect of matters connected with the Land
Planning Act192 for example.
The verification of execution of a transfer of
land under the Registered Land Act 1963 acts as a
safeguard against impersonation and would potentially
limit the incidence of fraud. This verification is
facilitated by the system of national identity cards in
Kenya. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a
determined forger from obtaining a fake identity card
and entering into a fraudulent transfer. 193
 While
there is no similar system of verification of transfers
in England, it would be expedient if the procedure in
section 75 of the Law of Property Act 1925 were to be
made compulsory.
The necessity of obtaining land control consent
under the Land Control Act 1967 if the land is
agricultural is underlined by section 6(1) of the 1967
Act which provides that a failure to obtain consent
renders a transaction "void for all purposes". Failure
to obtain such consent renders a contract for the sale
of land incapable of specific performance. However,
the problem arises where a void transfer is registered
by mistake. As discussed earlier there exists a
difference of opinion as to the effect of such a
registration. Land Registry practice treats such a
192 Cap. 303.
193 As in Republic v. Godfrey Kariuki Kinyaniui, Crim.
Case No. 35 of 1982, Kiambu S.R.M.C. (unreported).
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registration as void. But such a view can cause
enormous complications for innocent third parties who
have relied on the register and have registered their
interests or who have obtained rights in the land such
as overriding interests. Their interests would be
declared void if the land registry view was to prevail.
Such a view is contrary to the objective of land
registration that the register is everything and is
therefore proof of title. It was argued that section 4
of the Registered Land Act 1963 is concerned with pre-
registration dealings so that a transfer of
agricultural land should not be registered until
consent has been obtained. If consent is not granted,
a mistaken registration should, nevertheless, confer
valid title on the registered proprietor, subject to
rectification.
Despite the existence of this problem it is
unlikely that it will occur frequently because the
requirement of land control consent before registration
of a transfer is strictly adhered to)- 94
 Nevertheless,
it is a problem which can only be satisfactorily
resolved by the courts, thereby ending the uncertainty.
It is evident that pitfalls exist even in the
relatively 'simple' system of registered conveyancing.
Arguably, amendments can be made to the Registered Land
Act 1963 to protect unassisted purchasers. For
example, provision may be made for covenants for title
194 Land Control Act 1967, s. 20(1).
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to be implied where operative words such as 'beneficial
owner' are used in a transfer. 195
 Allowing the
registration of local land charges on the register of
title would make it easier to ascertain the existence
of such charges and would prevent the delay in
registration as is the current procedure.196
Alternatively, local land charges could be added to the
list of overriding interests under section 30 of the
Registered Land Act 1963 and which would bind a
purchaser; this is the position under the Land
Registration Act 1925. 197 To prevent registering a
195 The amending Act would have to set out the
covenants which are to be implied on a transfer. The
operative words may then be included in the transfer
form (Form R.L. 1). See the proposed amendment (clause
27) by the Law Commission in their Fourth Report on
Land Registration (Law Corn. No. 173).
196 A similar suggestion has been made with respect to
the register under the Land Registration Act 1925.
Information about local land charges and other local
authority matters affecting the house would also be
placed on the land certificate - Michael Joseph,
Lawyers Can Seriously Damage Your Health, (London
1984),pp. 292, 293. However, the Law Commission felt
that it was not sensible to require the registration of
local land charges on the register, (these are capable
of being registered - see section 70(1)(i) of the Land
Registration Act 1925 - a point that Mr. Joseph, supra,
does not seem to be aware of) because they are already
registrable under the Local Land Charges Register.
Instead they recommended that local land charges should
take effect as general burdens under the Land
Registration Act 1925 with the Registrar having a
discretion to enter a note of them on the register -
Third Report on Land Registration, Law Corn. No. 158,
paras. 2.15, 2.94.
197 Section 70(1). See the recommendation of the Law
Commission _supra, n. 176. However, it is interesting
to note that although the Working Party on African Land
Tenure noted that such charges should be overriding
interests, this was not implemented - see Report of the 
Working Party on African Land Tenure 1957-58, (Nairobi
1958), para. 67(a). Making such charges overriding
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transfer that has not received consent Registry
officials should carefully scrutinise the documents
presented for registration.
The English Law Society has however promoted a new
conveyancing protocol known as TransAction designed to
speed up the conveyancing process. One of the elements
of the protocol was that the vendor's solicitor would
have the responsibility of undertaking a local search
at the vendor's cost, and the result of the search
provided fee of charge to the purchaser's solicitor.
Such a procedure would certainly save the purchaser
time and money.
Despite the fact that registered conveyancing is
'simple' the vast majority of persons in England do not
undertake their own conveyancing. The Royal Commission
on Legal Services commented that it is only
in a small proportion of transactions that a vendor and
purchaser act on their own account'. 198 It has been
suggested that this is probably due to solicitors
making "a great song and dance about all the
complicated things which [they have] to check before
exchange of contracts" although in reality the work the
solicitor does is 'worse than useless' since in the
case of registered land all he has to do is to send
printed forms since he no longer has to investigate
interests however, would mean that a purchaser would
want to find out what changes were binding on the land.
198 Final Report of the Royal Commission on Legal 
Services, Vol. I, Cmnd. 7648, para. 21.28.
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title. 199
 Undoubtedly, the necessity of local land
charge searches and inquiries of local authorities adds
to the complexities of transferring registered land.
But more significant is the existence of overriding
interests and the difficulty of their discoverability.
This is a serious pitfall for purchasers of registered
land whether in Kenya or in England, and would
certainly prejudice those who conducted their own
transfers and were unaware of what to inspect. This
aspect is discussed in the next chapter.
199 Michael Joseph, op. cit., pp. 291,292.
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Chapter Six
CUSTOMARY RIGHTS AND THE REGISTERED LAND ACT 1963 
1.	 Introduction
The challenge that has faced the land adjudication
teams is to ensure that all customary rights, whether
those amounting to ownership of land or lesser rights
in land, are identified and recorded on the
adjudication register. However, as was shown in
Chapter Three, the adjudication teams, particularly
those in the Central Province, failed to record many
lesser or subordinate customary rights, and including
the rights of those claiming to own land. Several
reasons were responsible; individuals claiming those
rights were not present during land adjudication to
ensure the registration of these claims on the
adjudication register because of the civil war of the
1950's; the adjudication teams were not diligent enough
when undertaking the adjudication process, with the
inevitable consequence that some rights were missed
out; many subordinate rights were unrecorded because
there was a preoccupation with recording land ownership
claims; moreover, the teams themselves were unable to
categorise some of the customary rights into rights
recognised by the Registered Land Act 1963.
In view of the fact that many of these customary
rights were not recorded onto the adjudication register
and hence not transferred onto the register under the
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Registered Land Act 1963, the question that arises is
this: are customary rights that are not protected on
the adjudication register extinguished when land is
brought onto the register, or do they survive
registration even though they may be unprotected? This
issue is an important one because many individuals are
still asserting customary rights against registered
proprietors many years after land adjudication is
complete, claiming that these rights are still binding
on these proprietors; consequently many have brought
these cases before the courts. However, this issue has
divided the courts.
One line of thought promoted in this chapter is
that certain customary rights, despite being
unregistered, are capable of binding the registered
proprietor of land. To be binding however it has been
held that such rights have to arise behind an implied
trust. Two types of implied trusts have emerged: the
resulting and the customary trust. Both these trusts
have been developed by the courts in an attempt to
protect those who failed to have their rights
registered during land adjudication.
The contrasting line of thought was that initially
expressed °biter in the High Court decision in Obiero 
v. Opiyol and later followed in Esiroyo v. Esiroyo,2
where it was held that customary rights are
1	 [1972] E.A. 227.
2	 [1973] E.A. 388.
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extinguished when land is brought onto the register.
In the words of Bennett J. in Obiero v. Opiyo:
"Had the legislature intended that the rights
of a registered proprietor were to be subject
to the rights of any person under customary
law, nothing cquld have been easier than for
it to say so."'
One researcher, Simon Coldham, supports this view and
advanced an argument to lend credence to it, which can
be summarised as follows: 4 section 40(f) of the Land
Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance 1959 had
expressly included a "right of occupation under native
law and custom" as an overriding interest. Clearly
under that statute, customary rights were not
extinguished on registration. However, this provision
was not repeated in the Registered Land Act 1963 which
replaced the 1959 Ordinance. Instead section 11(3) of
the 1963 Act provides that a right of occupation under
African customary law recorded in the adjudication
register is deemed to be a tenancy from year to year,
such right falling under section 30(d) of the 1963 Act
as an overriding interest. The inference that Coldham
draws is that customary rights that are not recorded on
the adjudication register - and therefore would not be
3	 [1972] E.A. 277, at p. 228.
4	 Simon Coldham, The Effect of Registration of Title
Upon Customary Land Rights in Kenya [1978] J.A.L. 91 at
p. 106. See also Simon Coldham Registration of Title
to Land in the Former Special Areas of Kenya,
unpublished Ph.D thesis, London University, 1977, p.
196.
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recorded onto the register under the 1963 Act - are
extinguished.5
One right in particular has emerged to be of
importance in this debate: the right to receive a share
of land under customary law. The purpose of this
chapter is to show that this customary right has been
accepted as capable of binding registered proprietors
of land despite the fact that it may be unregistered,
and how the device of the resulting and the customary
trust has been used to protect such a right.
It will be further shown that customary tenancies,
despite being unregistered, are capable of subsisting
under the Registered Land Act 1963, but under the new
clothes of the rights created by the Act. Two
important rights are recognised by the Act: the
periodic tenancy and the licence. For a customary
tenant to assert that his right is not extinguished he
would have to show that his customary tenancy is either
capable of subsisting as a periodic tenancy or licence
because it has the elements of one of these rights. In
this way his right is not extinguished but is
transformed into a new right recognised by the Act. It
will be shown that these rights may be protected either
by the entry of a caution, or may even subsist as
overriding interests under the Registered Land Act
1963.
5	 Ibid.
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In England the protection of customary rights is
not an issue that has generated the type of debate that
has emerged in Kenya. Cases concerning customary
rights have rarely come before the courts particularly
in this century with regard to registered land.
Nevertheless, the Land Registration Act 1925 makes
provision for such rights to subsist as overriding
interests.6
In discussing the use of the caution and other
restraints on disposition such as the restriction and
inhibition, provided for in the Registered Land Act
1963, their effect is compared with the effect of
cautions and other restraints on dispositions entered
under the Land Registration Act 1925. Of significance
too is the question of overriding interests; the
equivalent of section 30(g) of the Registered Land Act
1963 is section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act
1925, both which protect the rights of those in actual
occupation. It will be shown that a customary right
may be capable of subsisting as an overriding interest
under section 30(g) of the Registered Land Act 1963.
In considering the deficiencies of the provisions of
the Registered Land Act 1963 in this area, regard is
made to the remedies that can be made to improve the
system.
6	 S. 70(1)(a).
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II. Methods of Protection
A.	 Cautions
The method of systematic adjudication and
registration of land in Kenya means that nobody can
prevent the registration of any land within an
adjudication area. 7 For this reason there is no
provision made for the entry of cautions against first
registration. In contrast, provision is made for the
entry of a caution against first registration under the
Land Registration Act 1925 with respect to land that is
unregistered. 8 This means that in the ad hoc system of
land registration in England and Wales, anyone with an
interest in land can prevent the registration of such
land, albeit temporarily, with the entry of a caution.
However the absence of provisions enabling the entry of
a caution against first registration under the
Registered Land Act 1963 means that those who
discovered that their rights have not been recorded in
the adjudication register in the interval between the
completion of that register and the transfer of the
recorded rights in that register to the register under
the Registered Land Act 1963 cannot prevent the
registration of that land.
Nevertheless, the Registered Land Act 1963 makes
provision for a person to enter a caution against
7	 See Chapter Three, supra.
8	 S. 55(1).
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dealings. Section 131(2) of the Act provides that a
caution may either:
"a) forbid the registration of dispositions
and the making of entries altogether; or
b) forbid the registration of dispositions
and the making of entries to the extent
therein expressed.
Section 54(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925 merely
states that a person may lodge a caution,
u ... to the effect that no dealing with such
land or charge on the part of the proprietor
is to be registered until notice has been
served on the cautioner."
Hence the entry of cautions under both Acts has the
effect of preventing a registered proprietor from
registering any dealings with his land. The difference
is that under the Registered Land Act 1963, a caution
of the section 131(2)(b) variety may be used to prevent
the registration of dispositions to a limited extent.
For example a caution may be expressed to prevent the
registration of a transfer of the land if the purchase
money is paid to less than a certain number of co-
owners, whether two, three or four. In this way, the
entry of such a caution would be similar to the effect
of a restriction which can be entered to prevent
purchase moneys being advanced to less than a certain
number of people.9
However, the power of the cautioner in preventing
dealings with the registered land is governed by the
extent to which he can continue to make successful
9	 Land Registt!tion Act 1925, S. 58(3); c.f.
Registered Land Act 1963, ss. 136(1),(2).
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objections to the removal of the caution. 1° Under the
Registered Land Act 1963 the cautioner has a 30 day
period within which to object to the removal of the
caution, 11 compared with the 14 day period under the
Land Registration Act 1925.12
A caution entered under section 131(1) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 is capable of protecting
either one of the customary rights mentioned earlier.
Two heads under this subsection are of importance here;
section 131(1) provides that any person who:
"a) claims the right, whether contractual or
otherwise to obtain an interest in any land,
lease or charge, that is to say, some defined
interest capable of creation by an instrument
registrable under this Act: or
b)	 is entitled to a licence
c)
1.	 Section 131(1)(a)
Under this subsection, a person with the benefit
of a contract to grant an interest in land is entitled
to lodge a caution. For example, a contract to grant
an easement, profit or restrictive agreement, such
interests being capable of created by forms registrable
10 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 133(2); Land
Registration Act 1925, s. 55(1).
11 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 133(2)(a); Practice
Instruction: Removal of Cautions Under Section 133 of
the Registered Land Act Cap.300 (K.D.L.R. Admin. File)
from Chief Land Registrar to all Land Registrars.
12	 Land Registration Act 1925, ss. 55(1); Land
Registration Rules 1925, r. 218.
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under the Act 13 would be capable of being protected by
a caution.
However, the use of the term 'otherwise' in this
subsection would indicate that a claim to obtain the
right to an interest in land can arise by means other
than by contract. The Chief Land Registrar indicated
in a Practice Instruction that interests which arise
behind a resulting trust qualify for protection by the
entry of a caution under section 131(1)(a) of the 1963
Act14 . Such an interest would include the customary
right to receive a share of land. This issue is
considered below.
a	 Rights Arising Under a Resulting Trust
The Chief Land Registrar recognised that during
land adjudication family land was often given to one
member of the family "on the understanding that he
holds it on trust for himself and his other brothers"15
The Registrar clearly envisaged the type of trust
recognised in English law when land is voluntarily
conveyed in the name of another. 16 This type of
arrangement has sparked off a significant amount of
13 For the registration of these interests, see
Registered Land Act 1963, ss. 94, 95, 96.
14 Practice Instruction, Cautions : A Beneficiaries 
Interest, Ref. No. 79696/111/173.
15 Practice Instruction, Cautions : A Beneficiaries 
Interest, op. cit.
16	 See Hodgson v. Marks [1971] Ch. 892. For a
see Chapter Seven, infra.further discussion,
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caselaw, because in many of these arrangements the
person who received the land which was then registered
in his name would subsequently deny his undertaking to
hold the land on trust for the family members and, in
some cases, would seek to evict his own family members
from the land by virtue of the fact that their
interests were not registered.17
One problem is definition; in the situation
described above, the courts have described the type of
trust they have implied as a 'family trust' 18 while
other commentators have described it as a 'customary
trust' 19
However, the situation the Registrar envisaged was
partly brought about by the provisions of section
101(4) of the Registered Land Act which does not permit
the registration of more than five persons as
proprietors. 20 As African families or clans as land
holding units tended to be large, it was often mutually
17 See for example Gatimu Kinguru v. Muva Gathangi 
(1976) Kenya L.R. 253; Muthuita v. Muthuita, Civil
Appeal No. 12 of 1982 (unreported); Ngugi Miru v. 
Kiringi Miru, Nation Law Reports, 30 December 1985;
Kinyuru Matu v. Mwangi Matu, Civil Appeal No. 122 of
1985 (unreported).
18 John Kiruga v. Mugecha Kiruga, Civil Appeal No. 52
of 1985 (unreported), per Apaloo J.A.
19 Simon Coldham, Registration of Title to Land in
the Former Special Areas of Kenya, Unpublished Ph.D
Thesis, London 1977, p. 186. P.L. Onalo, Land Law and
Conveyancing in Kenya, (Nairobi 1986), p. 196 et. seq.
This type of trust is discussed below.
20 This section was contained in section 66 of the
Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance 1959, the
predecessor of the 1963 Act.
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agreed among them that one of their number should have
the land registered in his name on behalf of the family
or clan. This is illustrated in the case of Alan Kiama 
v. Ndia Mathunya. 21 There, the members of a large clan
collectively owned a sizeable piece of land. Due to
the upheaval caused by the Mau Mau war some clan
members were put in detention. It was therefore felt
that the land should be sub-divided among the clan
members when things cooled down. In the meantime, they
nominated one of their number, one Karuru Kiragu, to be
registered as proprietor. However, Kiragu later sold
the land to the plaintiff in exchange for another plot
of land. The plaintiff brought an action against the
clan members who were still occupying the land. It was
held that a resulting trust arose in favour of the clan
because of the "relationship of the parties" and the
circumstances of the case, the clan having voluntarily
conveyed the land to Kiragu. The court went on to hold
that the clan members, having a equitable interest
under the trust, had overriding interests under section
30(g) of the Registered Land Act 1963 binding on the
plaintiff because they were in actual occupation of the
land.
The clan members therefore, having the right to
have the land subdivided among themselves, could have
entered a caution under section 131(1)(a) of the
21 Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1978 (unreported); noted in
[1983] J.A.L. 62.
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Registered Land Act 1963 by virtue of being
beneficiaries under the resulting trust.22
b	 Rights Arising Under a Customary Trust
This type of trust is peculiar to Kenya, implied
by the courts as a result of the influence of customary
law23 combined with the inability of the courts to
rectify the register 24 to give effects to the
unprotected rights of individuals.
In many African societies, it was the custom for
the eldest son to distribute land belonging to the
family to the family members, particularly the male
issue. 25 This happened when the family head died
intestate, the eldest son having been appointed under
customary law. The eldest son was therefore viewed as
the head of the extended family. With the outset of
land registration, many of these had themselves
registered as proprietors of the land, often by mutual
agreement with their brothers, or by virtue of
customary law, particularly if the brothers were not
22 See Practice Instruction: Cautions : A
Beneficiaries Interest, op. cit.
23 The Chief Land Registrar probably had this trust
in mind which he classified as a resulting trust. See
Practice Instruction, op. cit.
24 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 143(1). See further
Chapter Eight, infra.
25 See generally, E. Cotran, Restatement of African
Law, Kenya, Vol. II : The Law of Succession, (London
1969).
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present. 26 Often, the rights of the other family
members were not recorded, although they still
continued to occupy the land.
Problems, however, began to occur when disputes
arose several years later. This happened when the
registered proprietor, probably due to a family quarrel
decided to evict his brothers from the land they were
occupying on the basis that their rights were
unregistered and he, as first registered proprietor,
took free from them by virtue of section 28 of the
Registered Land Act 1963 and, in any event, as first
registered proprietor, the register could not be
rectified to take those rights into account because of
section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963.
In these circumstances, the courts, unable to have
the register rectified, 27 began to imply a trust. For
example in Muguthu v Muguth1128 the plaintiff was the
younger brother of the defendant. When land
registration took place the defendant had the family
land registered in his name. The plaintiff
subsequently sought a court order declaring that the
defendant was a trustee, holding the land for the
benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant in equal
26 During the Mau Mau Civil War many family members
were put in detention if they were found to have been
in sympathy with the Mau Mau. See for example Gatimu
Kinguru v. Muya Gathanqi (1976) Kenya L.R. 253.
27 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 143(1); see further
Chapter Eight, infra.
28	 [1971] K.H.C.D. 16.
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shares. The court granted such a declaration on the
basis that the defendant "was registered as owner as
the eldest son of the family in accordance with Kikuyu
custom which has the notion of trust inherent in it."
It was not necessary for the plaintiff to have been
registered "as trustee" within section 126(1) of the
1963 Act. The defendant's right to receive a share of
the land was binding on the defendant.
Muguthu was followed in Gatimu Kinguru v. Muya 
Gathancri. 29 In that case the plaintiff and the
defendant were brothers. The plaintiff, who was
registered as proprietor of a plot of land claimed that
the defendant was a persistent trespasser having
erected a temporary house and cultivated on the land.
Accordingly, the plaintiff sought a perpetual
injunction restraining the defendant from trespassing
on the land. The defendant claimed that he and the
plaintiff were entitled to inherit the land in equal
shares, but that while the defendant was in detention
during the Mau Mau Civil war, the plaintiff was
registered as proprietor. Hence he held the land on
trust for the defendant and himself in equal shares.
The court held, inter alia, that although the
plaintiff was not registered "as trustee" within
section 126(1) of the 1963 Act, he still held the land
on trust for himself and the defendant in equal shares
29	 (1976) Kenya L.R. 253.
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and, accordingly, the defendant was entitled to live on
the land."
Gathangi was applied in the Court of Appeal
decision in Muthuita v Muthuita. 31 The parties in this
case were all members of one family. The respondent
was the eldest son in the family who, after the death
of his father, had the land registered in his name with
the concurrence of the appellants who were his mother
and two younger brothers. The respondent claimed that
the land was his, having been registered as sole
proprietor. The appellants, who had initiated the
action, claimed that the respondent held the land on
trust on their behalf since he had been registered as
the eldest son in accordance with Kikuyu customary law.
The Court of Appeal held that the respondent held the
land on trust even though he was not registered "as
trustee". Accordingly, the rights of the appellant to
have the land subdivided amongst them were binding on
the respondent.
The principle in Muguthu and Gathangi was applied
in another Court of Appeal decision, Ngugi Miru v. 
Kiringu Miru. 32 In that case both the appellant and
respondent were brothers. The appellant claimed that
they were both entitled to inherit a plot of land that
belonged to their deceased father. During land
30 See further, Chapters Seven and Eight, infra.
31 Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1982 (unreported).
32 Nation Law Reports, 30 December, 1985.
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adjudication, the land was registered in the name of
the respondent. The appellant sought a declaration
that the respondent held the land on trust for himself
and the appellant in equal shares. The court accepted
that the respondent held the land on trust and ordered
that the land be sub-divided in equal shares.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court of
Appeal in Kinyuru Matu v Mwangi Matu. 33 Again, the
parties were members of the same family. The land was
registered in the name of the appellant, who was the
elder brother of the respondents. The appellant
claimed that he held the land as sole proprietor, to
the exclusion of his brothers whose rights were
unregistered. The court however held that the
appellant held the land on trust for himself and his
brothers, and that the rights of the latter were
binding on him notwithstanding that they were
unprotected on the register. Several factors are
present in these cases.
1. In every case, with the exception of Alan Kiama v
Ndiya Mathunya, 34
 the proprietor was a first
registered proprietor who, on the basis of section
28 of the Registered Land Act 1963 argued that the
rights of the claimants were not binding on him
because they were unprotected.
33	 Civil Appeal No. 122 of 1985 (unreported).
34	 Op. cit.
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2.	 Notwithstanding this argument, the courts implied
a trust which explicitly recognised the customary
practice of having land vested in one person with
the responsibility of distributing that land to
members of his family.
3. The rights asserted by the claimants, who all
happened to be family members, in all cases were
the right to have a share of the registered land
by virtue of the customary law on inheritance.
4. These rights were binding on the registered
proprietor by virtue of section 126(3) of the
Registered Land Act 1963.
These cases establish an important principle; that
the customary right to have an inheritance share in
land is an interest in land that survives registration
and is capable of binding the registered proprietor,
despite the right remaining unregistered. It follows
that a person can protect this right by the entry of a
caution under section 131(1)(a) of the Registered Land
Act 1963. 35
It is notable that the elements running through
the cases illustrating the customary trust are similar
to the elements in the resulting trust envisaged by the
Chief Land Registrar. In both instances, there either
existed a mutual agreement that the land be registered
in the name of the eldest son, or the eldest son
35 This would amount to a beneficiary's interest as
defined by the Chief Land Registrar - Practice
Instruction, Cautions : A Beneficiary's Interest, Ref.
No. 79696/111/173.
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registers himself in recognition of customary practice.
In reality there may be no difference between the
resulting and the customary trust and they are, more or
less, examples of one genre, the implied trust. In
practice, placing these trusts in two different
categories may not serve any practical purpose.
Lord Diplock in Gissing v. Gissing36 took an
analogous view with respect to resulting implied or
constructive trusts in English law in so far as they
apply to disputes over the matrimonial home. As far as
he was concerned, there was no need to distinguish
between those three classes of trusts.37
The view that there is no need to categorise these
trusts was echoed in Lloyds Bank v. Rosset 38 where Lord
Bridge said that he did not see any need to create nice
legal distinctions between the trusts. 39 It would
appear that while textbook writers may favour
conceptual tidiness whereby the circumstances giving
rise to a particular trust are categorised, the judges
see no practical benefit of pigeon holing situations to
fit a label."
36	 [1971] A.C. 886 at p. 905.
37	 Ibid.
38	 [1990] 2 W.L.R. 867.
39	 Ibid., at p. 876.
40 Traditional texts have conventionally sought to
distinguish implied, resulting or constructive trusts -
see for example Snell's Principles of Equity, 28th ed.
by P.V. Baker and P. St. J. Langan, (London 1982), Part
II Ch 4 & 5. The challenge facing authors of new
editions may be whether to abandon the traditional
classification of these trusts where the family home is
366
One may therefore conclude that customary trusts
of family land in Kenya and trusts of the family home
in England are both species of implied trusts.
The distinction is that in Kenya, the courts look
at whether the person claiming a beneficial interest in
the land formerly under customary law has a customary
right to receive a share of that land; at times there
may exist an agreement or understanding between the
parties to this effect. 41 Usually, in finding out what
the customary law position is, the court is able to
take judicial notice of the custom without further
proof "as for instance in cases where the particular
customary law has been the subject of a previous
judicial decision or where the customary law is set out
in a book or document of reference •.•H42 However, the
normal practice in court is for the party relying on
concerned and simply call them trusts of the family
home - see for example Hanbury & Maudsley, Modern
Equity 13th ed. by Jill E. Martin, (London 1989),
Chapter 11. See also the argument by Professor David
Hayton, Equitable Rights of Cohabitees, [1990] Cony.
370, that in reality there is no distinction between
'common intention' constructive trusts and proprietary
estoppel. See also Chapter Seven, infra.
41 See for example Muthuita v Muthuita, Civil Appeal
No. 12 of 1982, unreported.
42	 Kimani v. Gikanga [1965] E.A. 735 at p. 738, per
Duffus J.A. See also Evidence Act 1963, ss 60(1)(a),
(2). A leading treatise frequently resorted to by the
courts to ascertain the customary law of any tribe in
Kenya is E. Cotran, Restatement of African Law, Kenya, 
Vol.II : The Law of Succession, (London 1969).
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customary law to call witnesses who testify as to what
the relevant customary law is.43
In England, the question is whether there exists
an agreement or understanding that the property is to
be shared beneficially; in default of such agreement
then is there a common intention - inferred from the
conduct of the parties such as the payment of direct
contributions to the purchase price - that the property
be shared beneficially. 44 This approach, expressed by
Lord Bridge in Lloyds Bank v. Rosset 45 is a return to
the orthodoxy in Gissing v. Gissing 48 and moves away
from the approach pioneered by Lord Denning in the
Court of Appeal who developed the 'constructive trust
of a new model' 47 which was imposed whenever 'justice
and good conscience' required it.48
However, it has been suggested that the approach
of the Kenyan courts towards the customary trust is
identical to that taken by Lord Denning above; in
effect that the customary trust is imposed where
43 Kimani v Gikanga, supra, at p. 738. Such
witnesses will usually be elders or respected wise men
from the community.
44	 Lloyds Bank v. Rosset [1990] 2 W.L.R. 867, at p.
877. Grant v. Edwards [1986] Ch. 638; Gissing v. 
Gissing [1971] A.C. 886.
45	 Op. cit.
46	 Op. cit.
47	 Eves v. Eves [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1338, at p. 1341.
48	 Hussey v Palmer [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1286, at p. 1289.
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justice and good conscience requires it. 49 With
respect, this view has been outmoded by the principles
which have been fashioned by the courts through
caselaw. A body of principles is now well established,
for the customary trust to be inferred. 50 No trust is
inferred if a case falls outside these principles.51
Hence it cannot be said that the customary trust is
imposed where justice and good conscience requires it.
Nevertheless, the customary trust approach is
somewhat reminiscent of the approach taken by Dillon J
in the English case of Lyus v. Prowsa Developments.52
There, a bank sold registered land to the defendants
with the express stipulation that the sale was subject
to a contract for the benefit of the plaintiff. It was
held that the plaintiff was entitled to an order for
specific performance against the defendants despite the
fact that the contract was not protected on the
register. A constructive trust in favour of the
plaintiff was imposed upon the defendants because they
had reneged "on a positive stipulation in favour of the
49 Simon Coldham, The Effect of Registration of Title
Upon Customary Land Rights in Kenya, [1978] J.A.L. 91
at p. 107; Registration of Title to Land in the Former
Special Areas of Kenya, Unpublished Ph.D thesis,
University of London 1977, p. 182.
50 See above. This is considered further in Chapter
Seven, infra.
51 See for example, John Kiruga v. Mugecha Kiruga,
op. cit.
52	 [1982] 2 All E.R. 953. For criticism of this case
see n. 115, infra.
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plaintiffs." 53 In a similar fashion, the proprietor of
land, in the Kenyan cases, has had the customary trust
imposed upon him because in some instance, he has
reneged on a positive stipulation that he is to hold
the land on behalf of his family members.
However, the Court of Appeal decision in Elizabeth
Waniohi v. Official Receiver (Continental Credit 
Finance Ltd) 54 casts doubt on all the customary trust
cases. In each case, beginning with Muguthu v. 
Muguthu55 the courts justified the validity of the
customary trust on the basis of section 126 of the
Registered Land Act 1963. The unregistered rights of
the claimants arising under the customary trust were
held binding on the registered proprietor by virtue of
section 126(3). However, section 126(3) provides that
the registered proprietor is subject to any
unregistered liabilities rights or interests to which
the land is subject "by virtue of the instrument
creating the trust" (italics mine). Section 126(3)
therefore envisages a trust arising expressly, created
by a written document. In Wan'ohi the Court of Appeal
was of this view. They said,56
"The Registered Land Act itself did not omit
to regulate the interest in land acquired by
53	 Ibid. at p. 962.
54 The Nairobi Law Monthly, No. 14, February 1989, p.
43.
55	 [1971] K.H.C.D. 16.
5$ The Nairobi Law Monthly, February 1989, 42 at p.
43.
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fiduciaries. But the regulatory provisions
[i.e. s.126] apply only when the fiduciary
relationship arose from a written instrument"
(Italics mine).
Clearly, in the opinion of the court, section 126 of
the Registered Land Act 1963 governs express trusts
rather than implied trusts, In all the cases
establishing the customary trust, based on section 126,
none of the trusts were created expressly but, rather,
were implied. 57 Wan'ohi would therefore be
inconsistent with all these cases, thereby casting
doubt on the decisions. Strictly speaking, Wan'ohi is
correct to state that section 126(3) is confined to
express trusts. However, the Court of Appeal in
Wan'ohi did not overrule or even attempt to discuss any
or all of these cases, many of them Court of Appeal
decisions, which have decided otherwise.
A situation of uncertainty therefore exists. Have
the courts in the customary trust cases conveniently
ignored the real effect of section 126(3) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 or do they recognise its
effect but have nevertheless gone on to fill what they
perceive is a legislative gap? It would appear that
the latter view may represent the true position and was
even alluded to in Muguthu v. Muquthu 58 and repeated in
57 Section 126(3) of the Registered Land Act 1963 is
in contrast with section 74 of the Land Registration
Act 1925 which provides that no person dealing with
registered land "shall be affected with notice of a
trust express implied or constructive." Clearly,
section 74 is not confined to express trusts unlike
section 126(3) of the 1963 Act which is.
58	 [1971] K.H.C.D. 16.
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Gatimu Kinguru V. Muva Gathangi' 59 It is clear that
the position needs to be clarified. Parliament could
amend section 126(3) to provide clearly that a
proprietor holding the land under a trust, whether
express or implied, is subject to the unregistered
rights and interest under the trust.
c.	 Periodic Tenancies
These tenancies are capable of protection by the
entry of a caution under s.131(1) (a) 60 of the 1963 Act.
Section 46 of the same outlines the circumstances
giving rise to a periodic tenancy. It is possible for
a customary tenancy to be capable of protection by the
entry of a caution if it falls within section 46(1)(b).
That subsection provides:
"where the proprietor of land permits the
exclusive occupation of the land or any part
thereof by any other person at a rent but
without any agreement in writing, that
occupation shall be deemed to constitute a
periodic tenancy;"
Many of the customary tenancies such as the
Muthami, for example, were created orally. However,
where these tenancies are not protected on the
register, because of having been overlooked during
adjudication, it is submitted that they can continue to
subsist, but in the new clothes of the periodic tenancy
only, and only if the tenant can show:
i) he is in exclusive occupation, and
59	 (1976) Kenya L.R. 253 at 263.60	 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 46(2).
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ii) he pays rent.
The question of what amounts to exclusive
occupation was considered in Wainaina v. Murai. 61 The
plaintiff was permitted by the registered proprietor of
certain land to build and cultivate on the land. The
plaintiff built a house and planted various crops on
it, and was even allowed to borrow money on the
security of the land. The proprietor later died and
the plaintiff sought an order to be registered as
proprietor in the place of the deceased. An issue the
court had to consider was whether the plaintiff was
either a donee, licensee or tenant at will.
It was held that the plaintiff was in exclusive
occupation of the land and, accordingly, a tenancy at
will was presumed. In the words of Simpson J.,
II ... the plaintiff was allowed to build a
house on the land, to improve it, to
cultivate permanent crops and to bury his
mother on the land. [The deceased] assisted
him to borrow money on the land without
restriction as to the amount. fl62
These factors were sufficient to indicate a
tenancy at will rather than a licence.63
It is significant here that the plaintiff paid no
rent. If rent had been paid, it is probable that the
61	 (1976) Kenya L.R. 227.
62	 Ibid., at p. 231.
63 The decision in E.A. Power & Lighting v. A.G.
(1978) Kenya L.R. 217, is inconsistent with Wainaina v. 
Murai. In the former the court, without referring to
Wainaina, held that a tenancy at will can only exist in
Kenya when it results from an express agreement to
create such a tenancy, and that there is no reason to
imply one in Kenya.
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court would have presumed a periodic tenancy, depending
on the frequency of rent payments. Nevertheless, this
case is important for the fact that the court accepted
that the right of the plaintiff was equivalent to that
of a muhoi in Kikuyu customary law, and that this right
survived registration but re-emerged as a tenancy at
will, the right holder successfully having established
exclusive occupation.
Likewise, if a plaintiff is able to establish that
he is in 'exclusive occupation' and continues to pay
rent to the registered proprietor, then he can protect
that interest by entering a caution under section
131(1)(a) of the Registered Land Act 1963.
At English law, 'exclusive possession' or
'exclusive occupation' is a hallmark distinguishing a
lease from a licence." This distinction is vital
because the lease comes under the protection of the
Rent Acts while a licence does not. 65 Moreover, in the
context of registered land, a lease or tenancy is an
64 The phrases 'exclusive possession' and 'exclusive
occupation' often tend to be used synonymously by the
courts in the sphere of landlord and tenant law - see
for example, Heslop v. Burns [1974] 3 All E.R. 406;
A.G. Securities v. Vaughan [1988] 3 W.L.R. 1205. The
court in Wainaina v. Murai (1976) Kenya L.R. 227, did
not view the terms as mutually exclusive. However, it
has been pointed out that the two terms are
distinguishable because 'exclusive occuption' often
characterises many licences; hence 'exclusive
possession' is indicative of a true tenancy, the test
being whether the landlord ertains 'overall control' or
not - Kevin Gray, Elements of Land Law, (London 1987),
p. 440.
65 For a further discussion, see Jill E. Martin,
Security of Tenure Under the Rent Act, (London 1986).
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interest in land and therefore falls within the
definition of a 'minor interest' under the Land
Registration Act 1925 66 which is capable of protection
on the register, or is capable of subsisting as an
overriding interest within section 70(1)(g) of the same
if the tenant is in actual occupation; a licence on the
other hand would not be capable of such protection.67
In the context of the Registered Land Act 1963,
the position is distinct: both periodic tenancies and
licences are capable of protection by the entry of a
caution under the Act. The position regarding licences
is considered in the next section.
2.	 Section 131(1)(b)
Under this subsection, a licence is capable of
protection by the entry of a caution on the register.
A licence is defined in section 3 of the Registered
Land Act 1963 to mean,
11 ... a permission given by the proprietor of
land or a lease which allows the licensee to
do some act in relation to the land or the
land comprised in the lease which would
otherwise be a trespass ..."
Hence, if a person claiming the right to a
customary tenancy that was not protected on the
adjudication register68 during land adjudication fails
to show that he had exclusive occupation of the land
66	 S. 3(xv).
67 But see the discussion in the next section, infra.
68 Land Adjudication Act 1963, s. 28; Registered Land
Act 1963, s. 11(2A).
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and paid rent, his next line of defence to show that he
has a licence as defined in the Act which he can
protect by the entry of a caution. In John Kiruga v. 
Mugecha Kiruga 69 the plaintiff claimed to have the
customary right to receive an equal share of land
registered in the name of his brother, the second
defendant, and subsequently sold to the first
defendant. However, it was held that in this instance,
the second defendant had merely given him permission to
stay on his land and cultivate a portion as a
humanitarian gesture because the plaintiff had already
sold his own piece of land. Accordingly, the plaintiff
was a mere licensee and therefore did not have an
overriding interest under section 30(g) of the 1963
Act, even though he was in actual occupation.
However, the court did not consider the effect of
a licence which is not protected by a caution under
section 131(1)(b) of the 1963 Act. Section 100(2) of
the Registered Land Act 1963 provides:
"A licence relating to the use or enjoyment
of land is ineffective against a bona fide
purchaser for valuable consideration unless
the licensee has protected his interest by
lodging a caution under that section [i.e.
section 131(1)(b)].
Therefore, according to section 100(2) a licence not
protected by the entry of a caution is still capable of
subsisting against a purchaser with male fides or a
volunteer. The court in Kiruga failed to consider
whether the first defendant was a bona fide purchaser
69 Civil Appeal No. 52 of 1985 (unreported).
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for value; if he was not then the plaintiff's
unprotected license would have been binding on him.
When section 3 defining the licence is juxtaposed
with section 100(2) and 131(1)(b) of the Registered
Land Act 1963, there appears to be conflict between
them. While section 3 essentially defines the license
as a personal interest, only enforceable between
licensor and licensee, sections 100(2) and 131(1)(b)
would appear to elevate it into an interest in land.
Protection of a license by a caution under section
131(1)(b) would make it binding on all third parties
unless the caution was removed. Moreover, an
unprotected licence would still be capable of binding a
purchaser tainted with mala ties or a volunteer.
Does this mean that a licence in Kenyan registered
land law is an interest in land? The Court of Appeal
in John Kiruga v. Mugecha Kiruga70 viewed the licence
as a mere personal interest and not an interest in
land, although this point was not argued before the
court. Undoubtedly, the protection of a licence by the
entry of a caution under the 1963 Act raises the status
of the licence over and above what has been the
conventional definition of a licence in English law71
and summarised in section 3 of the Registered Land Act
1963. Effectively, the licence is capable of binding
70	 Op. cit.
71	 See Thomas v. Sorrell (1673) Vaug. 330; King v.
David Allen & Sons (Billposting Ltd) [1916] 2 A.C. 54;
Clore v. Theatrical Properties Ltd [1936] 3 All E.R.
483.
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third parties and, notwithstanding its definition in
section 3, it may be viewed as a right in rem. This
forms an important distinction between the position
under the Registered Land Act 1963 and English law.
Since licences are not viewed as interests in land in
England, they do not fall within the definition of
minor interests under section 3(xv) of the Land
Registration Act 1925 and, therefore, are not capable
of protection by a caution, notice, restriction or
inhibition under the 1925 Act. Neither would a licence
constitute an overriding interest under section
70(1)(g) of the same.
Nevertheless, efforts have been made, notably by
Lord Denning, to establish the contractual licence as
an interest in land, 72 contrary to established cases.73
However, the Court of Appeal in Ashburn Anstalt v
Arnold74 rejected this notion, albeit obiter, and
instead held that a licence could give rise to a
constructive trust only if the conscience of the third
party was affected. The court gave examples such as
Binions v. Evans 75 where the purchaser bought expressly
subject to the licence and therefore at a reduced
price, and Lyus v. Prowsa Developments 76 where the
72	 Errington v Errington & Woods [1952] 1 K.B. 290;
Binions v Evans[].972] Ch. 359; D.H.N. Food Distributors 
Ltd v. Tower Hamlets L.B.C. [1976] 1 W.L.R. 852.
73	 See n. 71, supra.
74	 [1988] 2 W.L.R. 706.
75	 [1972] Ch. 359.
76	 [1982] 2 All E.R. 953.
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plaintiff purchaser had given an express assurance that
he would take care of the interest. 77 Such a licence
could be protected by a caution under section 54 of the
Land Registration Act 1925, or can subsist as an
overriding interest under section 70(1)(g) of the same
if the licensee is in actual occupation.
Estoppel licences are a second category which have
been accepted as interests in land in England. These
arise where one party knowingly encourages another to
act, or acquiesces in the others actions to his
detriment and infringement of the former's rights.78
So in Inwards v. Baker" a son who built a bungalow on
his father's land at his own expense having been
encouraged to do so by the father was held to have a
licence binding on the trustees for sale." It has
been argued that an estoppel licence may be capable of
protection as a minor interest by the entry of a
caution under the Land Registration Act 1925. 81 In
reality it would be difficult to protect an estoppel
licence by the entry of a caution because those with
77	 [1988] 2 W.L.R. 706 at pp. 727, 728, per Fox L.J.
78 Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129; Willmot
v Barber (1880) 15 Ch.D. 96; Crabb v. Arun D.C. [1976]
Ch. 179.
79	 [1965] 2 Q.B. 29.
80	 See also Greaseley v. Cooke [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1306;
Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co. 
Ltd. [1981] 2 W.L.R. 576.
81 Maudsley and Burn, Land Law, Cases and Materials,
5th ed., by E.H. Burn, (London 1986), p. 511.
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such an interest would not be aware of the need to
protect it on the register. The estoppel interest is a
defensive measure raised in response to an attempt by
the proprietor of land to suit the holder of the
interest from the land. An effectual protection is if
it subsists as an overriding interest with section
70(1)(g) of the 1925 Act.82
In Kenya, the courts have accepted estoppel
licences as interests capable of binding third
parties. 83 Hence such interests would be capable of
subsisting as overriding interests under section 30(g)
of the Registered Land Act 1963. They would also be
capable of protection by the entry of a caution under
section 131(1)(b) of the Registered Land Act 1963;
however, the practical problem mentioned above, of
protecting the estoppel licence with a caution would
mean that its protection effectively lies in section
30(g) of the Registered Land Act 1963, as an overriding
interest.
Hence, section 131(1)(b) of the 1963 Act is of
advantage to licence holders in Kenya since they can
protect them on the register, unlike their counterparts
in England whose licences are not capable of binding
third parties, and as a result, are not capable of
protection on the register, unless they can show that
82	 Ibid, p. 859.
83 Century Automobiles v. Hutchings Biemar
[1965] E.A. 304, where the court applied the
in Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 129.
Commissioner of Lands v. Hussein [1968] E.A.
Ltd.
principle
See also
585.
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the licence gave rise to a constructive trust or arose
by estoppel.
While it would appear unlikely that many people in
Kenya would be aware of the need to protect their
interests by lodging a caution, it is suprising how
many people are indeed aware of the need to do so in
reality. In the Kiambu District Land Registry, for
example, 697 cautions were registered between 1988 and
1989. 84 When one considers that the population is
rural and with little access to legal advice, this
represents a significantly high number. 85 It was
observed from perusal of the Kiambu registers that
some of these cautions actually protected the rights of
beneficiaries under what would have been inferred by
the courts as a customary trust; an example was the
entry of cautions by family members where the land was
registered in the name of one of their number.
B.	 Restrictions and Inhibitions
When compared with the numbers of cautions entered
on the register under the Registered Land Act 1963, the
numbers of restrictions and inhibitions entered are
negligible. Between 1988 and 1989 for example, only 10
restrictions were entered on the register in the Kiambu
District Land Registry, while in the same period, only
2 inhibitions were made.
84 K.D.L.R. Monthly Returns, July 1988 - July 1989.
85 See Chapter Four, supra.
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The entry of restrictions under the Registered
Land Act 1963 is governed by sections 136-138. 86 Their
function, inter alia, is to prevent fraud or improper
dealing' 87 To this end they may be expressed to
endure "for a particular period", or until the
occurrence of a particular event, "or until the making
of a further order", and may prohibit or restrict all
dealings or only such dealings as do not comply with
specified conditions. 88 Unlike the Land Registration
Act 1925 which only allows an application for a
restriction to be made by the registered proprietor.89
Any person interested in the land may enter a
restriction under section 136(1) of the Registered Land
Act 1963. It would be practical for family members who
own land registered in the name of one of their number
to be advised to enter a restriction providing that the
land should not be sold until the consent of the family
members is obtained. A similar provision exists in
section 57(3) of the Land Registration Act 1925 with
respect to joint proprietors, whereby the restriction
may be to the effect that if the number of proprietors
is reduced below a certain number no disposition shall
be entered except under an order of the court, or of
the registrar after inquiry into title.
86	 C.f. Land Registration Act 1925, s. 58.
87	 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 136(1).
88	 Ibid., s. 136(2).
89	 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 58(1).
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Notably, section 136(1) of the 1963 Act provides
that the Registrar may enter a restriction on his own
motion. The power of the Land Registrar under the 1925
Act is limited to rejecting the application for a
restriction on the basis that it is "unreasonable or
calculated to cause inconvenience"." It is usually
the case for the Kenyan registrar to enter a
restriction on the title of a proprietor who has
died. 91
Inhibitions on the other hand are entered by the
court92 although under the Land Registration Act 1925
they may also be entered by the Registrar. 93 As
indicated by the figures above they are rarely entered.
Nevertheless in the few instances, they have been
entered to prevent registered land being dealt with
while the dispute concerning the land is before the
court or even the Registrar. Thus an inhibition
exercises the same function as an injunction. To
obtain an inhibition, however, an applicant must make
an application by originating summons. 94 This would
probably explain why there are hardly any inhibition
orders made. Obtaining an inhibition is more involving
90	 Ibid., s. 58(2).
91 Practice Instruction, Cautions: A Beneficiary's
Interest, Ref. No. 79696/111/173.
92	 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 128(1).
93	 s. 57(1).
94 Civil Procedure Rules, Order XXXVI, r.3F. See for
example Sarah Nvambura Kungu v. David Thige H.C.C.C.
No. 1882 of 1982 (0.S.).
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and expensive than obtaining a caution. Hence the
caution remains the most popular method of restraining
dispositions of registered land.
Notably, under the Land Registration Act 1925 an
additional method of protecting interests by means of a
notice95
 is available, whereas under the Registered
Land Act 1963, only the three methods, that is the
caution, restriction and inhibition are available to
protect subordinate interests.
The Committee responsible for the draft Registered
Land Bill felt that three types of entry would be
sufficient. The entry of an inhibition would be a
"hostile act by the court"; the entry of a caution a
'hostile act by some individual'; whereas the
restriction would be entered by the Registrar although
in this case, such an entry 'may well be friendly.'96
The entry of the inhibition and caution are viewed as
hostile acts because they are entered without the
permission of the registered proprietor and have the
effect of fettering his power of disposition. 97 A
restriction, on the other hand, can only be entered by
95	 Ss. 48-52.
96 Quoted in S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and
Registration (Cambridge 1976), p. 584.
97 Under the Land Registration Act 1925, the entry of
a caution is viewed as a hostile act because it is not
necessary to produce the land certificate to make an
entry, unlike the entry of a notice or restriction
which requires the production of the land certificate
and therefore the assistance of the registered
proprietor - see s.64(1)(c); David J. Hayton,
Registered Land, 3rd ed. (London 1981), pp. 23,25.26.
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the Registrar after he has made inquiries and served
notices on interested persons which would include the
proprietor.98
In view of the Committees satisfaction with the
inhibition, caution and restriction, there was no need
to include the notice as an additional means of
protecting an interest. Under the Land Registration
1925 a notice, when entered, operates by way of notice
only and does not otherwise validate the interest it
protects, 99 nor does it prevent the registered
proprietor from disposing his land or seek the consent
of the unlike the effect of a caution or restriction.
However, if a person failed to protect his
interest by one of the methods available either under
the Registered Land Act 1963 or the Land Registration
Act 1925, can such an interest bind a third party who
had notice of it?
C. The Question of Notice
Under section 28 of the Registered Land Act 1963
the rights of a proprietor are "free from all other
interests and claims ... but subject to [encumbrances
on the register and overriding interests]". Hence any
right or interest not falling
would not bind the registered
from him and although it does
within these categories
proprietor or a purchaser
not specifically say so,
98	 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 135(1); Land
Registration Act 1925, s. 52(2).
99	 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 52(2).
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the section implies that they are not binding on him
even if he has notice of them. Although the proviso to
section 28 and section 126(3) of the 1963 Act provides
that the unregistered rights of beneficiaries behind a
trust are binding on the registered proprietor where he
is a trustee, for the purpose of registered dealings it
is expressly provided in section 126(3) that a
purchaser is deemed not to have notice of the trust.
The combination of these provisions would appear to
exclude the equitable doctrine of notice.
However, the issue of whether an unprotected right
is binding on a purchaser of land with notice of it
under the Registered Land Act 1963 is brought into
question with regard to licences by virtue of section
100(2) of the Act. That section provides that a
licence "is ineffective against a bona fide purchaser
for valuable consideration" unless the licence is
protected by a caution. Therefore, by the converse
operation of section 100(2), a licence not protected by
a caution is binding upon a purchaser who is not bona
fide, or a purchaser for nominal consideration ,100 or a
volunteer. It follows, therefore that a licence
unprotected by a caution does not bind a purchaser in
good faith for value.
Is a purchaser in good faith, therefore, one who
has no notice? 'Good faith' is not defined in the 1963
Act, nor has it yet been defined by the courts. But it
100 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 3.
386
is clear that fraudulent conduct on the part of the
purchaser would render him liable to take subject to an
unprotected interest. For example, in Wanyoya V. 
Gichuncto 101 the plaintiff claimed to have a share as
tenant in common in land that was solely registered in
the name of the first defendant. The latter, who was
aware of the unprotected interest of the plaintiff,
transferred the land to his son, the second defendant,
with the intention of defeating the interest of the
plaintiff. The son was aware of this purpose. Muli J.
held that the transfer was fraudulent, the son taking
the land subject to the rights of the plaintiff.
Clearly the son would have been in bad faith within
section 100(2) of the Registered Land Act 1963. In
view of the lack of Kenyan authorities on whether
notice amounts to bad faith, this would be an area
where English decisions on the question could be
usefully applied.102
The leading English case is Midland Bank Trust v. 
Green.- 03
 There a father granted an option to purchase
land to his son, but it was not registered under the
Land Charges Act 1925 (now Land Charges Act 1972).
Later the father wishing to deprive the son of the
option, conveyed the land to the mother. The son, on
discovering this, tried to register the option. The
101 [1973] K.H.C.D. 59.
102 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 163.
103	 [1981] A.C. 513.
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House of Lords held that the option was void against
the mother because, inter alia, 'good faith' was not
part of the definition of a 'purchaser' within the Land
Charges Act 1925 and even though the mother had notice
of the unregistered option, she had not acted in bad
faith. In this connection Lord Wilberforce, said,
"If the position was simply that the
purchaser had notice of the option, and
decided nevertheless to buy the land, relying
on the absence of notification, nobody could
contend that she would be lacking in good
faith. She would merely be taking advantage
of the situation, which the law has provided,
and the addition of a profit motive could not
create an absence of good faith. ,104
(Italics mine.)
The difficulty for the court lies in finding out what
the true motives of a purchaser are. In the words of
Lord Wilberforce,
"Any advantage to oneself seems necessarily
to involve a disadvantage for another: to
make the validity of the purchaser depend
upon which aspect of the transaction was
prevalent in the purchaser's mind seems to
create a distinction equally difficult to
analyse in law as to establish in fact:
avarice and malice may be distinct sins, but
in human condupt they are liable to be
intertwined. 10z
Therefore in the eyes of the House of Lords,
notice of an unprotected interest cannot amount to bad
faith. This case is certainly preferable to the
decision of Graham J. in Peffer v. Rigg106 which was
104 Ibid, p. 530.
105 Ibid.
106 [1977] 1 W.L.R. 285.
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concerned with the provisions in the Land Registration
Act 1925. Although the Act defines a 'purchaser' as
being one in 'good faith for valuable consideration,107
notice is expressly excluded.'" Despite that, Graham
J held that a purchaser of registered land who had
notice of an unprotected interest was not in good
faith, and therefore took subject to the interest. The
decision has been roundly condemned for equating 'good
faith' with the absence of notice when the 1925 Act
clearly excludes notice and, moreover, not taking into
account those decisions which have variously held or
stated that purchasers are not bound with interests not
protected on the register of which they have notice.109
For example, in De Lusignan v. Johnson 110 a purchaser
with express notice of an estate contract was held not
to be in bad faith. In Hodges v. Jones, 111 Luxmoore J.
stated that notice of an unprotected interest "does not
affect the property alleged to be subject to it. 11112
107 S. 3(xxi).
108 S. 59(6).
109 See R.J. Smith, Registered Land: Purchasers with
Actual Notice (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 341; F.R. Crane,
Casenote (1977) 41 Cony . (N.S.) 207; S. Anderson,
Notice of Unprotected Trusts (1977) 40 M.L.R. 602; D.J.
Hayton, Purchasers of Registered Land [1977] C.L.J.
227; J. Martin, Constructive Trusts of Registered Land
[1978] Cony . 52.
110 (1973) 230 E.G. 499.
111 [1935] Ch. 657 at 671.
112 See also Miles v. Bull (No.2) [1969] 3 All E.R.
1585, per Bridge J.
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The subsequent decision in Williams & Glynn's Bank 
v. Boland113 has reiterated the position that notice
has no role to play in the Land Registration Act 1925.
In the words of Lord Wilberforce, "the only kind of
notice recognised is by entry on the register".
-'4
Although Peffer v. Rigg has not been overruled, it is
unlikely to be followed in the future.115
The principle that notice of an unprotected
interest does not amount to bad faith would therefore
be applicable in Kenya. It is unfortunate that the
Kenya Court of Appeal in John Kiructa v. Muctecha 
Kiruga116 failed to consider whether the purchaser of
the land was bound by the plaintiff's unprotected
licence within section 100(2) of the Registered Land
Act 1963. They should have determined whether the
purchaser was bona fide or not; if he was not bona fide
113 [1981] A.C. 481.
114 Ibid, at p. 504.
115 The decision in Lyus v. Prowsa Developments [1982]
2 All E.R. 953, was also criticised on the basis that
it introduced the doctrine of notice in registered land
- see Phillip H. Kenny, Constructive Trust of 
Registered Land, (1983) 46 M.L.R.96; Charles Harpum
Constructive Trusts and Registered Land [1983]
C.L.J.54; Paul Jackson, Estate Contracts, Trusts and
Registered Land [1983] Cony . 64; C.T. Emery & B.
Smythe, The Imposition of Trusts by 'Subject To' 
Clauses (1983) N.L.J. 798. However, Lyus was approved
by the Court of Appeal in Ashburn Anstalt v. Arnold 
[1988] 2 W.L.R. 706 on the basis that the purchaser had
bought the land expressly subject to an unprotected
estate contract and had given assurances that he would
give effect to the estate contract. According to Fox
L.J. this was a valid application of the constructive
trust - [1988] 2 W.L.R. 706, at pp. 727, 728.
116	 . .Civil Appeal No. 52 of 1985 (unreported).
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then the licence would have been binding on him. To
this extent it is respectfully submitted that the
decision is per incuriam.
D. Summary
This section has tried to show that unprotected
customary rights are capable of being protected on the
register by the entry of a caution or a restriction
under the Registered Land Act 1963. The customary
trust has been developed by the courts to protect those
with unprotected rights based on custom, notably the
right to receive a share of land, where the land is
registered in the name of one person who reneges on the
customary practice. It is also established Land
Registry practice to allow those with such a right to
enter a caution on the register. This practice runs
counter to the argument that customary rights are
extinguished when land is registered under the
Registered Land Act 1963.
However, the next section will also show that such
rights, arising behind a customary trust, are capable
of subsisting as overriding interests within section
30(g) of the Registered Land Act 1963, and therefore
binding on third parties.
III Overriding Interests
These are a class of interests not entered on the
register and yet are binding on a purchaser; hence,
they constitute an important feature of registration of
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title. In view of their enforceability despite their
non-entry on the register, they are a contradiction to
the view that the 'register is everything'. 117 When
justifying the necessity of having such interest in a
system of registered title in Kenya, the Working Party
on African Land Tenure said,
n ... there are certain rights and
liabilities which it is not practicable to
register but which, though not recorded, must
nevertheless retain their validity. For
instance registration is not feasible every
time, say, a monthly tenancy is changed and
so it must be provided that short term leases
are valid even though not registered. Again,
public health and building regulations, for
example may impose restrictions which affect
all land in a certain area and which it would
be waste of effort to have to repeat on the
register in respect of every parcel affected.
These exceptions are known as 'overriding
intereM' and all systems make provision for
them."Ii°
The list of overriding interests compiled by the
Working Party in their draft bill became section 40 of
the Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959, which
subsequently became, with amendments, section 30 of the
Registered Land Act 1963. The equivalent of section 30
is section 70(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925.
The problem with overriding interests is that they take
effect even though they are not protected on the
register. They bind a proprietor irrespective of
notice, and hence they could be viewed as inconsistent
117 Waimiha Sawmilling Co. Ltd. v. Waione Timber Co. 
Ltd. [1926] A.C. 101 at 106.
118 Report of the Working Party on African Land 
Tenure, 1957-58, (Nairobi 1958), para. 67.
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with the whole concept of a registered title. 119
 One
former English Land Registrar described them as "the
stumbling block" on registration of title)- 20
 It means
that a purchaser cannot simply rely on the register of
title, but must necessarily make additional inspections
of the land he is proposing to buy in order to discover
any overriding interest that may be binding on him.
But not all overriding interests will be readily
apparent from inspection. What would be particularly
galling for a purchaser is to find himself bound by an
overriding interest despite having made a very careful
inspection of the land. Unfortunately, indemnity is
not available under the Registered Land Act 1963 or the
Land Registration Act 1925. This is one area where
reform is needed.121
The heads of overriding interests under section 30
of the Registered Land Act 1963 are as follows:
a) rights of way, rights of water and profits
subsisting at the time of first registration under
this Act;
b) natural rights of light, air, water and
support;
119 Law Reform Now, edited by Gerald Gardiner and
Andrew Martin (1964), p.81, quoted in Third Report on
Land Registration, Law Com. No. 158, para. 2.2.
120 Sir John Stewart Wallace, Principles of Land
Registration (1937), p. 32, quoted in Third Report ...
supra.
121 See the recommendations of the English Law
Commission with regard to the 1925 Act in the Third
Report, supra.
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c) rights of compulsory acquisition, resumption
entry, search and user conferred by any other
written law;
d) leases or agreements for leases for a term
not exceeding two years, periodic tenancies
and indeterminate tenancies, within the
meaning of section 46;
e) charges for unpaid rates and other moneys
which, without reference to registratiort
under this Act, are expressly declared by any
written law to be a charge upon land;
f) rights acquired or in the process of being
acquired by virtue of any written law
relating to the limitation of actions or by
prescription;
g) the rights of a person in possession or
actual occupation of land to which he is
entitled in right only of such possession or
occupation, save where inquiry is made of
such person and the rights are not disclosed;
h) electric supply lines, telephone and
telegraph lines or poles, pipelines,
aqueducts, canals, weirs and dams erected,
constructed or laid in pursuance or by virtue
of any written power conferred by any written
law:"
When compared with section 70(1) of the Land
Registration Act 1925, section 30 above contains fewer
heads of overriding interests. Nevertheless, there are
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significant differences. For example, section 30(a)
above excludes rights of way and rights of water and
profits from subsisting as overriding interests if
created after first registration. Easements and
profits therefore created after first registration can
therefore only take effect if registered as
encumbrances. 122
 However, section 70(1)(a) of the Land
Registration Act 1925 - the corresponding section to
30(a) - contains a longer list of easements while
section 70(1)(j) contains examples of profits such as
rights of fishing and sporting, seignorial and manorial
rights and franchises. The Law Commission has
considered that several examples of easements and
profits in section 70(1)(a) and 70(1)(j) are
superfluous and in need of pruning.123
A curious and somewhat anomalous provision is
section 30(b) of the Registered Land Act 1963 which
includes in the list of overriding interests:
"natural rights of light, air, water and support".
It is paradoxical that 'natural rights' should be
declared overriding interests since the epithet
'natural' describes a right that is one of the ordinary
and inseparable incidents of ownership, automatically
accompanying such ownership. 124
 Unlike easements
122 Registered Land Act 1963, ss. 94,96.
123 Law Commission, Property Law, Third Report on Land
Registration, Law Com. No. 158, (1987), paras. 2.19-
2.21.
124 Cheshire and Burn, Modern Law of Real property,
14th ed. by E. H. Burn (London 1988), p. 501.
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therefore, such rights are not acquired by grant,
whether actual, implied or presumed. 125
 Therefore, its
unnecessary to provied for such rights to subsist as
overriding interests since they automatically attach to
the land.
Interestingly, English common law has never
recognised a natural right to light 126 or a 151dural
right to air. 127
 In Harris v De Pinna 128 the court
rejected a claim to a general flow of air. Bowen L.J.
put it thus:
"It would be just like amenity of prospect, a
subject matter which is incapable of
definition. So the passage of undefined air
gives no rise to rights and can give rise to
no righs for the best of all reasons, the
reason of common sense, because you cannot
acquire any rights against others by a user
which they cannot interrupt."129
Nevertheless, rights to light and air can be
acquird as easements; for example, a right to the flow
of light to a particular window, 130
 or a right to a
flow of air through a definite channel, such as a
ventilator in a building. 131
 It is therefore
125 See Bac.khouse v Bonomi (1861) 9 H.L.C. 503 at p.
513, per Lord Wensleydale.
126 Sir Robert Megarry & H.W.R. Wade, The Law of Real 
Property 5th ed. (London 1984), p. 843.
127 Webb v Bird (1862) 13 C.B. N.S. 841 at 843; Bryant
v Lefever (1879) 4 C.P.D 172.
128 (1886) 33 Ch.D. 238.
129 Ibid, at p. 262.
130 Ibid, at p. 259; Coils v Homes and Colonial Stores 
Ltd [1904] A.C. 179. See also Prescription Act 1832,
s. 3; Rights of Light Act 1959.
131 Cable v Bryant [1908] 1 Ch. 259.
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significant, that section 30(b) recognises and, in
effect, creates new natural rights of light, and air in
Kenyan land law.132
English law did, on the other hand, recognise
certain rights to water and support as natural. For
example a riparian owner was entitled
"to have the water of the stream on the banks
of which his property lies, flow down as it
has been accuMmed to flow down to his
property —"I."
While landowners have a natural right to support,134
there is no natural right to support for buildings. In
the words of Lord Penzance in Dalton v Angus & CO3135
"The owner of the adjacent soil may
with perfect legality dig that soil
away, and allow his neighbour's
house, if supported by it, to fall
in ruins to the ground."
In view of these common law limitations with respect to
natural rights of water and support, would an
interpretation of section 30(b) take into account these
limitations, on the basis of section 163 of the same
Act? It is submitted that this should not be the case
since section 30(b) itself created two new natural
rights, light and air, which were unrecognised as such
in English law. Consequently, the natural rights of
132 There is no Kenyan caselaw which recognised such
rights as natural.
133 John Young & Co. v Bankier Distillery Co. [1893]
A.C. 691 at 698, per Lord Macnaghten.
134 Hunt v Peake (1860) Johns 705 at p. 710; Backhouse
v Bonomi (1861) 9 H.L.C. 503 at p. 513.
135 (1881) 6 Appeal Cas. 740 at p. 804.
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/water and support' in section 30(b) should be read
'ejusdem genesis' to the former and not subject to the
common law limits on these natural rights.
Section 30(b) therefore represents a radical
departure from English common law, establishing new
rights but only over registered land subject to the
Act. Land subject to the Indian Transfer of Property
Act 1882 would therefore be subject to the English
Common law view on natural rights as expressed above,
since the 1882 Act is silent on these matters.136
Section 30(c) of the 1963 Act provides that rights
of compulsory acquisition are overriding interests. It
is submitted that this section is superfluous in view
of section 75 of the Constitution of Kenya which
retains the inherent power of the state to expropriate
property. Section 75 provides that no property "shall
be compulsorily taken possession of" unless:
a)	 "the taking of possession or
acquisition is necessary in
the interest of defence,
public safety, public order,
public morality, public
health, town and country
planning or the development or
utilization of any property in
such manner as to promote the
pbulic benefit; and
136 See Judicature Act 1967, s. 3.
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b)	 the necessity thereof is such
to afford reasonable
justification for the causing
any hardships that may result
to any person having any
interest in or right over the
property.
Section 75 further provides for the payment of "full
compensation" when property is compulsorily
acquired. 137 It is therefore irrelevant that rights of
compulsory acquisition are made overriding interests in
land registered under the Registered Land Act 1963,
since section 75 affects all land in Kenya, whether
registered or not.
Section 70(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925
contains no provision equivalent to that in section
30(c) of the 1963 Act. Compulsory purchase in England
is governed by several statutory provisions which
empower a public body or class of public bodies such as
county councils to select and compulsorily buy land.138
This is done by making a compulsory purchase order and
following the procedure laid down in the Acquisition of
Land Act 1981. The Land Compensation Act 1961 contains
the rules for assessing compensation for those whose
137 See the Land Acquisition Act 1968 which
supplements section 75 of the Constitution, setting out
the procedure available to those opposing the legality
of a compulsory acquisition order.
138 See for example, Town and Country Planning Act
1971, Part VI.
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land subject to a compulsory purchase order' 139 A
compulsory purchase order applies to any land, whether
registered or unregistered. When a compulsory purchase
order is obtained the authority must notify the owners
and occupiers concerned, and if a 'general vesting
declaration' is made, then notice of this declaration
must be registered as a total land charge under the
Local Land Charges Act 1975. 140
In Kenya, a purchaser would therefore have to make
enquiry to a local authority as to whether the land he
is purchasing is subject to compulsory acquisition
under section 75 of the Constitution of Kenya, since
there is no local land charges register as in England
where he could find out this information.
Section 30(d) allows a much shorter time limit for
leases to take effect as overriding interests - two
years when compared with 21 years under section
70(1)(k) of the 1925 Act. This means that the register
has to be kept up to date with accurate information
regarding short leases with more than 2 years, a
process which creates extra work for little purpose.
This is a factor that convinced the English Law
Commisstion that the 21 year period was adequate,
because it reduced the workload of the Land Registry,
and helped save tenants the cost of having to register
139 On compulsory purchase in England generally, see
Law of Compulsory Purchase and Compensation, K. Davies,
4th ed. (London 1984).
140 "Land" is usually defined in the appropriate
authorizing Act.
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short leases. 141 Another difference lies in the fact
that section 30(d) permits agreements for a lease to be
an overriding interest, whereas section 70(1)(k.) of the
1925 Act does not; the latter only provides for leases
which are granted for a term and therefore excludes a
mere agreement for a lease. 142
The overriding interests under section 30(e) of
the 1963 Act correspond to those in section 70(1)(i) of
the 1925 Act, the important difference being that
section 30(e) is only limited to charges of a monetary
nature, whereas local land charges under section 70(1)
of the 1925 Act are varied, for example prohibitions of
or restrictions on the use of land imposed by a local
authority. 143
Section 30(f) relates to rights acquired by
adverse possession under the Limitations of Actions Act
1967; this subsection corresponds with section 70(1)(f)
of the 1925 Act. Section 30(g) which deals with the
rights of those in actual occupation ocresponds with
section 70(1)(g) of the 1925 Act.
Sections 30(d) and 30(g) of the 1963 Act are of
significance for the purpose of this chapter, and the
141 Law Commission, Property Law, First Report on Land
Registration, Law Corn. No. 125 (London 1983), para.
4.26; Property Law, Third Report on Land Registration,
op. cit. para. 2.41.
142 City Permanent Building Society v. Miller [1952] 1
Ch. 840 - the word 'granted' excluded by force of the
context the case of a mere agreement for a lease having
no more than contractual effect - ibid at pp. 852, 853,
per Jenkins L.J.
143 Local Land Charges Act 1975, s. 1.
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question is whether they allow customary rights to
subsist as overriding interests. The conventional view
stated earlier has been that customary rights are not
capable of subsisting as overriding interests under the
registered Land Avt 1963. The view was first
expressed, albeit obiter, by the High Court in Obiero 
v. Opiyo. 144 In that case the plaintiff, who was the
widow of Opiyo, was registered as proprietor of 9 acres
of land. Opiyo had been polygamous and had married
several wives before his death. The defendants were
the sons of the other wives.
	
The plaintiff brought an
action against the defendants for damages for trespass
and an injunction to restrain them from repeating the
acts of trespass. The defendants claimed that they
were the owners of the land under customary law; they
had occupied and cultivated the land for many years.
However, Bennett J. was not satisfied, on the evidence,
that the defendants ever had any rights to the land
under customary law, but even if they did "those rights
would have been extinguished when the plaintiff became
the registered proprietor. 145
 He added:
"Had the legislature intended that the rights
of a registered proprietor were to be subject
to the rights of any person under customary
law, nothing could have been easier than for
"146it to say so.
144 [1972] E.A. 227.
145 [1972] E.A. 227 at 228.
146 Ibid.
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These obiter remarks were applied by Kneller J. in
Esiroyo v. Esiroyo. 147 There, the plaintiff, who was
the father of the defendants, sought an order to evict
his sons from his land. The defendants claimed that
because they were the natural sons of the plaintiff
they were entitled to certain portions of the
plaintiff's land, their titles to this land being well
founded in customary law. However, Kneller J. held
that "the matter is taken out of the purview of
customary law by the provisions of the Registered Land
Act" 148 Although the defendants had rights under
customary law they were extinguished when the plaintiff
became the registered proprietor. Moreover, they did
not amount to overriding interests because "rights
arising under customary law are not among the interests
listed in s.30 of the [Registered Land] Act as
overriding interests."- 49 Esiroyo has been followed in
several decisions, notably the Court of Appeal
decisions in Alan Kiama v. Ndiya Mathunya 150
 and
Elizabeth Wanjohi V. Official Receiver (Continental 
Credit Finance Ltd). 151
However, it is respectfully submitted that this
view can be rebutted if the provisions of the Act are
147 [1973] E.A. 388.
148 Ibid, at p. 390.
149 Ibid.
150 Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1978 (unreported).
151 The Nairobi Law Monthly, No.14, February 1989.
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examined closely. Earlier in this chapter, 152 it was
shown that a right arising under a resulting trust, a
customary trust, a periodic tenancy or a licence are
capable of protection by the entry of a caution on the
register. It is submitted that these rights, although
they may have their origin in custom, may still subsist
as overriding interests under section 30 of the
Registered Land Act 1963. This issue is now addressed
with particular reference to two heads of overriding
interests under sub-sections 30(d) and 30(g).
A.	 Section 30(d)
"Leases or agreements for leases for a
term not exceeding two years, periodic
tenances and indeterminate tenancies within
the meaning of section 46."
Section 46(1) of the 1963 Act states two ways a
periodic tenancy can arise:
i. where in a lease the term is not specified and no
provision is made for the giving of notice to
determine the tenancy, or
ii. where the proprietor of land permits the exclusive
occupation of the land at a rent but without any
agreement in writing.
Customary tenancies, as seen earlier- 53 were created
orally. The types of tenancy created would depend on
the terms and conditions. So for example a muthami had
more extensive rights than a muhoi, and it was more
152 Section II(A), infra.
153 See Chapter Two, supra.
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difficult to determine the tenure of the muthami than
that of the muhoi. During land adjudication, the
function of the Recording Officer is to categorise the
customary right being claimed as a class of right or
interest recognised by the Registered Land Act 1963.
Most rights wer either entered on the adjudication
register as rights of occupation or ignored. With
regard to rights recorded on the adjudication register,
section 11(3) of the Registered Land Act 1963
automatically deems them periodic tenancies without
more irrespective of whether such rights could be
properly classed as periodic tenancies. Therefore,
with these rights there is no need to consider whether
there is exclusive occupation or not or whether rent is
payable or not. The difference occurs with those
rights that are not noted on the adjudication register.
In what way?
With regard to customary tenancies not noted, in
determining whether they still remain effective the
question to ask is not whether they are subsisting as
customary interests, but whether they fall within
sections 45 and 46 of the Registered Land Act 1963.
For example, suppose the registered proprietor granted
to a third party a tenancy before the land was
registered. If this tenancy is recorded as a right of
occupation, then it is automatically deemed a periodic
tenancy. If it is not recorded, it is for the third
party to show:-
405
1. that a lease was granted for the life of the
lessor or lessee or for a definite term. If the
term of the lease is not specified - as is the
case with customary tenancies, the term being left
to run indefinitely until the occurence of an
event which makes the landlord terminate the
tenancy - and 'no provision is made for the giving
of notice to determine the tenancy' then a
periodic tenancy is deemed to have been
created. 154
2. Alternatively, if he cannot show that a lease was
granted, he must show that the proprietor
permitted him to have exclusive occupation of the
land or part of it, at a rent. In all the
customary tenancies even if some form of regular
payment was not made, what can be termed as a
nominal rent ws usually paid to the landlord as a
gesture of goodwill. 155
 The case of Wainaina v. 
Murai156 illustrates what acts amount to exclusive
occupation.
If the third party can produce enough evidence to
show the above, bringing himself within section 46(1)
of the 1963 Act, then it is submitted that his
customary tenancy is transformed into a periodic
tenancy, and therefore capable of subsisting as an
154 Registered Land Act 1963, s.46(1)(a).
155 Chapter Two, supra.
156 (1976) Kenya L.R. 227, discussed supra.
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overriding interest under section 30(d) of the
Registered Land Act 1963.
B.	 Section 30(g)
"the rights of a person in possession or
actual occupation of land to which he is
entitled in right only of such possession or
occupation, save where inquiry is made of
such person and the rights are not disclosed"
The corresponding provision in the Land Registration
Act 1925 to the above sub-section is section 70(1)(g)
which reads,
"the rights of every person in actual
occupation of the land or in receipt of the
rents and profits thereof, save where enquiry
is made of such person and the rights are not
disclosed."
A significant difference between the two subsections is
the addition in section 30(g) of the words "to which he
is entitled in right only of such possession or
occupation". These words make section 30(g) very
difficult to understand, a point that was even admitted
by one of the draftsmen of the Act.157
The effect of section 30(g) was considered by
Madan J.A. in Alan Kiama v. Ndiva Mathunya 158 where he
said,
"overriding interests which arise in right
only of possession or actual occupation
157 S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration
(Cambridge 1976), p. 500. Section 30(g) was actually
copied from section 47(f) of the draft Registered Land
Bill for Lagos, Nigeria which had attempted to improve
on the formula of section 70(1)(g) of the Land
Registration Act 1925.
158 Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1978 (unreported).
Although Madan J.A.'s judgment was a partially
dissenting one (on the question of the resulting trust)
he came to the same conclusion as the majority.
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without legal title are equitable rights
which are binding on the land, therefore on
the registered owner of it. Under section
30(g) they possess legal sanctity without
being noted on the register; they have
achieved legal recognition in consequence of
being written into statute" (Italics mine).
1.	 The 'rights'
According to Madan J.A., the rights of the person
under section 30(g) are equitable interests which are
binding on the land. 159 This reflects what the House
of Lords in National Provincial Bank v. Ainsworthl"
said with regard to the rights arising under section
70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925, that the
rights,
"must ... create a burden on the land, that
is, an equitable estate or interest in the
land" (italics mine)
Hence, both section 30(g) of the 1963 Act and section
70(1)(g) of the 1925 Act would not protect mere
personal rights. 162
 In England, examples of rights
that have been held to come under section 70(1)(g)
include an option to purchase 163 the equitable interest
159 This was also accepted in John Kiruga v. Mugecha
Kiruqa Civil Appeal No. 52 of 1985 (unreported).
160 [1965] A.C. 1175.
161 Ibid, at p. 1237 per Lord Upjohn - the House of
Lords adopted the statement of principle of Russell
L.J. in the Court of Appeal - [1964] Ch. 665 at 696.
See also City of London Building Society v. Flegq
[1987] 2 W.L.R. 1266 at p. 1287 per Lord Oliver.
162 Elizabeth Wanjohi v. Official Receiver 
(Continental Credit Finance Ltd). The Nairobi Law
Monthly, No.14, Feb. 1989, 42; National Provincial Bank
v. Ainsworth [1965) A.C. 1175.
163 Webb v. Pollmount [1966] Ch. 584.
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of a beneficiary under a resulting trust 164 or a trust
for sale165
 the right to an unpaid vendor's lien-66 and
the right to have a conveyance rectified in equity on
the ground of mistake.167
Section 30(g) on the other hand has not often been
considered by the courts in Kenya. What is of
immediate concern is whether section 30(g) can protect
the customary rights of those who failed to have them
protected on the register during adjudication. It is
significant that section 70(1)(a) of the Land
Registration Act 1925 expressly provides that customary
rights are overriding interests. Such rights would
include for example the right of the fisherman
inhibitants of a parish to spread and dry their nets on
the land of a private owner 168
 and the right to dance
upon a particular close belonging to an individual.-69
The predecessor to the Registered Land Act 1963, the
Land Registration (Special Areas) Ordinance 1959,
expressly provided in section 40(f) that a customary
right of occupation was an overriding interest. But
164 Hodgson v. Marks [1971] Ch. 892.
165 Williams & Glyns Bank v Boland [1981] A.C. 487.
166 London & Cheshire Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laplagrene
Property Co. ltd. [1971] Ch. 499.
167 Blacklocks v. J.B. Developments (Godalming) Ltd. 
[1982] Ch. 183.
168 Mercer V. Denne [1905] 2 Ch. 538.
169 Abbot v. Weekly (1665) 1 Lev. 176. For further
examples see Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed.,
Vol.12 (London 1975), para. 401.
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this section was not repeated in the 1963 Act which led
to the argument that customary rights are
extinguished.170
However, in view of the position that the rights
protected by section 30(g) of the Registered Land Act
1963 are equitable in nature, the question to ask is
whether customary rights arising in Kenya are capable
of subsisting as equitable interests under section
30(g). It is argued that they can if they arise under
a trust.
a. Rights Under a Resulting Trust
This trust arises where land is voluntarily
conveyed into the name of another person. The rights
of the beneficiaries under such a trust are capable of
subsisting as an overriding interest under section
30(g) if they are in actual occuption. In Alan Kiama 
v. Ndiya Mathunva l71
 the members of a clan who had the
land registerd in the name of one of their members who
then subsequently sold the land to the plaintiff were
held to have overriding interests under section 30(g)
that were binding on the plaintiff. These rights, that
is, the right to have the land divided among the clan
members were equitable rights arising by virtue of the
resulting trust.
170 S. Coldham, The Effect of Registration of Title 
Upon Customary Land Rights in Kenya [1978] J.A.L. 91,
at p. 106.
171	 . .Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1978 (unreported).
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It is significant that this right had its origin
in custom, and was not extinguished when the land was
registered but was able to subsist as an overriding
interest under section 30(g) of the Registered Land Act
1963. It has been shown that such a right is capable
of protection by a caution which can be entered after
first registration. 172
Another right arising under a resulting trust
is where two or more persons advance purchase money for
the acquisition of land but the transfer is made to one
person only and registered in his or her name. The
Kenya Chief Land Registrar pointed out that such a
trust is capable of protection by a caution. 173
 Such a
trust usually arises where a matrimonial home is
concerned, with the wife claiming to have a beneficial
interest in the home which is registered in the sole
name of the husband. 174
 In Karanja v. Karanja 175
 a
trust was declared where the wife had made direct and
indirect contributions to the purchase of the home.
Although section 30(g) of the Registered Land Act 1963
was not in issue in Karan'a the wife could have had an
overriding interest under that subsection.176
172 See section II(A)(1)(a).
173 Practice Instruction, Cautions: A Beneficiary's
Interest, Ref. No. 79696/111/173.
174 The converse applies.
175 (1976) Kenya L.R. 307. For a further discussion
of this case, see Chapter Seven, infra.
176 See also Wanjohi v. Official Receiver (Continental 
Credit Finance Ltd). The Nairobi Law Monthly, No.14,
Feb. 1989, 42 at p. 43.
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b. Rights Under a Customary Trust
It was argued earlier that rights arising under
such a trust are capable of being protected by the
entry of a caution. Essentially, the right that
usually arises under the customary or family trust is
the right to have a share in the division of inherited
land, which has been held to be binding on the first
registered proprietor. 177
 The question whether such a
right can subsist as an overriding interest under
section 30(g) of the Registered Land Act 1963 ws
considered in John Kiruga v. Mugecha Kiruga. 178
 The
plaintiff and the first defendant were brothers. A
certain plot of land was registered in the name of the
first defendant. He sold the land to the second
defendant. The plaintiff resided and cultivated on the
land and the second defendant subsequently sought to
evict him. The plaintiff claimed that he was entitled
to receive a share of the land, stating that the first
defendant took advantage of prevailing circumstances
and had himself registered as proprietor of the family
land which should have been divided between the
brothers. Accordingly, he claimed to have an
overriding interest under section 30(g) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 that was binding on the second
defendant. Alternatively, he claimed to have acquired
177 See for example Muthuita v. Muthuita, Civil Appeal
No. 12 of 1982 (unreported).
178	 . .Civil Appeal No. 52 of 1985.
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title by adverse possession. At first instance, it was
held that the plaintiff did not have an interest
binding on the second defendant, and therefore the
second defendant was entitled to evict him from the
land.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal considered whether
a customary trust did arise. It was found in evidence
that the plaintiff had already received a share of land
from his father but had sold it. However, his brother,
the first defendant had allowed him to reside on the
land in dispute. No trust arose because the act of the
first defendant was "an act of charity" and "on grounds
of pure humanity." 179
 The plaintiff had only a licence
which was revoked when the first defendant sold the
land the second defendant. The Court distinguished
Williams & Glyn's Bank v. Boland19 ° from the present
case on the basis that in Boland the wife had made
contributions to the purchase of the property which was
registered in the sole name of her husband whereas in
Kiruga the plaintiff was merely given permission to
reside on the land. Nevertheless, it is implicit from
the judgments in Kiruga that customary rights would be
capable of subsisting as overriding interests.
But the argument that customary rights are
overriding interests was rejected by a differently
constituted Court of Appeal in Wanjohi v. Official 
179 Per Masime and Apaloo JJ.A.
180 (1981) A.C. 487.
181
42.
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Receiver (Continental Credit Finance Ltd). 181 The
plaintiffs were the wives of the registered proprietors
who had charged their land to the defendant finance
company. The proprietors defaulted in their repayments
and later died. The defendants subsequently sought to
exercise their power of sale under section 74 of the
Registered Land Act 1963. The plaintiffs applied for
an injunction to restrain the defendants from selling
the land, arguing that they had a right to own the land
by virtue of their customary law marriage to the
chargors and since they were in actual occupation, they
had an overriding interst under section 30(g) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 that was binding on the
chargees. In effect they were asserting that their
right to own the land was a customary right which was
an overriding interest under section 30(g). 182
Counsel for the plaintiffs argued that the rights
of the plaintiffs could subsist as a section 30(g)
overriding interest because they arose behind a
customary trust: the land that was registered in the
names of their husbands was family land which was held
by the husbands on trust for their families and since
the wives were part of the family they had an interest
in the land, that interest being the right to own the
land on the death of their husbands. As they were in
actual occupation of the land, that interest was
The Nairobi Law Monthly, No. 14, February 1989,
Ibid, pp. 42,43.
414
binding on the chargees when the land was charged.
However, the court admitted that it did not understand
this argument and therefore it was rejected.183 They
held that,
n ... the relationship of trustee-beneficiary
between the applicants and their late
husbands could only arise, if the applicants
were in truth the owners of these ... lands
but allowed their titles to ip - vegistered in
the names of their husbands." 8'
The court went on to hold that in reality the
applicants "asserted no other right to the land beyond
those of wives in coverture in occupation of their
spouses' lands" and that this in no way impressed the
land with any trust. In any event, such a right was a
mere right in personam rather than a right in rem and
since it was a right based on custom it was
extinguished on registration of the land)-85
However, in rejecting the argument that a right
arising behind a customary trust could not subsist as
an overriding interest under section 30(g) of the
Registered Land Act 1963, the Court failed to consider
its own decision in John Kiruga v. Mugecha Kirucia186
which had clearly pointed out that a right arising
behind a customary trust could subsist as an overriding
interest. The court in Wan'ohi also neglected to
consider all the cases which had inferred a customary
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid, p. 43.
185 Ibid.
186 Civil Appeal No. 52 of 1985, (unreported).
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trust, preferring instead to reject the idea that a
customary trust could be inferred. In one respect the
conclusion of the Court that the rights of wives to
reside on land qua wives are not proprietary interests
in land and therefore are not overriding interests is
reminiscent of the House of Lords approach in National
Provincial Bank v. Ainsworth- 87
 where the contention
that the right of a deserted wife to occupy a
matrimonial home was an overriding interest within
section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925 was
rejected. Lord Hodgson in analysing the nature of the
wife's rights said,
"The matrimonial law did not, however, at any
time give the wife any property in the house
in which she lived with her husband unless
she could rely upon a settlement. His duty
is to live with his wife and to supprt her
but she has no proprietary rights in the
house by virtue of her status as a wife. She
is lawfully there not by reason of any
contract or licence but simply because she is
the wife. If her husband leaves her the
right which she has to be left undisturbed is
a personal right and does not attach itself
to any specific piece of property which may
at a given time be the house in which the
spouses have lived together." (Italics
.mine) 188
The decision in Wan . ohi that the rights of wives to
reside on land qua wives are not proprietary interests,
and therefore cannot subsist as overriding interests
under section 30(g) of the Registered Land Act 1963
187 [1965] A.C. 1175.
188 mid, at p. 1220.
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would correspond with the decision in Ainsworth with
respect to the deserted wife's equity.'"
However, the failure of the Court of Appeal in
Wan'ohi to accept the principle that customary rights
may subsist as overriding interests if they arise
behind a customary trust is inconsistent with its
decision in Kiruga. The further rejection of the
customary trusts without discussion negates all the
decisions of the Court of Appeal and the High Court
wich have established the customary trust. It is
therefore respectfully submitted that to this extent
the decision in Kiruga is preferred to that in
Wan'ohi.
2.	 'Possession or Actual Occupation'
What constitutes an overriding interest in section
30(g) of the Registered Land Act 1963 is, "the rights
of a person in possession or actual occupation ...";
the formula used in section 70(1)(g) of the Land
Registration Act 1925 is "the rights of every person in
actual occupation or in receipt of rents and profits
thereof ..." It has been accepted with regard to both
sub-sections that actual occupation is not in itself an
189 The Matrimonial Homes Act 1967 (now Matrimonial
Homes Act 1983) was passed to mitigate the rigours of
Ainsworth. The Act gives a 'right of occupation' to a
spouse who was not entitled to occupation by virtue of
any estate or interest; the right is registrable as a
land charge (Land Charges Act 1972 s. 2(7)) or
protected by the entry of a notice under the Land
Registration Act 1925 (Matrimonial Homes Act 1983,
S. 2(8)(a)) and therefore binding on third parties.
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overriding interest; the rights of a person plua his
actual occupation constitute the overriding
interest. 190
It is evident that the formula in section 30(g) of
the 1963 Act is distinct from section 70(1)(g) of the
1925 Act through the use of the term 'possession' in
the former and the phrase 'in receipt of rents and
profits' in the latter. Prima facie, section 30(g)
would appear to confine the rights only to those who
are in physical occupation, thereby excluding those who
are in receipt of rents and profits such as landlords.
Indeed this had been the intention of those who drafted
the Registered Land Act 1963; one of the draftsmen
said,
"we suggest that the omission of the words
'or in receipt of rents and profits thereof'
would confine it unmistakably to the rights
of the occupation tenant, and that this is
all it should be concerned with."1-91
This intention would have been successfully carried out
had the term 'possession' not been included in section
30(g) of the 1963 Act. Although 'possession' is not
defined in the 1963 Act, English common law recognised
several types of possession: legal, actual and
constructive possession. A person could be said to be
in constructive possession of land if for example he
1" John Kiruga v. Mugecha Kiruga, Civil App. No.52 of
1985, (unreported); City of London Building Society v. 
Flegg  [1987] 2 W.L.R. 1266.
191 S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration,
(Cambridge 1976, p. 500).
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leased it to someone.192 Not surprisingly section
205(xix) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that
"possession' includes receipt of rents and profits and
the right to receive the same •••". 193 In view of the
common law definition of 'possession' a landlord in
receipt of rent from a licensee could be in
'possession' within section 30(g) of the Registered
Land Act 1963 and therefore have an overriding
interest. 194
However, recognising the rights of landlords in
receipt of rents and profits as overriding interests
complicates matters for purchasers of land. It means
that they have to enquire from the person in occupation
as to whether he pays rent to anyone, and also whether
the person in occupation has any rights. 195
 The
English Law Commission accepted this problem as the
192 Jowitt's Dictionary of English law, Vol.2, 2nd ed.
by John Burke (London 1977), p. 1389; see also Martin
Estates Co. v. Watt & Hunter [1925] N.I. 79 at p. 85
per Moore L.J.; Ocean Estates Ltd v Pinder [1969] 2
A.C. 19 at pp. 25, 26, per Lord Diplock.
193 See also Land Registration Act 1925, s. 3(xviii).
It has been pointed out that for a person to be in
'receipt of rents and profits' under section 70(1)(g)
of the 1925, he must be in actual receipt and not
merely have the right to receive such rent and profits
- Law Commission, Property Law: Third Report of Land
Registrtion, Law Corn. No. 158, para. 2.58; see Strand
Securities v. Caswell [1965] Ch. 958. This means that
the phrase 'in receipt of rents and profits' does not
equate with the concept of possession in section
3(xviii) of the 1925 Act - para. 2.58.
194 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 163.
195 This information may not be apparent from the
certification of search if the person in occupation is
a tenant under an equitable lease.
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reason for excluding the rights of persons in "receipt
of rents and profits" from section 70(1)(g) of the Land
Registrtion Act 1925. 196
 Moreover, in their view, it
was sensible to expect such persons to have their
rights protected on the register avoiding the injustice
of having the purchaser make two sets of enquiries; in
any event, the interest of the landlord "is inherently
more likely to be compensatable by payment of indemnity
than the interest of the purchaser." 197 These
arguments could also be used to limit the term
'possession' in section 30(g) of the 1963 Act to mean
those who have physical control of the land, that is,
those with actual possession as opposed to constructive
possession. Hence the meaning of 'possession' in
section 30(g) of the 1963 Act would correspond with the
meaning given to the same term in section 143(2) of the
same. 198
'Actual occupation' on the other hand is concerned
with physical presence on the land as opposed to some
entitlement in law. 199
 It was accepted by the English
Court of Appeal in Lloyds Bank v. Rosset 2 " that a
196 Law Commission, Property Law; Third Report on Land
Registration, Law Com. No. 158, para. 2.70.
197 Ibid.
198 See Natwarlal Chauhan v. Zakaria Omagwa, Civil
Appeal No. 12 of 1980, (unreported), discussed further
in Chapter Eight, infra.
199	 .	 .Williams & Glyns Bank v. Boland [1981] A.C. 487,
at p. 505 per Lord Wilberforce.
200 [1988] 3 All E.R. 915.
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person could be in 'actual occupation' through the
physical presence of an employee or agent on the
property although this would depend on the function the
employee or agent was discharging in the presmises;
therefore, the defendant's wife could be in 'actual
occupation' of a semi-derelict house which was being
renovated by builders. 201
 In the Kenyan case of John
Kiruga v. Mugecha Kirgua 202
 the Court of Appeal
accepted the fact that a person could be in 'actual
occupation' through the presence of his wife, while he
was absent. However, 'actual occupation' denotes some
degree of permanance and continuity; therefore, in the
House of Lords decision in Abbey National Building
Society v. Cann2" it was held that the acts of laying
carpets and bringing furniture into a house prior to
moving in did not establish actual occupation, these
being no more than preparatory steps leading to the
assumption of actual residential occupation.
3.	 Protection From Section 30(g).
How can a purchaser of land registered under the
Registered Land Act 1963 ensure that he takes free from
201 Ibid, pp. 925-927, per Nicholls L.J. This point
was not considered by the House of Lords on appeal
because the Court concluded that the wife had no
beneficial interest in the property. There was no
common intention that the husband and wife were to
share the property beneficially [1990] 2 W.L.R. 867 at
pp. 877, 878, per Lord Bridge.
202 Civil Appeal No. 52 of 1985 (unreported).
203 [1990] 2 W.L.R. 832.
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the rights arising under section 30(g) of the Act?
Section 30(g), like section 70(1)(g) of the 1925 Act,
provides that the rights are not binding where inquiry
is made of the person in possession or actual
occupation and the rights are not disclosed. Hence the
purchaser has to make careful inspection of the land he
is proposing to buy and make inquiry of all the persons
in actual occupation. 204 In the words of Russell L.J.
in Hodgson v. Marks 205 with regard to section 70(1)(g)
of the 1925 Act, the purchaser cannot rely on the
"untrue ipse dixit of the vendor". This principle was
applied in John Kiruga v. Mugecha Kiruga 206 where it
was pointed out that the purchaser of the land should
not have confined himself to making enquiries of the
registered proprietor but should have made enquiry of
the plaintiff but since he was not present on the land,
enquiry should have also been made of his wife too.
The position reflects the view taken by the House
of Lords in Williams & Glyn's Bank v. Boland 207 that
what is involved is a departure from the easy going
practice of dispensing with enquiries as to occupation
beyond that of the vendor and accepting the risks of
doing so, and to "substitute for this a practice of
more careful inquiry as to the fact of occupation ..."
204 John Kiruga v. Mugecha Kiruga, op. cit.
205 [1971] Ch. 892 at p. 932.
206 Op. cit.
207 [1981] A.C. 487 at p. 508, per Lord Wilberforce.
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Nevertheless, even the most careful inquiry and
inspection will not necessarily protect a purchaser
since there may be rights not at all apparent to the
purchaser. 208 A further problem arises where a person
with rights enters into actual occupation after
inspection has been made but before registration. This
is an acute problem for a mortgagee who creates a
charge over the land having made all the necessary
inquiries, but a person enters occupation before the
charge is registered. This issue (the so called
'registration gap') has not been considered by the
Kenyan courts vis a vis section 30(g) of the Registered
Land Act 1963; however, it has been considered by the
House of Lords with respect to section 70(1)(g) in
Abbey National Building Society v. Cann. 2 " It was
held that the person claiming an overriding interest
under section 70(1)(g) had to have been in actual
occupation at the time of creation or transfer of the
legal estate and not at the moment of registration.
This decision removes the danger facing a purchaser or
mortgageee who registers a transfer or charge, unaware
of a person with rights who has entered occupation
208 See for example, Kling v. Keston Properties (1983)
49 P & C.R. 212, where an option to purchase a garage
was binding on a lessee of the garage. The persson
with the benefit of the option was held to be in
'actual occupation' of the garage by virtue of the
presence of her car in the garage. Vinelott J.
expressed disquiet that this overriding interest would
not have been apparent despite careful inspection and
inquiry by the purchaser - ibid, at p. 222.
209 [1990] 2 W.L.R. 832.
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after the creation of the charge or the signing of the
transfer forms. If this issue were to arise before the
Kenyan Courts, it is submittd that this problem would
be eliminated if Abbey National were to be followed.
With regard to rights arising behind a trust for
sale, particularly where a matrimonial home is jointly
owned, the safeguard for a purchaser under the Land
Registration Act 1925 is to pay the purchase money to
at least two trustees for sale or a trust
corporation. 210
 Such payment has the effect of
overreaching the interests of beneficiaries under a
trust for sale, these interests being transferred to
the proceeds of sale.211
In Kenya, the only time a trust for sale arises is
when a proprietor makes a strict settlement of land
under the Trusts of Land Act 1941. 212
 That Act, unlike
the English Settled Land Act 1925, imposes a trust for
sale where land is settled or where there is an
210 Law of Property Act 1925, ss. 2, 27.
211 City of London Building Society v. Flegg [1987] 2
W.L.R. 1266. However, the Law Commission has argued
that overreching puts the equitable owner at a
disadvantage because it obliges him "to surrender his
occupation right in favour of his financial one,
without the chance to make a choice" since the interest
is transferred to the proceeds of sale. The Commission
therefore recommended that the conveyance of a legal
estate should not overreach the interest of the
equitable owner (of full age and capacity) in actual
occupation "unless that person consents." (italics
mine) - Law Commission, Transfer of Land, Overreaching: 
Beneficiaries in Occupation, Law Comm. No. 188, paras.
4.1, 4.3.
212 See further Chapter Seven, infra.
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attempted settlement of land.213 If a settlement was
created, the beneficaries under the settlement would
have overriding interests within section 30(g) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 if they are in actual
occupation of the land subject to the settlement.
However, such interests may be overreached if a
purchaser pays the purchase money to no less than two
trustees for sale or to a trust corporation. 214
 The
equitable interests behind the trust take effect in the
proceeds of sale and the purchaser takes a good title
free from all beneficial claims.
The mechanism of the trust for sale therefore
confers a measure of protection to a purchaser. It has
limited application where the Registered Land Act 1963
is concerned applying only where land is settled. At
present, a purchaser of registered land under the Act
can only make inquiries to ensure there are no
interests which may bind him. However, where
overriding interets that are not apparent are
concerned, inquiry may not offer adequate protection.
This is therefore an area which could undergo reform;
the mechanism of the trust for sale could be adopted so
that land that is jointly owned under the Registered
Land Act 1963 may be made subject to a trust for sale.
At present the Act merely allows no more than five
213 Trusts of Land Act 1941, ss. 11, 12.
214 Ibid, s. 7.
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persons to be registered as proprietors. 2 15 However,
as shown earlier, the rights of family members are
capable of subsisting as overriding interests. Since
these rights are claims to joint ownership of land, a
purchaser may find himself saddled with them
particularly where the vendor was silent about their
existence. Paying purchase money to more than one
person would ensure that the purchaser takes free from
such interests. 216 An additional safeguard for the
beneficiaries under the trust for sale is to provide
that their rights should not be overreached unless they
have consented. 217
 This would prevent a proprietor
from appointing a sham trustee to simply comply with
the rules for payment of the purchase moneys.
IV CONCLUSION
This chaek has shown that despite the view that
unprotected customary rights are extinguished when land
is brought onto the register, in reality certain
customary rights have been accepted as capable of being
protected by a caution, and probably by a restriction
under the Registered Land Act 1963. One right that
stands out is the right of family members to receive a
215 Registered Land Act 1963, S. 101(4). See the
discussion in Chapter Seven, infra.
216 It is suggested in Chapter Seven that payment to a
large number of trustees for sale would be adequate,
particuarly in view of the fact that families or clans
tend to be large in Kenya.
217 See Law Commission, Third Report ... op. cit,
supra.
426
share of land. This right has been held to be binding
on a registered proprietor if it arises behind a
customary trust, notwithstanding the fact that it is
unregistered.218 Moreover, the right of clan members
to subdivide clan land may take effect behind a
resulting trust. 219
 Not only would such rights be
capable of protection by a caution, but would also be
capable of subsisting as overriding interests.220
Moreover, those with customary tenancies that were
not entered on the adjudication register and thereafter
transferred to the Register under the Registered Land
Act 1963 can do either of two things:
1. Show that the customary tenancy amounts to a
periodic tenancy under section 46(1)(b) of
the Registered Land Act 1963. The tenant
would have to show that he has exclusive
occupation of the land and he pays rent. If
so, then he can register a caution under
section 131(1)(a) of the 1963 Act;
2. Alternatively, the periodic tenancy would be
capable of subsisting as an overriding
interest under section 30(d) of the
218 Gatimu Kinguru v. Muva Gathangi (1976) Kenya L.R.
253; Muthuita V. Muthita, Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1982(unreported); John Kirucia v. Mucrecha Kiruga, Civil
Appeal No. 52 of 1985.
219 Alan Kiama v. Ndiya Mathunya, Civil Appeal No. 42
of 1978 (unreported).
220 Practice Instruction, Cautions: A Beneficiary's 
Interest (K.D.L.R. Admin File); Alan Kiama v Ndiya 
Mathunya, op. cit.; John Kiruga v. Muctecha Kiruga, op.
cit.
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Registered Land Act 1963. If the elements of
exclusive occupation or rent are not present
in the customary tenancy, the next option is
to show that it is a licence relating to the
use or enjoyment of land. 221
 All a person
has to show is that he has been given
permission to reside on the land. 222
 Such a
licence is capable of protection by a
caution; 223
 if not protected, it would still
be capable of binding a purchaser with bad
faith or a volunteer. This represents an
important difference with the position in
English law where licences are viewed as
personal interests rather than interests in
land, and therefore are not capable of
binding third parties. Hence they would not
be capable of protection by a notice, caution
or restriction under the Land Registration
Act 1925. Nevertheless, a licence giving
_rise to a constructive trust, 224
 or an
estoppel licence, 225
 could be capable of
being protected on the register by a notice
or caution for example, or capable of
221 Registered Land Act 1963, S. 100(2).
222 Ibid, s. 3.
223 Ibid. ss. 100(2); 131(1)(b).
224 See Ashburn Anstalt v. Arnold [1988] 2 W.L.R. 706.
225 Inwards v. Baker [1965] 2 Q.B. 29.
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subsisting as an overriling interest within
section 30(g) of the Land Registration Act
1925.
However, the question of whether customary rights
are capable of binding registered proprietors has
continued to be a problematic one for the courts in
Kenya. No court has yet analysed in depth and reviewed
the cases recognising the customary trust and those
cases which reject the idea that customary rights
survive first registration. In essence, the
fundamental fault lies with the adjudication teams
which should have noted scrupulously all the customary
rights that were being claimed. It is of interest that
many of the cases where customary rights are being
claimed and which have come before the courts mainly
concern land situated in the Central province. This
was the area that bore the brunt of the Mau Mau Civil
War in the 1950's. The war caused the adjudication
teams to conduct their work with haste with the
colonial government endeavouring to speed up the work
in an attempt to stifle African support for the Mau
Mau, and as a result, many failed to have their rights
protected on the Adjudication register.226
Many years later, the courts are now having to
deal with these unprotected rights. The difference in
approach may suggest that some judges are unprepared to
accept customary rights as capable of surviving
226 See Chapters Two and Three, supra.
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registration while other judges are. However, the
general consensus accepts that the customary right to
inherit land can still bind a registered proprietor.
Nevertheless, this is one area that will require
judical clarification. Clearly it is necessary for the
Court of Appeal to review all the caselaw and come up
with an authoritative ruling. Alternatively,
legislative reform may be necessary to clear this
anomaly.
How can a purchaser protect himself from adverse
interests, particularly, as we have seen, the rights of
those claiming to have a share of land under customary
law? Undoubtedly, obtaining a search of the register
would be the first prerequisite. The entry of a
caution should be enough to put him on alert. However,
obtaining a certificate of search is not adequate
protection in view of the existence of overriding
interests, and particularly those interests not
apparent on inspection of the land. Herein lies the
weak link in the system of land registration. The
register cannot fully protect the purchaser from
adverse interests and making enquiries and inspecting
the land may, in some circumstances, not be enough.
The 'two trustee' rule in English law whereby the
interests of those behind a trust for sale are
overreached offers a measure of protection for the
purchaser or mortgagee. 227
 This mechanism could
227 City.of London Building Society v Flegq [1987] 2
W.L.R. 1266.
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usefully be adopted in Kenya, applying to co-owned land
registered under the Registered Land Act 1963. At
present a statutory trust for sale is applied only
where land is subject to a strict settlement. 228
 These
provisions could be extended so that a trust for sale
is imposed whenever land is co-owned. A purchaser need
not worry about being bound by the interests of
beneficiaries behind a trust for sale so long as he
pays the purchase moneys to a limited number of
trustees. Provision may be made, as has been suggested
by the English Law Commission with respect to the
provisions under the Law of Property Act 1925, that
overreaching may only take place where the
beneficiaries of full age have given their consent.
This would ensure that the land is not sold behind the
backs of the beneficiaries.
However, this may not necessarily protect the
purchaser from all overriding interests. The problem
with both the Registered Land Act 1963 and the Land
Registration Act 1925 is that the provisions on
rectification and indemnity do not apply to overriding
interests. 229
 The English Law Commission has
recommended with respect to the Land Registration Act
1925 that,
u ... a registered proprietor against whom an
overriding interest is asserted should be
able to apply for indemnity but the Registrar
may, as a discretionary condition precedent
228 Trusts of Land Act 1941, ss. 11, 12.
229 See Re Chowood's Registered Land [1933] Ch. 574.
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to paying indemnity, rectify the register by
entering the overriding interest in it."230
Such a remedy would not be available to the registered
proprietor if he contributed to the loss suffered by a
lack of proper care. 231
 This could happen where for
example, he fails to make the necessary inspections and
enquiries. If such a reform was adopted to amend the
Registered Land Act 1963, it would remove the
disadvantage suffered by purchasers of land with
respect to overriding interests.
The two reforms, that is the mechanism of the
trust for sale and allowing overriding interests to be
subject to rectification and indemnity would ensure
some kind of balance under the Registered Land Act
1963, protecting those with subordinate interests as
well as purchasers of registered land.	 Such measures
can only come about through legislative reform.
230 Law Commission, Property Law: Third Report on Land
Registration, Law Com. No. 158, para. 3.29.
231	 /bid.
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Chapter Seven
CO-OWNERSHIP IN REGISTERED LAND
I) Introduction
Co-ownership arises where two or more people are
simultaneously entitled in possession to an interest or
interests in the same property. In Kenya the law on
co-ownership was complicated by the dichotomy of
various land laws. Land that was registered under the
Land Titles Act 1908, the Government Lands Act 1915,
and the Registration of Titles Act 1919 was subject to
the substantive land law contained in the Indian
Transfer of Property Act 1882. The 1882 Act contains
provisions on co-ownership that are vague and
ambiguous l . Moreover, Trust Land that was not
registered under the above Acts was subject to
customary law which varied from tribe to tribe.
Naturally, the nature of co-ownership varied in these
societies. The aim of enacting the Registered Land Act
1963 was not only to unify the system of land
registration but also the substantive law. Part of the
substantive law that the Act introduced was a system of
co-ownership. This system would eventually replace the
system of co-ownership under the Indian Transfer of
Property Act 1882 once all land registered under the
three registration Acts mentioned above was brought
1	 Discussed infra.
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under the Registered Land Act 1963 2 . Further, the
system under the 1963 Act was to replace the methods of
land holding under the multifarious customary laws of
the various tribes inhabiting the Trust Lands. Once
the Trust Lands were brought under the Registered Land
Act 1963 the customary methods of land holding would
cease to exist, having been replaced by the system
under the 1963 Act.
The Registered Land Act 1963 introduced a system
of co-ownership that, in some respects, was similar to
the system under the English Law of Property Act 1925.
The major difference is that land held by co-owners
under the Registered Land Act 1963 does not take effect
behind a trust for sale, whether the co-owners hold as
joint tenants (or 'joint proprietors' which is the term
used in the 1963 Act) or tenants in common
('proprietors in common'). In contrast co-owned land
in England is held on trust for sale under the Law of
Property Act 1925. Moreover, the system of co-
ownership under the 1963 Act has several limitations;
for example, it is virtually impossible to unilaterally
sever a joint proprietorship, whereas under English law
where several methods are prescribed. This creates
problems for the joint proprietor who wishes to sever
his share inter vivos or by will. Further problems
occur in a situation where one joint owner kills the
2	 The Indian Transfer of Property Act 1882 would
eventually cease to apply completely once all land was
registered under the Registered Land Act 1963 - see s.
3 Registered Land Act 1963.
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other in order to obtain his share by jus accrescendi.
Kenyan law is not very clear on the legal position in
such a situation. The solution to this problem can be
found by turning to English sources.
A more serious problem is the lacuna created by
section 101(4) of the Registered Land Act 1963 which
provides that in the special areas 3
 land should be
registered in the names of no more than five
proprietors. It means that this limitation does not
apply to registered land situated in the urban areas
for example, and it is submitted that an unlimited
number of persons can be registered as proprietors.
However, the Act does not say what happens when the
land is owned by more than five people. In contrast,
the Law of Property Act 1925 imposes a trust for sale
where land is co-owned. This chapter therefore looks
at the types of trusts that can be imposed in a
situation under the 1963 Act where land is held by more
than five people.
The Kenya Parliament did attempt to correct the
deficiency by enacting the Land (Group Representatives)
Act 1968. However, it will be shown that this Act is
unsatisfactory in several respects and it does not
really solve the problem caused by section 101(4) of
the Registered Land Act 1963.
3	 Land which formed the African Reserves, see
Chapter Two, supra.
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Nevertheless, before the provisions on co-
ownership in the Registered land Act 1963 can be
considered, it would be useful to consider the nature
of multiple ownership in areas that were subject to
customary tenure, that is the special areas, and also
the system of co-ownership set up by the Indian
Transfer of Property Act 1882, before looking at the
position under English common law.
A. Co-ownership In Land Subject To Customary Tenure
It is difficult to categorise African conceptions
of land holding along the lines of English common law.
To say that Africans had a method of land holding,
where more than one person had an interest in the
ownership of the same piece of land, and that this was
analogous to co-ownership under common law, would be
myopic. Two reasons account for this; firstly, the
difficulties in evaluating the clusters of rights,
privileges and liabilities which are related to the
ways in which Africans hold land; and secondly, the
'imbrication of economic, social and political
factors' 4 . These aspects make the system of land
holding among Africans unique.
It used to be said by various historians and
anthropologists that land amongst the Africans was
owned by the whole community or by the tribe and
therefore the concept of private ownership of land by
individuals within these groups was non-existent5.
4	 D. Biebuyck, ed., African Agrarian System (1960),
p. 52.
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This view, however, was erroneous because it was
assumed that these societies had centralised political
authority whereby the Chief or King held the residuary
and reversionary ownership of all the land occupied by
the community, the community members merely having a
possessory interest in the lane. In Kenya this was
not the position. Kenyan societies had segmented
political structures with no overall Chief or King7;
most societies were divided into clans which were in
turn made up of families. The majority of clans had
elders whose function was to administer over the
affairs of the clan and this included the arbitration
of disputes among clan members and the granting of
consent for transfers of land among clan members or to
strangers (i.e. people who were not members of the
clan). However, these elders had no residuary or
reversionary interest in the land. It was the family
which was the unit of land holding rather than the clan
or the society as a whole.
5	 See for example, F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in
Tropical Africa (London, 1922), p. 280.
6	 See T.O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary 
Law (Manchester 1956) pp. 82-6, 164.
7	 The colonial authorities did try to promote
prominent individuals within certain societies to
become leaders in order to act as go-betweens between
the colonial government and that particular society.
For example, the colonial government recognised Lenana
as the 'paramount chief of all the Masai' at the
beginning of this century. However, the Masai had
never recognised such a position - M.P.K. Sorrenson,
Origins of European Settlement in Kenya (Nairobi 1968),
p. 191.
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It is more accurate to say that ownership of land
among African communities in Kenya was part communal
part individual. This kind of land ownership practised
by these communities can be traced to the period when
those communities migrated from the northern parts of
the continent into what is now Kenya seeking areas to
settle, eventually settling in land that was unclaimed.
Families within these communities would clear the land
of bush and seek to cultivate it, and each family would
demarcate the land that they had cleared. Although the
land belonged to the head of the family each member of
the family had the right to live, work and cultivate on
the land. Normally, the head of the famil, %iho
usually had more than one wife, would allocate land to
his wives to cultivate upon during their lives. When
his sons reached marriageable age he would also
allocate some land to them to cultivate and build upon.
This would be the basis for the development of their
own families. If the family head died before he could
allocate land to his sons, then the customary rules of
intestacy for that group would apply 8 . This process
would be repeated when each son started his own family
8	 It is true to say that the customary rules of
intestacy among many societies were more or less
identical. It was often the case that the sons of the
deceased family head received equal shares of the
property, the notional title to which had been vested
in the deceased, such property being viewed as family
land.
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and later would allocate among his male issue shares of
the land that he initially received from his father9.
The communal nature of land ownership was
demonstrated by the fact that not only was land set
aside for communal purposes, such as grazing land, but
also within the family the family head could not
transfer the land to another member of the community
without seeking first the consent of his family members
and the consent of the clan elders 10 . The nature of
the interests of the family members in the land
reflects the African view that land was shared by the
members of the family as a whole, because land was
regarded as a "social and economic cement that held the
society together" 11 . Land was not viewed as a mere
commodity to sell or to speculate with, but as a means
of providing the family social and economic security12.
Nevertheless, the fact that there was a power to
sell the land, subject to the necessary consents, plus
9	 The daughters never received a share of land
absolutely. See E. Cotran, Restatement of African Law, 
(Kenya), The Law of Succession, Vol. 2. (London 1969),
for an illuminating discussion on the laws of
succession of different tribes in Kenya. See also
Chapter Two, supra.
10 See Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, (Nairobi,
1979) pp. 31-2.
11 Mwangi Wa-Githumo, Land and Nationalism (New York,
1981), p. 48.
12	 In Warari v Public Trustee H.C.C.C. No. 227 of
1975 (unreported), E. Cotran, Casebook on Kenya 
Customary Law (Nairobi 1987), Case No. 86 p. 310 at p.
321, Muli J., remarking on Kikuyu custom, said that the
custom discouraged "free alienation of land ...
although alienation among members of the family and the
clan was to a limited extend permissible."
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the fact that an individual family member who had been
allocated land by the head could exclude other
community members from it meant that land ownership was
not wholly communal but was tinged with a form of
private ownership.
This interwoven nature of communal and private
ownership as expressed through the family members was
commented upon by A.P. Barlow who, on observing the
Kikuyu people, said:
"The sense of family ownership is so strong
and the instinct to preserve the integrity of
the family's land (githaka) is so deep seated
that the inquirer into the system of tenure
may at times find difficulty in disentangling
family rights and individual rights. Under
normal circumstances, family control over the
land remains inconspicuous, and individual
rights play the important part in the
everyday life of the land (githaka). Every
sub-division of the clan (mbari), and every
individual, down to the youngest son of the
youngest wife of the most junior member of
the family, have their indisputable rights in
their respective portions of the land. And
yet every transaction concerning any modicum
of the land is preceded by consultation
between the members of the mbari whose common
interests are affected."13
Although this method of land holding was unique to the
Africans and satisfactory for their purposes, the
colonial government saw it as an impediment to
agricultural development. The Working Party on African
Land Tenure said that this method of ownership was "a
serious danger" to the idea of using and utilising land
economically and to make it freely negotiable, because
13 The Kenya Land Commission Report, Evidence and
Memoranda, Cmd. 4556 (1934), p. 3023.
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the customary laws of inheritance "produces more and
more owners and smaller and smaller shares" 14 . The
Working Party felt that it would be difficult to
develop land as a single unit, or even to sell it to a
purchaser, because of "the impracticability of
obtaining the agreement of numerous persons" 15 . This
method of land holding would make it very difficult for
a progressive co-owner to obtain a mortgage to develop
a portion of his share of the land, if the other co-
owners were unwilling to grant their consent.
Furthermore banks would be unwilling to lend their
money to owners of land held under customary law.
Since customary law was by nature unwritten, it meant
that those claiming rights of ownership in land subject
to customary law could not prove their cmlNersh.
documents which could act as sufficient security for
the banks.
The system of land registration proposed by the
Working Party on African Land Tenure was designed to
remove this uncertainty, since the interests of those
claiming ownership of land would be recorded on the
register, with registration being proof of ownership16.
The Working Party also proposed to limit the number of
co-owners who could be registered as owners of
14 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure, 1957-8, (Nairobi 1958), para. 82.
15	 Ibid.
16 See Chapter Three, supra, for the discussion of
land adjudication the aim of which was to have these
rights recorded.
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registered land to five 17 . This would prevent
unauthorized subdivisions on the ground and would fully
secure the rights of those registered.
B. Co-ownership Under the Indian Transfer of Property
Act 1882
The African system of land tenure was confined to
the Trust Lands. Land outside the Trust Lands was set
apart for European settlement 18 . The substantive law
governing land outside the Trust Lands was provided by
the Indian Transfer of Property Act 188219.
This Act was deficient in many respects, and one
of its deficiencies was its failure to define forms of
co-ownership and provide an adequate structure for co-
owning land. The provisions of the Act merely implied
that a joint tenancy and a tenancy in common could be
created and they did not define what they were or the
conditions under which they could be held. The oblique
references in the Act to such forms of co-ownership
were sections 44 - which allowed a tenant in common to
sell his share - and section 45 which provided that a
purchase of property by two or more persons would
result in their sharing the property in shares
corresponding to their contributions; section 46
17 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure, op. cit., para. 87.
18 This land came to be known as the Scheduled Areas
which were defined in the seventh schedule to the
Highlands Order-in-Council 1939.
19 It was a simplified version of the Conveyancing
Act 1881, an Act in force in England before the Law of
Property Act 1925 was enacted.
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provided that where there was a sale the proceeds would
be divided in accordance with the shares they held in
the property.
The failure of the Indian Transfer of Property Act
1882 to adequately and comprehensively fill in the
substantive law on joint tenancies and tenancies in
common and, in particular, the lack of a proper
definition and the conditions upon which they were held
meant that the gaps in the Act had to be filled by the
application of English common law20.
C. Co-ownership Under English Common Law21
The essential nature of a joint tenancy under
common law is that the joint tenants as a group own the
entire interest in the property but without ihdicatioa
as to the share of each. The common law provided that
for a joint tenancy to be created what are known as the
four unities must co-exist; these are unity of
possession, interest, time and title. If they do not
exist a tenancy in common will arise.
On the other hand, a tenant in common has a
definite interest in the property but it is not
physically demarcated and the shares of the tenant in
20 By virtue of art. 11(a) of the East Africa Order-
in-Council 1897 which was subsequently repealed and
eventually replaced by the Judicature Act, 1967
s. 3(1)(c), the applied common law would have been that
existing on 12 August 1897.
21 See generally Sir Robert Megarry & H.W.R. Wade,
The Law of Real Property, 5th ed., (London 1984), pp.
457-462.
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common remain undivided. The only unity required for a
tenancy in common was unity of possession. Before 1925
a tenancy in common in England was capable of existing
at law. This would mean that under the Indian Transfer
of Property Act 1882 both joint tenancies and tenancies
in common could subsist as legal titles and can still
do notwithstanding the fact tenancies in common were
abolished as legal estates in England by the Law of
Property Act 1925 and thereafter they could only exist
in equity22.
As mentioned earlier, this chapter looks at the
structure set up by the Registered Land Act 1963
regarding co-ownership in comparison with the English
common law position and the structure under the Law of
Property Act 1925. Further analysis is made of the
judicial approach to the position of co-owners and
beneficiaries where land is registered in the name of
one person. In the third section of this chapter of
the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968 is discussed.
This Act was passed by the Kenya Parliament to
facilitate the registration of land occupied by large
groups of people who had no concept of individual land
ownership, but rather held land communally. Since the
co-ownership structure in the Registered Land Act 1963
22	 Ss. 1(6), 34(1), 36(2); Settled Land Act 1925,
s. 36(4). Co-parcenary and tenancy by entireties were
two further types of co-ownership that existed prior to
1925. The latter was abolished by the Law of Property
Act 1925, Sched. 1, Pt VI, whereas the former rarely
occurs and is now virtually obsolete - see generally
Sir Robert Megarry and H.W.R. Wade, op.cit., pp. 456-
462.
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would have been unsuitable for these groups the 1968
Act sets up a form of co-ownership that is unique to
these groups.
II. Co-ownership Under The Registered Land Act 1963 
The Registered Land Act 1963 introduced two types
of co-ownership: joint proprietorship and
proprietorship in common 23 . The terminology used to
express these two forms of co-ownership is modern and
does not reflect the anachronistic 'joint tenancy' and
'tenancy in common' still used in English law.
Although the tenor of the Kenyan 'joint proprietorship'
and the 'proprietorship in common' is similar to the
English joint tenancy and tenancy in common, there are
differences in their characteristics. An important
difference lies in the function of law and equity in
relation to land that is co-owned. The Law of Property
Act 1925 established that all forms of co-ownership
should exist behind a trust for sale with the legal
estate being held by a small number of trustees. The
Registered Land Act 1963, however, did not set up a
similar arrangement and as a result, a conceptual
problem has arisen.
23	 Ss. 102, 103.
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A.	 The 'Joint Proprietorship' and the 'Joint Tenancy'
Contrasted
The characteristics of the joint proprietorship
are set out in section 102 of the Registered Land Act
1963. That section provides as follows:
"(1) Where the land, lease or charge is owed
jointly, no proprietor is entitled to any
separate share in the land, and consequently
-
(a) dispositions may be made only by all the
joint proprietors; and
(b) on the death of a joint proprietor, his
interest shall vest in the surviving
proprietor or the surviving proprietors
jointly.
(2) For avoidance of doubt, it is hereby
declared that -
(a) the sole proprietor of any land, lease or
charge may transfer the same to himself and
other person jointly; and
(b) a joint proprietor of any land, lease or
charge may transfer his interest therein to
all the other proprietors. 	 .
(3) Joint proprietors, not being trustees,
may execute an instrument in the prescribed
form signifying that they agree to sever the
joint proprietorship, and the severance shall
be completed by registration of the joint
proprietors as proprietors in common and by
filing the instrument."
The essential nature of joint ownership is therefore
preserved in this section; in the eyes of the common
law joint owners are viewed as one person even though
as between themselves they have separate rights. This
is reflected in section 102(1) of the Registered Land
Act 1963 which provides that no joint proprietor is
entitled to any separate share in the land, and in
section 102(1)(a) of the same Act which provides that
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dispositions may be made only by all the joint
proprietors.
A unique feature of joint ownership at common law
was jus accrescendi - the right of survivorship. This
right is enshrined in section 102(1)(b) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 to the effect that on the
death of one joint owner his interest in the land vests
in the other joint owner(s), the process continuing
until there is only one survivor who then holds as the
sole owner.
At common law for a joint tenancy to be created
the four unities had to co-exist; with unity of
possession each joint tenant must be entitled to the
possession of the whole of the land; unity of interest
required that each joint tenant must have the same
estate or interest in the land; unity of title required
that each joint tenant must have the same title, having
acquired it in the same instrument; whereas unity of
time meant that each joint tenant must have an estate
for the same time 24 . Since the Registered Land Act
1963 is silent on how a joint proprietorship can be
created, this would appear to be an area where the
provisions of the common law of England regarding the
creation of a joint tenancy would apply by virtue of
section 163 of the Registered Land Act 1963.
24	 Sir Robert Megarry & H.W.R. Wade, op cit., pp.
419-422.
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1.	 Severance of a Joint Tenancy
In England the methods of severance at common law
were summarised in Williams v. Hensman25 by Sir William
Page-Wood V.C. where he stated three methods of
severing a joint tenancy: first, by an act of any one
of the persons interested operating on his own share;
secondly, severance by mutual agreement; and thirdly,
severance by a course of dealing. Before 1926 a joint
tenancy could be severed both at law and in equity by
any one of the three ways above. However, section
36(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 abolished the
right to sever a joint tenancy at law although it did
not affect the right to sever a joint tenancy in
equity, and neither did it affect the common law
methods of severance. Nevertheless, section 36(2) did
add an additional method of severance, namely, the
service by a tenant upon the other joint tenants of a
notice indicating a desire to sever. By virtue of
section 196(4) of the Law of Property Act 1925 this
notice can be sent by post in a registered letter
addressed to the other joint tenants at their address.
Once a joint tenancy is severed in equity the
joint tenants become tenants in common in equal shares
irrespective of the size of their contributions to the
purchase price 26 while the legal estate is still held
as a joint tenancy on trust for sale.
25	 (1861) 1 J. & H. 546 at p. 557-558.
26	 Goodman v. Gallant [1986] Fain. 106. See also M.P.
Thompson, Co-Ownership (London 1988), pp. 24-25.
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2.	 Severance of a Joint Proprietorship
The Registered Land Act 1963 on the other hand
provides that a joint proprietor can sever the joint
proprietorship by executing an instrument in the
prescribed form 27 . Since no other methods of severance
are prescribed in the Act, can it be argued that the
Williams v Hensman28 methods of severance are
applicable to jointly owned land under the 1963 Act?
According to section 163 of the Registered Land
Act 1963, the English common law is applicable to land
registered under the 1963 Act but subject to the
provisions of the Act. Since section 102(3) of the
1963 Act does provide a method of severance it would
follow that the additional common law methods of
severance cannot be applied, since the common law is
applicable where there is a gap in the provisions of
the Act. This interpretation was applied by the Court
of Appeal in Virginia Edith Wambui Otieno v Joash 
Ochieng Ougo & Another 29 when considering a similar
provision to section 163 in the Judicature Act 1967
(s.3(1)). They said that "the common law and doctrines
of equity ... are to be applied to fill up what is not
provided for in the written laws ..." (italics mine).
This means, therefore, that where severance of a joint
27	 S. 102(3). For the form see Registered Land Rules
1963, 3rd Sched., Form R.L. 15.
28	 Op.cit.
29	 Civil App. No.31 of 1987 (unreported); Eugene
Cotran, Casebook on Kenya Customary Law, (Nairobi
1987), Case No. 88, p.331.
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proprietorship is concerned, there is only one method
of severance compared to the four methods in English
Law.
Severance, under the 1963 Act, can only be
undertaken by joint proprietors who are not trustees".
This would appear to be similar to the position under
the Law of Property Act 1925 whereby severance of a
joint tenancy can only be made in equity 31 . This is
made possible due to the fact that the Law of Property
Act 1925 automatically sets up a trust for sale
whenever land is co-owned 32 so that, for example, the
legal estate can be held by joint tenants on trust for
sale for themselves beneficially. However, the
position under the 1963 Act is made ambiguous by the
fact that the Act does not reveal hom and when a joint
proprietor can be made a trustee, thereby making it
difficult to determine which joint proprietor can or
cannot sever the joint proprietorship33 . A further
important difference is the fact that under English
law, where severance of a joint tenancy in equity is
made and the land is already registered under the Land
Registration Act 1925, the joint tenants who are now
tenants in common cannot be registered as proprietors
unless they happen to be registered as legal joint
30	 Registered Land Act 1963, s.102(3).
31	 Law of Property Act 1925, s.36(2).
32	 Ss. 34(2), 36(2).
33	 See the suggested solution, supra.
450
tenants, such legal joint tenancy not being
severable 34 . In contrast, under section 102(3) of the
Registered Land Act 1963, the equitable joint
proprietors who sever their shares are registered as
proprietors in common. However, in harmony with
section 101(4) of the 1963 Act, the number of persons
who are registered cannot exceed five. What is the
position where there are more than five? The Act is
silent. This problem is addressed below.
Unilateral severance by one joint tenant acting on
his own share would not appear to be possible under the
Registered Land Act 1963. This is implied by the
wording in section 102(3) which states that "Joint
proprietors
... may execute an instrument signifying that they
agree to sever ... and the severance shall be completed
by registration of the joint proprietors as proprietors
in common •.." (italics mine). Section 102(2)(b) of
the Act further states that a joint proprietor may
transfer his interest to all the other proprietors. No
mention is made as to whether that interest can be
alienated inter vivos or by will to someone who is not
a joint proprietor. The Act therefore makes it
virtually impossible for a joint proprietor, who does
not want his share to pass to the other joint
proprietors on his death, to sever his share
unilaterally so that he can transmit that share in his
34	 Law of Property Act 1925, s. 36(2).
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will to his heirs or to transfer it to a third party
inter vivos. The difficulty was caused by the fact that
he would have to get all the other joint proprietors to
agree to sever their shares as wel1. 35 This may be
virtually impossible especially where there are numerous
co-owners some of whom may not want to sever their
shares. The effect of this means that unlike the position
in English law whereby one joint tenant can sever his
share and transfer it inter vivos to a stranger who then
holds that share as tenant in common while the other
joint tenants still continue to hold their shares as
joint tenants, 36 joint proprietors under the 1963 Act
would all have to sever their shares and all become
proprietors in common. It would not be possible for some
joint owners to remain as joint proprietors while others
hold as proprietors in common.
But suppose a joint proprietor decided to forge the
signatures of the other joint proprietors on the
prescribed form; would this be sufficient to sever the
joint proprietorship? Although this issue has not been
considered in Kenya, the English Court of Appeal in
37First National Securities v. Hegerty 	 took the view
that the act of a husband who forged his wife's signature
on a legal charge was "a sufficient act of alienation of
35 The position is similar for proprietors in common -
S. 103(2) Registered Land Act 1963.
36 Bedson v Bedson [1965] 2 QB 666 at 689, per Russell
L.J.
37 [1985] Q.B. 850. See also Ahmed v Kendrick [1988]
Fam. Law 201.
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the husband's interest to sever the beneficial joint
tenancy" and the effect was that they held as tenants in
common." Since there is nothing in section 102 of the
Registered Land Act 1963 to conflict with the application
of this principle, nor is there judicial opinion to the
contrary it is arguable that this case could apply in
Kenya by virtue of section 163 of the Registered Land Act
1963, with the result that the other joint proprietors
become proprietors in common.
Nevertheless, safeguards in the Registered Land Act
1963 make it difficult for a co-owner to forge the
signatures of the other co-owners. Section 110 of the
Act provides that the execution of an instrument must be
verified before the Registrar or other public
officer. 39
 Since the prescribed form of severance must
be registered" the Registrar would have to ascertain
that the signatures of the co-owners are proper and
not mere forgeries. 41
 However, if a co-owner was
38 [1985] Q.B. 850 at p. 862, per Sir Denys Buckley. The
case was decided on other grounds.
39 Registered Land Rules 1963, r. 7, Fourth Schedule.
40 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 102(3).
41 This would be done by verifying the signatures as
well as the identities of the co-owners against their
national identity cards.
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successful in forging the signatures of the other co-
owners and had the form of severance registered, a
chargee, in pursuing his power of sale under section
77(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963, should only be
able to recover the loan money from the cash value of
the forger's share of the proceeds of sale, the rest of
the money entitled to be distributed to the other co-
owners.
What is the legal position in Kenya where one
joint tenant kills the only other joint tenant in order
to obtain that ones share by jus accrescendi? 42 The
Law of Succession Act 1972 provides in section 96(1)
that
"a person who, while sane, murders another
person shall not be entitled directly or
indirectly to any share in the estate of the
murdered person, and the persons beneficially
entitled to shares in the estate of the
murdered person shall be ascertained as
though the murderer died immediately before
the murdered person".
However, it would appear to follow that if the joint
tenant is found guilty of manslaughter, he would be
entitled to the estate of the dead joint tenant43.
Section 96(1) of the Law of Succession Act 1972
reflects the long established principle at English law
known as the forfeiture rule, that a criminal should
not profit from his crime44 . However, section 96(1)
42	 Registered land Act 1963, s. 102(1)(b).
43 See Law of Succession Act 1972, s. 96(2). The
same would apply if the joint tenant became insane
before committing the murder - ibid, s. 96(1).
44	 In the Estate of Crippen [1911] p.108 at p.112,
per Evans P.
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only applies to murder and would not apply, for
example, where the criminal is guilty of manslaughter.
Looked at closely, section 96(1) arguably does not
offer any solution to the problem where one joint
tenant murders the other. The section merely refers to
the fact that the defendant shall not be entitled to
any share "in the estate of the murdered person". By
implication this would mean that the defendant would be
entitled to his own share where the property was
jointly owned or where the proprietor and the deceased
are proprietors in common45.
Therefore, if the defendant and the deceased held
the property as joint proprietors under section 102 of
the Registered Land Act 1963, how would the share of
the deceased be held? There are two solutions to the
problem: the whole property can be vested in the
survivor in accord with the jus accrescendi principle,
but holding one half on constructive trust for the
benefit of the next of kin of the deceased, with the
survivor not entitled to take as a beneficiary; or
secondly, the killing would sever the joint
proprietorship so that the survivor and the deceased
(or his estate) became proprietors in common. The
45 While in English law a tenant in common would be
entitled to receive his share, it was held in Davitt v
Titcumb [1989] 3 All E.R. 417 that the estate of the
murdered tenant in common is entitled to receive a
contribution in equity from the surviving tenant in
common.
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former solution has been promoted in the Commonwealth"
while the latter represents the position at English
law47 . Under English law the survivor holds the
property on trust for himself and the estate of the
deceased as tenants in common in equal shares48.
In view of the fact that Kenyan law is silent on
the question of how the shares of two joint tenants
should be held where one has murdered the other, if the
property was registered under the Registered Land Act
1963 it is submitted that the English common law
position is applicable by virtue of section 163 of the
1963 Act. Therefore the survivor holds the property on
trust for himself and the deceased's estate as
proprietors in common. Arguably the English common law
position should also apply where the surviving joint
tenant is guilty of manslaughter. Since section 96(1)
of the Law of Succession Act 1972 is only concerned
with murder, the implication is that the surviving
joint tenant would be entitled to the interest ot the
deceased, even though found guilty of manslaughter.
However, where the land is registered under the
Registered Land Act 1963 it is submitted that the
46	 Schobelt v. Barber (1966) 60 D.L.R. (2d) 519; Re
Pechar (dec'd) (1969) N.Z.L.R. 574.
47	 Re K (dec'd) [1985] Ch. 85, affmd [1986] 1 Ch.
180.
48 Ibid. See Kevin Gray Elements of Land Law,
(London, 1987) pp. 333 et. seq. Sections 2(1) & (2) of
the Forfeiture Act 1982 allow the courts to modify the
forfeiture rule by taking into account the conduct of
the offender and the deceased and other material
circumstances.
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equitable principle that no criminal should profit from
his own crime is applicable by virtue of section 163 of
the Act49 thereby displacing the implication above.
Unilateral severance is permissible under the Law
of Property Act 1925 50 by a joint tenant acting upon
his own share by giving notice to the other joint
tenants of his intention to sever 51 . In England it had
once been thought that one joint tenant could sever his
interest by adopting a course of conduct from which his
intention to sever could be inferred, for example
taking out a summons under section 17 of the Married
Women's Property Act 1882 asking for an order that the
property be sold 52 . However, it is accepted that a
unilateral act or course of conduct by one joint tenant
can be sufficient to sever the joint tenancy as long as
it indicates an intention to terminate the joint
tenancy and is made clear to the other joint tenant53.
Unilateral severance by one joint tenant giving notice
to the other joint tenants only affects the share of
the joint tenant who is severing so that while his
49 In the case of land that is not registered under
the Registered Land Act and therefore subject to the
Indian Transfer of Property Act 1882, it is submitted
that the English common law position would also be
applicable by virtue of section 3 of the Judicature Act
1967 (Cap 8).
50	 S. 36(2).
51 Ibid.
52	 Re Draper's Conveyance [1969] 1 Ch. 486.
53 Sir Robert Megarry & H.W.R. Wade, The Law of Real 
Property,  5th ed., (London, 1984) p. 432.
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interest converts into that of a tenant in common, the
shares of the other joint tenants still remain joint
tenancies.
The Registered Land Act 1963 therefore creates a
serious limitation on the power of a joint proprietor
to sever his share unilaterally. This can create
potential difficulties where the joint tenants are
husband and wife and the marriage has broken down and
the wife, for example, seeks to sever her interest but
the husband refuses to sever his share. It is
submitted that the wording of section 102 (2) & (3) of
the 1963 Act does not allow the application of common
law principles on unilateral severance by a joint
tenant. However, the solution to this problem lies in
the procedure on partitioning land that is set out in
sections 104-106 of the Registered Land Act 1963 and is
discussed below.
B. Characteristics of the Proprietorship in Common
Before 1926, a tenancy in common could exist in
English law as a legal estate and in equity. However,
section 1(6) of the Law of Property Act 1925 abolished
it as a legal estate and now it can only exist in
equity under a trust for sale. In Kenya the Working
Party on African Land Tenure considered whether the
tenancy in common should be contained in the
legislation on land registration that they were about
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to introduce54 . They felt that although it had been
abolished as a legal estate in England, there was no
harm in retaining it in Kenya because there were
occasions where it might be desired; for example, it
might encourage a father and his sons to work a holding
together in partnership, or it could encourage a
businessman and a farmer to team up together in
developing a farm, the former providing capital for the
enterprise 55 . However, the Working Party had consulted
other officials who were of the opinion that land
should be inherited by a sole heir as a safeguard
against fragmentation of land; some Africans in some of
the Districts expressed a desire that land should be
inherited by a sole heir 56 . The Working Party
therefore decided to have the 'best of both worlds' by
not forbidding a tenancy in common altogether, but by
having not more than five persons registered as the
owners of any parcel of land57 . The tenancy in common
was renamed 'proprietorship in common' which would
reflect the modern sense of the phrase.
The characteristics of the 'proprietorship in
common' are now set out in section 103 of the
Registered Land Act 1963 and they are as follows:
54 Report of the Working Party on African Land Tenure
1957-8, (Nairobi 1958), para. 84.
55	 Ibid., para. 86.
56	 Ibid., paras. 84, 85.
57	 See now Registered Land Act 1963, s. 101(4).
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"(1) Where any land, lease or charge is owned
in common, each proprietor shall be entitled
to an undivided share in the whole, and on
the death of a proprietor his share shall be
administered as part of his estate.
(2) No proprietor in common shall deal with
his undivided share in favour of any person
other than another proprietor in common of
the same land, except with the consent in
writing of the remaining proprietor or
proprietors of the land, but such consent
shall not be unreasonably withheld."
Section 103(1) reflects the common law position
regarding tenancies in common. Under common law,
tenants in common hold in undivided shares, with each
having a distinctive share in the property but which is
not yet divided among the tenants. While the tenancy
lasted no one could say which particular share belonged
to him58 , but nevertheless it is only between tenants
in common that the allocation of shares or proportions
was possible, unlike joint tenants, so that, for
example, A could claim a one-quarter interest and B a
three-quarters interest. This would also be similar
with the 'proprietorship in common' under the
Registered Land Act 1963. However, unity of
possession, which is the sole and an essential
constitutive element of a tenancy in common 59 , and, a
fortiori, a proprietorship in common, would mean that
no proprietor in common could physically demarcate any
58	 Sir Robert Megarry & H.W.R. Wade, op. cit., p.
422.
59 Kevin Gray, Elements of Land Law (London 1987),
p. 303.
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part of that land as his to the exclusion of the other
proprietors in common.
Section 103(1) also indicates the absence of a
right of survivorship in a proprietorship in common
which was also absent in a tenancy in common at common
law. In the absence of a right of survivorship, the
share of each proprietor in common passes on his death
either in accordance with the terms of his will (if he
dies testate) or according to the rules of intestate
succession".
However, the proprietor in common, by virtue of
section 103(2), cannot deal with his undivided share as
he would like. He would have to seek the consent of
the others in writing if, for example, he wanted to
alienate his share inter vivos to a third party. The
Working Party on African Land Tenure inserted this
provision to "emphasize the partnership nature of this
co-ownership" and to enable the other co-owners "to
prevent the intrusion into the 'partnership' of anybody
they do not like" 61 . But the Working Party was aware
of the danger whereby an unscrupulous co-owner could
refuse to give his consent to a sale and thereby
depreciate the value of the undivided share 62 . Their
solution was to provide a procedure whereby the co-
60 Ibid. The Law of Succession Act 1972 governs the
rules of intestate succession in Kenya.
61 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure, 1957-58, (Nairobi 1958), para. 89.
62	 Ibid.
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owner who was unable to obtain the necessary consents
to the sale of his undivided share could apply to the
Registrar for the land to be partitioned or sold and
either a separate part of the land could be allocated
to him or the land or his share could be valued and
offered for sale63.
However, section 103(2) contains a proviso which
states that "such consent shall not be unreasonably
withheld". This acts as a safeguard to prevent the
withdrawal of consent by a co-owner for unwarranted
reasons. Nevertheless, if a co-owner can provide good
reasons for refusing to grant consent, the court cannot
force that one to give his consent. In Mohamedali v
Keki Dastoori" it was held that the consent of the
other co-owner is not a mere formality and if he raised
valid objections, and the applicant cannot discharge
his burden of proving that they are unreasonable, then
the court will uphold those objections.
This subsection seems to reflect the customary law
position existing in many societies whereby one who
sought to grant some interest or land to a stranger who
was not a member of the family, clan or tribe could not
do so until the consent of the elders had been
obtained65 . The purpose of the Registered Land Act
1963 was to remove the constraints of customary law
63	 Ibid.
64	 (1976) Kenya L.R. 233.
65	 See S. Coldham, Land Control in Kenya, [1978]
J.A.L. 63 at pp. 72-73.
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enabling security of title as well as allowing freely
marketable titles thereby freeing landowners from the
constraints of customary law. The safeguard is that a
co-owner of registered land, who is hampered by the
unreasonable objections of the other co-owners, may not
only make an application to the High Court to have the
objections removed, but may also employ the partition
procedure set out in sections 104-106 of the Registered
Land Act 1963 which is now discussed.
C.	 Partition
Partition is the method whereby "each of the co-
owners becomes the owner of a single defined
subdivision of the land in proportion to the size of
his undivided share" 66 . The Working Party on African
Land Tenure felt that the partition of co-owned land
would be a safeguard against the shortcomings of
multiple ownership. Their recommendations were adopted
and sections 104-106 of the Registered Land Act 1963
now contain detailed provisions on partitioning land
owned in common. Partition was in effect the method
that was adopted under the 1963 Act to help a
proprietor in common who wanted to deal with his
undivided share but was prevented by the other
proprietors in common who refused to grant their
consent to such a move under section 103(2), or where a
joint proprietor wanted to sever his share unilaterally
66 S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration
(Cambridge 1976), p. 244.
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but was prevented from doing so by the provisions of
section 102(3) of the Registered Land Act 196367.
An application can be made to the Registrar for
the partition of land owned in common by any one or
more of the proprietors". The Registrar can effect
partition of the land in accordance with the agreement
of the proprietors in common, and if there is no
agreement, then the Registrar can partition the land in
"such a manner as he may determine" 69 . It would appear
therefore that partition can be forced on the other co-
owners even if they wanted otherwise. Each co-owner
would get a separate piece of the original land
proportional to his share. Partition is then completed
by "closing the register of the parcel partitioned and
opening registers in respect of the new parcels created
by the partition and filing the agreement or
determination"70.
The Registrar may order sale of the co-owned land
either because the land is incapable of partition - for
example because it is too small and partition would
result in parcels of land which are below the economic
level conducive for effective farming 71 - or because
67 Supra.
68	 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 104(1)(a). This is
made on form R.L. 16 - Registered Land Rules 1963, 3rd
Schedule.
69	 Ibid., s. 104(1).
70	 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 104(1).
71 The economic levels vary from district to
district. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture
recommended that the economic level in Kisii District
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the partition would adversely affect the proper use of
the land, and a demand is made by one of the
proprietors in common that the land or share be sold72.
The Registrar is entitled to value the land, in default
of any agreement between the co-owners, and sell it by
public auction 73 and any proprietor in common is
entitled to buy the whole of the land or share, thus
enabling him, to buy out the others74.
However, where land is sought to be partitioned
but the shares would be too small to satisfy the co-
proprietors, the Registrar is authorised to "add such
share to the share of any other proprietor or
distribute such share amongst two or more other
proprietors in such manner and in such proportions as,
in default of agreement, he thinks fit" 75 . The
proprietor who has had his share distributed to the
others is entitled to receive the value of his share
from the other co-proprietors who have received a
proportion of it76.
should not be less that 3.0 ha, while in Nyeri the
minimum levels varied between 2.4-4.0 ha - R.J.A.
Wilson, Land Tenure and Economic Development: A Study 
of the Economic Consequences of Land Registration in 
Kenya's Smallholder Areas, (1972) 22 J.S.S.I.I. 124 at
pp. 143, 147.
72	 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 105(1).
73	 Ibid.
74	 Ibid., s. 105(2).
75	 Ibid., s. 106(1).
76	 Ibid., s. 106(2).
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This procedure is in direct contrast to the
position of co-owners in English law. A joint tenancy
or a tenancy in common can only exist behind a trust
for sale, and consequently the trustees for sale are
given power to effect a partition if the co-owners want
to physically sub-divide the land. Under section 28(3)
of the Law of Property Act 1925 trustees for sale can
effect partition with the consent of the beneficiaries
and to convey to each his separate portion of the land.
However, if one of the beneficiaries refused to consent
to a partition, then any person interested can apply to
the court under section 30 of the Law of Property Act
1925 which may then make "such order as it thinks fit".
It has been noted that partition of co-owned land in
England is very rare 77 . In contrast applicaticms tom
partition of land by co-owners are numerous in Kenya.
For example, between July 1988 and July 1989, the
Kiambu Land Registrar received 762 applications for the
partition of co-owned land 78 . Many of these
applications concerned co-owners, many of whom were
related to each other, holding an interest in
agricultural land and seeking to partition that land
for a variety of reasons; one example was where a
husband registered some land in the names of his two
wives as joint proprietors, but the wives had a
77	 Kevin Gray, Elements of Land Law (London 1987), p.
342, n. 13.
78 Kiambu District Land Registry, Monthly Returns,
July 1988 - July 1989.
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disagreement and sought to have the land partitioned79.
In another example, two brothers with an interest in
land, which previously had been in the name of their
deceased father, sought to have that land partitioned
because they each wanted to farm a separate portion of
it80.
To understand the reason as to why partition of
land is rare in England while common in Kenya, one has
only to look at the type of property that is registered
and the physical relationships of the co-owners. In
England co-owners mainly consist of either husband and
wife or co-habitees, and the type of property that is
co-owned consists of a house which forms the
matrimonial home. If the relationship breaks down
(which is frequently the case in co-ownership
disputes), and the parties seek to realise their
shares, it is impossible to physically sub-divide the
house. Consequently the house is sold to enable the
proceeds of sale to be shared. On the other hand, in
Kenya a lot of land that is subject to co-ownership is
mainly farmland, and many farms are co-owned by family
members. Where disputes arise between the co-owners,
usually over inheritance, partition is sought so that
the co-owners can farm their own identifiable portion
79	 Re Komathai/Kibichoi/801, K. D. L. R. Case File
(unreported).
80 Re Ndumberi/Ndumberi/1089 K. D. L. R. Case File
(unreported).
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of the land, as opposed to selling the land to realise
their shares, land being viewed as very precious81.
It was mentioned earlier land that is subject to
co-ownership in England is held on trust for sale. The
trust for sale is a conveyancing device to facilitate
the transfer of land that is subject to co-ownership.
The purchaser deals with a limited number of trustees
without having to investigate the title of all the
beneficiaries, and the interest of the beneficiaries
transferred to the proceeds of sale (known as the
doctrine of conversion) 82 . However, the Registered
Land Act 1963 never adopted the trust for sale or any
other trust where land is subject to co-ownership.
This causes a conceptual and practical problem where
land is owned by more than five people. This issue is
discussed in the next section.
III. Co-ownership And The Imposition Of Trusts
Co-ownership of land has been viewed as a
'disease' because it is a barrier to effective dealings
with land and thereby impedes development 83 . It has
been pointed out that it can be cured in several ways:
81 However, if the partition of land proceeds at this
rate, the problem of land fragmentation which had
largely been eradicated by the programme of land
consolidation, will bound to recur in the future.
82	 Kevin Gray, op. cit., pp. 358, et seq. However,
the Law Commission has recommended the abolition of the
trust for sale, and to be replaced with a new trust of
land - The Law Commission, Transfer of Land, Trusts of 
Land, Law Corn. No. 181. Discussed infra.
83	 S. Rowton Simpson, op cit., p.243.
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(a) by partitioning the land, (b) appointing trustees
to deal with the land, (c) incorporating the co-owners,
or (d) compulsorily selling sub-economic shares 84 . The
approach in English law since 1925 to facilitate
dealings with land subject to co-ownership, is to
impose a statutory trust for sale upon land conveyed to
or held by on behalf of two or more persons
beneficially, whether as joint tenants or as tenants in
common85 . The legal estate is held by not more than
four trustees as joint tenants" "upon trust to sell
the [land] and to stand possessed of the net proceeds
of sale ... and subject to such powers and provisions,
as may be requisite for giving effect to the rights of
the persons ... interested in the land ..." 87 . A
purchaser therefore is only be concerned with the legal
estate vested in the trustees for sale. The beneficial
interests would be of no concern to him so long as he
paid his purchase money to two or more trustees for
sale or a trust corporation88 . This greatly improved
the investigation of title, and no longer would the
purchaser have the inconvenience of investigating the
84	 Ibid.
85	 Law of Property Act 1925, ss. 34 & 36.
86	 Ibid, s. 34(2).
87	 Law of Property Act 1925, s. 35.
88	 Ibid, ss. 2(1)(ii), 27. See City of London
Building Society v. Fleqq [1987] 2 W.L.R. 1266.
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titles of all the co-owners, especially where land was
held under a tenancy in common89.
In Kenya the approach was different. The Trusts
of Land Act 1941 imposes the mechanism of a trust for
sale where land is settled". However, the Trusts of
Land Act 1941 does not impose a trust for sale where
co-ownership arises. The Working Party on African Land
Tenure, when considering the topic of co-ownership, did
not even refer to the question of a trust arising where
land was co-owned. They merely stated that not more
than five persons should be registered as owners of any
parcel of land91 . Where there were more than five
persons, usually in cases of inheritance, the Working
Party proposed that the African court should decide
which five of them would take the land and how the
89	 Sir Robert Megarry & H.W.R. Wade, The Law of Real
Property, 5th ed. (London 1984), p.434.
90	 Ss. 10, 11, 12. The trustees therefore have a
duty to sell the land (see definition in section 2,
ibid) although a power to postpone sale is implied(ibid, s. 3(1)). A purchaser of settled land
overreaches the interests behind the trust if payment
of the purchase money is paid to no less than two
trustees for sale or a trust corporation (ibid, s.7.)
In comparison, the English settled Land Act 1925
imposes a cumbersome mechanism where land is settled.
The 1925 Act empowers the tenant for life with the
disposition of the settled land (s. 38) but in order to
overreach the interests of the settled land
beneficiaries, he must pay the proceeds of sale to no
less than two trustees of the settlement (s. 18(1)).
For who is a tenant for life and the trustees of the
settlement see Settled Land Act 1925, ss. 19 and 30
respectively. As to the creation of a settlement under
the 1925 Act, see s. 4(1).
91 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure, 1957-8 (Nairobi 1958), para. 87.
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others would be compensated, whether by distributing
the movable assets of the deceased, or by ordering the
payment of compensation by the registered five to the
excluded persons 92 . It is felt that the Working Party
promoted this solution because it was obsessed with
preventing the problem of fragmentation of land
recurring, thereby unravelling the whole programme of
land consolidation 93 . Land fragmentation had been
caused by the ownership, mainly through inheritance
under customary law, of numerous plots of land by
individuals which led to uneconomic farming94.
Therefore, having only five
persons registered as proprietors of one registered
parcel of land would result in fewer landowners and
therefore less subdivision of land. The recommendation
regarding the registration of a maximum of five co-
proprietors was adopted in section 101(4) of the
Registered land Act 1963. Section 101(3)(a) provides
that this number may be increased or reduced by the
Minister of Lands who "may prescribe the maximum number
... of persons who are allowed to be registered in the
same register as proprietors ..." 95 . Section 120 of
92	 Ibid.
93 See also the Report of the Mission on Land
Consolidation and Registration in Kenya 1965-66,
(London 1966), para. 266.
94 See Chapter Two, supra.
95 The maximum number of proprietors has been
increased to 20 but only in respect of land registered
in Embu district - Registered Land (Registration of
Maximum Number of Proprietors) Rules 1968.
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the Act also contained a procedure whereby an African
court could determine which heirs were entitled to
inherit the land of a proprietor who had died
intestate. Where there were more than five heirs
section 120(7) provided:
"a court ... may add the share of any
entitled person to the share of any other
entitled person or distribute such share
amongst two or more entitled persons in
accordance with any agreement which may be
made between such persons or, in the absence
of agreement, in such manner and in such
proportions as that court thinks fit, with
compensation, if any, as it may determine to
be proper to be paid by the person who
benefits by the addition to any person
adversely affected thereby, and the court may
order that such compensation be secured by
way of charge on the share of the person who
benefits by the addition."
The solution contained in the above provision would
have been unsatisfactory and unacceptable because no
African likes to be excluded from inheriting a piece of
land no matter how small it is or how numerous the
heirs are96 . As mentioned earlier in this chapter
Africans viewed land not as a mere commodity to buy and
sell, but as the cement that held society together. To
be excluded from inheriting a piece of land would in
effect be viewed as being excluded from one's own
society. Even if one was able to inherit movables,
inheriting no land was viewed as inheriting nothing97.
96	 See Warari v Public Trustee H.C.C.C. No. 227 of
1975 (unreported), reproduced in Eugene Cotran,
Casebook on Kenya Customary Law (Nairobi 1987) Case No.
86 p. 310 at pp. 320, 321.
97 See S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration,
(Cambridge 1976), p. 551.
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Land was certainly an emotive issue and this explains
why the sense of grievance that many Africans in Kenya
felt about their loss of land to the Europeans exploded
in the form of the Mau Mau civil war of the 1950s98.
Money could never be adequate compensation for loss of
land since money can, in any event, be squandered or
frittered away.
It is therefore not surprising that the procedure
in section 120(7) was found to be "very difficult to
operate" and therefore virtually unworkable99 . Section
120 was eventually repealed by the Law of Succession
Act 1972 100 . The Act introduced new rules of intestate
successionnl which determined how land and other
movable property would be inherited in intestacy. The
High court was granted power to consider who would be
granted letters of administration to distribute the
property according to the rules of intestacy in the Law
of Succession Act 1972 102 . It is provided in sections
35 and 38 of the Act that in the case of intestate
succession, the intestate's children receive an equal
share of the property 103
. Therefore the solution here
was that the land would be divided equally among the
98 See Chapter Two, supra.
99	 S. Rowton Simpson, op.cit., p. 576.
100	 .Ninth Schedule.
101 Part V.
102 S. 66.
103 The spouse having received a life interest in the
property.
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intestate's children, no matter how many there were.
Assuming that the children were interested in receiving
a physical share of the land, it would mean that the
land would have to be sub-divided and distributed among
them. 104
The solution provided by the Law of Succession Act
1972 meant that the wheel turned full circle. Sub-
division of the land that belonged to a proprietor who
had died intestate would result in the problem of land
fragmentation recurring, especially where the land was
agricultural, a problem which the Working Party on
African Land Tenure had striven to avoid.
However, the solution in the Law of Succession Act
1972 only applies where a proprietor has died intestate
and has heirs, who may number more than five, and who
are entitled to the land, which is registered in this
case. Those heirs would be entitled to have the land
sub-divided among them, an act which would prevent co-
ownership of the land from arising amongst them.
But the problem created by section 101(4) of the
Registered Land Act still remains. The Law of
Succession Act 1972 only came into force in July 1981
and there are still cases coming up before the courts
which involve registered proprietors who died intestate
before 1981 and who left several heirs claiming a share
104 Those who were not interested in the land could
simply sell their shares. However, if the deceased did
not own land, but owned a house, the ultimate result
would be that the house would have to be sold for each
of his issue to realise a share.
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in the registered land belonging to the deceased.
Since only five can be registered as proprietors of the
land, what happens to those in excess of five?
Moreover, what is the position where, for example, a
group of people, lets call them A, B, C, D, E, F, and
G, are interested in buying a plot of registered land?
The application of section 101(4) of the Registered
Land Act 1963 would mean that only A, B, C, D and E
would be entitled to be registered as proprietors. The
Act does not say what happens to F and G. The
pragmatic solution is that the five registered
proprietors should hold on trust for the others. But
what is the nature of this trust? The Registered Land
Act 1963 does not say. This is therefore, a serious
omission that was made by the drafters of the
Registered Land Act 1963 and this omission is to be
regretted. Nonetheless, it is submitted that there are
types of trusts that may be applicable depending on the
circumstances, and these are now considered in turn.
Also considered later is the solution that Parliament
proposed in the form of the Land (Group
Representatives) Act 1968.
A.	 Resulting Trusts
In English law, resulting trusts are classified
into two categories 105 : 'automatic' and 'presumed'
105 See the discussion by Megarry J. in Re
Vandervell's Trusts (No.2) [1974] Ch. 269 at p.294.
For a general discussion see Hanbury and Maudsley,
Modern Equity, 14th ed. by Jill E. Martin (London
1989), Chapters 10 & 11.
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resulting trusts. The first category arises where
property in conveyed to trustees but the beneficial
interest is not completely disposed of, causing a
resulting trust to arise in favour of the settlor. The
second category arises where a conveyance in property
is not made expressly upon trust, but due to certain
presumptions established by law, the legal owner is
required to hold the property upon trust for the
settlor. This section is concerned with the second
category of resulting trusts and the extent to vhich
they may apply to fill the gap created by section
101(4) of the Registered Land Act 1963. Two types of
presumed resulting trusts are considered.
1. Property Purchased in the Name of Another
Eyre C.B. in Dyer v Dyer l" explained the
principle thus:
"The clear result of all the cases, without a
single exception, is, that the trust of a
legal estate, ... whether taken in the names
of the purchasers and others jointly, or in
the name of others without that of the
purchaser, whether in one name or several;
whether jointly or successive, results to the
man who advances the purchase money.u107
The application of this type of resulting trust arises
frequently in England in the context of the matrimonial
home. The issue has been considered in Kenya in the
leading case of Karanja v Karanja. 108 The plaintiff
106 (1788) 2 Cox Eq. Cas. 92 at p.93.
107 See also Wray v Steele (1814) 2 V. & B. 388.
108 (1976) Kenya L.R. 307, Customary Law Casebook,
Case No. 30, p.116.
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had been married to the defendant for 20 years before
their marriage was dissolved. The plaintiff claimed
that during their marriage she made direct and indirect
contributions to the purchase of several properties
including the matrimonial home, all of which were
registered in the sole name of her husband. She
therefore sought a declaration that she was a joint
owner. Simpson J. held that the defendant held the
property on trust for himself and the plaintiff.
Significantly, Simpson J. stated that payments by the
wife need not be direct but may be indirect such as the
meeting of household or other expenses, since these
would relieve the husband from expenditure which he
would otherwise have had to bear, thereby helping him
indirectly with the mortgage expenses.
Although Simpson J. referred to the English case
of Gissinq v Gissinq l", he did not highlight the
stress laid by Lord Diplockln , where indirect
contributions are made, that such contributions must be
consistent with the existence of an original common
intention between the parties that they are to share
the beneficial interest in the home. In Karanja v
Karanja111 the wife had, in any event made substantial
109 [1971] A.C. 886.
110 Ibid., at pp. 908, 909 & 910. See the further
discussion below.
111 Supra.
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direct contributions to the purchase of the properties
to justify the imposition of a trust. 112
The purchase money resulting trust therefore
provides the answser in a situation where a group of
individuals, whether more or less than five, purchase
land which is registered in the names of one or more of
their number. Those registered as proprietors would
hold the land on resulting trust for those whose names
are not on the register of title, in shares depending
on their respective contributions. Where the
contributions have been in unequal shares then those
whose names are on the register hold for themselves and
the others as proprietors in common.113
2. Voluntary Transfers of Property
This type of resulting trust arises where the
existing owner of property makes a voluntary transfer
of the property to a third party or to one's wife, for
example. The grantee is said to have the legal estate
112 Simpson J. did not label the trust he imposed. It
was, nevertheless, a good example of a purchase money
resulting trust.
113 Wambui Njenga v F.X. Njenga, H.C.M.C. No. 342 of
1981 (unreported). The court in this case used the
phrase 'tenants in common' because the land was
registered under the Government Lands Act 1915, and
therefore subject to the Indian Transfer of Property
Act 1882. If the land was registered under the
Registered Land Act 1963 the appropriate phrase would
have been 'proprietors in common'. In England unequal
contributions may result in the purchasers holding as
tenants in common - Lake v Gibson (1729) 1 E9 . Ca. Abr.
290 at p.291.
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while the grantor retains the equitable interest 114 .
It has been said that in English law, where there is a
voluntary conveyance of land in the name of the
grantee, no resulting trust in favour of the grantor
arises 115 . Although Russell L.J. in Hodgson v Marks--6
said that this point was debatable 117
 the decision
itself seems to point firmly in favour of the view that
a voluntary conveyance in the name of another does
create a resulting trust in favour of the grantor118.
In that case, Mrs Hodgson was an old lady who was the
registered owner of a house. She developed an
affection for a lodger, Evans, who lived in the house.
She trusted him to look after all her affairs. She
transferred the house to Evans in order to prevent him
from being kicked out of the house by Mrs Hodgson's
nephew. However, it was orally agreed that she would
continue to be the beneficial owner. Evans sold the
house to a bona fide purchaser and the question was
whether Mrs Hodgson was protected against the
purchaser. It was held that she remained the
beneficial owner because she remained in actual
occupation, she had an overriding interest119
114 Hanbury & Maudsley, Modern Equity, 13 th Ed. b
Jill E. Martin (London 1989) pp. 240, 241.
	 Y
115 Snell's Principles of Equity, 28th Eci
Baker & P. St. J. Langan, (London 1982) p. s ' 8 bY P.v.1 .
116 [1971] Ch. 892.
117 Ibid, at p. 933.
118 See Hanbury & Maudsley, op.cit. p. 241
119 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 70(1)().
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Although the oral agreement was unenforceable under
section 53(1)(b) of the Law of Property Act 1925 the
evidence of her intention was sufficient to give rise
to "a resulting trust of the beneficial interest to the
plaintiff, which would not, of course, be affected by
section 53(1)(b)" (italics mine)120.
In Kenya it has been recognised that a resulting
trust can occur where there is a voluntary transfer of
land from a person or group of persons to the name of
another. The leading case in this respect is Alan
Kiama v. Ndia Mathunya 121 . In the High Court Muli J.
held that the plaintiff held the land on trust for the
defendants and ordered him to transfer it to them to be
registered as owners in common 122 , and on appeal the
Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the High Court.
Law and Potter JJ.A held that a resulting trust arose
"out of the relationship of the parties" and "the
circumstances of the case". Only Madan J.A. dissented
on this point, holding that "there was no trust
resulting or otherwise by implication of law or under
Kikuyu customary law". The court concluded that since
the clan members were in actual occupation, they had
overriding interests within section 30(g) of the
120 [1971] Ch. 892, at p. 933.
121 Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1978 (unreported); Casenote
in [1983] J.A.L. 62. See Chapter Six supra.
122 Mull J. seemed to have been unaware of the fact
that not more than five members of the clan could have
been registered as proprietors of the land by virtue of
section 101 of the Registered Land Act 1963.
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Registered Land Act 1963 which were binding on the
plaintiff. As the clan's interest here was the right
to have the land transferred in their name, the court
ordered the plaintiff to transfer the land to the
clan. 123
The case of Alan Kiama v. Ndiya Mathunya124
highlights the solution to the problem that section
101(4) of the Registered Land Act 1963 creates-25 ; in
that case the clan mutually agreed that the land should
be registered in the name of one of the members of the
clan, since it would have been impossible for all the
members of the clan to be registered as proprietors of
the land. The court recognised this arrangement as a
resulting trust, notwithstanding the fact that the land
was voluntarily transferred by the clan to Kiraqu.
There was a common intention among the members of the
clan that the members would retain a beneficial
interest in the property while the legal title was
123 However, the Court of Appeal did not promote a
solution as to which five members should be registered
as proprietors. It would appear that the matter was
left to the clan members to decide which five should be
registered.
In Wainaina v Wainaina Civil App. No. 8 of 1979
(S.R.M.C.) (unreported); Customary Law Casebook, Case
No. 74, p. 270, Rauf S.R.M. in a succession case went
further and ordered the land in question to be
registered in the names of seven persons as tenants in
common in equal shares. Since this land was not
registered in Embu District and in view of section
101(4) of the Registered Land Act 1963, it is
respectfully submitted that the decision in Wainaina is
per incuriam.
124 Op.cit.
125 supra.
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registered in the name of Kiragu, this being done as a
matter of convenience, and Kiragu was aware of this
intention. Therefore where more than five people have
inherited registered land and are co-proprietors,
whether jointly or in common, the solution is to
mutually agree that one or not more than five of them
should be registered as proprietors of the land, thus
creating a resulting trust.
However, the courts in Kenya have also recognised
another trust that is peculiar to Kenya; this is the
customary trust, and this second type of trust is
considered below.
B.	 Customary Trusts 
It was shown in Chapter Six that rights arising
under a customary trust are capable of protection by
the entry of a caution or even subsist as overriding
interests under section 30(g) of the Registered Land
Act 1963. The trust is implied in a situation where a
person, who has been registered as a proprietor of land
that belonged to his family on the understanding that
he will distribute portions of the land among members
of the family, once the land is registered, reneges on
that understanding on the basis that his registration
is indefeasible by virtue of section 28 of the
Registered Land Act 1963, the rights of the family
members not being protected on the register. The
understanding that the proprietor would distribute the
land to the family members had in these cases been
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based on customary law, the rule under custom being
that the eldest son had the obligation to distribute
the family land among the family members, in default of
the father having done so.
In all cases the customary trust has been implied
where several individuals claim to have a share in the
ownership of land registered in the name of one
person126 . The question arises whether the customary
trust can be implied to fill the lacuna created by
section 101(4) of the Registered Land Act 1963. It is
submitted that the customary trust has limited
application. Following the principles established in
the caselaw127
 the customary trust can be implied if
the following conditions are met:
1) the land is viewed as family land because,
although owned by a family head, the members
of his family live on the land and acquire
rights to it, particularly the right to
126 Muguthu v. Muquthu [1971] K.H.C.D. 16; Wamathai v. 
Mugweru H.C.C.C. No. 56 of 1972 (unreported); Mishek 
v. Wambui & Wanjiku, H.C.C.C. No. 1400 of 1973
(unreported); Mukono v. Nganga H.C.C.C. No. 1762 of
1973 (unreported), Customary Law Casebook, Case No. 73,
p. 268; Gatimu Kinquru v. Muya Gathangi (1976) Kenya
L.R. 253; Limuli v. Sabavi, (1979) Kenya L.R. 251;
Imbusi v. Imbusi, H.C.C.C. No. 72 of 1978 (unreported);
Muthuita v. Muthuita, Civil App. No. 12 of 1982
(unreported); Ngugi Miru v. Kiringu Miru, Nation Law
Reports, 30 Dec. 1985. Warari v. Public Trustee,
H.C.C.C. No. 227 of 1975 (unreported), Customary Law
Casebook, Case No. 86, p. 310 at p. 321. Doubt was
however expressed on the validity of the customary
trust in Elizabeth Wanjohi v. Official Receiver 
(Continental Credit Finance Ltd). The Nairobi Law
Monthly, No. 14 Feb. 1989, p. 42, on the basis that
section 126 of the Registered Land Act 1963 deals with
trusts which have been created by a written instrument.
However, see the arguments in Chapter Six where this
case is discussed.
127 See The Cases in n.122 supra.
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inherit a share under the customary laws on
the death of the family head, and;
2) the family head before his death appoints
his eldest son or any other son to distribute
the land amongst his brothers, and other
relatives, or if he died before making such
an appointment the eldest son is appointed as
administrator in accordance with customary
law in order to distribute the family head's
property, including the land, according to
the customary rules of succession, and;
3) the land, if it was unregistered prior to
the deceased's death, is registered in the
name of the administrator and he becomes the
first registered proprietor, and;
4) the administrator subsequently refuses to
distribute the land to the intended
beneficiaries, denying his obligations under
cust9wry law or any undertakings that were
made' .
In these circumstances the courts have implied the
trust. The family aspect of this trust is reflected by
the fact that it is implied only where there exists a
close family relationship between the registered
proprietor of the land and the beneficiaries. For
example the trust has been imposed between brothers and
their sister- in-law 129 , step-brothers130 , brothers131,
128 It is not necessary that the unconscionable
conduct of the administrator is a necessary pre
condition for the implication of a customary trust. In
Kamau Mukono v Julius Kamau Nganga H.C.C.C. No. 1762 of
1963 (unreported); Customary Law Casebook, Case No. 73,
p. 268, the defendant did not deny the existence of the
customary trust. What was in issue was the extent of
the share belonging to the plaintiff, who was the half-
brother of the defendent.
129 Mishek v Wambui & Wanjiku H.C.C.C. No. 1400 of
1973 (unreported).
130 Nguai Miru V. Kiringu Miru, Nation Law Reports,
30th December 1985.
131 Kinyuru Matu v. Mwangi Matu, Civil Appeal No. 122
of 1985 (unreported).
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father and son 132 and between a mother and step-
daughter133. In these cases the trustee has been
compelled by the courts to carry out his obligations
under customary law, thereby reinforcing the customary
flavour of this type of trust.
However, the application of this trust has been
limited by the enactment of the Law of Succession Act
1972 which came into force in 1981. A common element
that runs through the cases that deal with the
customary trust is succession, hence the recognition of
the administrator as trustee. Since the parties in
these cases had been subject to customary law,
inheritance was based on the customary rules of
succession. However, the 1972 Act changes that to a
large degree, providing that where a testator dies
after 1981 without having made a will then the rules of
intestate succession that apply are those found in Part
V of the Act. A person granted letters of
administration by the court would have to distribute
the property in accordance with the provisions in
sections 35-40 of the Law of Succession Act 1972.
However, the Act also makes provision for a testator to
dispose any of his property by will "by reference to
any secular or religious law that he chooses" .134 It
132 Mani Gichuru v. Kamau Mani, H.C.C.C. No. 34 of
1977 (unreported).
133 Muthiora v Muthiora, Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1982
(unreported).
134 Law of Succession Act 1972, s. 5(1).
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would therefore be possible for the testator to state
in his will that his property shall devolve in
accordance with the customary law belonging to his
tribe. A court would therefore have to ascertain what
the applied customary law would be135.
Therefore, the customary trust would still have
application where the testator died intestate before
1981, and there are many decisions where this is the
case. However, it will be only a matter of time before
the customary rules of succession, will have been
superseded as a whole by the provisions of the Law of
Succession Act 1972 and hence limiting the application
of the customary trust.
Despite the recognition by the courts of the
customary trust, they will not necessarily imply such a
trust whenever the circumstances outlined in 1) to 4)
above appear. In John Kiruga v. Mugecha Kiruga 136 the
appellant contended that his father had transferred
land to his brother, the respondent, to hold it on
trust for both of them. The land was registered in the
name of the respondent and both of them occupied it.
The land was subsequently sold by the respondent to a
purchaser, who was joined in the action. The appellant
contended that as he was in actual occupation, he was
entitled to an overriding interest binding on the
135 As to how it would do this, see rule 64 of the
Probate and Administration Rules.
136	 . .Civil Appeal No. 52 of 1985 (unreported). See
Chapter Six, supra.
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purchaser, by virtue of the customary trust. However,
the Court of Appeal (per Apaloo and Masime JJ.A) held
that there was no customary trust. The land had been
given to the respondent as a gift by his father, and
therefore he was entitled to sell the land.
Consequently the appellant had no overriding interest
binding on the purchaser. But in his dissenting
judgement, Platt J.A. felt that a customary trust had
been established at the time the respondent was
registered as proprietor of the land and that the
appellant was entitled to receive a share of the land,
and since he was in actual occupation, he had an
overriding interest binding on the purchaser. The
majority judges however, did recognise that the
appellant had simply not adduced enough evidence to
warrant the court's recognition of a customary
trust137 . Therefore, if he had adduced more evidence,
the court would have recognised the existence of a
customary trust.	 Despite the above limitations on
the application of the customary trust, it has
certainly become part of the jurisprudence of the law
of Kenya. In the context of sections 101(3) & (4) of
the Registered Land Act 1963, where more than five
people are entitled to a share of registered land by
virtue of inheritance through customary law, the person
or persons (not more than five) who are registered as
137 What influenced the court was the fact that the
appellant had, in the past, received a share of family
land but subsequently sold it.
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proprietors of the land with a duty to distribute the
land, may be viewed as holding the land on a customary
trust for the intended beneficiaries.
C.	 Constructive Trusts
Could a constructive trust be imposed in a
situation where several people claim a beneficial
interest to land as co-owners, and the land is
registered in the names of one of their number?
The Kenyan courts have imposed constructive trusts
in cases where a person intermeddles with trust
property thereby becoming a trustee de son tort. 138
 It
has been further argued that the cases which have
established what was considered in the previous section
as the customary trust, are in fact applications of the
constructive trust as an equitable remedy.139
Nevertheless, it has been submitted that the customary
trust is an institution in its own right, applicable in
the factual situations discussed in the previous
section. 140 Moreover, Kenyan courts have never termed
the customary trust a 'constructive trust' .
What role can the constructive trust play where
section 101(4) of the Registered Land Act 1963 is
concerned? If, as stated earlier, several individuals
138 Mungolora Wamatha v Mugweru (1972) H.C.C.C. No.56
of 1972 (unreported); Mzee Karanja v Mukuria Karanja 
H.C.C.C. No. 1455 of 1977, Customary Law Casebook, Case
No. 71, p.259.
139 Simon Coldham, Registration of Title to Land in
the Former Special Areas of Kenya, Unpublished Ph.D.
Thesis, University of London, 1977, p.188.-
140 See Chapter Six, supra.
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claim a beneficial interest in land that is registered
in the name of one or two of their number, then a
constructive trust could only be imposed where the
registered proprietors conduct themselves inequitably
denying the beneficiaries an interest in the land. 141
In England, this type of constructive trust has
seen frequent application in the context of the
matrimmonial home. In the words of Lord Diplock in
Gissing v Gissing 142 the trustee will have conducted
himself inequitably,
"if by his words or conduct he has induced
the cestui que trust to act to his own
detriment in the reasonable belief that by so
acting he was acquiring a beneficial interest
in the land."
It is the case that the parties in these situations do
not make an express written agreement as to the way in
which the beneficial interest will be held. There will
instead be either an oral agreement or an understanding
- or what the court in Gissing v Gissing 143 described
as a common intention - that the beneficial interest
in the land shall be rested in them jointly. Direct
contributions to the mortgage instalments would be
conduct corroborative of such a common intention. A
constructive trust would therefore be imposed on the
141 See Gissinq v Gissing [1971] A.C. 886 at p.905,
per Lord Diplock.
142 Supra.
143 [1971] A.C. 886.
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party in whose name the property was registered, or
whose name was on the title deeds.
The English Court of Appeal led by Lord Denning
ignored the orthodox view established in Gissinq and
instead took the view that the constructive trust was a
remedy to be imposed "wherever justice and good
conscience [required] it ..., an equitable remedy by
which the court can enable an aggrieved party to obtain
restitution" 144. This1 "constructive trust of a new
model" 145
 went into decline with the retirement of Lord
Denning, and the Court of Appeal began a return to the
orthodoxy in Gissing v Gissing 146. In Grant v
Edwards 147
 the Court of Appeal held that where a couple
chose to set up home together and a house was purchased
in the name of one of the parties, equity would infer a
trust if there was a common intention that both should
have a beneficial interest in the property and the non-
proprietary owner had acted to his or her detriment
upon that intention.
These principles were recently stressed by the
House of Lords in Lloyds Bank v Rosset. 148 Lord Bridge
giving the leading judgement held that a constructive
144 Hussey v Palmer [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1286 at p.1289 per
Lord Denning MR.
145 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1338.
146 Op.cit. See Burns v Burns [1984] 1 All E.R. 244;
Midland Bank v Dobson [1986] 1 F.L.R. 171.
147 [1986] 1 Ch. 638.
148 [1990] 2 W.L.R. 867.
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trust could be created where there has been an
agreement or understanding that property is to be
shared beneficially between the parties and one of the
parties relies to his or her detriment in reliance on
the agreement. 149 Alternatively, if there was no
agreement or arrangement to share, then the court can
rely on the conduct of the parties from which to infer
a common intention to share the property bheneficially,
giving rise to a constructive trust.
It would appear that the wheel has turned full
circle back to the principles enunciated in Gissing v
Gissing150 . Since none of the new model constructive
trust cases have been overruled, 151 a Kenyan court
would therefore have the choice in deciding whether to
apply the 'common intention constructive trust' 152
 or
the 'new model constructive trust' in a situation where
one or more individuals claim a beneficial interest in
property registered in the names of one or more
different parties.153
149 Ibid., at p.887.
150 Op.cit.
151 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1338 was in fact
supported by Lord Bridge in Lloyds Bank v Rossett,
op.cit at p.877, on the basis that the excuse made by
the male partner to the female partner that her name
could not be put onto the title because she was
underage gave rise to a common intention that she was
to have a beneficial interest in the property and she
acted to her detriment in reliance on the
understanding.
152 Terminology used by Professor David Hayton,
Equitable Rights of Cohabitees, [1990] Cony . 370.
153 On the basis of section 163 of the Registered Land
Act 1963.
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The advantage of the 'common intention
constructive trust' is that it gives rise to greater
certainty in the law because it is inferred on the
basis of settled principles. The principle of
certainty, particularly where property rights are
involved, was emphasised by Bagnall J. in Cowcher v
Cowcher154 where he said:
"I am convinced that in determining rights,
particularly property rights, the only
justice that can be attained by mortals, who
are fallible and are not omniscient, is
justice according to law; the justice that
flows from the application of sure and
settled principles to proved or admitted
facts. So in the field of property law the
length of the Chancellor's foot has been
measured or is capable of measurement. This
does not mean that equity is past child-
bearing; simply that its progeny must be
legitimate - by precedent out of principle.
It is as well that this should be so;
otherwise no lawyer could safely advise on
his client's title an every quarrel would
lead to a law suit".1-')5
The new model constructive trust on the other hand is
more akin to the American view of the constructive
trust, that it may be imposed whenever the constructive
trustee has been "unjustly enriched at the expense of
the constructive beneficiary")- 56
 The criticism with
the new model constructive trust is that it is imposed
"regardless of established legal rules, in order to
154 [1972] 1 W.L.R. 425 at p.430.
155 See also Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] A.C. 777 at
pp.793, 801, 803, 805, 809, 825.
156 A.J. Oakley, Constructive Trusts, 2nd ed. (London
1987), p.10. See paragraph 160 of the American
Restatement of Restitution.
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reach the result required by equity, justice and good
conscience." 157
 It therefore leads to uncertainty as
to when it would apply. It also led one commentator to
remark that it introduced "a rule that in cases which
the plaintiff ought to win, but has no legal doctrine
or authority to support him, a constructive trust in
his favour will do the trick. 58
The common intention constructive trust has
therefore much to commend it, and it is submitted that
a Kenyan court could be persuaded to apply the
principles expressed by the House of Lords. It is of
interest to note that in the Kenyan case of Karania v
Karan . a159 , counsel argued that since the parties were
both Kikuyu, there could be no intention between the
husband and wife that the wife should have a share in
the property, because under Kikuyu customary law a
married woman could not own property. This argument
was rejected by Simpson J. because on evidence, married
women under Kikuyu customary law could own property)-60
Moreover, since the husband and wife were both
urbanised and in salaried employment, that, by
implication, displaced customary law and the English
authorities were applicable. The fact that the
157 Hanbury and Maudsley, Modern Equity, 14th ed. by
Jill E. Martin, p.310.
158 Ibid. See also R.H. Maudsley Constructive Trusts,
(1977) 28 N.I.L.Q. 123.
159 (1976) Kenya L.R. 307, Customary Law Casebook,
Case No. 30, p.116, considered supra.
160 Customary Law Casebook, pp.118, 119.
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property was registered in the sole name of the husband
did not exclude the imputation of a trust in favour of
the wife.161
D. Summary
Three types of trust have been considered which
may be applicable to fill the lacuna created by
sections 101(3) & (4) of the Registered Land Act; the
resulting trust of the presumed resulting type which
may occur either where a group of individuals purchase
land and have it registered in the name of their
number162 , or where the group of individuals already
own the land which is unregistered, but when it is
registered, have the land registered in the name of one
of their number 163 . The customary trust was the second
type of trust that was considered, and its applicatioIN
is limited to those situations where the registered
proprietor denies obligations imposed upon him by
custom to distribute the land among his relations, or
denies oral agreement whereby he undertakes to
distribute the land to the same.
The constructive trust is the third type of trust that
may be applicable. It was argued that the Kenyan
courts may have a choice between applying a
161 Ibid, at p.119.
162 This will usually occur in the matrimonial
situation, as in Karanja v Karanja (1976) Kenya L.R.
307.
163 Alan Kiama v Ndiva Mathunva, Civil Appeal No. 42
of 1978.
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constructive trust inferred where justice and good
conscience requires it, or a constru4ive trust arising
where the parties have expressed a common intention
that the property is to be shared beneficially and they
act to their detriment on the basis of such an
intention. It is notable that there has been a
tendency among English judges on the other hand to blur
the distinctions between resulting and constructive
trusts 164
 and even recently, between constructive
trusts and proprietary estoppel. 165
 For example Lord
Bridge in Lloyds Bank v Rosset 166
 held that in a
situation where there is no evidence to support a
finding of an agreement or arrangement to share the
property beneficially, the court relies on the conduct
of the parties from which to infer the common
intention; but he felt that nothing less than direct
contributions to the purchase price by the partner who
is not the legal owner would justify the inference
necessary to the creation of a constructive trust.167
This limitation on direct contributions means that the
common intention constructive trust is in reality not
164 See for example Gissing v Gissing [1971] A.C. 886
at p.905 per Lord Diplock; Hussey v Palmer [1972] 1
W.L.R. 1286 at p.1289 per Lord Denning MR.
165 Lloyds Bank v Rosset (1990] 2 W.L.R. 867 at p.877
per Lord Bridge.
166 Ibid.
167 All the other Law Lords agreed with Lord Bridge's
speech.
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very different from the purchase money resulting trust
discussed above. 168
Moreover, Lord Bridge further held that a partner
acting to his or her detriment in reliance on an
agreement to share the property beneficially gives rise
"to a constructive trust or a proprietary estoppel". 169
It has been argued by Professor Hayton that this is an
example of how the principles of the constructive trust
and proprietory estoppel run together and that the
distinction between the two can be rendered
illusory;-70
 consequently, he argues it "is time that
the courts moved beyond pigeon-holing circumstances
into constructive trusts and proprietary estoppels and
looked at this basic principle of unconscionability
underlying both concepts. 11171
Indeed, this argument can be taken further when
looking at the resulting, customary and constructive
trusts discussed above. The principle that runs
through these is that of unconscionability. It is
significant that the Kenyan courts have never attempted
to pigeon-hole these categories of trusts, but neither
has there been any meaningful discussion of the type of
trusts that should be inferred in the context of
168 See a similar doubt expressed by Professor David
Hayton, Equitable Rights of Cohabitees, [1990] Cony.
370 at p.377, n.33.
169 [1990] 2 W.L.R. 867 at p.877.
170 Professor David Hayton, op.cit., at pp.377 et.
seq.
171 Ibid., at p.378.
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section 101(4) of the Registered Land Act 1963. It is
therefore submitted that either the resulting,
customary and constructive trusts described above may
be applied by a Kenyan court when looking at the
problem. Unconscionability is merely a factor that
will be taken into account in deciding whether a party
not registered as a co-owner is entitled to a
beneficial interest.
However, the Kenyan Parliament enacted an Act that
provides a structure where land is co-owned by a group
of people, and this Act is considered in the next
section.
IV. The Land (Group Representatives) ACt 1968 
A. The Structure
As mentioned earlier, the Registered Land Act 1963
did not make provision for the registration of land in
the names of more than five persons, and was silent on
the legal position where the land was owned by more
than five people. The Land (Group Representatives) Act
1968 was enacted to enable the registration of land
occupied by large groups of people. A group is defined
as "a tribe, clan, section family or other group of
persons, whose land under recognized customary law
belongs communally to the persons, who are for the time
" 172 ...	 -being the members of the group . 	 The fact that
these groups owned the land communally would reflect
Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968, s. 2; Land
Adjudication Act 1968, s. 2.
172
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the fact that individual ownership would have been an
unknown concept among these groups. Many of these
groups were nomadic, leading a peripatetic life, moving
seasonally from place to place with their livestock in
search of water and pasture. It would therefore have
been a hopeless task to induce the concept of
individualisation among these peoples. This could only
come with time, and especially when these groups saw
the benefits accruing to individuals in other societies
who had their own land and registered in their own
names.
The Lawrance Mission felt it would be appropriate
to establish group ranches covering thousands of acres
for these nomadic societies, such as the Masai, In view
of their traditional way of life. These ranches would
contribute to the development of these groups, and it
they were registered they would be able to attract
credit to facilitate agricultural development 173 . The
Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968 was passed to
adopt this recommendation 174 . The Act sets up a
structure whereby a number of representatives from the
group are incorporated as 'group representatives'175.
The function of these representatives is to act on
173 Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and 
Registration in Kenya, 1965-1966, (London 1966) para.
106.
174 S.F.R. Coldham, Land Tenure Reform in Kenya: the
Limits of the Law (1979) 17 J.M.A.S 615 at p.621.
175 Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968, s. 7. A
maximum of ten and a minimum of three representatives
are elected by the members, ibid, ss. 5(1), 7(1).
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behalf of the members of the group, and have the power
to "sue ... acquire, hold, charge and dispose of
property of any kind and to borrow money ..." 176 . The
enactment of the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968
facilitated the registration of group land under the
Registered Land Act 1963. Section 11 (2A) of the 1963
Act provides that the group representatives are
registered as proprietors of the group land. Section
106A of the Registered land Act 1963 deems the group
representatives to be "absolute proprietors" once
registered.
What, then, is the position of the members of the
group once the group land is registered in the names of
the group representatives? The Second Schedule to the
Land (Group Representatives) (Prescribed Provisions)
Order 1969 provides that the constitution of every
group shall be deemed to contain a provision that every
member of the group shall "be deemed to" share in the
ownership of the group land in undivided shares. This
provision is curious in view of the fact that neither
the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968 nor the 1968
Order provides that the group representatives are
trustees of group land. It has been argued that this
means the members cannot be viewed as beneficiaries in
equity, since there is no recognition by the Land
(Group Representatives) Act 1968 of the existence of a
176 Ibid, s. 8(1).
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trust177 . On the other hand, it is arguable that since
group land is registered under the Registered Land Act
1963, the application of the doctrines of equity by
virtue of section 163 of the latter Act would bring
about the implication of a resulting trust, so that
although the representatives are registered as
proprietors, the members retain a beneficial interest.
However, this argument may not have much force in view
of the fact that under the Land (Group Representatives)
Act 1968, the rights of the members are recorded in the
group constitutions, so that the members are rather
like shareholders of a company, while the group
representatives are like directors having the power to
manage and control group land. This arrangement in the
Act would appear to preclude the implication of a
trust.
Even though the Land (Group Representatives)
(Prescribed Provisions) Order 1969 deems the members to
share ownership of the group land in undivided shares,
in no way can they sever their shares, whether
unilaterally or by mutual agreement with the other
members. It follows that a member can never dispose
his share inter vivos or by will 178 . It therefore
appears that the Second Schedule to the 1969 Order
177 S. Coldham, Registration of Title to Land in the
Former Special Areas of Kenya, Unpublished Ph.D thesis
1977, University of London, p. 145.
178 It is theoretically possible for the constitution
of a group to make provision for the severance of the
shares of the members.
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rings hollow. Deeming ownership to the group members
does not mean that as individuals they can deal with
their share in any way they think fit, nor can they
order the Registrar to order sale of the land or apply
for partition of the land under section 105 and 104 of
the Registered Land Act 1963, unless all the group
members decided to do so178.
Real ownership lies with the group
representatives. Studies have shown that in many group
ranches, group representatives rarely promote the
interests of the group members because of the lack of
'collective responsibility' 180
 . For example, they
hardly call the members of the group together, neither
do the group representatives meet frequently. It is
usually the case that decisions are made affecting the
group by one of the group representatives acting on his
own initiative and without consu1tation181
 .
B. Purchase of Group Land
A person wanting to purchase group land would have
to deal with the group representatives since only they
have the power to sell group land 182 . However, the
representatives can only exercise their power of sale
179 This process is now being encouraged, discussedinfra.
180 S.F.R. Coldham, Land Tenure Reform in Kenya: the 
Limits of Law, (1979) 17 J.M.A.S. 615 at p. 623.
181 Ibid. This has caused widespread dissatisfaction
among the members, see infra.
182 Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968, s. 8(1).
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if it is for the "collective benefit of all the members
of the group', 183. In determining whether the sale
would be for the collective benefit of the group, the
group representatives are bound to consult the other
members of the group and seek their agreement to the
sale 184 . The 1968 Act does not specify how many
members are required to give their assent to such an
exercise of the power of the group representatives, but
it is likely that the group's constitution may have a
provision stating the numbers required for a majority.
Once the consent to sell is obtained, the land may
be sold. The purchaser need not be concerned with the
interests of the members, so long as he advances the
purchase money to the group representatives. The money
received is then kept in the group's account managed by
the treasurer 185 , the money being used for the benefit
of the members, such as improving ranch facilities.
Although the members may be deemed to be joint owners
nowhere is it provided that they are entitled to
receive a share of the proceeds of sale of any part of
the group land, although it is theoretically possible
that the group's constitution may make such a
provision.
183 Ibid., s. 8(2).
184 Ibid.
185 Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968, ss. 18, 19.
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C. Assessment of the Act
As a social measure the Act was designed to
protect and even change the behaviour of nomadic groups
by protecting their occupation within well defined
boundaries and having the land registered as group
land. The registration of such land would create
opportunities for the agricultural development of the
group land. This policy has succeeded to a limited
extent. Some group ranches have been able to introduce
irrigation, which has in turn improved agricultural
productivity to some extent on these ranches.
However, from a legal standpoint the Act has
significant deficiencies186 . The declaration in the
Second Schedule to the Land (Group Representatives)
(Prescribed Provisions) Order 1969 that the group
members are deemed to be joint owners of the group land
belies the reality. Their rights cannot be equated
with those of joint proprietors under section 102 of
the Registered Land Act 1963. Joint proprietors under
the latter Act have the right to sever their shares,
albeit by mutual agreement, and can also have the
registered land partitioned. On the other hand, group
members have no right to do so. Their rights are those
of occupation in the group land, and to utilise the
ranch facilities as well as the right to vote at
186 S.F.R. Coldham, Land Tenure Reform in Kenya,
op.cit., considers the social problems which the Act
has failed to remedy and which are beyond the scope of
this thesis to consider.
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general meetings)-87 They are not entitled to share in
the proceeds of sale of any part of group land, as
joint proprietors under the Registered Land Act 1963
are entitled to.
The fact that the group members are not beneficial
owners poses problems where the group representatives
sell part of the group land without consulting the
group members. The members cannot claim to have
overriding interests over the land if they are in
actual occupation under section 30(g) of the Registered
Land Act 1963 since they have no equitable rights to
protect. However, it is arguable that such a secret
sale by the representatives would be ultra vires the
constitution of the group, and accordingly the sale
would be void. It would therefore be open to the
members to make an application to the High Court to
have the sale set aside.
More than twenty years have passed since the
enactment of the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968.
It is noticeable that there has been a trend among many
groups to have group land partitioned, so that
individuals within the groups can have their own plots
of land. However, the desire to partition the group
land is due to the considerable dissatisfaction group
187	 Although the members can, by exercising the
right to vote at general meetings, have the land
partitioned, the majority of the members would have to
agree to such a proposition. This would make it
difficult, to say the least, for a sole individual
wanting to have the land partitioned, so that he can
sell his share.
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members have felt with the way group representatives
have undertaken their responsibilities. This has, in
turn led to many quarrels between the members and their
group representatives. This led to the President of
Kenya directing that these Ranches should be sub-
divided between the members of the groups, so that each
would get a parcel of land and have it registered in
his name 188 . This means that before group land can be
partitioned, a resolution in favour of partition has to
be passed by the majority of the members. The Survey
of Kenya is now involved in surveying and partitioning
the land belonging to groups who have resolved to have
the land partitioned. An example of a group ranch
which decided to have the land sub-divided is the
Olchoro Onyore Group Ranch in Kajiado district which
has a total of 3,572 ha. At the time of research the
Survey of Kenya was measuring the land and marking the
boundaries, these measurements being used as the basis
for drawing plans for the plots that each member would
receive. The plots varied in size from one to ten
acres.
This process is a remarkable reflection of the way
land tenure amongst these nomadic groups, and in
particular the Masai, has evolved from communal to
individual land holding. While this evolution,
especially among occupants of group land, is mainly due
to dissatisfaction with the structure under the Land
188 Interview with Dr Aruka, Land Adjudication
Department, Nairobi 12 September 1989.
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(Group Representatives) Act 1968, it can be said in
favour of the Act that it has facilitated this change
and therefore it has been of benefit. The serious
problem, however, is that a large proportion of group
land is arid or semi-arid. Sub-division of this land
into small plots would bring economic problems for the
proprietors because it would be difficult to grow crops
on such land, unless it was irrigated. Some
proprietors have resorted to selling their land to
individuals intent on acquiring large blocks of land
that would support livestock for commercial purposes,
or to use the land for the establishment of shops and
other commercial property 189 . Nevertheless the fact
that most of these small plots are uneconomic
agriculturally is a problem that demands economic
rather than legal solutions.
V.	 Conclusion
This chapter has highlighted some similarities
between the structure of co-ownership under the
Registered Land Act 1963 and that under English Law.
Although the fundamental characteristics of the joint
proprietorship and the proprietorship in common under
the Registered Land Act 1963 190
 are similar to the
joint tenancy and the tenancy in common in English law
differences arise where the method of severance of a
189 Interview with Mr J. Yago, Survey of Kenya,
Nairobi 13 September 1989.
190 Ss. 102, 103.
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joint tenancy/joint proprietorship are concerned.
Additional methods of severance of a joint tenancy are
possible under common law in addition to severance by
written notice under the Law of Property Act 1925 191
 in
comparison with severance of a joint proprietorship
under the Registered Land Act 1963 which only allows
severance by a written notice which must be
registered192 . Nevertheless it has been argued that
where a joint proprietor has forged the signature of
the other joint proprietor in order to sell the
property to a bona fide purchaser or kills the other
joint proprietor, these acts will be sufficient to
sever the joint proprietorship. This is the position
under English law, and it is submitted that this
position is applicable under the Registered land Act
1963 by virtue of section 163.
However, the biggest difference is in connection
with the method of land holding where land is co-owned.
The Law of Property Act 1925 imposes a trust for sale
where land is subject to co-ownership. This facility
enabled co-owned land to be sold easily, purchasers not
being concerned with the interests of the beneficiaries
and only having to deal with the trustees for sale,
while at the same time providing security for the
beneficiaries through the device of 'overreaching,193 .
191 S. 36(2).
192 S. 102(3).
193 Kevin Gray, Elements of Land Law, (London 1987) p.
354.
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The Registered Land Act 1963 did not introduce a
similar concept because the land was viewed not merely
as an investment asset to buy and sell but to be used
as an agricultural asset for the benefit of the owners.
The Working Party on African Land Tenure was against
land being held by more than five people because it
would encourage the fragmentation of land, caused by
the numerous owners seeking to sub-divide the land
among themselves in turn re-creating the problems of
land fragmentation which land consolidation had
removed. This is the philosophy that lay behind the
co-ownership provisions in the Registered Land Act 1963
and in particular section 101(3) & (4) of that Act.
However, the Working Party was out of touch with
reality, and their solution which was adopted in
section 120 of the Registered Land Act 1963 was a
failure. But the abolition of that section has not
solved the problem of what happens where land is owned
by more than five people.
It has been argued in this chapter that three
types of trusts may arise: a resulting trust, a
customary trust and a constructive trust.	 The
resulting trust would arise where either a group of
persons purchase land but have the land registered in
the names of one of their number and in any case not
more than five. The persons who are registered would
hold on resulting trust for the other members of the
group. The resulting trust would also arise where, for
example, a clan voluntarily decide to have their land,
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which was unregistered, registered in the name of one
of their number 194
 . The customary trust would mainly
arise in succession cases where a dispute arises
between those persons entitled to an interest in land
that is registered in the name of one of their number
by virtue of customary law. The refusal of the
registered proprietor to recognise the existence of the
rights of the other persons residing on the land brings
about the imposition of the trust. However, the
enactment of the Law of Succession Act 1972 which
introduced new rules of intestate succession means that
the significance of the customary trust is bound to
diminish with the passing of time. This means that the
constructive trust will begin to play a greter role in
this situation.
The Land (Group Representative) Act 1968 was
passed to provide a structure where land is co-owned by
large groups of people. The land is registered in a
limited number of group representatives who retain
absolute and beneficial ownership of the land. The
members of the group in reality do not have a
beneficial interest in the group though deemed to be
joint owners. If the group representatives are
unscrupulous and secretly sell part of the group land
to a bona fide purchaser, so long as the purchaser
advances the purchase money to the group
representatives he takes free from any interests of the
194 As in Alan Kiama v Ndiya Mathunva Civil Appeal No.
42 of 1978 (unreported); noted in [1983] J.A.L. 62.
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members. It would be up to the members to prove that
the sale was ultra vires the constitution of the
group. Dissatisfaction by group members with the way
the group representatives have misused their powers has
caused the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968 to be
discredited. Many groups are resolving to sell group
land and at the rate that this is taking place it will
not be long before group land under the 1968 Act ceases
to exist.
Clearly legislative reform is necessary to provide
a satisfactory solution to the position where land is
owned by more than one person under the Registered Land
Act 1963, which would provide protection for the co-
owners and certainty for purchasers of land subject to
co-ownership, because the trusts outlined above will
not necessarily be implied if some of the ingredients
necessary for their existence are not present.
It is of interest to note that in England,
dissatisfaction has been expressed with the trust for
sale on the ground that it is an artificial concept
since the imposition of a duty to sell on the trustees
is inconsistent with the interests and intentions of
the majority co-owners who acquire land, not for the
purpose of using the land for investment purposes and
the realisation of the capital value of the land, but
rather for the purpose of occupation 195 ; further
artificiality is illustrated by the doctrine of
195 Law Commission, Transfer of Land: Trusts of Land,
Law Com. No. 181, para. 3.2.
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conversion whereby an interest held under a trust for
sale is an interest in the proceeds of sale of the land
and therefore the beneficiaries are deemed not to have
an interest in the land196,
The Law Commission therefore proposed the
abolition of the trust for sale, replacing it with a
trust of land which would give the trustees of land a
power to sell and a power to retain the land rather
than a power merely to postpone sale- 97 . The abolition
of the trust for sale would, ipso facto, do away with
the doctrine of conversion 199 . However, as at present,
a purchaser would continue to take title from the
trustees and if payment was made to two trustees the
equitable interests of the beneficiaries would be
overreached 199 . In a subsequent report200 ttl. Law
Commission further recommended that the interest of a
person of full age and capacity who is entitled to the
beneficial interest in the property and who has the
right to occupy it and is in actual occupation should
not be overreached, unless that person consents. The
new trust of land that is proposed by the Law
196 Ibid., para. 3.4. See Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd
v Boland [1981] A.C. 487.
197 Law Commission, Transfer of Land; Trusts of Land,
Law Com. No. 181, paras. 3.5, 3.6.
198 Ibid.
199 Ibid., para. 3.6.
200 The Law Commission, Transfer of Land, 
Overreaching: Beneficiaries in Occupation, Law Coin. No.
188 (1989) para. 4.3.
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Commission will not radically change the law on co-
ownership, and will not be much different from the
trust for sale. In fact the trust of land has been
viewed as "cosmetically more attractive" than the trust
for sale which was "inaccurately labelled but perfectly
workable" 201 .
Nevertheless such a trust is clearly advantageous
where land is co-owned. It is arguable that the
adoption of a similar trust in Kenya to apply where
land was co-owned would solve the problem created by
section 101 of the Registered Land Act. Such a trust
would, on the one hand, facilitate conveyancing by
allowing a purchaser of land subject to co-ownership to
deal with a specific number of trustees 202 and not be
concerned with the interests of the beneficiaries; on
the other hand such a trust would safeguard the
interests of the beneficiaries since their interests
would only be defeated if the purchaser failed to
advance the purchase moneys to all the trustees. In
view of the fact that in Kenya co-owners tend to be
numerous, such as where a clan has an interest in land,
it would be advantageous if the minimum number of
trustees a purchaser was to deal with was say, not less
than four. A high minimum number would prevent a
transfer that was not in accord with the wishes of the
beneficiaries and would also prevent fraudulent
201 Kevin Gray, op.cit., p. 368.
202 There should be at least not less than two.
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transfers there by preventing the scenario in Alan Kiama
v Ndiya Mathunva 203.
203	 . .Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1978 (unreported).
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Chapter Eight
RECTIFICATION AND INDEMNITY
I.	 Introduction
One of the greatest advantages of a registered
title is its curative nature. Past defects, present
when the title was unregistered, are cured once it is
registered and successive purchasers need no longer
investigate the past history of the title or even be
concerned with the previous faults. 1 It is this that
has given rise to registered titles being described as
'indefeasible', 2 'absolute' 3 or 'state guaranteed. '4
These phrases give the impression that a registered
title cannot be impugned under any circumstances, and
therefore, it remains intact for all time. However the
phrases are a misnomer because:
i)	 Registered titles are subject to overriding
interests. Therefore the registered proprietor should
have made exhaustive enquiries prior to purchase in
order to discover whether there are any which may bind
him; failure to do so may result in the registered
1	 See Gibbs v. Messer [1891] A.C. 248 at p. 254.
2	 Ibid.
3	 Land Registration Act 1925, ss. 4, 5.
4	 S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration 
(Cambridge 1976), p. 175).
5.	 Williams & Glyns Bank v. Boland [1981] A.C. 487;
Alam Kiama v. Ndia Mathunya, Civil Appeal No. 42 of
1978 (unreported).
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proprietor unexpectedly finding himself subsequently
bound by the
rights of persons whether he has notice of them or not,
thereby impeaching his, heretofore, 'absolute' title.5
ii) The system of registered title is administered by
humans and since they are fallible, they are bound to
make mistakes or omissions when registering title,
which may cause the registered proprietor to suffer
loss.6
iii) A registered proprietor may fall victim to fraud
committed by unscrupulous individuals. Through forgery
these may either charge the land without the knowledge
of the registered proprietor, or transfer it to
themselves or even to an innocent purchaser who
subsequently becomes the registered proprietor.7
It would certainly not cut much ice, if a
registered proprietor, after having suffered loss
through either one of the three above mentioned ways,
was told that he has an 'indefeasible' title. 8 It is
6	 See for example, Re 139 High Street, Deptford
[1951] Ch. 574; The District Commissioner, Kiambu v. R. 
ex p. Ethan Njau [1960] E.A. 109.
7	 Re Leighton's Conveyance [1936] 1 All E.R. 667;
Argyle Building Society v. Hammond (1985) 49 P & C.R.
148; Natwarlal Chauhan v. Zakaria Omagwa Civil Appeal
No. 12 of 1980 (unreported).
8 Ruoff & Roper argue that the term 'absolute' title
is accurate because such titles indicate that they are
"so far as is humanly possible, complete and perfect" -
Registered Conveyancing, 5th Ed., (London 1986) p. 880.
This is the term used in the land Registration Act 1925
and in the Registered Land Act 1963.
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evident, therefore, that this protection is qualified.9
For this reason, most land registration legislation
makes provision for rectification of the register where
the proprietor has suffered loss due to a mistake,
omission, or to fraud, and if such rectification is not
possible, then compensation or an indemnity is awarded
for the loss incurred.10
Both the Land Registration Act 1925 and the
Registered Land Act 1963 have provisions for
rectification of the register and indemnity where loss
is suffered due to rectification)- 1 However, it is of
interest to note that the original precursor to the
Land Registration Act 1925, the Land Registry Act 1862,
only contained provisions for rectification of the
register on the ground of fraud 12 because the
requirements for the grant of an absolute title were so
stringent that it was not thought that there could be
any cause for error. However, this Act was a failure
because the conditions were too strict and only a few
proprietors had their titles registered. The LeaNd
Transfer Act 1875 removed the stringent conditions for
9	 C.f. Re 139 High Street, Deptford [1951] 1 Ch. 884
at p.889.
10 It is of interest to note that there are some
countries with systems of registered land, such as
Fiji, Malaysia and Sudan, which do not have provision
for indemnity - see S.Rowton Simpson, Land Law and
Registration, (Cambridge 1976), pp. 179-183.
11 Land Registration Act 1925, ss. 82, 83; Registered
Land Act 1963, ss. 142, 143, 144-147.
12	 Land Registry Act 1862, s. 138.
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registration of titles and for the first time the court
was given a power to rectify the register. This Act
was repealed by the Land Transfer Act 1897 which added
provisions for indemnity. The Land Registration Act
1925 increased the power of rectification although it
provided a measure of protection for registered
proprietors 'in possession.'13
In Kenya, prior to the enactment of the Registered
Land Act 1963, the Land Titles Act 1908, which
introduced a form of registration of titles in the
Coast Province, made no provision for rectification or
indemnity because at the time it was felt that "the
cost of forming an insurance fund and employing
officers of sufficient legal knowledge to make it safe
for government to guarantee title would be beyond the
income which could be expected from transactions. 1,14
The Registration of Titles Act 1919, which introduced
an improved system of registration, made provision for
rectification and indemnity. 15
 However, the provisions
in section 24 for claiming an indemnity are stringent
and make it difficult for a proprietor to obtain
compensation for lose or damage suffered by him due to
a mistake or error in the register. Not surprisingly,
this Act was found to be unsatisfactory in many
13 Law Commission, Property Law, Third Report on Land
Registration, Law Comm. No. 158, p. 41 para. 3.1.
14	 S.Rowton Simpson, op.cit.
15	 Ss. 23, 24.
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respects, with some provisions being found "to be in
conflict with others". 16
The Registered Land Act 1963 brought numerous
improvements to the whole system of registered land,
including provisions for rectification and indemnity.
This chapter will show that the provisions for
rectification and indemnity under the Registered land
Act 1963 are unduly restrictive,in comparison with the
relevant provisions in the Land Registration Act 1925.
Consequently, the 1963 Act provisions are more likely
to cause injustice to those who suffer loss;
furthermore, the protection from rectification that is
afforded to registered proprietors under the Registered
Land Act 1963 is rather limited. This chapter will
further show how the courts in Kenya have endeavoured
to go round the statutory barrier preventing the
rectification of first registrations.
II. Rectification
A.	 Meaning of 'Rectification'
'Rectification' is not defined either in the Land
Registrations Act 1925 or in the Registered Land Act
1963. The English courts have yet to define the word
in the context of the Land Registration Act 1925.
There are, however, definitions of the word in relation
16	 Adonia v. Mutekanga [1970] E.A. 429 at p. 433, per
Spry J.A. Nevertheless, this Act, together with the
Land Titles Act 1908 is still in force. See Chapter
Two, supra.
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to other Acts of Parliament. For example in Pulbrook
V. Richmond Consolidated Mining17 Jessel MR defined the
word in relation to the Companies Act 1862 where he
said:
"The result is that, rightly or wrongly, but
I am bound for this purpose to assume
rightly, the name of Mr. Cuthbert has been
struck out of the register and the register
rectified. The effect of that is exactly the
same as if it had never been put in. That is
the meaning of 'rectified'. You strike it
out by way of rectification, and the court
has therefore declared that it ought never to
have been entered at all. They have struck
it out from the beginning."
However, this is a narrow view of the meaning of
'rectification', because the above definition is
confined to the correction of errors. 'Rectification',
in the context of the Land Registration Act 1925, not
only means the correction of errors, but also includes
the insertion of matters which have been omitted.18
The courts in Kenya seem to have taken a narrow
view of the meaning of 'rectification' in relation to
the Registered Land Act 1963. In The District 
Commissioner, Kiambu v. R. ex parte Ethan Niau l9 Gould
J.A. in defining rectification, referred to Hogg,
Registration of Title Throughout the Empire, (1920
Edn.) p. 367, where it said:
"Rectification of the register, though
sometimes denoting any alteration, properly
means an alteration made in the register for
the purpose of putting right an erroneous
17	 (1878) 9 Ch.D 610 at p. 615.
18	 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 82(1)(b).
19	 [1960] E.A. 109 at p. 125.
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entry ... [R]ectification is only required
when some mistake in the register cannot
otherwise be put right." (Italics mine).
The above definition is narrow for it does not include
rectification of omissions. Kneller, J.A. in Muthiora 
v. Muthiora 2 ° relied on the definition of Jessel MR in
Pubrook v. Richmond Consolidated Minim:1 21 quoted above.
However, Kneller J.A. went on to say:
"To rectify, however, is to correct or define
something which is erroneous or doubtful.
Rectification is often used for making an
alteration correcting an entry in a register
and that, in my judgment, is its meaning in
section 143 of the Act itself." (italics
mine).
Although Kneller JA did not refer to Ex parte Ethan
Njau he emphatically appears to take the same narrow
view as Gould J.A. on the definition of rectification,
that it is confined to the correction of errors in the
register. It is submitted both these definitions fail
to point out that 'rectification' in the Registered
Land Act 1963, like the Land Registration Act 1925, is
an amendment to the register to correct an erroneous
entry as well as inserting matters which have been
omitted.22
B. Rectification as a Discretionary Power
In both the Land Registration Act 1925 and the
Registered Land Act 1963, the Registrar and the Courts
are given the power to rectify the register. However,
20	 Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1982 (unreported).
21	 Op.cit.
22	 Registered Land Act 1963, ss. 142(1)(a), 143(1).
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in both Acts there are limitations on this power. For
example there can be no rectification if the registered
proprietor is in possession •23 Moreover, under the
case of the Registered Land Act 1963, first
registrations cannot be rectified. 24 Nevertheless,
where these limitations do not apply, or have been met,
rectification is a discretionary remedy. 25 In Epps v. 
Esso Petroleum26
 Templeman J., when considering the
exceptions in section 82(3) of the Land Registration
Act 1925 which allow rectification where the proprietor
is in possession, said that the discretion is such that
even where section 82(3) does not apply, "there may
still be circumstances which defeat the claim for
rectification." 27 For example, section 82(1)(h)
provides that the court may rectify the register in any
other case where it may be deemed just. The Law
Commission, commenting on this section, said that one
of the factors that a court would have to take into
account under this subsection is the conduct of the
23	 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 82(3); 1Registered
Land Act 1963, s. 143(2) - under the latter Act he must
have acquired the registered land for valuable
consideration.
24	 S. 143(1).
25 As indicated by the use of the word 'may' in both
Acts e.g. 'The register may be rectified' - s. 82(1)
Land Registration Act 1925; 'The Registrar may rectify'
and 'the court may order rectification' - ss. 142(1),
143(1) Registered Land Act 1963.
26	 [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1071 at p. 1078, 1079.
27	 Ibid., at pp. 1078, 1079. See also Argyle 
Building Society v. Hammond (1985) 49 P & C.R. 148 at
p. 158 per Slade L.J.
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parties; 28 if the conduct of the parties was
unconscionable, the court may refuse to order
rectification.
Although the discretion under section 82 has been
described as "wide" and "unqualified", 29 it must be
exercised judicially on general equitable principles.30
Despite rectification being a discretionary remedy, the
Registered Land Act 1963 gives the Kenyan courts and
the Registrar very limited powers of rectification
compared with the power granted to the court and the
Registrar under the Land Registration Act 1925. The
differences in the power to rectify are discussed
below.
C. Rectification by the Registrar
Section 142(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963
provides that the Registrar may rectify the register in
the following cases:
"a) in formal matters and in the case of errors
or omissions not materially affecting the
interests of any proprietor;
b)	 in any case and at any time with the consent
of all persons interested;
C)	 where, upon resurvey, a dimension or area
shown in the register is found to be
incorrect, but in such case the Registrar
shall first give notice to all persons
28 Property Law, Third Report on Land Registration,
Law Com. No. 158, para. 3.7.
29	 Price Bros v. J. Kelly Homes [1975] 3 All E.R. 369
at p. 373 per Buckley L.J.
30 Argyle Building Society v. Hammond, op.cit., at p.
162.
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appearing by the register to be interested or
affected of his intention so to rectify."
1.	 Section 142(1)(a)
'Formal matters' includes such things as the
misspelling of the name of a proprietor or the
misdescription of land or part of it. The correction
of names in the register by the Registrar is done
frequently. This is either due to misspelling by the
registry, or the proprietor changing his name. Between
July 1986 and July 1989 the Kiambu Land Registrar made
464 correction of names in the register. Application
is normally made by the proprietor who wishes to have
his name changed. He fills in the application form as
well as the statutory declaration which must be signed
and stamped by a Commissioner for Oaths, and witnessed
by one other person. The proprietor must then submit
the application form together with his National
Identity Card. Once the Registrar is satisfied with
the application he can proceed to rectify the register.
The limited power of the Registrar to rectify the
register is reflected in the fact that he can rectify
the register under this subsection "in the case of
errors or omissions which do not materially affect the
interests of any proprietor" (italics mine). A
'proprietor' is defined in section 3 of the Registered
Land Act 1963 to mean:
"a) in relation to land or a lease, the person
named in the register as the proprietor
thereof; and
b) in relation to a charge of land or a lease,
the person named in the register of the land
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or lease as the person in whose favour the
charge is made."
The scope of this definition considerably narrows the
power of the Registrar to rectify. To illustrate;
suppose A is the registered proprietor of a farm. B
succeeds in forging a transfer of the farm to himself
and is registered as the proprietor; he subsequently
charges the land to C and the charge is registered. B
defaults on his payments and C seeks to repossess the
farm. A then discovers the forgery and applies to the
Registrar for rectification of the proprietorship and
the charges register. It follows that the Register
would have no power to rectify the proprietorship
register because B is "the person named in the
register" and his interests as a proprietor would be
'materially' affected by the rectification. 31 The
Registrar would also be unable to rectify the charges
register because C is "the person named in the register
of the land ... as the person in whose favour the
charge is made" and therefore as a 'proprietor' his
interests would also be materially afffected if
rectification were made.32
In contrast the English Land Registrar would have
the power to order the rectification of both registers
31 While this may appear perverse, the conclusion is
inevitable due to the wording of the sub-section.
32 Nevertheless, the High Court would have power to
order rectification of both registers under secction
143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963, as the
registration in B's name would be a second
registration. If the charges register were to be
rectified against C, he would be entitled to an
indemnity.
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in the above situation by virtue of sections 82(1)(g)
and (2)
	 the Land Registration Act 1925 thereby
indicating a much wider power than that exercisable by
the Kenyan Land Registrar.
The power of the Kenya Land Registrar under
section 142(1)(a) of the Registered Land Act 1963 could
have been exercised in the case of Rahab Nieri Kinuthia 
v. Nganga Kirogo. 34 There the Land Registry made a
mistake by issuing the plaintiff and the defendant the
wrong title numbers. Both parties were occupying the
correct parcels of land but the plaintiff was issued
with the title number that belonged to the defendant
and vice versa. The solution was simply to rectify the
property section of each register to reflect the
correct title numbers. What complicated the matter was
that the parties did not want that to be done but
rather wanted to move into each other's land. The
Chief Land Registrar advised the parties to, inter
alia, make an application to the High Court and have
the case determined there. Unfortunately the High
Court referred the case to a panel of elders which then
proceeded to subdivide the land between the parties and
ordered rectification of the register. This order was
33 In relation to the rectification of the charges
register, the Court of Appeal in Argyle Building
Society v. Hammond (1985) 49 P & CR., held that the
court had power to rectify the charges register against
a bona fide chargee by virtue of section 82(3) of the
Land Registration Act 1925. This power could also be
exercised by the Registrar - see s. 82(1).
34	 H.C.C.C. No. 404 of 1982 (unreported).
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contrary to section 143(1) of the Registered land Act
1963 which prevents rectification of a first
registration. 35 It would have been within the power
of the Registrar to have made a simple rectification to
correct the error since the material interests of both
proprietors would not have been affected; in this way
the decision by the panel of elders, which was contrary
to law and therefore per incuriam, would have been
avoided. 36
2. Section 142(1)(b)
Under section 142(1)(b) of the Registered Land Act
1963 the Land Registrar can rectify the register 'in
any case and at any time with the consent of all
persons interested.' 37 Here, there is no limit on the
rectification of first registrations 38 and
rectification can be made whether or not the material
interests of any proprietor are affected. Considering
that the consent of all interested persons would have
to be obtained, it is unlikely this power is often used
except probably in non-contentious matters.
3. Section 142(1) (c)
Section 142(1)(c) relates to the rectification of
the register where there has been an improper survey,
35 The land in question was subject to a first
registration.
36 For a discussion of the panel of elders and the
problems they have created see Chapter Nine, infra.
37	 Section 82(1)(c) of the Land Registration Act 1925
has a similar provision.
38	 See s. 143(1) R.L.A. 1963.
526
most likely during land adjudication. Large areas in
the Central Province were surveyed in a hurry during
the 19505 during the height of the Emergency and it is
not surprising that many improper surveys were made.39
The Chief Land Registrar pointed out that the Registry
Index Maps are often unreliable in determining
boundaries and therefore Land Registrars should not
place undue reliance on them."
The English Land Registrar has unlimited powers of
rectifying the register where it is proved to his
satisfaction that the whole of land comprised in a
title or too large a part to be properly dealt with as
a mere clerical mistake, has been registered in
error. 41
In summary, the English Land Registrar has wider
powers of rectification than those of the Kenyan Land
Registrar. For example he can rectify the register
where any entry in the register has been made by
fraud; 42 where two or more persons are, by mistake,
registered as proprietors of the same registered estate
or charge; 43 where a mortgagee has been registered as
39 Witness the enactment of the Land Registration
(Fort Hall District) Special Provisions Ordinance 1961
- see the discussion in Chapter Three, supra.
40 Practice Instruction: Use of Registry Index Maps 
in the Determination of Boundary Disputes and the Role
of Surveyors in the same, 8 March, 1985.
41	 Land Registration Rules 1925, rr. 13, 14.
42	 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 82(1)(d).
43	 Ibid, s. 82(1)(e).
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proprietor of the land instead as proprietor of a
charge and a right of redemption is subsisting; 44 and
finally "in any other case where, by reason of any
error or omission in the register, or by reason of any
entry made under a mistake, it may be deemed just to
rectify the register, or otherwise." 45 (italics mine).
Why is the power of rectification of the Kenyan
Land Registrar under the Registered Land Act 1963 so
narrow, in particular under section 142(1)(a)? One of
the draftsmen of the Act hinted as to why this power
was limited; he pointed out that because rectification
appeared to upset the basic principle of registration
of title - that the entry in the register is absolute
proof of title - it should only be allowed without
injuring anyone." It is interesting that the English
Law Commission in their Third Report pointed out that
Hdefeasibility through the ready availability of
rectification is productive of future uncertainty and
contrary to the raison d'etre of registration of
title." 47 However, while this is a purist!s view of the
effect of registered title, rectification is inevitable
44	 Ibid, s. 82(1)(f).
45	 Ibid, s. 82(1)(h).
46	
• Rowton Simpson, op.cit., p. 283 - This would
reflect why under section 142(1)(a) the Registrar can
only rectify an error or omission where the material
interests of any proprietor are not affected.
47 Property Law : Third Report on Land Rectistration, 
A. Overriding interests, B.  Rectification and 
Indemnity, C. Minor Interests, Law. Coin. No. 158, para.
3.5.
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in a system of land registration because, as indicated
earlier, the register is always susceptible to human
error. Nevertheless, although the Law Commission
regretted the existence of the rectification provisions
in section 82 of the Land Registration Act 1925, they
added that the principle of indefeasibility is
compensated for in practice by the possibility of
indemnity under section 83 of the 1925 Act. 48 While
the indemnity provisions in the Land Registration Act
1925 are satisfactory, those in the Registered Land Act
1963 are clearly not as they are very limited in their
application. 49 While monetary compensation may be a
poor substitute for one who has lost title due to
rectification of the register, at least it eases some
of the pain. Under the Registered Land Act 1963, the
inability of obtaining rectification as well as
indemnity simply aggravates the pain of losing title.
This becomes evident when one considers the limited
power of the courts to rectify the register under the
Registered Land Act 1963.
D. Rectification by the Court
Section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963
provides that the court may rectify the register
"by directing that any registration be
cancelled or amended where it is satisfied
that any registration (other than a first
48	 Ibid, para. 3.4.
49 These limitations are discussed below.
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registration) has been obtained, made or
omitted by fraud or mistake."
From this subsection it is evident that the court can
rectify any50 registration, so long as it is not a
first registration, which is caused by fraud or
mistake. It has to be 'satisfied' that such
registrations have been "obtained, made or omitted by
fraud or mistake." It therefore appears that if the
court is not satisfied that a registration has been
caused by fraud or mistake, it can not order
rectification. Thus the words 'where it is satisfied'
would appear to limit the discretion to rectify granted
by the section.51
The limits on the power of the courts to rectify
the register imposed by sections 143(1) & (2) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 are therefore as follows:
1. First registrations cannot be rectified -
s. 143(1)
2. Any other registration can only be rectified if
the court is satisfied that it has been 'obtained,
made or omitted by fraud or mistake'. - s. 143(1).
3. Rectification cannot be made against a proprietor
in possession who must have been a purchaser of
50 Here the word 'any' refers to the types of
registrations available, for example, registrations of
absolute proprietors, registered leases, easements, et
al. Prima Facie the use of this word would make it
possible for a court to rectify retrospectively. This
is not possible under the Land Registration Act 1925 -
Freer v. Unwins [1976] Ch.288.
51 As indicated by the use of the phrase, 'may order
rectification' - s. 143(1).
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the registered land for valuable consideration -
s. 143(2).
Each of these limitations are now considered in turn.
1. Non-Rectification of First Registrations
This limitation is the most drastic imposed on the
courts by the Registered Land Act 1963 and its severity
is reflected by the fact that the court cannot even
rectify a first registration which has been obtained by
fraud or mistake. Why was such a provision inserted in
the Act? In a Practice Note issued by the Chief Land
Registrar 52
 he stated that the provision was "a
deliberate administrative policy decision in order to:
a) stave off any vexatious litigants and
b) to ensure the finality of a registered title ..."
The first ground has its origins in land litigation
that was particularly rampant in Central Province prior
to consolidation and adjudication of land in the
1950s. 53 The litigation had been caused by land
shortage together with the uncertainty of Government
policy. Government policy in connection with land was
to encourage the creation of individual titles and to
promote the scientific use and management of land.54
However, the shortage of land meant that a number of
52	 Section 143(1) 8 E.A.L.J. 68.
53 For a general account see M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land
Reform in the Kikuyu Country, (Nairobi 1967), pp. 78-
80. See also Chapter Three, supra.
54 R.J.M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the 
Development of African Agriculture in Kenya, (Nairobi
1954).
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Kikuyu began to evict ahoi, 55 who had inhabited their
land for many years, as a result of the increasing need
of the land owners to cultivate all of their land.
This resulted in bitter disputes between the real
owners and the ahoi and it "was common for a plaintiff
to allege that the defendant was his muhoi and vice
versa". 56 Moreover, due to the undocumented nature of
customary law, many disputes arose over the position of
boundaries.
This conflict over land was said to have turned
"family against family, brother against brother in an
individualistic race for more acres of eroded soil."57
The resulting land litigation resulted in huge fees
being spent in bringing these cases before the African
Courts. 58 In Kiambu District, for example, the fees
being paid in African Court cases - the majority of
them being land cases - rose from £13,000 in 1949 to
£24,000 in 1951. 	 the introduction of
consolidation and adjudication of land in the Central
Province, the colonial administration felt that these
disputes would jeopardise the whole exercise of land
55 For the rights of ahoi see Chapter Two, infra.
56	 M.P.K. Sorrenson, op. cit., p. 79.
57 Fort Hall District Annual Report, 1949 - quoted in
Sorrenson, op.cit., p. 79.
58 The African Courts had exclusive jurisdiction over
cases between Africans. See Chapter Seven for a
discussion of the jurisdiction of the African Courts.
59 Kiambu District Annual Report, 1951 - quoted in
Sorrenson, op.cit., p. 79.
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registration. Accordingly the African (Suspension of
Suits) Ordinance 1956 was passed. It put a temporary
stay on all litigation for a period of three years,"
enabling consolidation, adjudication and finally
registration of title to proceed unhindered. Before
approving the Ordinance the Governor, Sir Evelyn
Baring, promised that appeals to the Courts would be
allowed in the substantive legislation which was going
to be prepared by the Working Party on African Land
Tenure. 61 However, colonial officials felt that the
achievements being made in the consolidation and
adjudication programme would be undermined if appeals
were allowed against the completed register. 62 It
appears that the administrative officials did succeed
in convincing the Working Party on African Land Tenure
on the need to prevent the rectification of first
registrations. In their report the Working Party
said: 63
"We discussed at length with Provincial and
District Commissioners the desirability of
including provision where errors in the first
registration of titles could be rectified.
All concerned were of opinion that to allow
the first registration to be open to
challenge would endanger the whole process
... One of the major advantages that Africans
will gain from registration will be relief
from the crippling burden of payment for
lawsuits brought before the African courts.
60	 S. 1(2).
61	 M.P.K. Soresnon, op.cit., pp. 134, 188.
62	 Ibid., at pp. 187, 188.
63 Report of the Working Party on African Land
Tenure, 1957-58 (Nairboi 1958), para. 67(i).
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We came to the conclusion that the advantage
to the Africans of making first registration
final and absolute far outweigh any advantage
that might result from allowing the original
adjudication to be challenged."
This led to the second ground / 64 that is, the opinion
that the register should be final, thereby cementing
the whole process of land registration. The above
recommendation of the Working Party was adopted in
section 89(1) in the Native Lands Registration
Ordinance 1959. That section provided in part:
"a court may order rectification of the
register -
a) by directing that any registration entry
or note in the register (other than the first
registration of the title to any land in
accordance with the provisions of this
Ordinance) be cancelled or amended if the
court is satisfied - ..." (italics mine).
The Court of Appeal in The District Commissioner, 
Kiambu v. R. ex parte Ethan Njau65 held that the alywe
sub-section effectively precluded any rectification of
first registrations.
The effect of the African Courts (Suspension of
Suits) Ordinance 1956 and, subsequently, section
89(1)(a) of the Native Land Registration Ordinance 1959
meant that any disputes over land should have been
determined and solved during the objections stage in
the adjudication process thereby obviating the need to
rectify a first registration." Once a proprietor was
64	 Practice Note, 8 E.A. L.J. 68.
65	 [1960] E.A. 109.
66 Land Adjudication Act 1968, ss. 26, 27. However,
this was on the assumption thta the land adjudication
committees were successful in determining disputes over
titles, and in identifying defects in titles. However,
as was shown in Chapter Three, many of these committees
534
granted his certificate of title, his registration
could no longer be challenged, and it was, so to speak,
set in stone.
However, the Chief Land Registrar in his Practice
Note did not set out the third reason why first
registrations were precluded from rectification. The
reason is a political one. Following the outbreak of
the Mau Mau civil war and the declaration of the
Emergency in October 1953, the colonial government
decided to implement the recommendations of the
Swynnerton Plan. 67 Swynnerton had recommended that an
improvement in African agriculture could be made if the
system of land tenure was reformed by the consolidation
of fragmented land holdings and the registration of
these titles, and if Africans were given the
opportunity of growing cash crops.
The government felt that if it could implement
these measures, support for the Mau Mau would diminish
as Africans would seize the opportunities of growing
cash crops, resulting in increased incomes as well as
the benefit of having a secure registered title.
Because many African land owners as well as politicians
had been detained for supporting the Mau Mau during the
Emergency, the administration felt that it was
failed to properly identify everyone who had
proprietary interests in the titles concerned or
classify adequately various interests in land.
67 R.J.M. Swynnerton, A Plan to Intensify the 
Development of African Agriculture in Kenya (Nairobi
1954). See Chapter Two, infra, for a discussion of the
Plan.
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important to push through with land consolidation and
adjudication as fast as possible before those detainees
were released as it was feared that they would cause
trouble and interfere with the programme. Several of
these detainees had their land confiscated and awarded
to those considered loyal to the government."
Moreover, there were allegations that the Land
Adjudication Committees had ignored the rights and
interests in land belonging to those who were put in
detention when adjudicating over land belonging to them
and in many instances deprived them of the land and
awarded it to others." By preventing the
rectification of these registrations, the released
detainees would be unable to get their land back. 7° It
was suggested that allowing these detainees the
opportunity to make applications to have the register
68 Under the Forfeiture of Lands Ordinance 1954. For
a detailed account see M.P.K. Sorrenson, op. cit., pp.
104-107, 113-118; 240-241.
69 See the Report of the Mission on Land 
Consolidation and Registration in Kenya 1965-66,
(London 1966), para. 273.
70 Interestingly, the absence of the detainees was
often exploited by those who were left behind to look
after their lands (such land having avoided
confiscation), usually members of the family. These
ones were often registered as proprietors of these
lands and subsequently took advantage of the provisions
of the Registered Land Act 1963 (ss. 28 & 143(1)) to
deny the real owners ownership of the land - see
Practice Note, section 143(1) 8 E.A.L.J. 68; Kimani v. 
Gikanga (1965] E.A. 735 (allegations by the defendant);
Gatimu Kinguru v. Muya Gathanqi (1976) Kenya L.R. 256
(plaintiff denied that the defendant, who was his
brother and had been in detention, was entitled to a
share of land which was now registered in his (the
plaintiff's) name. The court held that the defendant
was entitled to an equal share of the land.
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rectified would have reopened old wounds, reviving the
bitterness that existed within the Kikuyu tribe.71
Nevertheless, the prevention of rectification of
first registrations has had a wide effect on all those
who had their land registered under the Registered Land
Act 1963, including those who had nothing to do with
the convulsions in Central Province. The harsh effect
of section 143(1) can be illustrated in the landmark
decision in The District Commissioner, Kiambu v. R. ex
parte Ethan Njau. 72 The facts of the case are as
follows: during land consolidation in the Kiambu area
of Kiambu District, the adjudication committee
appointed under the Native Land Tenure Rules 1956 (the
original precursor to the Registered Land Act 1963)
allocated a certain plot of land to Ethan Njau after
having ascertained and made up the record of existing
rights. The committee allocated another plot of land
half a mile away to John Munge. After Njau was given a
certificate of title, Munge complained that the plot of
land that was allocated to Njau should have been
allocated to himself, and therefore the allocation was
unfair. The committee considered this complaint and,
by a majority, reversed its decision. The register was
then drawn up reflecting the new position. Before the
register was confirmed Njau complained, arguing that by
virtue of the certificate issued to him he was the
71 See Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation
op. cit., para. 274.
72	 [1960] E.A. 109.
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owner of the plot originally allocated to him. This
complaint was rejected by the committee, and it
proceeded to confirm the register as it stood.
Njau then made an application to the High Court
for an order of mandamus directed to the District
Commissioner as the officer responsible under the 1956
Rules to register Njau as the title holder. The High
Court held that the action of the committee in
subsequently allocating the plot to Munge was unlawful
and, therefore, mandamus would be granted. The
District Commissioner appealed.
The Court of Appeal held that the allocation of
land by the committee to Munge was ultra vires because
they had no power under the 1956 Rules to consider
allegations of unfairness. The Court considered the
effect of section 89(1)(a) of the Native Lands
Registration Ordinance 1959 (this Act had come into
force while the case was pending appeal), which
provided that the court could order rectification of
the register other than a first registration. Gould
J.A. considered that granting an order for mandamus
would be the same as ordering rectification. Since the
subsection precluded rectifications of first
registrations, the court would not issue an order of
mandamus. As a result Njau was unable to have the
register rectified even though the decision of the
committee was ultra vires.
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Nevertheless the court said that it was open to
Njau to obtain an indemnity under section 90(1)(b) of
the Native Lands Registration Ordinance.73
The inability of the courts to rectify first
registrations is manifestly unfair to those who are
affected through no fault of their own, as in Njau's
case. Moreover, the fact that no indemnity is now
available for mistakes and omissions in first
registrations aggravates the injustice. 74 The
astonishing effect of section 143(1) of the Registered
Land Act 1963 is that the court cannot even rectify a
first registration even if it has been obtained by
fraud. Indirectly, therefore, the Act is an instrument
of encouraging fraud and the courts remain powerless to
act, even though this was not the intention of
Parliament.75
Nevertheless the Practice Note issued by the Chief
Land Registrar 75
 pointed out a way of avoiding the
harshness of this section and the courts have made
increasing use of this method.
73	 [1960] E.A. 109, at pp. 128,129. It is
significant that section 90(1)(b) was not
reproduced in the Registered Land Act 1963.
Section 144 of the 1963 Act provides that mistakes
or omissions in first registrations cannot be
indemnified except where they have been obtained
by fraud. If Njau had brought his action after
1963 he would not have obtained either
rectification or an indemnity.
74	 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 144(1)(b).
75	 Practice Note, Section 143(1) 8 E.A.L.J. 68.
76	 Ibid.
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a.	 Solutions to the problem
i. The Order in Personam
The Chief Land Registrar was of the opinion that
the hands of a court were tied by section 143(1) of the
Registered Land Act 1963. He therefore proposed that
where a court found itself in this situation, it would
be "well within its powers and within the spirit of the
Act to make an order in personam directing, for
instance, A (the registered proprietor tainted with
fraud) to transfer the parcel to B", and if A refused
to do so, then someone else (e.g. a Registrar of the
High Court, a District Commissioner or a Land
Registrar) could "effect the execution for and on
behalf of A". 77 Having consulted with the Attorney
General, the Chief Land Registrar concluded that the
process should be taken in two stages:
"a) The declaration that A holds the
property as a trustee for B including the
order in personam to A to transfer the
property to B.
b)	 In deficit of A obeying the court order
a second application be made to the court so
that a person other than A be authorised to
exeWe the transfer for and on behalf of
A. 11 "
This view had been raised previously in The District
Commissioner, Kiambu v. R. ex parte Ethan Njau 79 where
Gould J.A. (although he did not expand on this issue)
77	 Ibid.
78	 Ibid., at p. 69.
79	 Op. cit., at p. 125.
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quoted Hogg, Registration of Title Throughout the
Empire (1920 edn.) p. 367, where it said:
"Occasionally the court, in deciding in
favour of a person who claims rectification,
will declare the registered owner a trustee
for the claimant, in lieu of ordering the
register to be actually altered. So the
court will sometimes order the registered
owner to transfer to the person rightfully
entitled, instead of ordering the existing
entries on the register to be cancelled."
Thus by directing an order in personam against the
registered proprietor (who has been declared trustee)
to execute a transfer of the registered title to the
real owner, the court is able to neatly sidestep
section 143(1) and yet achieve the same effect as if
rectification had been ordered. This procedure has
been applied by the courts in several cases concerning
first registrations." The position was summarised by
Cotran J. in Limuli v. Sabayi 81 where he said:
"It is now generally accepted by the courts
of Kenya that there is nothing in the
Registered Land Act which prevents the
declaration of a trust in respect of
registered land, even if it is a first
registration, and there is nothing to prevent
the giving effect to such a trust by
requiring the trustee to do his duty by
executing the transfer documents."
It is evident, therefore, that for the courts to make
an order in personam directed against the registered
proprietor, they would have to declare him a trustee,
80 Muthiora v. Muthiora, Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1982
(unreported); Nthiga V. Nthiga, H.C.C.C. No. 1949 of
1976 (unreported); Warmattai v. Mugweru, Nyeri H.C.C.C.
No. 56 of 1972 (unreported); Muguthu v. Muguthu, [1971]
K.H.C.D. 16.
81	 [1979] J.A.L. 187 at p. 188.
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holding the property on trust for the real owners. In
Gatimu Kinquru v. Muya Gathang i 82 Madan J held that
section 143(1) "does not exclude the recognition of a
trust provided it can be established" (italics mine).
How have courts been able to establish the existence of
trusts in these circumstances? This issue has led to
the development of the customary trust.
ii. Declarations of Trust : the Customary trust
The nature of the customary trust was discussed in
Chapter Six. It arose primarily due to the
unconscionable behaviour on the part of administrators
appointed under customary law to distribute family land
among the male issue in the family. The land was
registered in the name of the administrator, who was
normally the eldest son in the family, to hold it on
trust for his brothers, especially where his brothers
were too young, 83 or where they were staying
elsewhere. 84 Many of these administrators subsequently
denied the existence of these trusts, and claimed that
they were the absolute proprietors and held the land
free from unregistered interests. 85 Since many of
these were first registrations, they could not be
rectified because of Section 143(1) of the Registered
82	 (1976) Kenya L.R. 253 at p. 263.
83	 See for example Limuli v. Sabayi [1979) J.A.L.
187.
84 Gatimu Kinguru v. Muya Gathangi, op. cit.,
(younger brother in detention).
85	 Registered Land Act 1963, S. 28.
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Land Act 1963. However, the courts took the view that
these trustees were bound to carry out their
obligations notwithstanding the fact that these were
obligations under customary law. This is because the
proviso to section 28 of the Registered Land Act 1963
provides that a proprietor cannot escape from his
duties and obligations as a trustee. Since the
registration of the eldest son as proprietor of the
land had 'the notion of trust inherent in it' the
administrators held the land subject to these trusts."
Although the interests of the beneficiaries (i.e. the
right to receive a share of the registered land) under
these trusts were unregistered, the trustees were still
bound by them because section 126(1) of the Registered
Land Act 1963 provides that trustees are subject to
unregistered liabilities.87
Having been able to establish the existence of a
trust, the courts were then able to issue an order in
personam against the registered proprietor directing
him to execute transfer documents in favour of those
entitled to a share of the land. In this way the
courts avoid breaching section 143(1) and rectification
of the register is indirectly made.
b. Rectification and Adverse Possession
The non-rectification of first registrations by
section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963 has
86	 Muguthu v. Muguthu [1971] K.H.C.D. 16.
87	 See Gatimu Kinguru v. Muya Gathangi, op. cit., at
p. 263.
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raised the question as to what happens where a person
obtains title by adverse possession against the
registered proprietor. Section 38(1) of the Limitation
of Actions Act 1967 provides:
"Where a person claims to have been entitled
by adverse possession to land registered
under any of the Acts cited in section 37
[i.e. the Government Lands Act 1915, the
Registration of Titles Act 1919, the Land
Titles Act 1908, and the Registered Land Act
1963], or land comprised in a lease
registered under any of those Acts, he may
apply to the High Court for an order that he
be registered as the proprietor of the land
or lease in place of the person then
registered as proprietor of the land."
Does this section conflict with section 143(1) of the
Registered Land Act 1963, or does it merely create an
exception to the rule? The effect of sections 37 and
38 of the Limitations of Actions Act 1967 were
considered in Hosea v. Njiru. 88
 The case concerned an
action for adverse possession of registered land.
Simpson J. held that by virtue of section 37 of the
Limitation of Actions Act 1967 the registered
proprietor held the land as trustee on behalf of the
adverse possessor. 89 He said that an order made under
section 38(1) of the Limitations of Actions At 1967 was
"distinguishable from rectification under section 143
[of the R.L.A. 1963]" and therefore such an order could
88	 [1974] E.A. 526.
89	 Section 37(a) provides: "where, if the land were
not so registered, the title of the person registered
as proprietor for the time being in trust for the
person who, by virtue of this Act has acquired title
against any person registered as proprietor ...".
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affect a first registration." However, Simpson J. did
not order rectification of the register in favour of
the plaintiff, but rather, he ordered the defendant,
who was now holding the land as trustee, to execute a
transfer of the land to the plaintiff.
However, a close inspection of section 38(1) of
the Limitations of Actions Act 1967 reveals that the
court can, in effect, order rectification of the
register because that sub-section provides that the
adverse possess can apply to the High Court "for an
order that he be registered as the proprietor of the
land ... in place of the person then registered as
proprietor ... (italics mine)." This is a direct order
to the Registrar to effect rectification rather than an
order in personam against the registered proprietor to
transfer the land to the adverse possessor as ordered
y Simpson J. in Hosea v NAiru. 91 Madan J. in Gatimu
Kinguru v. Muya Gathangi 92 gave a further explanation
as to why the registration of an adverse possessor as
proprietor displacing the first registered proprietor
is not in conflict with section 143(1) of the
Registered Land Act 1963. He said:
n ... section 143(1) does not erect a
statutory barrier which wipes out the
benefit of a title acquired by adverse
possession even in the case of a first
registration. A title acquired by
adverse possession creates a change in
90	 [1974] E.A. 526 at p. 529.
91	 Op. cit.
92	 (1976) Kenya L.R. 253.
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ownership of the title, not requiring
rectification of the register. There is
no mistake or error which is rectified,
corrected or set right or to be
rectified, corrected or set right ... It
is transmission of title by operation of
law and what happens is that a new owner
supplants the existing or old owner."93
Therefore, according to Madan J., a successful action
for adverse possession causes a change of ownership to
the title of the existing proprietor and the replacing
of the latter's name on the register with that of the
adverse possessor is not a 'rectification' since title
has been transmitted by operation of law, and therefore
it does not conflict with section 143(1) of the
Registered land Act 1963. Interestingly, in a
subsequent case 94 where the applicant claimed adverse
possession of registered land, Cotran J. said that he
was "precluded by section 143 of the Registered Land
Act from ordering the rectification of the register."
Therefore he preferred to make an order direction the
first registered proprietor to "execute a transfer" of
the registered land to the applicant. However, Cotran
J. was not referred to the arguments expressed in Hosea 
v. Njiru95 and Gatimu Kinguru v. Muya Gathangi96
discussed above, though the order in personam was
correctly issued. It is submitted that he would have
93	 Op. cit., p. 261.
94	 Abdi v. Shem [1979] J.A . L. 189.
95	 Op.cit.
96	 Op.cit.
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been perfectly entitled to order rectification of the
register in favour of the applicant.
Not to be forgotten is the fact that rights
acquired by adverse possession are overriding interests
by virtue of section 30(f) of the Registered Land Act
1963. Since the Registrar is empowered to register any
of the overriding interests as he thinks fit, if a
person can successfully establish adverse possession,
the Registrar can register the name of the adverse
possessor as proprietor in place of the existing
registered proprietor.
The Land Registration Act 1925 on the other hand
provides in section 75(1) that where title has been
obtained by adverse possession, the title shall be held
on trust by the registered proprietor for the adverse
possessor. Since, invariably, there will be a dispute
between the adverse possessor and the registered
proprietor, both may apply to the court for the
determination of the dispute under section 75(3).
The difference, therefore, between the provisions
in Kenya on adverse possession of registered land and
those in England is that in England, section 75(2) of
the Land Registration Act 1925 permits the adverse
possessor to apply to the Chief Land Registrar to be
registered as proprietor. The application is based on
the best available evidence, supported by statutory
declaration. 97 In Kenya, an application has to be made
97 Ruoff & Roper, Registered Conveyancing, 5th Ed.,
by T.B.F. Ruoff, C. Roper & E.J. Pryer (London 1986),
pp. 737, 738.
547
to the High Court under section 38(1) of the
Limitations of Actions Act 1967 for an order that the
name of the possessor should replace that of the
existing registered proprietor. The Land Registrar
would then effect such an order.
The similarities in the provisions on the
registration of adverse possessors in both countries is
that the registered proprietor who has been ousted from
possession holds the land on trust for the adverse
possessor. 98 The title of the original registered
proprietor is not extinguished as it would have been if
the land was unregistered. 99 Furthermore both section
30 of the Registered land Act 1963 and section 70(1) of
the Land Registration Act 1925 provide that rights
acquired by virtue of limitation are overriding
interests. However, while the Registrar under the Land
Registration Act 1925 is empowered to enter a notice of
the overriding interest on the register, 100 the Kenyan
Registrar can register the overriding interests as he
thinks fit.-°1
98	 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 75(1); Limitation
of Actions Act 1967, s. 37(a).
99 Ibid. See also Spectrum Investment Co. v Holmes 
[1981] 1 W.L.R. 221.
100 S. 70(3).
101 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 30.
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2. Rectification of Other Registrations
Although the courts in Kenya cannot rectify first
registrations, nevertheless, they are empowered by
section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963 to
rectify other registrations if they are "satisfied that
any registration ... has been obtained, made or omitted
by fraud or mistake." This is a narrow power of
rectification in comparison with the power of English
courts to rectify the register where "by reason of any
error or omission in the register, or by reason of any
entry made under a mistake, it may be deemed just to
rectify ..." (italics mine). 102 The courts in Kenya
are confined to rectifying registrations which have
been brought about by fraud or mistake.
What types of conduct would amount to fraud under
section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963? At one
end of the specturm, it is evident that a deliberate
act of deception will amount to fraud. This is
illustrated in Raphael Njuguna Mwaura v Gikonyo Kariuki 
Kaniaru v Others- 03
 In 1974, the plaintiff bought a
plot of land in Kiambu from the first dependent and the
Land control Board granted consent to the transfer.
The second defendant subsequently entered into an
agreement with the first defendant to purchase two
acres out of that same plot that had been sold to the
plaintiff. However, the Land Control Board refused to
102 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 82(1)(h). See also
ss. 82(1)(d) & (e).
103 Daily Nation, September 28, 1990, p. 3.
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grant consent to this agreement. The sale agreement
between the first and second defendants was then
rescinded by mutual consent. In the meantime, the
second defendant had succeeded in lodging a caution
against the plaintiff's title by "suppressing the
material fact from the (Kiambu District] Land Registrar
that the Land Control Board had refused to grant
consent to the transfer of the land in his favour."
The second defendant then approached the Chief
Land Registrar and convinced him that he was the true
owner of the land registered in the plaintiff's name.
The latter, not knowing the truth, wrote a letter to
the Kiambu District Land Registrar directing him to
register the land in the second defendants name. The
District Land Registrar complied with the direction by
deleting the plaintiff's name, replacing it with that
of the second defendant, and issuing a new land
certificate.
Pall J. held that the registration of the second
defendant was fraudulently obtained and the register
should be rectified in favour of the plaintiff. This
was certainly an elaborate web of deception contrived
and executed by the second defendant. Indeed Pall J.
remarked that the second defendant was "lucky indeed
that he has not been charged with knowingly deceiving
and misleading the Land Registrar by failing to give
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true and honest information in respect of his professed
interest in the land."104
Another example of conduct that is certainly
fraudulent under section 143(1) of the Registered Land
Act 1963 is a double conveyance. In Natwarlal Chauhan
v Zakaria Omagwa, 105 a registered proprietor of land
entered into a contract for the sale of land with the
plaintiff. The plaintiff, for reasons that are
unclear, did not have himself registered as proprietor
but nevertheless went ahead and started building on the
land. Aware that the plaintiff had not registered
himself as proprietor, the vendor sold the same land to
the defendant who proceeded to register himself as
proprietor. The plaintiff prevented the defendant from
entering the land when he realised what happened, and
applied to have the register rectified. The Court of
Appeal granted an order for rectification of the
register because the registration of the defendant was
obtained as a result of the fraudulent double
104 The offence is under section 155(2) of the
Registered Land Act 1963. It is not known why the
second defendant was not charged with the offence. A
disturbing element of this case is the fact that even
though the Chief Land Registrar was deceived by the
second defendant, he had no jurisdiction to order
rectification of the register in the name of the second
defendant. The preferred course of action would have
been for the Registrar to state a case to the High
Court for its opinion under section 149 of the
Registered Land Act 1963. This course of action would,
it is submitted, have uncovered the deceoption before
it was successfully carried out.
105 Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1980 (unreported).
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conveyance perpetrated by the original registered
proprietor. 106
At the other end of the spectrum is the question
of whether mere notice of an unregistered interest
amounts to fraud. This is addressed to below. In
between both ends of the spectrum is the issue of
whether a deliberate ploy to defet an unregistered
interest amounts to fraud. This question was addressed
by the Kenya High Court in Rungoyo Wanyoya v. Samuel 
Gichungo. 107 The first defendant transferred land to
his son, the second defendant, knowing full well that
the plaintiffs had not protected their right to receive
a share of the land in the register, and that their
rights would have been defeated by the transfer. Muli
J. held that the transfer was fraudulent because it was
106 While obtaining registration as a result of
presenting forged documents would be fraudulent, there
is no reported Kenyan case on this issue, vis a vis
registered land. Interestingly, this point has not
been directly addressed to in England by the Courts.
In one case, Re Leighton's Conveyance [1936] 1 All E.R.
667, a plea that the transfer was forged was not
proceeded with. In the second case, Argyle Building 
Society v Hammond (1985) 49 P & C.R. 148, although it
was alleged by the appellant that the transfer and
registration of the property was effected as a result
of a forged deed, no finding of forgery was made at
first instance or in the Court of Appeal. Furthermore
when the case was sent back to the High Court for a
rehearing, Argyle Building Society v Steed, (1989)
LEXIS Transcript, forgery was not pleaded but rather
the plea of non est factum. Forgery is, in any event,
a criminal offence in England under the Forgery and
Counterfeiting Act 1981. In the context of land
retgistration it would be considered as a criminal
offence under section 117 of the Land Registration Act
1925. In Kenya, forgery would be considered as an
offence under section 155(2) of the Registered Land Act
1963.
107 [1973] K.H.C.D. 59.
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deliberately intended to defeat the rights of the
plaintiffs. Therefore the court ordered that the
register should be rectified so that the plaintiffs
should be entered in the register as proprietors in
common. This case therefore illustrates that a
deliberate ploy to defeat an unregistered interest will
amount to fraud, and a transfer resulting out of such
conduct would be subject to rectification. 108
The above case would have undoubtedly fallen
within the definition of 'fraud' in section 2 of the
Registration of Titles Act 1919. That section
provides,
" 'fraud' shall on the part of a person
obtaining registration include a proved
knowledge of the existence of an unregistered
interest on the part of some other person,
whose interest he knowingly and wrongfully
defeats by that registration."
This section 2 definition would preclude mere notice of
an unregistered interest as amounting to fraud.109
But does, the definition of fraud under the Registered
Land Act 1963 also preclude mere notice? It was shown
in Chapter Six that mere notice under the 1963 Act
would not amount to bad faith and, therefore, it
follows that it would not also amount to fraud. The
paucity of Kenyan authorities to illustrate what type
of conduct amounts to fraud under section 143(1) of the
108 C.f. Waimiha Sawmilling Co. Ltd. v. Waione Timber 
Co. Ltd. [1926] A.C. 101 at p. 106, per Lord Buckmaster
- "if the designed object of a transfer be to cheat a
man of a known existing right, that is fraudulent."
109 Jandu v. Kirpal [1975] E.A. 225.
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Registered Land Act 1963, makes it pertinent to view
English cases which illustrate fraudulent conduct in
relation to the Land Registration Act 1925, and which
would therefore be of persuasive authority before a
Kenyan court.
In Jones v. Lipman 11 ° a vendor conveyed property
to a company that he controlled, in an attempt to
defeat an unregistered contract. It was argued that
the company was a purchaser for value. However,
Russell J. held that the company was, in reality, a
creature of the vendor, "a device and a sham, a mask
which he holds before his face in an attempt to avoid
recognition by the eye of equity. 1,111
 Accordingly,
specific performance was ordered. The sham transaction
was therefore viewed as an example of fraudulent
conduct. 112
 This deliberate ploy is indeed reminiscent
of the defendants transfer in Rungoyo Wanvoya v Samuel 
Gichungo 113 to defeat the plaintiff's unregistered
interest, the difference being that in the latter case,
110 [1962] 1 W.L.R. 832.
111 Ibid., at p. 836.
112 Diplock L.J. in Snook v. London and West Riding
Investment Co Ltd. [1967] 2 Q.B. 786 at p. 802, defined
a sham transaction as involving "acts done or documents
executed by the parties to the 'sham' which are
intended by them to give to third parties or to the
court the appearance of creating between the parties
legal rights and obligations different from the actual
legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties
intended to create."
113 Op. cit.
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the transfer was to an individual rather than to a sham
company as in Jones v Lipman.114
In Lyus v. Prowsa Developments 115
 land had been
transferred to the defendants subject to and with the
benefit of the plaintiff's contract. The defendants
pleaded that the contract was not protected on the
register and therefore was not binding on them.
However, Dillon J. held that because the defendants had
expressly contracted to take subject to the contract,
their reliance on the Land Registration Act 1925 was to
use it as an instrument of fraud. The fraudulent
conduct was the "first defendant reneging on a positive
stipulation in favour of the plaintiffs in the bargain
under which the first defendant acquired the land."
Despite considerable academic criticism 116 this case
was approved in Ashburn Anstalt v. Arnold, 117 on the
basis that the defendants had given an express
assurance that they would honour the plaintiff's
contract. 118
To this extent, Lvus is distinct from Peffer v. 
Rigq.119 In Peffer, there was no express assurance
that the transferee would give effect to the
114 Op. cit.
115 [1982] 2 All E.R. 953.
116 See Chapter Six.
117 [1988] 2 W.L.R. 706.
118 [1988] 2 W.L.R. 706, at p. 728, per Fox L.J.
119 [1977] 1 W.L.R. 285.
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unregistered interest. There, the first defendant
transferred to the second defendant a house for £1, and
the latter was registered as proprietor. The second
defendant claimed that an express trust in favour of
the plaintiff was not binding on her because the
plaintiff had not protected his interest on the
register. The court imposed a constructive trust on
the second defendant because she knew "that the
property was trust property when the transfer was made
to her. 120 Therefore, mere notice, according to Graham
J., amounted to bad faith.
One academic has supported the imposition of the
constructive trust in Peffer v Ri qq121 "on the basis
that the transferee's conduct was sufficiently
fraudulent to cause the equitable in personam
-jurisdiction to be invoked." 122
 However, it has been
argued123
 that this reasoning is weak because althvu.gh
there are cases which have established that a
constructive trust can be imposed on a purchaser - who
claims to take free from an unregistered interest -
because of his fraudulent or unconscionable conduct,
there is an element of fraudulent misrepresentation,124
Ibid., at p.294.
Ibid., at p. 294.
David J. Hayton, Registered Land, 3rd ed., (Lo ndon
1981), p.134.
123 M.P. Thompson, Registered Land, 3rd ed., (London
1981), C.L.J. 280 at pp. 290-292.
124 Loke Yew v. Port Swettenham Rubber Co. Ltd. [1913]
A.C. 491
120
121
122
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bribery or corruption on the part of the purchaser;125
mere notice, the author concluded was not enough in
these cases. 126 Peffer v. Ri cig 127 has also been
heavily criticised on the basis that it imports the
doctrine of notice into the Land Registration Act 1925
which is contrary to the policy of the Act.128
Although Peffer has never been overruled, it has been
seriously discredited and it is unlikely to be followed
in the future.
3.	 Other Limits to Rectification
Section 143(2) of the Registered Land Act 1963
provides that the register "shall not be rectified so
as to affect the title of a proprietor who is in
possession and acquired the land ... for valuable
consideration ..."
Therefore if a proprietor is to protect his title from
rectification he must establish:
a)	 that he is 'in possession'; and
125 Assets Co. Ltd. V. Mere Roihi [1905] A.C. 176 at
p. 210, per Lord Lindley.
126 M.P. Thompson, Op. cit.
127 Op.cit.
128 One commentator described it as driving "a coach
and horses through the Land Registration Act 1925". -
David Hayton, Purchasers of Registered Land, [1977]
C.L.J. 227. For further criticism see also Stuart
Anderson, Notice of Unprotected Trusts, (1977) 40
M.L.R. 602; Roger J. Smith, Registered Land: Purchasers 
with Actual Notice (1977) 93 L.Q.R. 341; Jill Martin,
Constructive Trusts of Registered Land [1978] Con y . 52.
M.P. Thompson, Registration, Fraud and Notice, [1985]
C.L.J. 280.
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b)	 that he acquired the land 'for valuable
consideration'.
What is the significance of these two elements?
a.	 'In Possession'
Possession is a legal concept of variable meaning
depending on the context. 129
 A person who exercises
physical control over land may be said to be in actual
or de facto possession, for example a lessee of a house
is in actual possession while he occupies it.- 30
 What
is the meaning, therefore, of 'possession' in the
context of section 143(2) of the Registered Land Act
1963? The Kenya Court of Appeal had the opportunity to
consider this issue in Natwarlal Chauhan v. Zakaria 
Omagwa. 131 the facts of which have been outlined
earlier. In determining whether they could rectify the
register against the defendant, who had been registered
as proprietor as a result of the fraud committed by the
first registered proprietor, the Court of App[eal had
to consider whether the defendant was 'in possession'.
If he was, and there was no doubt that he was innocent,
129 See Chapter Six, supra. The question as to
whether there exists exclusive possession in
distinguishing a lease from a licence in English law is
an issue that has continued to absorb the time and
attention of the courts. For examples of recent cases
Street v. Mountford [1985] A.C. 809; A.G. Securities v. 
Vaughan [1988] 3 W.L.R. 1205; Antoniades v. Villiers 
[1988] 3 All ER 1053; Asian v. Murphy (No.1) [1989] 3
All ER 130; Mikeover Ltd. v. Brady [1989] 3 All ER 618.
130 Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2nd ed., by J.
Burke
131	 . .Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1980 (unreported).
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then rectification could not be made against him, 132
Madan J.A., who gave the leading judgment, held that
/possession' within the context of section 143(2) of
the Registered Land Act 1963 "means actual possessing
of the land (italics mine)". 133 Therefore, if a
proprietor was to have his title protected from
rectification he would have to be in physical control
of 'actual possession' of the land. Since, in this
case, the defendant had been prevented by the plaintiff
from entering the land he was held not to be 'in
possession'. 134
 Accordingly the court ordered that the
register be rectified in favour of the plaintiff as the
proprietor.135
The Land Registration Act 1925 also provides that
rectification cannot be ordered against a registered
proprietor in possession. 136 However, possession is
defined "unless the context otherwise requires" in
132 The defendant was clearly a proprietor since he
was 'the person named in the register as the
proprietor' - Registered Land Act 1963.
133 However, Madan J.A. did not seem to be sure
because he prefaced the sentence by saying, "I think
II
...
134 C.f. the English case of Epps v. Esso Petroleum
Co., [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1071 where the plaintiff erected a
fence to act as a boundary between the disputed land -
which the defendant was claiming - and the defendant's
land. Templeman J. said that the defendants did not
have to forcibly tear down the fence and re-enter the
land in order to come within section 82(3) which
protects proprietors in possession.
135 The defendant would have been entitled to an
indemnity under section 144(1) of the Registered Land
Act 1963.
136	
• 82(3).
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section 3 (xviii) to include "receipt of rents and
profits or the right to receive the same, if any".
This would mean that rectification would not be ordered
against a non-occupying proprietor 'since he could
claim the right to receive the profits of the land, if
any, merely by virtue of being registered.' 137
 This is
in direct contrast to the position under section 143(2)
of the Registered Land Act 1963; since, according to
Madan J.A. 'possession' in that sub-section means
'actual possession' or physical control, it follows
that the courts in Kenya would be able to order
rectification against a non-occupying registered
proprietor who received rents or profits from the land,
such as a landlord.
It has been argued that the meaning of
'possession' in relation to section 82(3) of the Land
Registration Act 1925 should be restricted to protect
the proprietor who is in the physical occupation of the
registered property. Ruoff and Roper state:
"There is little doubt, however, that the
principle behind the Land Registration Acts
is that an innocent registered proprietor who
is in physical occupation of the registered
property should not be ousted from his
enjoyment of it. Monetary compensation is of
little comfort to a man who is thrown out of
his home or ejected from his land, whilst it
should normally be ample to recompense an
owner who has never occupied his property.
This is plain common sense."138
137 Law Commission, Property Law, Third Report on Land
Registration, Law. Corn. No. 158, para. 3.12.
138 Registered Conveyancing, 5th ed. (London 1986), p.
887.
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The Law Commission was of the same opinion and
recommended that only proprietors in actual occupation
of the land should be protected. 139
 If this
recommendation is adopted in an Act of Parliament, it
would cause the meaning of 'possession' where
rectification is concerened under the Land Registration
Act 1925, to be similar to the meaning of 'possession'
under the Registered Land Act 1963.
b)	 'Valuable Consideration'
For a registered proprietor in Kenya to be
protected from rectification, not only must he be 'in
possession', he also must have acquired the land for
'valuable consideration' •140 'Valuable consideration'
is defined in section 3 of the Registered Land Act 1963
as including 'marriage, but does not include a nominal
consideration'. The requirement of valuable
consideration means that no protection from
rectification is afforded to registered proprietors who
are donees, or who have been registered as trustees by
virtue of customary law, 141
 or those who have received
the land by virtue of inheritance, unless these
139 Third Report, op.cit., In their Fourth Report 
(Law Com. No. 173), the Law Commission included this
recommendation in s.44(3)(b) in their draft Land
Registration Bill.
140 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 143(2).
141 Muguthu v. Muguthu [1971] K.H.C.D. 16; Gatimu
Kinguru v. Muya Gathangi (1976) Kenya L.R. 253. See
generally Chapter Six, supra.
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registered proprietors are under a first
registration. 142
The position under the Registered Land Act is in
contrast to that under the Land Registration Act 1925.
The latter Act does not provide the requirement that
the registered proprietor should have acquired the land
for value. Although section 3(xxi) of the Land
Registration Act 1925 defines 'purchaser' to mean "a
purchaser in good faith for valuable consideration
(italics mine)" the word 'purchaser' is not referred to
in section 82(3) of the Act and therefore the
definition in that sub-section would not apply to the
proprietor. However, the Law Commission in their Third
Report on Land Registration recommended that section
82(3) of the Land Registration Act 1925 should be
redrafted so as to benefit registered proprietors who
were prudent purchasers for value in good faith"
(italics mine). 143
 They said that this would make the
sub-section consistent with "general and statutory
principles of property law and conveyancing,11144 as
well as harmonise with the position of minor interests
since they are asserted against persons who have not
142 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 143(1).
143 Third Report, op.cit., para. 3.15. Although the
Law Commission did not explain what they meant by a
'prudent purchaser', this can be taken to mean a
purchaser who has made all the necessary searches,
inquiries and inspections of the land prior to
purchase.
144 Third Report, op.cit., para. 3.15.
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given value or who are not in good faith.- 45 If this
recommendation is adopted in a future Land Registration
Act146
 then the protection currently afforded to the
registered proprietor will have been narrowed
significantly.
4.	 Rectification Against the Proprietor in Possession
Section 143(2) of the Registered Land Act 1963
provides that rectification can be ordered against the
proprietor in possession if he "had knowledge of the
omission, fraud or mistake in consequence of which the
rectification is sought, or caused such omission, fraud
or mistake or substantially contributed to it by his
act, neglect or default." There are therefore three
elements, either of which must be present if
rectification is to be ordered against the proprietor
in possession. The proprietor must either have had:
145 Under the Land Registration Act 1925, (ss. 20(4),
23(5), unprotected minor interests are binding against
the original grantor or creator and against anyone
taking from such person otherwise than by purchase for
value.
146 The Law Commission inserted this recommendation in
their Land Registration Bill contained in the Fourth
Report on Land Registration Law Comm. No. 173) Section
44(3) of the draft Bill provides that the proprietor
should have been a purchaser if he is to be protected
from rectification. However, the reference to a
purchaser would bring in the requirement of good faith
which forms part of the definition of 'purchaser' in
section 3(xxi) of the Land Registration Act 1925. If
this recommendation is adopted, it would form a
significant difference between the protection from
rectification afforded to the registered proprietor
under the Registered Land Act 1963 and that afforded to
the proprietor under the Land Registration Act 1925 (if
amended), since under the former Act the registered
proprietor need not have acquired the registered title
in good faith.
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1. "knowledge of the omission, fraud or mistake," or;
2. "caused such omission, fraud or mistake," or;
3. "substantially contributed to it by his act,
neglect
or default."
An example of how a registered proprietor in possession
who acquired the land for valuable consideration lost
his protection from rectification is illustrated in
Rungoyo Wanyoya v. Samuel Gichungo. 147 It is arguable
that the second defendant could have been found to have
'caused' or 'substantially contributed' to the fraud
'by his act' of presenting the transfer documents for
registration. In other words the fraud would not have
been successful had the second defendant not signed and
presented the transfer documents for registration;
therefore by the mere act of presenting the documents
for registration the second defendant wouLd tame caused
or substantially contributed to the fraud. While this
causes no problem where the defendants have connived to
execute the fraud, it does create a problem for the
registered proprietor who, when purchasing the land
from the vendor, is unaware of the fraud committed by
the latter. 'By his act' of simply presenting the
transfer documents for registration the proprietor,
even though he acted in good faith, may be found to
have 'caused' the fraud or 'substantially contributed'
to it. Such a construction is perverse in so far as it
147 Op.cit.
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affects the registered proprietor who was unaware of
the fraud. 148 It would appear that the same result
would occur where a mistake made by the Land Registry
results in an application for rectification. This can
happen for example where the Registry registers A,
without his knowledge, as proprietor of a title that
belongs to B, while B is registered as proprietor of
title belonging to A.149
Subsequently, A, without knowledge of the mistake,
transfers the land to C, a bona fide purchaser, who has
the land registered in his name and enters possession.
B later realises the mistake and seeks to have the
register rectified as against C. It is submitted that
C may be found to have 'caused' or 'substantially
contributed' to the mistake 'by the [mere l act' of
presenting the transfer documents for registration and
having the land registered in his name, thereby
allowing the register to be rectified against him.
Rectification against C would certainly be unfair
considering that he was unaware of the mistake and
neither could he have known of it. Nevertheless, C
would be entitled to an indemnity under section
144(1)(a) of the Registered Land Act 1963 because
although rectification is made against him as a result
148 The English courts came to the same conclusion -
see below.
149 A similar mistake committed by the land registry
occurred in Rahab Nganqa Kinuthia v. Nganga Kirogo,
H.C.C.C. No. 404 of 1982 (unreported), but this point
was not argued. For a discussion of this case see
above.
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of his substantial contribution to the mistake 'by his
act', and therefore loses the protection given to
proprietors in possession under section 143(2), section
144(2) provides that indemnity is not payable to those
who have contributed to the damage by their 'fraud or
negligence'. Consequently, C, having substantially
contributed to the mistake 'by his act' would be
outside section 144(2) of the Registered Land Act 1963.
The courts in Kenya have yet to discuss this
issue, that is, what acts by the proprietor in
possession will enable him to be found to have 'caused'
or 'substantially contributed' to either fraud or a
mistake, resulting in the loss of his protection from
rectification. However, this issue has been considered
by the courts in England in relation to the Land
Registration Act 1925. Prior to its amendment by the
Administration of Justice Act 1977, 150 section 82(3)(a)
provided that the registered proprietor lost his
protection if he was "a party or privy or has caused or
substantially contributed, by his act, neglect or
default, to the fraud, mistake or omission in
consequence of which such rectification is sought; ..."
(italics mine) 151
150 Ss. 24, 32, Sch. 5 Part IV. See also section
83(5)(a) of the 1925 Act with regard to indemnity,
which was amended by section 3(1) of the Land
Registration and Land Charges Act 1971.
151 The phrase in italics is identical to that used in
section 143(2) of the Registered Land Act 1963.
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The first of three English cases where this point
was considered was Chowood v. Lya11. 152 In that case
the plaintiffs were registered as first proprietors
with absolute title to a plot of freehold land, which
included certain strips of woodland. The plaintiffs
brought the action against the defendant for trespass.
In defence, the defendant successfully asserted a title
acquired before first registration based on adverse
possession. The defendant was also successful in a
counterclaim for rectification of the register.
Luxmoore J. held that one of the reasons why the claim
for rectification succeeded was because the plaintiff
company had "by its own act, that is, by the
registration of a conveyance which by itself is
inoperative to pass the pieces of land in dispute,
caused the mistake, that is the inclusion of the pieces
of the land in dispute in the registered title ..."
(italics mine). 153
 Although the Court of Appeal upheld
the decision on different grounds no dissent was made
from the above principle expressed by Luxmoore J.
The second case was Re 139 High Street, 
Deptford.- 54 In this case, a certain Mr. Dobkins,
having purchased an unregistered shop with an annexe,
became registered as first proprietor with an absolute
title. In the conveyance to Dobkins the land was
152 [1930] 1 Ch. 426.
153 Op.cit., at p. 438."<
154 [1951] Ch. 884.
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conveyed by description without any plan, and both the
vendor and Dobkins mistakenly believed that the
property conveyed included in its description the
annexe, although in fact this annexe was owned by the
British Transport Commission. The plan in the land
certificate which was issued to Dobkins showed plainly
that his title included both the shop and the annexe.
On an application by the Commission for rectification
of the register it was held (per Wynn-Parry J.) that
the Commission was entitled to rectification because
Dobkins had substantially contributed to the mistake in
registration by putting forward, quite innocently, a
misleading description of the property for the purposes
of registration.
The third case was Re Sea View Gardens. 155 There
Pennycuick J. held:
"The registered proprietor is a party to the
mistake and has caused or substantially
contributed to it, when he puts forward a
transfer which contains incorrect particulars
of the land it contained ... [Wynn-Parry J.
in Deptford) bases his reasoning, quite
clearly, on the view that where a registered
proprietor lodges with the Land Registry a
document which contains a misdescription of
the property, then he has caused or
substantially contributed to the mistake."
(italics mine).
In summary these three cases held that registered
proprietors had substantially contributed to the
mistake even though there was no fault on their part.
In the view of Cretney and Dworkin, the courts in these
155 [1966] 3 All E.R. 935.
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three cases merely looked at the matter as one of
causation and hardly any attention was given to the
question of whether or not the mistake was
"unintentional and non-negligent" •156
Section 83(2)(a) of the Land Registration Act 1925
was subsequently amended and it now provides that the
proprietor in possession loses his protection where he
"has caused or substantially contributed to the error
or omission by fraud or lack of proper care ..."157
The phrase 'lack of proper care' indicates that there
would have to be fault on the part of the proprietor
before he loses his protection from rectification.
Although the Law Commission pointed out that the
wording 'lack of proper care' lacks definition,
statutory or judicia1 158 it has been suggested that a
"failure to carry out the usual conveyancing inquiries
and inspections should amount to lack of proper care,
which probably should be judged objectively and not
subjectively." 159
 In view of the fact that this issue
has not been deliberated upon by the courts in Kenya,
how would it be considered if it came before them? The
156 S. Cretney & G. Dworkin, Rectification and
Indemnity: Illusion and Reality, (1968) 84 L.Q.R. 528,
at p. 535. This article exposed the deficiency of s.
82(3) of the LRA 1925, and led to the amendment of the
sub-section.
157 See Theodore Ruoff & Peter Meehan, Land
Registration: The Recent Act 35 Conveyancer (N.S.) 390.
158 Third Report, op. cit., para. 3.14.
159 David J. Hayton, Registered Land, 3rd ed., (London
1981) p. 175.
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courts would certainly have to examine The three
English cases discussed above would be persuasive
authority in determining whether a registered
proprietor would have substantially contributed to a
mistake by simply presenting a defective transfer
document for registration. However, like section
82(3)(a) of the Land Registration Act before it was
amended, section 143(2) of the Registered Land Act 1963
does not introduce the question of motive, that is,
whether the mistake should be viewed as intentional or
unintentional, and it is probably for this reason that
the courts in the three English cases above did not
introduce this element in deciding whether the
registered proprietors in those cases had caused or
substantially contributed to the mista1ce. 160 This is
why legislative intervention was necessary to rectify
this deficiency. It is submitted that section 143(2)
of the Registered Land Act 1963 would similarly have to
be rectified to give ample protection to the proprietor
in possession and thus prevent the existing protection
from being illusory.
III. Indemnity
A.	 Introduction
An important benefit of a registered title is the
fact that a registered proprietor of land or a charge
may receive an indemnity or compensation from the State
160 In contrast, section 144(2) of the 1963 Act
introduces the motive element with regard to indemnity
through the use of the wording 'fraud or negligence'.
C.F. Land Registration Act 1925, s. 83(5(a).
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where he suffers loss due to his property because of
fraud. This contributes to make a registered title
superior to an unregistered one, the latter titles
having no similar provisions. The provisions for
indemnity reflect the common phrase that a registered
title is 'State guaranteed' or that the State insures
proprietors of registered titles against the loss that
they may suffer. In effect "the applicant for first
registration enters into a contract with the State for
insurance against defects overlooked by or unknown to
him or to his solicitors as well as against defects
known to him and candidly disclosed, and a small part
of the fees may be regarded as a premium. "-63-u16
However, some writers do not necessarily see the
need for indemnity provisions in statutes dealing with
registration of title. Simpson'- 62
 for example, points
out that there are many countries with systems of land
registration which do not have provisions for indemnity
in their statutes. Such countries are Fiji, Malaysia,
Belize, Germany and most of the Continental systems.
Simpson argues that although these countries have no
provisions for indemnity their system of registered
title is operated effectively. Moreover, in view of
the fact that those countries which do provide for
indemnity do not pay out substantial sums in
compensation, it may be argued that indemnity is
161 Ruoff & Roper, op.cit., p. 879.
162 S. Rowton Simpson, Land Law and Registration, 
(Cambridge 1976), pp. 179-183.
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unnecessary. However, it must be remembered that in
registered conveyancing the transfer and vesting or
ownership is not effected by the execution of the
instrument of transfer or other act of the owner but by
the State through its officer, the Registrar. As the
Registrar is human, and therefore imperfect and
fallible, he is bound to make mistakes which may result
in a proprietor suffering from the loss of his
title.- 63 Since the register, which is operated by the
State, has been relied upon at all times by the
proprietor it would only be fair for the State to
recompense him for the loss of his title due to a
mistake made by one of its officers. However, in the
case of fraud, a fraudster, for example, may deprive a
registered proprietor of his land and transfer it to a
bona fide purchaser who, having relied on the State
operated register, registers himself as proprietor. If
the first registered proprietor obtains rectification
of the register, then the bona fide purchaser should be
indemnified for the loss he has suffered since he
relied on a register which contained no adverse
interests. Conversely, if the first proprietor is
unable to obtain rectification, then he should obtain
indemnity. In both cases since the register has
warranted that it is conclusive, those who have relied
on it and subsequently suffer loss should be
compensated by the State which operates the register.
163 In making a claim for indemnity it is not
necessary to show that the Registrar was at fault.
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In effect the State, in the case of fraud, transfers
the burden of paying compensation from the fraudster to
itself. 164 Such features make the provisions on
indemnity an attractive feature of land registration.
B. The Right to Indemnity
The indemnity provisions in the Registered Land
Act 1963 and in the Land Registration Act 1925 are
complimentary to the rectification provisions. Section
144 of the Registered Land Act 1963 contains the main
provisions for the award of indemnity. Section 144(1)
provides:
"Subject to the provisions of this Act
and of any written law relating to the
limitation of actions, any person
suffering damage by reason of:-
a) any rectification of the register
under this Act; or
b) any mistake or omission in the
register which cannot be rectified under
this Act, other than a mistake or
omission in a first registration; or
C)	 any error in a copy of or extract
from the register or in a copy of or
extract from any document or plan
certified under this Act,
shall be entitled to be indemnified by the
Government out of moneys provided by the
Legislature."
Therefore, there are three main heads, when considering
the right to indemnity under section 144(1) of the
Registered Land Act 1963, and it is to these we now
turn to.
164 Nevertheless the right to sue the fraudster
remains.
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1.	 Rectification
Section 144(1)(a) provides that a person suffering
damage by reason of "any rectification of the register
under this Act" may obtain an indemnity. 165 While this
provision may appear wide, it is qualified by the
preceding words, that is, the entitlement to indemnity
is subject to the provisions of the Act and adverse
possession. For example, section 30 of the Registered
Land Act 1963 provides that the Registrar may register
an overriding interest thus, in effect rectifying the
register. Since a registered proprietor takes land
subject to overriding interests 166 he suffers no damage
if the Registrar subsequently registers an overriding
interest under section 30, thereby rectifying the
register. Further if the proprietor purchased land,
part of it in the possession of a squatter who has
165 See section 83(1) of the Land Registration Act
1925. The difference is that under section 144(1) (a)
of the Registered Land Act 1963, a person has to show
that he suffered 'damage', whereas under section 83(1)
of the 1925 Act a person must have suffered 'loss' .
The predecessor to the 1963 Act, the Land Registration
(Special Areas) Ordinance 1959 had used the word 'loss'
in section 90(1). However, the Committee responsible
for drafting the 1963 Act substituted the word 'damage'
for 'loss' since, in the words of one of the draftsmen,
"a person might be registered, in error, as the
proprietor of land he was not entitled to own, and he
might then be able to claim on rectification, that he
had suffered 'loss' whereas he could not maintain that
he had suffered 'damage'." - S. Rowton Simpson, op.
cit., p. 596. But even such a person might still be
able to claim that he had suffered 'damage'. For
example, if the transferor made the error, so that he
included land he though he owned in the transfer
documents, and the purchase price reflected this, the
purchaser will certainly have suffered 'damage' if the
register is rectified.
166 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 28.
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acquired title, if the squatter succeeds in being
registered as the proprietor under the Limitation of
Actions Act 1967, the former proprietor would not be
entitled to an indemnity for his 'damage' because he
was bound by such an interest anyway; moreover rights
acquired by virtue of limitation are overriding
interests under section 30(f) of the Registered Land
Act 1963.
The English courts have taken a similar view in
respect of the indemnity provisions under the Land
Registration Act 1925. In Chowood v. Lya11 167 the
plaintiff was held not to have title to some strips of
woodland, even though they had been included in the
parcels of the conveyance to them, because the
defendant had acquired a good title by adverse
possession and was then able to obtain rectification of
the register. The plaintiff then claimed an indemnity
for the loss of the woodlands 168 but it was held that
the rectification in favour of Mrs. Lyall had put the
company in no worse position than before rectification,
and accordingly since they had suffered no loss, the
plaintiffs would not be entitled to indemnity. 169
167 [1930] 1 Ch. 426 affirmed [1930] 2 Ch. 156,
discussed supra.
168 Re Chowood's Rectistered Land [1933] Ch. 574.
169 The English Law Commission has recommended that
the indemnity scheme should be extended to cover
overriding interests. Although a registered proprietor
would still automatically take subject to overriding
interests, he will be able to apply for indemnity -
Third Report, op. cit., para. 3.29.
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Section 144(1)(a) of the Registered Land Act
enables a person who has been the victim of fraud to be
able to recover indemnity. For example in the case of
Natwarlal Chauhan v. Zakaria Omagwa, 17 ° the defendant
who had the register rectified against him because he
was not in possession would have been entitled to
indemnity under this sub-section. The subsection also
enables those who have been victims of fraud but are
not able to obtain rectification due to exclusion of
first registrations in section 143(1) of the Registered
Land Act 1963, to be entitled to receive an indemnity.
2.	 Non-Rectification
Where a mistake or omission has occurred in the
register, but it is not rectified, the position in
Kenya and in England respectively is that any person
suffering 'damage'171 or i loss' 172
 is entitled to
indemnity. The significant difference between the
Registered Land Act 1963 and the Land Registration Act
1925 is that the former provides in section 144(1)(b)
that mistakes or omissions in first registrations
cannot be indemnified. Just as in the case of
rectification173 this is a significant exception. When
discussing the reasons for the exclusion of the
170 Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1980 (unreported),
discussed supra.
171 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 144(1)(b).
172 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 83(2).
173 Registered Land Act 1963, S. 143(1).
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rectification of first registrations under section
143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963, it was seen
that one of the reasons for the exclusion was
political. 174
 However, although the Native Lands
Registration Ordinance 1959 had provided that there
could be no rectification of first registrations,175
section 90(1)(b) provided that any person suffering
loss by reason of an error or omission which could not
be rectified was entitled to indemnity. In the
District Commissioner, Kiambu v. R. Ex parte Ethan
Njau, although unable to obtain rectification
of the register despite the ultra vires action of the
adjudication committee, was advised by the Court of
Appeal that he may have been able to obtain indemnity
under section 90(1)(b). 177
 Four years later the
Registered Land Act 1963 was enacted and it prevented
persons suffering mistakes and omissions in first
registrations from being able to receive indemnity.
Although it has not been said why this change was
made178 it may be due to the fact that the Njau case
174 Supra.
175 S. 89(1)(a).
176 [1960] E.A. 109.
177 [1960] E.A. 109, at p. 129. It is not known
whether he succeeded in obtaining an indemnity.
178 The amendment was not discussed in Parliament when
the Registered Land Bill was being debated.
Furthermore the 30 year rule prevented the writer from
being able to look at official documents in the Kenya
National Archives which would have thrown light on the
matter.
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had made the Government realise that many people would
be entitled to claim indemnity if they failed to obtain
rectification, 179
 since, as indicated earlier, many
mistakes had been made during land adjudication which
affected many proprietors. If indemnity was available,
this would have resulted in a flood of cases as people
brought compensation claims, and it may have been
feared that the cost of indemnifying these claims would
have been prohibitive. As a 'result it may have been
decided to prevent the indemnity of mistakes and errors
in first registrations thereby bringing this provision
in line with section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act
1963.
However, despite the exclusion of first
registrations in section 144(1)(b) of the Registered
Land Act 1963, other registrations are not affected.
3.	 Errors
Under section 144(1)(c) of the Registered Land Act
1963 any person who suffers damage due to an error in
an official search or a copy or extract from any
document or plan certified under the Act is entitled to
be indemnified. 18 ° An example of an error is where the
official search certificate states that the title has
no adverse interests and on the strength of this a
179 The Njau case had raised a lot of publicity - for
an account see M.P.K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in the 
Kikuyu Country, (Nairobi 1967), pp. 203-206.
180 C.f. Land Registration Act 1925, s. 83(3).
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person purchases the registered land only to discover
that there was indeed a charge registered against the
title. The registered proprietor would be entitled to
be indemnified for the damage suffered by having to
redeem the charge. In Kenya, there appears to have
been a serious problem whereby official searches
containing errors made by Land Registry officials were
causing purchasers relying on them to suffer damage by
subsequently discovering that there were adverse
interests registered against the title. It meant that
the proprietors relying on the certificates had to be
indemnified because of the mistakes and omissions on
the search certificates. This prompted a letter from
the Chief Land Registrar warning Land Registrars of the
need to exercise care when issuing search certificates.
The letter is worth quoting in full. He said:
"I must emphasize that by issuing a Search
Certificate, a Land Registrar assumes
responsibility on behalf of the Government
for the correctness of the information given.
Should any person incur any loss or damage by
reason of a mistake in a Search Certificate,
he would under section 144 of the Registered
Land Act be entitled to indemnity from the
Government. The Land Registrars should not
however expect to put the Government into
unnecessary expense by their carelessness or
negligence. It should therefore be made
clear to the Land Registrars that any money
paid by way of indemnity occasioned by
carelessness or negligence will be recovered
from the Land Registrar responsible."i81
181 Letter from the Chief Land Registrar to the Land
Registrars of Nyeri, Nakuru, Kakamega, Kisumu, Mombasa
and Embu, 1 July 1982.
579
This meant that Land Registrars would be personally
liable for such carelessness182 . In an interview with
the Deputy Chief Land Registrar 183
 he pointed out to
the writer that some Land Registrars had been
unscrupulous and had sometimes issued Search
Certificates which did not reflect the true position of
the register, and these actions had subsequently caused
the Government loss when they had to indemnify those
who had relied on the Certificates and had subsequently
suffered damage. The above letter would serve as a
potent warning to those who would be tempted to engage
in such conduct that they would be liable to reimburse
the government for the sums paid out as a result of
their carelessness. The Deputy Chief Land Registrar
pointed out that some Registrars had been dismissed for
their carelessness and negligence. He narrated the
example of a Land Registrar who negligently registered
a charge against a registered title before ensuring
that Land Control Board consent was obtained)-84
 The
Board refused to grant consent and the charge was
therefore void. 185
 By this time the bank had already
182 See also Registered Land Act 1963, s 147 where it
is evident that the Minister is entitled to recover the
amount paid by way of indemnity "from any person who
has caused or substantially contributed to the loss by
his fraud or negligence" (italics mine), hence there
would be power to recover the money from a Land
Registrar who negligently caused an error in a search
certificate for example.
183 Nairobi Lands Office, 2 October 1989.
184 Land Control Act 1967, s. 6(1)).
185 Ibid.
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advanced the moneys to the registered proprietor who
disappeared. Since the charge was void, the bank was
unable to realise its security. Accordingly, it sought
indemnity from the Government and it succeeded. The
negligent Land Registrar was later removed from his
position.
This revelation would probably explain why the
Registered Land Act 1963 contains no provision
providing that Land Registrars or other officials in
the Land Registries would not be liable for any act or
matter done or omitted to be done in good faith.188
This therefore puts a very heavy responsibility upon
Land Registrars in Kenya to be meticulous in compiling
the register and in issuing Search Certificates and
other documents connected with the register. The
absence of this provision makes a Land Registrar
potentially liable in damages for mistakes and
omissions made in good faith.187
C.	 Limits to Indemnity
1.	 Fraud and Negligence
Under section 144(2) of the Registered Land Act
1963 no indemnity is payable to "any person who has
himself caused or substantially contributed to the
damage by his fraud or negligence, or who derives title
(otherwise than under a registered disposition made
186 The Land Registration Act 1925 contains such a
provision in section 131. The Registrar, however,
would be liable for male fide acts.
187 See below.
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bona fide for valuable consideration) from a person who
so caused or substantially contributed to the damage."
This disqualification is less severe than section
143(2) which provides that no rectification is
available to the proprietor who substantially
contributed to the fraud or mistake by his 'act,
neglect, or default'. 188 The form of words in section
144(2) of the Registered Land Act 1963 is similar to
section 83(5)(a) of the Land Registration Act 1925
except that the latter sub-section uses 'lack of proper
care' rather than 'negligence'. Prior to its amendment
by the Land Registration and Land Charges Act 1971
section 83(5) had contained the words 'act neglect or
default'. However, it was argued that this form of
words seriously limited the availability of indemnity
to proprietors who, through no fault of theirs, were
found to have substantially contributed to a mistake
for example.189
2.	 Errors in Survey
Section 148(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963
provides:
"As between the Government and a proprietor,
no claim to indemnity shall arise and no suit
shall be maintained on account of any surplus
or deficiency in the area or measurement of
any land disclosed by a survey showing an
area or measurement differing from the area
or measurement disclosed on any subsequent
188 See supra.
189 S. Cretney & G. Dworkin, Rectification and 
Indemnity: Illusion and Reality, (1968) 84 L.Q.R. 528.
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survey or from the area or measurement shown
in the register or on the registry map."
This subsection refers to situation where the area or
measurements on the ground are different from those on
the Registry Index Map, such discrepancy having been
discovered by a subsequent survey. The Chief Land
Registrar highlighted that this problem arises with
surveys that were carried out during land
adjudication.-90
 As indicated previously, these
surveys were carried out in a hurry, resulting in many
errors being made. 191
 This provision therefore
protects the Government from having to pay out
indemnity to proprietors who discover the discrepancy
in the area of their land and also prevents proprietors
from bringing actions against the Government in respect
of such discrepancies.192
However, where a purchaser of registered land, for
example, bought land which was stated on the register
to measure an area of 3 acres, and subsequently has the
190 Practice Instruction: Use of Registry Index Maps 
in the Determination of Boundary Disputes and the Role
of Surveyors in the Same, 8 March 1985.
191 As in Fort Hall where the scale of the errors
resulted the enactment of the Land Registration (Fort
Hall District) Special Provisions Ordinance 1961 to
deal with the problem.
192 The English Land Registrar has the power to
rectify where too much land has been registered in
error, under the Land Registration Rules 1925, r. 14.
Indemnity under section 83(1) of the 1925 Act would be
available to a person suffering loss as a result of a
rule 14 rectification since the 1925 rules enjoy "the
same force as if enacted in [the 1925] Act." - Land
Registration Act 1925, s. 144(1). See also Law
Commission, Property Law: Third Report on Land
Registration, Law Corn. No. 158, para. 3.3.
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land surveyed and discovers that it only measures 2
acres then according section 148(2) the proprietor
would be entitled to be indemnified since the purchase
price he will have paid will have been calculated on
the basis of the area shown on the register. However,
section 148(2) imposes a limit of six months "from the
date of registration of the instrument under which the
proprietor acquired the land." It would mean,
therefore, that the proprietor would have to survey his
land immediately after registration, in order to come
within the six month period.
It is submitted that this limitation period is too
short. 193 Since the purchaser of registered land has
relied on a register that is meant to be conclusive and
which he should not have any reason to doubt it is
unfair to stipulate such a short period since it is
likely that the discrepancy would come to his knowledge
after a long time. It is submitted that the period
should be six years to fall in line with the limitation
period for the other provisions.
However, in view of the present short limitation
period it would be prudent for purchasers of registered
193 Under the section 83(11) of the Land Registration
Act 1925 liability to pay indemnity is deemed to be a
simple contract debt, so that it is barred after six
years; but time does not begin to run until the
claimant knows of the existence of his claim, or but
for his own default might have known. Although the
Registered Land Act 1963 does not specify what the
limitation period for recovering indemnity under
section 144 is, it would appear that sections 4(1)(d)
and 37 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1967 would make
the limitation period to be six years from the date on
which the course of action accrued.
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land to have the land measured before registering the
transaction and therefore avoid the problem of having
to seek indemnity, which can take a long time to
recover.
Although the Land Registration Act 1925 does not
contain a provision similar to section 148 of the
Registered Land Act 1963, nevertheless an equivalent
claim for indemnity would lie in respect of fixed
boundaries. Such boundaries are precisely measure and
if there was a rectification of those boundaries then
an indemnity claim could be sustained.194
3.	 Mistakes and Omissions in First Registrations
Section 144(1)(b) of the Registered Land Act 1963
provides that a person suffering damage by reason of
"any mistake or omission in the register
which cannot be rectified under this Act,
other than a mistake or omission in a first
registration ..."
shall be entitled to be indemnified. This sub-section
when read together with section 144(1)(a) would appear
to allow indemnity for a first registration obtained by
fraud. This is evident from the fact that section
144(1)(b) provides that indemnity is not payable for "a
mistake or omission in a first registration."
Therefore, although no first registration can be
rectified, whether obtained by fraud or otherwise,
indemnity is available for a first registration
194 See Ruoff & Roper, Registered Conveyancing, 5th
Ed., (London 1986, p. 66).
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obtained by fraud but not one made by mistake. Hence,
section 144(1)(b) appears to mitigate the rigours of
section 143(1), albeit limited to first registrations
obtained by fraud.
What remedy is therefore available to a person who
has, due to a mistake committed by the Land Registry
for example, had his land registered in the name of
another, and cannot have the register rectified because
it is a first registration nor can he obtain indemnity?
It is submitted that the only remedy available is to
sue the Land Registrar for negligence. It is notable
that the Registered Land Act 1963 does not contain a
provision providing for the immunity of the Chief Land
Registrar and other officers of the Registry from suit
for actions done in good faith, unlike its predecessor,
the Native Lands Registration Act 1959, which contained
such a provision in section 97• 195 This makes it
possible for an individual to bring an action against
the Land Registrar for damages, whether the mistake was
made in good faith or not, or preferably against the
Government, since the latter would be vicariously
liable for the acts of its officials. 196
 This is
illustrated in Kimani v. Attorney-General)- 97
 The
plaintiff and one Bari both claimed to own a certain
195 C.f. Land Registration Act 1925, s. 131 which
contains a similar provision.
196 Government Proceedings Act Cap.40, s. 4(3). In
suing the Government he would bring his action against
the Attorney General.
197	 [1969] E.A. 29.
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plot of land when the land was being consolidated. The
land consolidation committee for the area determined
the dispute and adjudged that the land belonged to the
plaintiff, whose name was subsequently entered into the
Record of Existing Rights under the Native Land Tenure
Rules 1956, and later transferred to the Adjudication
Register under the Native Land Registration Ordinance
1959 which replaced the Rules. However, Bari covertly
succeeded in convincing Government officials to have
the case reopened and, as a result, another land
consolidation committee held that the land should be
subdivided and Ban's name be entered on the reigster.
The actions of Bari were clearly improper and the order
of the committee to have the land subdivided was
evidently wrongly Obtained)- 98
 The plaintiff, in
effect, brought an action for rectification of the
register but failed. 199
 He then sued the Attorney
General for negligence, claiming damages for being
wrongfully deprived of his land, his name having been
removed from the register without any justification.
The High Court held that the Government was liable
in damages for the acts of its officials who had
removed the name of the plaintiff from the register.
Trevelyan J held that there was a duty of care between
the plaintiff and the Government Officers concerned
198 Ibid, at p. 30.
199 Apparently, because it was a first registration,ibid, at p. 30. See P.J. Bayne, Government Liability
for Torts by Public Officials, 6 E.A.L.J. 243 at p.
244.
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(among whom included the Land Registrar) not to remove
his name from the register and that the duty had been
breached when the plaintiff's name was removed from the
register. Accordingly, the plaintiff was awarded
damages for the loss of his land. 2" Although the
Attorney General appealed to the Court of Appeal on the
level of damages awarded by the High Court, which were
reduced accordingly, the decision of Trevelyan J. on
the substantive issue was affirmed.201
However, pursuing this remedy causes problems for
a chargee, whose charge is not registered by the
Registrar against the relevant title, and the chargee
consequently suffers economic loss. In Kimani v. 
Attorney-General, 202 Trevelyan J. in the High Court had
awarded the plaintiff damages for loss of profits, but
on appeal, it was held that such loss was economic and
therefore could not be recovered. The appeal against
this head of damage was therefore allowed. such a
chargee would be unable to recover for such loss.203
200 Surprisingly the Attorney General did not raise
the defence available in sections 4(4) of the
Government Proceedings Act Cap 40, and section 97 of
the Native Lands Registration Ordinance 1959 which
negatived the Government's liability.
201 [1969] E.A. 502.
202	 [1969( E.A. 29.
203 In contrast, in the English case of Ministry of
Housing and Local Government v. Sharp [1970] 2 Q.B.
223, the plaintiff was able to recover economic loss
against a local authority which, through its servant,
the local land charges registrar, negligently issued a
search certificate which failed to disclose the
plaintiff's interest. English law, however, draws the
line where economic loss is suffered as a result of a
negligent misstatement, and where it arises out of
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The Land Registration Act 1925 contains four other
instances not included in the Registered Land Act 1963
where indemnity is not payable to a claimant and they
are: for mines and mineral rights unless they are
expressly included in the title; 204 where a purchaser
has acquired an interest under a registered disposition
from a company free from any mortgage, charge,
debenture, debenture stock or trust deed (whether or
not it has been registered under the Companies Acts)
unless it is protected on the register of title;205
where a registered lease is disclaimed by the trustee
in bankruptcy and an order is made by the court vesting
the lease in any person; 206
 and costs incurred in
taking and defending any legal proceedings without the
consent of the Registrar.207
D.	 Levels of Indemnity
Both the Land Registration Act 1925 and the
Registered Land Act 1963 provide that a person is
damage or injury to property; in the former it is
recoverable whereas in the latter, it is not - see
generally Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 13th ed. by
W.V.H. Rogers, (London 1989) p. 84 et. seq. However,
Salmon L.J. in Ministry of Housing, infra, at p. 278,
did admit that the case did "not precisely fit into any
category of negligence yet considered by the courts".
204 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 83(5)(b).
205 Ibid., s. 60(2).
206 Ibid., s. 42(2).
207 Ibid., s. 83(5)(c). Under the section 146 of the
Registered Land Act 1963 the Registrar has the
discretion to award such costs. However, no consent
needs to be obtained from him.
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compensated for the actual loss that he has suffered.
Where indemnity is claimed for non-rectification of the
register both statutes provide that it shall not exceed
the value of the interest at the time when the mistake,
error or omission which caused the damage or loss was
made. 208
 However, this may result in the indemnity
awarded being inadequate especially where the mistake
is discovered a long time after it was made, and in the
meantime the value of the land has risen. Both
statutes provide that indemnity for rectification is
limited to the value of the lost interest immediately
before rectification.209
Since indemnity is paid for by the State it is
accordingly provided in section 144(1) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 that claims are paid out of
moneys provided for by Parliament. In an interview
with the Kenyan Deputy Chief Land Registrar,
pointed out that very little is paid out by way of
indemnity, although he himself was unaware of the
precise amounts involved. 211
 Nevertheless, he said
that it is probably due to the fact that there are not
208 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 145(a); Land
Registration Act 1925, S. 83(6)(a).
209 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 145(b); Land
Registration Act 1925, s. 83(6)(b).
210 Mr. Kago Gachiri.
211 It is unfortunate that in Kenya there are no
official records providing how much the Government has
had to pay out every year by way of indemnity.
Apparently such records confidential. It is therefore
impossible to compare numerically the levels of
indemnity in Kenya with those in England.
210 he
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many applications for indemnity. This may reflect the
fact that the tight limits in the provisions on
indemnity in the Registered Land Act 1963, such as no
indemnity for mistakes or omissions in first
registrations, may weed out many applications for
indemnity.
Section 146 of the Registered Land Act 1963
provides that on the application of an interested party
the Registrar may determine whether a right of
indemnity has arisen, and if so, can award indemnity
and has the discretion to award any costs and expenses
properly incurred in the matter. However, in practice,
where an application for indemnity includes a threat to
sue the Government the Chief Land Registrar, as a
matter of caution, passes on these claims to the
Attorney General who then determines the matter, that
is whether indemnity should be awarded or not. 212
 The
English Land Registrar has no power to determine
whether a person is entitled to indemnity and the
amount thereof. This power was taken away by the Land
Registration and Land Charges Act 1971, 213
 and now only
the High Court has the power to determine such claims.
Nevertheless the 1971 Act still allows the Land
Registrar to settle indemnity claims by agreement. 214
212 Interview with the Deputy Chief Land Registrar,
Mr. Kago Gachiri, 2 October, 1989.
213	 S . 2(1).
214 Ibid., s. 2(5).
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E.	 Conclusion
Undoubtedly the two biggest differences in the
rectification and indemnity provisions in the
Registered Land Act 1963 and the Land Registration Act
1925 are that the 1963 Act does not allow a court to
rectify a first registration irrespective of the
circumstances it was obtained; 215 neither does the 1963
Act provide for indemnity of mistakes and omissions in
first registrations. 216 It was shown that there were
three reasons why section 143(1) in particular was
inserted in the Act; 217
 to prevent vexatious litigants,
to ensure the finality of the register, and thirdly, to
prevent the system of land registration in Central
Province from being undermined since it had been pushed
through with tremendous haste in the 1950's, resulting
in numerous errors and mistakes being made; furthermore
many of those deprived of their land were political
detainees who were not present during adjudication to
protect their claims.
However, more then 25 years have elapsed since the
Registered Land Act 1963 was enacted and the question
arises whether the exception to rectification in
section 143(1) and consequently the exception in
section 144(1)(b) of the Act serve any useful purpose
today. Undoubtedly these sections cause untold
215 Registered Land Act 1963, s. 143(1).
216 Ibid., S. 144(1)(b).
217 Supra.
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hardship on individuals who were not registered as first
proprietors of their land parcels due to mistakes made by
adjudication and land registry officials, such mistakes
only being discovered years later. Such individuals
would not be able to obtain either rectification or
indemnity. The only option for these is to engage in a
costly action to sue the Government for the negligence of
the Land Registrar, which may be difficult to establish.
Where an individual has been the victim of fraud, and the
fraudster registers himself as the first registered
proprietor, the individual would be unable to obtain
rectification of the register although he would be
entitled to an indemnity. Nevertheless, the development
of the customary trust by the courts has minimised to
some extent the problem created by section 143(1); the
person who had obtained registration as proprietor by
fraud would be unable to assert his right if the fraud
could be proved, but would instead hold on customary
trust. 218 Unfortunately, section 143(1) may have the
effect of encouraging unscrupulous individuals to use
the Registered Land Act 1963 as an instrument of fraud.
In any event, even if a person who has been the victim
of the fraud could be indemnified for the loss of his
title, money is poor compensation where the loss of land
is involved, especially in Kenya where land is
218 See pp. 539-542, supra. Moreover, the fraudster can
also be prosecuted for a criminal offence under section
155(2)(a) of the Registered Land Act 1963. For example in
Republic v. Godfrey Kariuki Kinyanjui  Criminal Case No.
35 of 1982 Kiambu S.M.R.C. (unreported), the defendant
was convicted for obtaining a certificate of title by
fraudulent means and disposing the registered land.
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the sole means of livelihood for many people and in
view of the African concept of land is priceless,219
The issue whether sections 143(1) and 144(1)(b) of
the Registered Land Act 1963 should be repealed was
considered as far back as 1966 by the Lawrance Mission.
In their Report the Mission said that while they did
not wish to start a flood of cases or re-open old
wounds which might revive the bitterness that existed
within the Kikuyu tribe at the time of the Emergency,
there were some cases which would benefit from
ventilation and should be reviewed by the High
Court. 220 Accordingly the Mission suggested that
section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963 should
be amended by deleting the words "(other than a first
registration)" and section 143(2) to be amended to
ensure that the title of a proprietor on a first
registration is protected. They also advocated that
section 144(1)(b) of the 1963 Act should also be
amended by deleting the words "other than a mistake or
omission in a first registration" enabling individuals
who were affected by the errors committed during the
Emergency to be compensated if they could not obtain
rectification of the register. However, the Government
did not accept these recommendations. 221
 The matter
219 See Chapter Two, supra.
220 Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and
Registration in Kenya,  1965-66, (London 1966), paras.
273, 274.
221 See The National Assembly, Official Report, Vol.
XIV (6th Sess.), Col. 1943. It did, however, accept
the other recommendations of the Mission, such as the
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was also debated upon by Parliament years later and MPs
felt that section 143(1) should be repealed, but these
views were rejected by the Government because it felt
that repealing the sub section would cause the
political animosities of the 1950s to break out again,
as well as the increase of the litigation that the sub-
section was designed to prevent. 222
It therefore appears unlikely that the sections
143(1) and 144(1) are likely to be amended for a long
time. Nevertheless the use of the customary trust by
the courts to prevent registered proprietors from, in
many cases, defrauding their relatives has lessened the
impact of section 143(1) of the Registered Land Act
1963. The establishment of the trust enables an order
in personam to be issued against the proprietor
ordering him to transfer the registered land to the
real owners(s). While this procedure enables the court
to have the register rectified without breaching
section 143(1), it is limited in its application since
the customary trust will not be established in every
situation where fraud has been committed.
The powers of the Kenyan Land Registrar to rectify
the register are limited when compared to those of the
English Land Registrar. The Kenyan Registrar can only
rectify the register in minor matters and where the
adoption of the Land Adjudication Bill which the
Mission drafted, and which became the Land Adjudication
Act 1968.
222 See The National Assembly, Official Report, Vol.
LVI, (24 Nov. 1981), Col. 1913.
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material interests of any proprietor are not affected.
The Registrar cannot rectify where there has been
fraud, unless of course he can obtain the consent of
all persons interested. In contrast the English Land
Registrar can rectify any registration if he deems it
just to do so.223
The limited power of rectification by the Kenyan
Land Registrar and the limitation of the rectification
of first registrations reflects the finality of the
register of land under the Registered Land Act 1963,
thereby absolutely preventing any recourse to the past
to find the history of a title.
223 Land Registration Act 1925, s. 83(4).
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Chapter Nine
THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE MAGISTRATES' JURISDICTION
(AMENDMENT) ACT 1981
I.	 Introduction
Up to 1981 jurisdiction over land registered under
the Registered Land Act 1963 was exercised by the High
Court where the value was more than 10,000 kshs, and
where it was less, the High Court exercised concurrent
jurisdiction with the Resident Magistrates Court.1
Section 159 of the Registered Land Act 1963 governs the
jurisdiction of the courts over land registered under
the Act. 2 However, the Magistrates Jurisdiction
(Amendment) Act 1981 (hereinafter 'M.J.(A.) A. 1981')
made far reaching changes to the jurisdiction of the
courts over land registered under the 1963 Act through
the amendment of section 159 of that Act.
The M.J.(A.) A. 1981 amended the Magistrates'
Courts Act 1967 by introducing tribunals known as the
1	 The Magistrates Courts in Kenya are divided into
two tiers: the Resident Magistrates' and the District
Magistrates' Courts. Both are subordinate courts, with
the District Magistrates' Court lying at the bottom of
the tier. Their jurisdiction is governed by the
Magistrates' Courts Act 1967. Unlike the magistrates'
courts in England which are primarily criminal courts
with limited civil jurisdiction (see Magistrates'
Courts Act 1980; Terence Ingman, The English Legal 
Process, 3rd ed., (London 1990), pp.36-58), the
Magistrates' Courts in Kenya exercise criminal and wide
civil jurisdiction.
2	 Appeal from the High Court lies to the Court of
Appeal while from the Resident Magistrates' Court it
lies to the High Court and finally to the Court of
Appeal - Civil Procedure Act 1924, ss. 65(1), 66.
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panels of elders. 3 These panels were composed of
elders who were defined as,
If ... persons in the community or communities
... who are recognised by custom in the
community or communities as being, by virtue
of age, experience or otherwise, competent to
resolve issues between parties ..."4
Unlike the courts of normal jurisdiction, these panels
were composed of lay individuals with no legal
training. They were to exercise jurisdiction over
certain land matters, namely, the beneficial ownership
of land, division and determination of boundaries,
claims to occupy or work land, and trespass to land.5
The magistrates' courts were no longer to exercise
jurisdiction over such matters. 6 Importantly, the M.J.
(A.) A. 1981 amended section 159 of the Registered Land
Act 1963 to enable these panels to exercise
jurisdiction in such matters over land registered under
the 1963 Act.
Herein lies the root of the problem. To begin
with, the amended section 159 was poorly drafted. The
High Court, the Resident Magistrates' Court and the
panels of elders were to exercise jurisdiction over
registered land but the limits of this jurisdiction are
ambiguous. Further problems were generated by the
provisions creating the panels of elders. The panels
3	 Magistrates' Courts Act 1967, ss. 9A(2), 9B.
4	 Magistrates' Courts Act 1967, s. 9F.
5	 Ibid., s. 9A(1).
6	 Ibid., preamble and s. 9A(1).
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of elders are composed of people who have a knowledge
of customary law but had no legal training. Since
there was nobody with legal training who sat on the
panels, either as chairman or as an advisor to the
panels, many decisions have been reached which conflict
with the provisions of the Registered Land Act 1963.
As a result the 1963 Act is in danger of being
undermined, a problem made serious by the fact that the
higher courts cannot correct these decisions due to the
provisions of the 1981 Act which make it difficult to
make an appeal from the decision of a panel of elders.
This chapter considers how section 159 as amended
can be interpreted to achieve a measure of certainty
with respect to the jurisdiction of the courts. The
problems created by the panels of elders are
considered, particularly how decisions of these panels
have conflicted with the provisions of the Registered
Land Act 1963 and other provisions of the law. One
problematic area is procedural. The Land Registrar has
specific jurisdiction to determine boundary disputes of
registered land, but so have the panels. This has
created a procedural conflict which the Chief Land
Registrar has tried to solve with limited success.
In view of the difficulties caused by the creation
of the panels of elders, proposals for reforming the
system are analysed in the concluding part of this
chapter.
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II. Section 159 and the Jurisdiction of the High Court
and the Panels of Elders 
Section 159 of the Registered Land Act 1963, as
amended by the M.J.(A.) A. 1981, governs the
Jurisdiction of the High Court and the Resident
Magistrates Court over land registered under the Act.7
That section provides,
"Civil suits and proceedings relating to the
title to, or the possession of, land, or to
the title to a lease or charge, registered
under this Act, or to any interest in such
land, lease or charge, being an interest
which is registered or registrable under this
Act, or which is expressed by this Act not to
require registration, shall be tried by the
High Court and where the value of the subject
matters in dispute does not exceed twenty
five thousand pounds, by the Resident
Magistrate's Court, or, where the dispute
comes within the provisions of Part III A of
the Magistrates' Cours Act, in accordance
with that part."
It is evident that section 159 as amended is
ambiguous in the extreme. The ambiguity is created in
part by the portion which states "Civil suits [etc.
etc.] ... shall be tried by the High Court and where
the value of the subject matters in dispute does not
exceed twenty five thousand pounds, by the Resident
Magistrates Court ..." (italics mine). The inclusion
of the conjunction 'and' raises the question as to
whether the jurisdiction of the High Court is limited
to matters concerning registered land where the value
of the land exceeds £25,000 (500,000 k sh) or whether
7	 The District Magistrates Courts never had
jurisdiction over land registered under the Registered
Land Act 1963 - s. 159.
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the jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the
Resident Magistrates Court.
In addition, section 159 raises further questions
in the part which states,
n ... or, where the dispute comes within the
provisions of Part IIIA of the Magistrates
Cours Act, in accordance with that part.
Does this mean that the jurisdiction of the panel of
elders, is merely concurrent with that of the Resident
Magistrates Courts within section 159 or is it also
concurrent with that of the High Court, that is having
jurisdiction over land valued at more than E25,000?
In its pre-1981 form, section 159 was clear. It
stated,
II 
...[C]ivil suits and proceedings relating
to the title to, or the possession of, land,
or to the title to a lease or charge,
registered under this Act, or to any interest
in any such land, lease or charge, being an
interest which is registered or registrable
under this Act, or being an interest which is
expressed by this Act not to requires
registration, shall ... be tried by the High
Court, or, where the value of the subject
matter in dispute does not exceed ten
thousand shillings, by the High Court, or a
subordinate court held by a senior Resident
Magistrate or a Resident Magistrate"
(italics mine).
It was clear, in this version, that the
jurisdiction of the High Court extended to land over
10,000/- and concurrent with the jurisdiction of the
Resident Magistrates Courts where the value was less
than 10,000/-.	 How then, is section 159 in its
present form, to be construed?
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It was the intention of Parliament to limit the
jurisdiction of the High Court to matters over £25,000
where land was registered. This was made clear by the
Attorney General when moving the Magistrates
Jurisdiction (Amendment) Bill during its second
reading. He said,
il ... there has to be some division in the
case of registered land between the kinds of
cases which would go to the High Court and
those which would be heard by the elders or
to [the] Resident Magistrates Court [sic],
and that the dividing line is where the value
of the subject matter is in dispute. Now we
have put a figure of £25,000 which is a very
high figure ... [T]his figure was formerly
under the jurisdiction of the High Court.
But now the elders will look into that and
only the cases above that figure will go to
the High Court.8" (Italics mine).
However, the words of section 159 do not make this
intention clear. The clearest method in achieving the
intention would have been to insert an earlier clause
emphasising that the mandatory reference to the High
Court ('shall be tried by the High Court') only covered
claims exceeding £25,000. For example
"Civil suits [etc. etc.] ... where the value
of the subject matters in dispute exceeds
£25,000, shall be tried by the High Court,
but where the said value does not exceed
£25,000, shall be tried by the Resident
Magistrates Court."
To come to the construction of section 159 advanced by
Parliament, it is necessary to imply the italicised
words into the statute. The use of the conjunction
'but' (above) is preferable to 'and' (in the persent
8	 The National Assembly, Official Report, Vol. LVI,
Col. 1799 (24 November 1981).
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form) in making the intention clear. The pre-1981
version acquired its clarity by express reference to
'the High Court' after the value-limitation clause
clearly indicating that the jurisdiction of the High
Court was concurrent with that of the Resident
Magistrates Court.
However, since the courts cannot revert to the
debates of the Kenya Parliament as reported in Hansard9
and therefore discover what the intention of Parliament
was, how should they construe section 159?
If the amended version is construed with reference
to the pre-1981 version, the intention of Parliament
becomes tolerably clear - viz, to confine claims where
the value does not exceed £25,000 to the Resident
Magistrates' Court. Hence, the jurisdiction of the
High Court would not be concurrent with that of the
Resident Magistrates Court, but would be confined to
claims over £25,000. Although this point has never
been argued before the courts, Nyarangi J.A. in Wamalwa
Wekesa v. Patrick Muchwengen appeared to imply,
without discussion, that the jurisdiction of the High
Court was not concurrent with that of the Resident
Magistrates Court.
However, it is submitted that this construction is
in conflict with the Constitution of Kenya. Section
9	 Tudor Jackson, The Law of Kenya, 3rd ed. (Nairobi
1988), p. 10. Katikiro of Buganda v Attorney-General 
of Uganda [1959] E.A. 382 at p. 397, per O'Connor P.
10	 Civil Appeal No. 107 of 1985 (unreported).
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60(1) of the Constitution provides in part that the
High Court
it ... shall have unlimited original
jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters
and such other jurisdiction and powers as may
be conferred on it by this constitution or
any other law" (italics mine).
It follows that the jurisdiction of the High Court
cannot be ousted even by an express provision of a
statute. 11 Its jurisdiction can only be ousted or
limited by an amendment to the Consitution.12
According to section 3 of the Constitution,
n ... if any other law is inconsistent with
this constitution this constitution shall
prevail and the other law shall, to the
extent of the inconsistency, be void"
(italics mine).
Hence, if section 159 was construed to limit the
jurisdiction of the High Court to land over £25,000, it
would be in conflict with the Constitution. In
avoiding such a conflict, the ambiguity created by
section 159 should be resolved with reference to the
Constitution, in favour of the High Court retaining
concurrent jurisdiction with the Resident Magistrates'
Court. Undoubtedly, this would be at odds with the
intention of Parliament. However, it is respectfully
submitted that when enacting the M.J. (A.) A. 1981,
section 60(1) of the Constitution should also have been
11 Elijah arap Koross v. Anthony Oyier, H.C.C.C. No.
10 of 1980 (unreported), noted in Nairobi Law Monthly,
No. 14, February 1989.
12	 Christine Miller v. Cecil Miller, Civil
Application No. Nai. 12 of 1988 (unreported), noted in
Nairobi Law Monthly, No.14, February 1989.
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amended to reflect the limit of the High Courts'
jurisdiction with respect to registered land. 13
 The
failure to have done so means that section 159 of the
Registered Land Act 1963 as amended is void, in so far
as it conflicts with the Constitution. Therefore the
High Court should retain jurisdiction over registered
land where the value is less than £25,000.
The other question is whether panels of elders
have a concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court
where the value exceeds £25,000. The argument in
favour of a concurrent jurisdiction is that the use of
'or' in section 159 indicates that the restriction on
the Resident Magistrates Courts jurisdiction to £25,000
is not to affect the panels of elders: since the
dispute comes within Part IIIA of the Magistrates
Courts Act 1967, it must be '[tried] ... in accordance
with that Part.' Since Part IIIA does not itself set
any financial limit on the panels powers, it would
follow that their jurisdiction is concurrent with that
of the High Court.
However, the argument against concurrent
jurisdiction is evident from section 9A of the
Magistrates Courts Act 1967. Since, according to that
section, the panels are taking over jurisdiction from
the Magistrates Courts in certain matters, their
jurisdiction should be similarly limited to £25,000 in
13 A special Act of Parliament has to be enacted to
amend the Constitution, which should have the support
of two-thirds majority of the members of Parliament -
Constitution of Kenya, ss. 47(1)(2).
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the absence of any specific provision. In the absence
of authority on this point, this argument is attractive
and is preferable to the former.
III. Jurisdiction of the English Courts 
Section 138 of the Land Registration Act 1925
governs the courts having jurisdiction with respect to
land registered under the Act. Section 138(1) provides
that
"[A]ny jurisdiction conferred on the High
Court by [the Land Registration Act 1925] or
by the Land Registration and Land Charges Act
1971 may also be exercised, to such extent as
may be prescribed, by county courts."
However, no such rules extending jurisdiction to
the county courts have yet been made 14 . Therefore, a
reference to "the Court" in the 1925 Act confines it to
the High Court. 15
 However, section 82(1)(a) of the
1925 Act provides that rectification of the register
may be ordered by "a court of competent jurisdiction"
if that court has decided that a person is entitled to
any estate, right or interest in or to any registered
land. In Watts v. Waller 16 it was held that a county
14 But the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990
considerably widens the jurisdiction of the County
Courts. Section 1 enables the Lord Chancellor to make
orders allocating proceedings between the High Court
and the County Court. Personal actions where less than
£50,000 is at stake have to be commenced in the County
Court. Section 2 provides for the High Court to
transfer proceedings to a County Court and vice-versa.
15 Matters within the jurisdiction of the High Court
and assigned to the Chancery Division - Land
Registration Act 1925, s. 138(2).
16	 [1972] 3 All E.R. 257.
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court was "a court of competent jurisdiction", and
therefore had jurisdiction to order the vacation of a
notice.
Therefore, unlike Kenya where panels of elders,
composed of lay people have jurisdiction to determine
certain matters concerning land registered under the
Registered Land Act 1963, lay people do not hear and
determine disputes under the Land Registration Act
1925. Indeed lay people play a very small role in the
English judicial system where the determination of land
matters is concerned. 17 They are appointed to the
panels of Rent Tribuanals and Rent Assessment
Committees where they may sit as chairpersons;
moreover, lay persons can be appointed to sit in the
Local Valuation courts which value property for rating
purposes.
Questions concerning title to land and allied
matters require people with the knowledge and skill to
grasp the issues, and it would be difficult for a lay
person to be expected to do so, and more so to
adjudicate over such matters. Hence, such questions
are dealt with the judges of the High Court, who when
appointed are barristers of at least 10 years standing;
the county court is composed of circuit judges, who
must also be barristers of at least 10 years standing,
and registrars who are solicitors of at least 7 years
17 This is in contrast to the magistrates courts,
where the majority of magistrates are lay persons - see
section V, infra.
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standing. 18 The next section highlights the problems
caused by the use of lay people in the determination of
disputes over registered land in Kenya.
IV Problems Created by the Panels of Elders 
While moving the Magistrates Jurisdiction
(Amendment) Bill during its second reading the Attorney
General explained that the panels were being created in
response to the dissatisfaction that had been expressed
by farmers at the way the District Magistrates Courts
in particular, were conducting cases. Many people were
of the opinion that these courts were not often
understanding the issues of the disputes before them,
nor were they recording those issues or taking proper
evidence. Consequently, when appeals were made to the
High Court, the court was faced with a record that was
incomplete or insufficiently imprecise to form the
basis of an appeal and very often the High Court had no
alternative but to either persuade the parties to have
the case heard before elders, or to have the case re-
tried by the magistrate. Parties therefore frequently
experienced delay, expense and frustration.19
Therefore, the Attorney General felt that since
most communities in the country had a customary
machinery for the settling of disputes by means of
18 Walker & Walker, The English Legal System, 6th ed.
by R. J. Walker, (London 1985), pp. 193, 201, 210
19 The National Assembly, Official Report, Vol. LVI,
Col. 1797, (24 November 1981).
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elders, it was to those elders that litigants should
look for speedy resolutions of their disputes. 2 ° The
elders were viewed as people with "intimate knowledge
of the communities in which they live and their views
are in many cases more respected than those of
magistrates whose remoteness from the issues is felt to
be disadvantage."21
However, it is suspected that the real reason why
the panels were created was to prevent lawyers, from
representing litigants in land disputes; instead the
bulk of such disputes would be transferred to the
panels, and since these panels were composed of lay
members, litigants would appear before them
unrepresented. That this may be the real reason why
the panels were created is evident from the verbal
attacks, some quite vitriolic, made on the lawyers by
many members of Parliament while the Magistrates
Jurisdiction (Amendment) Bill was undergoing its second
reading. 22 Lawyers were seen as parasites, only intent
on collecting large fees from the conduct of land cases
and contributing to the delays common in these cases.
Therefore by referring these cases to the panels,
litigants could represent themselves, lawyers having
20	 Ibid.
21 The National Assembly, Official Report, Vol. LVI,
col. 1797 (24 November 1981).
22	 Ibid., cols. 1799-1802, 1805.
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been excluded from this process, thereby reducing
delay and cost.23
Although the elders are defined in section 9F of
the Magistrates Courts Act 1967 as persons who are
recognised as 'competent to resolve issues between
parties', it is evident that in pratice, the creation
of the panels of elders has generated more problems
than it has solved. The biggest drawback, especially
where the Registered Land Act 1963 is concerned, is
that the elders have no legal skills, and many of them
are even illiterate. As a result, they are unfamiliar
with the provisions of the Registered Land Act 1963.
Since there are no lawyers present in their
deliberations, there is no one to direct them to the
relevant provisions of the law or decided cases when
the disputes are being determined by the panels.24
Consequently, although the panels are proficient in
their knowledge of customary law, their decisions are
often in conflict with the Registered Land Act 1963, or
with the decisions of the courts. For example, in many
decisions, the panels have ordered rectifications of
first registrations despite the prohibition by section
143(1) of the Registered land Act 1963.25
23	 Ibid.
24 Although the Chairman of the panels is a District
Officer who is an administrative Official (Magistrates
Courts Act 1967, s. 9B(a)), he has little or no legal
training either.
25 See Re Ndumberi/Tincianga/76, Francis Kinyanjui v. 
Hannah Kirie, K.D.L.R. Case File (unreported); Re
Kiambaa/Thimbugua/527, Njambi Wamithu v. Waweru Kimani,
K.D.L.R. Case File (unreported); Re Ndumberi 
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Several other examples illustrate how the elders come
to conclusions and make decisions that fail to take
into account equitable and common law principles, as
well as provisions of the Registered Land Act 1963. In
Re Ndumberi/Ndumberi/1140, Peter Mwenja v. Kiringu
Miru, 26
 the plaintiff entered into a contract to
purchase a one acre plot of registered land from the
defendeant. The plaintiff paid the purchase price but
the dependant refused to transfer the land to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff therefore sought specific
performance. The dispute was adjudicated by a panel of
elders who decided, for reasons not evident in their
judgment, that the plot should be sub-divided so that
the plaintiff receive 0.75 acres and the defendant 0.25
acres. What makes this decision amazing is that
neither party sought partition of the land when arguing
this case before the panel. Instead the panel decided
on customary law principles, that the land should be
sub-divided. This was in conflict with equitable
principles which would have been applicable by virtue
of section 163 of the Registered Land Act 1963, the
remedy of specific performance being the appropriate
remedy. Moreover, this being a first rectification,
the subdivision of the land and the issuing of spearate
Tincranga/1554, Stephen Mugo v. Hannah Kangethe,
K.D.L.R. Case File (unreported); Rahab Nganga Kinuthia
v. Nganga Kirogo, H.C.C.C. No. 404 of 1982
(unreported).
26	 K.D.L.R. Case File (unreported).
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title deeds was a rectification of a first
registration, an order contrary to section 143(1) of
the Registered Land Act 1963. Another example is
Fredrick Kinyanjui v. Charity Kanyi; 27 in which the
plaintiff, who was registered proprietor of certain
property, transferred the property to his wife and sons
to prevent his creditors from repossessing property.
After he eventually repaid the creditors, he sought to
have his wife and sons transfer the property back to
him. They refused to do so. The wife claimed that he
had given the properties to her as a gift and he had
expressed no intention of wanting them back. Clearly
the issue here was whether there was a resulting trust
in favour of the husband, or whether the wife and sons
could successfully plead the presumption of
advancement. However, the elders did not analyse these
issues which were well established in the High Court
decision in Gideon Mutiso v. Sarah Mutiso. 28 Rather,
it was held applying Kikuyu customary law, that the
plaintiff was entitled to have the property registered
in his name because the plaintiff "was polygamous and
the idea of the properties being in the hands of one
wife and his sons is repugnant to say the least
according to Kikuyu customary law." (italics mine)
27	 R.M.C.C. No. 3165 of 1982/E.L.C. No.31 of 1984
(unreported).
28	 H.C.C.C. No. 631 of 1985 (unreported). It was
held that the wife could keep the property in her name
if the husband could not rebut the presumption of
advancement.
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This is an instance where the principle in Gideon
Mutiso v Sarah Mutiso29 should have prevailed over
customary law." Therefore, the panel of elders
decision is per incuriam and should not be followed.
The elders decision in Fredrick Kinvanjui v. 
Charity Kanyi 31 as well as the other cases referred to
above, illustrate the problem of having the panel of
elders arbitrate over registered land without any legal
assistance or training. There is no right of appeal
from the decision of a panel of elders. Their decision
can only be set aside by the Resident Magistrates Court
on the grounds of misconduct or corruption by a panel
or where a party fraudulently concealed a matter he
should have disclosed or wilfully misled the pane1.32
As a result, there is little opportunity for the higher
courts to overturn decisions of the panels although,
notably, there is a growing tendency for the higher
courts to consider appeals on the ground that the
panels had no jurisdiction to determine questions on
title.33
29	 Ibid.
30	 Judicature Act 1967, s.3(2).
31	 Op. cit.
32 Magistrates Courts Act 1967, s. 9D(3) - the record
of a panel of elders can only be set aside on the
grounds of misconduct or corruption by a panel member,
or where a party fraudulently concealed a matter he
should have disclosed or wilfully misled the panel.
33	 See Leonida Wekesa v. Musa Wanjala, Civil App. No.
23 of 1985, (unreported); Wamalwa Wekesa v. Patrick
Muchwenge, Civil Appeal No. 107 of 1985, (unreported)
discussed infra.
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The determination by the panels of elders over
boundary disputes 34 has brought about a conflict in
procedure. Under section 21(2) of the Registered Land
Act 1963 the Registry has the power to determine the
position of an uncertain or disputed boundary.
However, section 21(4) of the 1963 Act provides that
"No court shall entertain any action or other
proceedings relating to a dispute as to the
boundaries of registered land unless the
boundaries have been determined as provided
in this section."
Hence, before any court under section 159 of the 1963
Act can determine a boundary dispute, it must first be
determined by the Registrar. 35 However, it is evident
that in practice many parties have their boundary
disputes determined by the panels of elders without
first making an application to the Registrar under
section 21(2) of the Registered Land Act 1963. The
Registrar only knew about the determination by the
panels when a copy of their decision was sent to him
ordering rectification of the register in accordance
with their decision.35
34 Magistrates Courts Act 1967, s. 9A(b).
35 Thirikwa v. Mbogori, Civil Appeal No. 35 of 1974
(unreported): Kiarie Wamutu v. Mungai Kiarie, Civil
Appeal No. 64 of 1981 (unreported). But see Mwangi 
Muraguri v. Kamara Rukenva  Civil Appeal No.18 of 1983
(unreported) where it was held that the courts should
not determine the position even after the Registrar has
done so. It is respectfully submitted that the latter
decision was decided per incuriam because no reference
was made by the court to the two previously decided
cases.
36 Interview with the Kiambu District Land Registrar,
Miss R.N. Mule, Kiambu 2 October 1989.
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It is for this reason that the Chief Land
Registrar issued Practice Instructions providing that
the Land Registrar when determining a boundary dispute
should sit with four elders, each party appointing two
elders, although the parties could by agreement in
writing, dispense with the elders. 37 The Chief Land
Registrar was therefore incorporating the procedure in
section 9B of the Magistrates Courts Act 1967 which
provides that the panel of elders is to consist of a
chairman, who may be "any ... person appointed by the
District Commissioner, being a person who has had no
previous connection with the issues in dispute", 38
 and
"either two or four elders agreed upon by the
parties." 39 The Land Registrar would, as suggested by
the Chief Land Registrar, be appointed as Chairman by
the District Commissioner, and preside over a panel
adjudicating over a boundary dispute. Although under
section 9b(b) of Magistrates' Courts Act 1967, it is
evident that parties are to nominate their own elders,
and this is indeed the practice," the Chief Land
37 Practice Instruction: Magistrates Jurisdiction
(Amendment) Act 1981. Boundary Disputes and
Partitions, 15 September 1982 (K.D.L.R. Admin. File;
Practice Instruction: Use of Registry Maps in the 
Determination of Boundary Disputes and the Role of 
Surveyors in the same, 8 March 1985 (K.D.L.R. Admin.
File).
38	 Magistrates' Courts Act 1967, S. 9B(a). A
District Commissioner is the administrative official in
charge of a District. Kenya is divided up into 41 such
Districts.
39 Ibid., s. 9b(b). Each party would have either one
or two elders, the numbers being equal for both sides.
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Registrar suggested that the Land Registrar could
nominate a group of elders with the parties having
opportunity to reject any one of them thereby allowing
impartiality.41
This has now become the estalished practice.
Indeed, the views of the elders are not binding on the
Registrar and he is free to disregard them. 42 The
solution of the Chief Land Registrar is pragmatic since
the presence of the Land Registrar in the panel
prevents the elders from reaching a decision that
conflicts with the Registered Land Act 1963. However,
this solution can only be effective if proper publicity
is given to this procedure by the administration. This
was hinted by one author who felt that people were
unclear about the provisions of the law as a result of
the M.J. (A.) A. 1981.
	 not suprisingly,
people are still bypassing the Registrar and making
applictions to the District Officer to convene a panel
chaired by the latter whenever there is a boundary
dispute. 44
 A practical solution is for District
40 See infra for the discussion on the problems that
this procedure has created.
41 Letter from the Chief Land Registrar to the Land
Registrars of Nyeri, Nakuru, Embu, Kakemega, Kisumu and
Mombasa, 13 September 1982 (K.D.L.R. Admin. File).
42 Ibid. One former District Land Regisrar commented
that his views prevailed over those of the elders when
he chaired the panels. Interview with Mr. Kago
Gachiri, Nairobi, 3 October 1989.
43 Smokin Wanjala, Land Law and Disputes in Kenya,
(Nairobi 1990), p. 46.
44 Interview with the Kiambu District Land Registrar,
Miss R.M. Mule, Kiambu, 2 October 1989.
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Commissioners to be instructed to appoint the Land
Registrar as chairman of a panel whenever applications
are made to him (the District Commissioner) by parties
seeking to have boundary disputes determined.45
In other matters over which the panels have
jurisdiction" the Registrar does not chair the panels
unless the District Commissioner appoints him to do so
under section 9B(a) of the Magistrtes Courts Act 1967.
Consequently, as stated before, the panels arrive at
decisions that conflict with the provisions of the
Registered Land Act 1963, and frequently over matters
over which it has no jurisdiction, such as ordering
rectification of the register.47
To prevent the panels from exceeding their
jurisdiction, the Court of Appeal in Leonida Nekesa v. 
Musa Wanjala 48 declared that the panels of elders have
no jurisdiction to rectify first registrations and,
furthermore, have no jurisdiction over matters
connected with title to land. This was followed in
Wamalwa Wekesa v. Patrick Muchwencre. 49
 In Wamalwa the
Court of Appeal held that although the panels have
45 It was apparent from the Kiambu District Land
Registry files, and discussions with the District Land
Registrar, that District Commissioners did not often
appoint the Land Registrar as Chairman whenever there
was a boundary dispute.
46 Magistrates Courts Act 1967, s. 9A(1).
47	 See n. 24, supra.
48	 Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1985 (unreported).
49	 Civil Appeal No. 107 of 1985 (unreported).
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jurisdiction to consider the beneficial ownership of
land, 50 that does not entail a transfer of legal title.
Beneficial ownership entailed the equitable rather than
legal title to land. 51 The plaintiff had claimed that
his brother, the defendant, was registered as
proprietor of the family land, and therefore held one
portion on customary trust for the plaintiff. The
matter was considered by the panel of elders and they
ordered the defendant to transfer a portion of the land
to the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal held that the
panel had no jurisdiction to make such an order. Their
jurisdiction under section 9A(1) (a) of the Magistrates,
Courts Act 1967 was limited to making a declaration of
trust in favour of the plaintiff, but not ordering a
transfer of land.
This clarification of the jurisdiction of the
panels of elders is welcome because it prevents them
from making orders for rectification of the register
and transferring land from one person to another.52
Clearly the Court of Appeal was interpreting section
159 of the Registered Land Act 1963 to mean that
matters concerning title to land such as transfers or
rectification could only be considered by the High
Court or by the Resident Magistrates court but not by
50	 Magistrates Courts Act 1967, s. 9A(1) (a).
51 Civil Appeal No. 107 of 1985 (unreported), per
Nygarangi J.A.
52 This principle was also made clear by Gachuchi Ag.
J.A. in Leonida fiekesa v Musa Wanjala, op. cit.
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panels. One author has taken this to mean that "the
elders have no power to listen to any dispute
concerning land which is already registered under the
RLA." 53 It is respectfully submitted that this
statement is too wide and not based on a proper
understanding of the authorities. It would make a
nonsense of section 159 of the Registered Land Act
1963. Although it is desirable that the elders should
not have any jurisdiction over registered land in view
of the confusion they have brought into the law of
registered land, the provisions of section 159 of the
1963 Act and section 9A(1) of the Magistrates Courts
Act 1967 means that they still retain jurisdiction over
some matters. It is clear, however, that they have no
jurisdiction to order transfers of land or rectify
first registrations.
V. Panels of Elders Contrasted with Lay Magistrates 
in England
Although English lay magistrates mainly exercise
criminal jurisdiction albeit with some limited civil
jurisdiction, whereas the jurisdiction of the panel of
elders is only limited to specific land matters, both
their characteristics are worth comparing. The elders
and lay magistrates are ordinary members of the public
appointed - to these positions without legal training.
But herein lies an important difference: lay
53	 Smokin Wanjala, op.cit., p. 46.
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magistrates are expected to attend courses of
instruction. 54 Their training, which extends over a
year, consists of observing proceedings in the
magistrates courts, listening to lectures on
specialised legal matters and visiting penal
institutions. 55 The purpose of this training is to
enable them to understand their legal duties.
The panels of elders on the other hand receive no
training or attend no courses on how to exercise their
duties under the Magistrates Courts Act 1967; neither
are they made familiar with the principles of
registered land law. Consequently, their decisions
reflect their ignorance of statutory and case law.
Herein lies the root of their problem. However, it is
virtually impossible to train the panels of elders
because they are not appointed from a pool of
individuals by the parties; instead the parties to the
dispute appoint anyone from the community who, in their
opinion, is considered to be 'wise' 56 . Hence the panel
can be composed of anybody who is considered old and
wise in the community. The composition of panels is
therefore in constant flux, since their composition is
on an ad hoc basis. The solution to this problem would
54 Justices of the Peace Act 1979, s. 63.
55 Baldwin, The Compulsory Training of Magistrates,
[1975] Crim. L.R. 634; Terence Ingman, op. cit., p. 37.
56	 , Community' in section 9F of the Magistrates'
Courts Act 1967 can be widely defined, but in practice
is generally taken to mean the members of the tribe in
which a party belongs.
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be to have a pool of elders appointed for each
District. It would then be easier to train these
elders in the exercise of their duties and help them
acquire a knowledge of the basic princip-les of
registered land law. This was advocated as a possible
solution by the Kenya Law Reform Commission. 57
 They
suggested that parties to a dispute may be allowed to
object to the appointment of any elder from the pool to
hear thedispute.58
However, a significant difference between the lay
magistrates and the panels is that the former are
assisted by a justices' clerk who is a barrister or
solicitor of at least five years standing. 59 His
function is to advise the lay magistrates on questions
of law, practice and procedure." The panels of elders
on the other hand do not have a lawyer to assist them
in a similar manner. Although the Chairman is an
administrative official, he is not legally trained, and
therefore not of much assistance to the panels when
registered land law principles are in issue. The only
exception is when the Land Registrar acts as chairman
whenever there is a boundary dispute. The appointment
of a legally trained person to assist the panels may be
57 Kenya Law Reform Commission, Fourth Annual Report,
1 September 1985 - 31 August 1986 (Nairobi 1986), p.
17. para. 1(b).
58	 Ibid.
59	 Justices of the Peace Act 1979, s. 26.
60	 Ibid., s. 28(3): See also Practice Directions
[1981] 2 All E.R. 831; [1954] 1 All E.R. 230.
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beneficial in helping them rech decisions that are in
accord with the provisions of the law.
Like the lay magistrates, the panels of elders are
unpaid. The difference is that lay magistrates are
paid allowances for travel, subsistence and loss of
earnings. 61 The panels do not receive any allowances
from the Government. This is a serious drawback and
has been responsible for spawning corruption, 62 the
same problem that has afflicted the land adjudication
committees. 63 This problem has been aggravated by the
fact that the elders are appointed by the parties
themselves; since each party appoints his own elders,"
he is responsible for paying their expenses and as a
result, there has been a tendency for elders to demand
payments from the parties who have appointed them in
order to reach decisions in their favour. 65 As a
result, decisions are never impartial, elders being
polarised in favour of the parties appointing them.
Since the number of elders for each side are even, the
Chairman invariably makes the final decision." To
61	 Justice of the Peace Act, 1979, s. 12.
62	 Kenya Law Reform Commission, op.cit., p. 16;
Smokin Wanjala, op. cit., pp. 46, 47.
63 See Chapter Three, supra.
64	 See Magistrates Courts Act 1967, s. 9B(b):
Practice Instruction: Magistrates Jurisdiction
(Amendment) Act 1981. Boundary Disputes and
Partitions, 15 September 1982 (K.D.L.R. Admin. File).
66 Interview with Deputy Chief Land Registrar, Mr.
Kago Gachiri, Nairobi, 3 October, 1989. See also Kenya
Law Reform Commission, op. cit., p. 16; Smokin
Wanjala, op. cit., pp. 46,47.
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prevent this state of affiars, some kind of allowance
should be given to the elders when they deliberate.67
However, such allowances can only be effective if they
are granted to a pool of elders appointed specifically
to deal with mattters under section 9(A)(1) of the
Magistrates' Courts Act 1967.68
VI ' Proposals for Reform
The Magistrates Jurisdiction (Amendment) Act 1981
was described by one official as a 'dirty piece of
legislation'. The Kenya Law Reform Commission
admittted that the Act was a failure. 69 The Commission
received many complaints from the public and from
administration officials about the workings of the Act
and the difficulty of implementing it. 7 ° There were
frequent complaints that the panels were still
continuing to determine cases outside their
jurisdiction because the guidelines issued to them were
not clear. 71
 The writer came across several recent
panel decisions which ordered transfers of registered
67 When the Magistrates Jurisdiction (Amendment) Bill
ws undergoing its second reading in Parliament, one
member warned that the system would be undermined if no
allowances were given to the elders. Sadly his
prophecy has become true - The National Assembly, 
Official Report, Vol. LVI, Col. 1929 (24 November
1981).
68	 Kenya Law Reform Commission, op. cit., p. 16.
69	 Ibid., p. 21.
70	 Ibid, p. 19.
71	 Ibid, p. 16.
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land despite the Court of Appeal decisions holding that
the panels had no jurisdiction to order transfers of
registered land.72
It was certainly a retrograde step to allow the
panels of elders, composed of lay individuals, many of
them illiterate, to have jurisdiction over registered
land. Their application of customary law in these
cases, without being aware of the limitations imposed
by the written law on the application of customary law,
is in danger of unravelling the system put in place by
the Registered Land Act 1963 and creating a measure of
uncertainty. As the Kenya Law Reform Commission
pointed out, customary law varies from tribe to tribe,
ethnic group to ethnic group, and even from district to
disctrict. The danger therefore is that there will be
many different customary laws governing land, thereby
undermining the Registered Land Act 1963.
it is beyond the capabilities of the elders for
reconcile all the different customary laws with the
provisions of the Registered Land Act 1963. Concepts
such as adverse possession, absolute proprietorship,
propreitorship in common, licences, mortgages,
easements and so on "with all their concomitant
intricacies-" were said to be "wholly alien" and
72	 See Re Ndumberi/Tinganga/76, Francis Kinyaniui v. 
Hannah Kirie K.D.L.R. Case File (unreported); Re
Kiambaa/Thimbugua/527, Njambi Wamithi v. Waweru Kimani 
K.D.L.R. Case File (unreported).
73 Kenya Law Reform Commission, Fourth Annual Report,
1st September 1985 - 31 August 1986 (Nairobi 1986),
p.18.
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"incomprehensible" to the majority of elders and even
the District Officers who act as chairmen to the
panels. 74 In retrospect, it is difficult to see how
the elders could have been given jurisdiction over such
matters when many of them are illiterate to the extent
that some cannot even sign their names on the record!75
However, the Kenya Law Reform Commission made
several recommendations to improve the system. First
to prevent elders from exceeding their jurisdiction,
the District Officer should submit all applications
made to him to convene a panel to the Resident
Magistrates Court for it to determine the issues and
see whether they come under the jurisdiction of the
panels. 76 Secondly, there should be provision for a
general right of appeal from the decision of the
panels, since the existing provisions virtually prevent
anyone from lodging an appeal. 77 Third, there should
74	 Ibid., p. 20.
75	 See for example, Re Ndumberi/Tinganga/1554, 
Stephen Mugo v. hannah Kangethe (K.D.L.R. Case File);
Virginia Kinuthia v. Seraphino Kinuthia, Civil Appeal
No. 177 of 1987 (unreported). While the Magistrates
Jurisdiction (Amendment) Bill was undergoing its second
reading a member of Parliament pointed out that since
many elders were illiterate they would not understand
the issues. It was further suggested that an amendment
should be made to the Bill to ensure that all the
elders who would hear disputes were literate.
Unfortunately, this suggestion was never taken up by
the Attorney General. The National Assembly, Official 
Report, Vol. LVI, cols. 1811, 1906, (24 November 1981).
76 Kenya Law Reform Commission, Fourth Annual Report,
1 September 1985 - 31 August 1986 (Nairobi 1986), p.17,
para. 1(a).
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be two categories of elders: those chosen by the
administration to form a pool from which the District
Officer could choose, and those chosen by the parties
who would act as witnesses on their behalf. Those
choosen by the District Officer would be impartial in
comparison with the latter, since the role of the
latter would be that of witnesses.78
Alternatively, the 1981 Act could be repealed and
jurisdiction given to a circuit court to hear land
cases, with the elders acting as assessors for jury,
their decisions binding on the court. 78 The third
option would be to establish a Land Tribunal having a
lawyer as Chairman and assisted by specially appointed
elders together with a secretary. 80
The third option is the most attractive out of the
recommendations considered by the Law Reform
Commission. The presence of a lawyer as chairman would
ensure that the decisions do not conflict with the law.
The Commission also felt that those sitting on the
panel "should be paid some honoraria to guard against
corruption. ”81
These recommendations would go a long way to
improve the system established by the M. J. (A.) A.
1981 which remains discredited. However, they have not
78	 Ibid., para. 1(b).
79	 Ibid., para. 2.
80	 Ibid., para. 3.
81	 Ibid., para. 4.
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yet been implemented and it remains to be seen whether
the system will be modified. The Commission did not
consider the question raised by section 159 of the
Registered Land Act 1963 with respect to the
jurisdiction of the High Court. Although, as shown
earlier, the High Court should have unlimited original
jurisdiction over registered land, the Court of Appeal
accepts that its jurisdiction is not concurrent with
the Resident Magistrates Court. This is an another
area that will require legislative clarification.
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Chapter Ten
CONCLUSION
When it was enacted the Registered Land Act 1963
faced a huge task of bringing order to the chaotic
system of land law and registration in Kenya. Has it
lived up to its stated aims of making better provision
for the registration of title to land and the
regulation of dealings with such land? The purpose of
this thesis has been to show that the Act has not fully
lived up to its aims and its provisions have failed in
several respects to provide an effective system of law
to govern titles registered under the Act.
In determining whether the Act has established an
effective system of law and practice this thesis has
addressed itself to several key issues. First, how
effective has been the process of land adjudication
which brought onto the register land that was formerly
under customary law; at the same time how successful
has been the process of converting land that was
subject to one of the pre-existing systems of
registration, that is, the Registration of Documents
Act 1901, the Land Titles Act 1908, the Government
Lands Act 1915 or the Registration of Titles Act 1919,
onto the register created by the 1963 Act? Secondly,
how effective is the conveyancing machinery provided in
the Act and to what extent are purchasers of registered
land prejudiced by this machinery? Thirdly, are the
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rights of registered proprietors, including those
registered jointly or in common, as well as persons
with third party interests in land adequately protected
by the Act? Fourthly, to what extend have the
provisions of the Magistrates' Jurisdiction (Amendment)
Act 1981 undermined the provisions of the Registered
Land Act 1963? In answering these questions the
relevant provisions of the 1963 Act have been compared
with the corresponding provisions in the English Land
Registration Act 1925, and the law and practice that
has developed over registered land in England,
analysed. Key to this has been the judicial
interpretation of the provisions of the Land
Registration Act 1925, and determining to what extent
such interpretation can assist in solving some of the
problems created by the provisions of the Registered
Land Act 1963.
In answering the first question, it was shown in
Chapter Three of this thesis that while the speed at
which land has been adjudicated and brought onto the
register has been remarkable, to the extent that many
areas in Kenya have now had their titles systematically
brought onto the register, the land adjudication
process governed by the Land Adjudication Act 1968 had
many flaws. Such flaws have meant that the register of
title created under the Registered Land Act 1963 is
inaccurate, thereby prejudicing the interests of
registered proprietors as well as those claiming third
party interests over registered titles.
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A lot of the blame can be attributed to the
political decision of the colonial government in the
1950s to rush through with the programme of land
consolidation and adjudication in a bid to extinguish
the flames of the Mau Mau civil war. Consequently,
people who were not present to have their interests in
land recorded on the adjudication register by the
adjudication committees within the statutory period,
were viewed as having lost those interests, once the
register was confirmed. This was compounded later by
the fact that first registrations of title could not be
rectified by virtue of section 89(1) of the Native
Lands Registration Ordinance 1959, which was
subsequently replaced by 143(1) of the Registered Land
Act 1963. Many people in the 1950s lost their rights
in the Central Province in this fashion, not being able
to protect their interests due to the fact that they
were in detention at the same time adjudication was
progressing. Consequently, family members frequently
took advantage of their absence and had themselves
registered as proprietors in their place, thereby
laying the basis for future disputes over the land.
The composition of the adjudication committees has
also contributed to the inaccurate compilation of the
register. Composed of lay people with a knowledge of
customary law, the committees can be praised for having
been responsible for the rapid spread of registration
in Kenya at comparatively low cost. The committees
have the important task of ascertaining all the
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customary rights and interests affecting the land and
correlating them with the interests recognised by the
Registered Land Act 1963. This is a difficult task for
it requires a knowledge of English law, since the
interests of land capable of being protected under the
Registered Land Act 1963, such as leases, licences,
restrictive covenants, easements and mortgages, have
their origin in English law. The committees are
therefore responsible for converting land from a system
that had been based on customary law into a system
based on English law. One would therefore expect the
composition of the committees to include at least one
or more individuals with legal training.
Alternatively, one would expect the adjudication
officer to be a qualified lawyer. There is, however,
no such requirement in the Land Adjudication Act 1968.
The adjudication officer is an administrative official
with little formal legal training. The bulk of
adjudication committees are composed of lay members,
many of them illiterate or semi-literate.
The absence of persons with some legal training
has meant that committees have been unable to properly
equate the customary rights or interests in land with
their correlated interests in English law, and
recognised by the Registered Land Act 1963.
Consequently, those whose customary interests are being
adjudicated have ended up having either greater or
lesser rights than they had prior to registration. For
example a person who was a muhoi under Kikuyu customary
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law, and could therefore be evicted at any time,
received a greater right when his customary tenancy was
recorded, as was usually the case, as a right of
occupation, onto the register; it was deemed a yearly
tenancy under section 11(3) of the Registered Land Act
1963, which meant that the minimum period of notice was
six months which was a greater period of notice than he
would have had as a customary tenant. On the other
hand a vendor of land subject to redeemable sale, would
have the legal title shift from himself to the
mortgagee, when the land was registered as subject to a
mortgage. In effect, the vendor received lesser rights
on registration.
The Lawrance Mission decried the failure on the
part of the adjudication committees to record lesser
rights in land. This problem could have been averted
if individuals with legal training formed part of the
adjudication committees. It is submitted that the
above problems may have been averted if the Land
Registry was wholly involved in land adjudication from
the outset, with registry officials involved in helping
the adjudication committees in examining the customary
land. This is the fundamental problem with the land
adjudication in Kenya. The Land Adjudication Act 1968
created a regime separate from that under the
Registered Land Act 1963. The Land Registrar had no
role to play in land adjudication apart from simply
transferring the adjudication register onto the
register created by the Registered Land Act 1963, once
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adjudication within a section is complete. Land
Registry officials could have assisted the adjudication
teams in making the necessary correlations of customary
rights and interests, and categorising them within the
range of interests recognised by the Registered Land
Act 1963. At present, the Land Registrar has no power
under the Registered Land Act 1963 to query the
validity of the adjudication register once it is handed
to him by the Director of Adjudication under section 27
of the Land Adjudication Act 1968. He can only assume
that the examination of the titles has been done
properly.
It is submitted that the separate system of land
adjudication has undermined the accuracy of the
register of title under the Registered Land Act 1963.
The Land Registry must play a role in the adjudication
of land subject to customary law and this can be done
by having Land Registry officials appointed as part of
the adjudication teams. The solution is to integrate
the adjudication procedure under the Land Adjudication
Act 1968 with that in the Registered Land Act.
The adjudication committees should also be
remunerated for their efforts, thereby preventing the
temptation to submit to corruption. Although the
Government has saved huge costs by not paying the
committees, it has meant that the problem of corruption
is now becoming acute. Committees are also prone to
take less of an interest in the adjudication process
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since there is nothing to motivate them to speedily
complete land adjudication.
Chapter Six of this thesis has endeavoured to show
that the development of the customary trust by the
courts in Kenya has made it possible for persons whose
customary rights were not registered during land
adjudication to have such rights binding on a
proprietor of land. However, it is slabmitted that the
customary right that has so far been recognised by the
courts is the right of a family member to inherit a
portion of land belonging to the family, and that was
registered in the names of one of the family members.
It has been argued that such a right can be asserted as
an overriding interest under section 30(g) of the
Registered Land Act 1963 or, in the alternat1ve be
capable of being protected on the register by a
caution. It was further shown that a person asserting
any other interest recognised in customary law which
was not protected on the register during adjudication
can still protect such an interest but only if the
requirements of the Act were fulfilled. A good example
would be a person who claimed to be subject to a
customary tenancy. He can succeed in protecting such
an interest but only if he can show, within section 46
of the Act, that he was in exclusive occupation and he
pays rent to the landlord. The customary tenancy would
therefore be converted into a periodic tenancy, and
therefore capable of being protected by the entry of a
caution. The research has shown Land Registrars do
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routinely register rights arising behind a customary
trust, in view of the recognition of these rights by
the courts. Therefore, the view put forward that
customary rights are generally extinguished when land
is brought onto the register must be distinguished on
this basis.
It was shown in Chapter Three that the conversion
of titles registered or subject to one of the pre-
existing Registration Acts has yet to take place.
It is submitted that the deeming provision in section
12(1)(a)(1) of the Registered Land Act 1963 - whereby
certificates of title under the Registration of Titles
Act 1919 are "deemed" to be "title deeds" under the
1963 Act, and the register of titles kept under the
1919 Act is "deemed" to be a register kept under the
1963 Act - does not make much sense. While the
Registrar is given the power to prepare a new register
for a title formerly subject to the Registration of
Titles Act 1919, in reality this can only be done if a
proprietor of such land voluntarily requests the
conversion to be made. Since this is rarely done, what
force do the deeming provisions have? In reality,
nothing. Land Registered under the 1919 Act is still
dealt with as if it was still subject to the Act.
Conveyancers are conveying the land as if it was still
subject to the 1919 Act. The Land Registry is still
continuing to issue titles under the 1919 Act. Even
the courts have failed to apply Registered Land Act
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principles to the land supposed to be "deemed" to be
subject to the Act.
This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs and
reflects the fact that the Registered Land Act has
failed to provide a proper regime for the conversion of
titles subject to the pre-existing registration
systems. Further problems will be encountered by the
Land Registry when flats and horizontal units are
brought onto the register under the Sectional
Properties Act 1987. No recommendations have been made
public as to how this is to be done.
It is submitted that this is a problem that
urgently needs to be addressed. Clearly, the Land
Registry has been preoccupied with the registration of
land that has been the subject of land adjudication.
Conversion of titles already under some form of
registration has been accorded less priority. In view
of the progress that has been made in land
adjudication, detailed provisions should be made for
the actual conversion of the other titles subject to
the pre-existing registration systems. Since the
systematic conversion of these titles, as has been the
case with land adjudication, would create a huge volume
of work for the land registries, it would be easier to
provide for such titles to be registered when they are
conveyed on sale, as is the case in England. More
titles could probably be registered if voluntary
transfers are included.
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This is a problem that can be solved if more funds
are made available to the Land Registry in order to
train more officials in the art of converting such
titles, and recruiting conveyancing lawyers who would
assist in examining those titles that are subject to
the Registration of Documents Act 1901, the Land Titles
Act 1908 and the Government Lands Act 1915. If these
measures are made then substantial progress will be
made in converting all titles in Kenya into titles
registered under the Registered Land Act 1963.
In answer to the second question, Chapters Four
and Five of this thesis looked at the conveyancing
machinery introduced by the Registered Land Act 1963.
The Act was designed to provide a simple method of
conveying land that would enable people to undertake
their own conveyancing without the aid of lawyers.
This research has shown that this is one of the
remarkable achievements of the Act. Many members of
the public undertake their own conveyancing whether
purchasing or selling land registered under the Act,
and are familiar with the transfer procedures provided
by the Act. The role of lawyers is reduced to that of
mere assistance in the execution of documents.
This reflects the success of government policy to
ensure that not only were lawyers kept out of conveying
land registered under the Act, but also ensuring that
the populace were made aware, through public meetings
held around the country, of the advantages of
registration. People were encouraged to cooperate with
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the land adjudication teams registering their land and
to undertake their own transactions in the District
Land Registry where their titles were registered.
This has been made possible by allowing the
register to be open to public inspection. Registry
staff are helpful and assist many parties to complete
their transaction. The provision of national identity
cards has been crucial to the success of the procedure
on verification of execution. This limits the
possibility of forgery and is therefore an important
safeguard.
Though the goal of designing a registration system
which enables anybody to undertake their own
conveyancing is a worthy one, and it is indeed the case
in Kenya that a vast majority of people undertake their
own conveyancing, in contrast with the situation in
England, this thesis has gone on to show that the
provisions of the Registered Land Act 1963 provide
little protection for such a purchaser.
At the outset, boundaries of land registered under
the Adare inaccurate. This stems from the problems
encountered in surveying such land, whether on the
ground or from the air. Inaccurate ground surveys in
Fort Hall meant that the whole area had to be re-
surveyed again at great cost, and many boundaries in
other areas are being found to have been inaccurately
measured. Successful aerial photographic surveys, from
which the Registry Index Maps are drawn, depended on
hedges and boundary marks being visible from the air.
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Since many farms did not have satisfactory hedges,
proprietors were all encouraged to plant hedges which
could be seen from the air. However, as the Lawrance
Mission highlighted, many of these hedges failed to
grow, with the result that the Registry Index Maps
drawn from the photographs were highly inaccurate.
This problem has not yet been rectified and
consequently, purchasers have to rely on inaccurate
maps which have continued to be a frequent source of
dispute as proprietors discover that they have been
registered with less or more land than they previously
had. Consequently, individual plans for each title
have never been reproduced. Purchasers therefore have
to travel to the Land Registry to view the only copy
there is of the Registry Index Map. To obtain a copy
of the map they have to travel to the Survey Office in
Nairobi, since that office has the large copiers
capable of making copies of the Registry Index Maps.
This puts the purchaser at a disadvantage since he
can only rely on hand drawn maps made by the vendor of
the land, which cannot be relied on to properly
identify the registered land. Although it has been
recognised that re-survey has to be made of most of the
titles registered under the 1963 Act, this process has
not yet been started in earnest due to a lack of
adequate funds. Nevertheless, it is a process that
needs to be started urgently, if registered titles are
to be adequately identified. This state of affairs has
led to the paradoxical situation whereby titles
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registered under the Registration of Titles Act 1919
have precise boundaries which are represented on plans
drawn to scale, making it easier for a purchaser to
know the exact extent of the boundaries.
A further deficiency of the Registered Land Act
1963, which prejudices purchasers, is that the Act does
not imply covenants for title in a conveyance
registered land. In contrast covenants for title are
implied in conveyances of land registered under the
Land Registration Act 1925. There is a difference of
opinion as to whether such covenants do have a role to
play in registered land. It has been argued in Chapter
Five, with reference to English authorities, that
covenants for title do have a role to play in
registered land. In view of the fact that there are
serious limitations on rectification and indemnity
under the Registered Land Act 1963, the only recourse a
purchaser may have would be to sue the vendor for
breach of covenant. This may be all very well if the
purchaser has contracted on the basis of the Law
Society's Conditions of Sale - which will have been the
case if he has used a lawyer - and he may have a claim
in damages against the vendor for breach of one of the
conditions incorporated into the contract. But as this
research has shown, purchasers who contract to buy land
on their own behalf do not normally incorporate the
Conditions of Sale in their contract. If the vendor
had no power to convey some of the land bought by the
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purchaser, or he failed to disclose an overriding
interest which would be binding on the purchaser the
latter would have no recourse against the vendor.
A conflict between section 6(1) of the Land
Control Act 1967 and section 27 of the Registered Land
Act 1963 was exposed in Chapter Four. The effect of
section 6(1) is to declare void a contract for the
sale of agricultural land that has not been granted
consent by a Land Control Board. A problem may arise
if the Registrar registers a transfer by mistake which
has not been granted consent by the Land Control Board.
Should section 27 of the 1963 Act prevail over section
6(1) of the Land Control Act, or is the registration
void too? The Land Registry view is that such a
registration would be void. However, this can cause
enormous complications if there is a chain of
transactions stemming from the original. void
registration. The better view is that registration
should confer validity on a void transfer, in the same
manner that a forged transfer would confer valid title
on a registered proprietor.
The conveyancing machinery under the Registered
Land Act 1963 creates further problems for a purchaser.
A purchaser not only has to make a search of the
register of title, but has also to make a search for
any local land charges that bind the land. In Kenya
there is no register of local land charges, as there is
in England under the Local Land Charges Act 1975, which
makes it difficult for a purchaser to discover what
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charges, such as payment of rates, bind the land,
unless he makes inquiry of the local authority.
Although a local authority is bound to produce a
written statement to the Registrar that all rates and
other charges to the land have been paid under section
86 of the Registered Land Act 1963 - if such rates have
not been paid then the Registrar will refuse to
register the transfer - a mistaken declaration that no
charges are payable does not prevent a local authority
from seeking payment from the purchaser since such
unpaid rates are overriding interests under Section
30(e) of the Registered Land Act 1963. Such a purchase
cannot be indemnified were that to happen, unlike his
English contemporary who can be compensated for an
unregistered local land charge under section 140.5 of
the Local Land Charges Act 1975.
Indeed the problem of overriding interests is an
acute one for a purchaser of land. It is further
submitted that the conveyancing machinery created by
the Registered Land Act 1963 fails to provide adequate
protection against overriding interests. These
interests, listed in section 30 of the 1963 Act are
binding on a purchaser whether he is aware of them or
not. For example, as shown above, a purchaser is bound
by unpaid charges which are overriding interests even
if he was unaware of them, Further problems arise
where the rights of person in actual occupation are
concerned. In England, sections 2 and 27 of the Law of
Property Act 1925 create machinery of overreaching
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whereby a purchaser is unconcerned with the interests
behind a trust for sale for example, so long as the
purchase money is paid to two trustees for sale or a
trust corporation. As City of London Building Society
v. Flegg l
 illustrates, a beneficiary behind a trust for
sale cannot assert an overriding interest under section
70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925 if the
purchase money has been paid to a minimum number of two
trustees for sale, because the beneficiary's interest
is overreached. Therefore, a purchaser of land
registered under the 1925 Act benefits from the
protection accorded by the overreaching machinery,
although he still has to make inspection against other
lurking overriding interests not capable of being
overreached.
In contrast, overreaching is not provided for in
the Registered Land Act 1963. A purchaser can only
make careful inspection of the land he is about to
purchase to discover the existence of overriding
interests. He cannot rely on the "untrue ipse dixit"
of the vendor. This may be difficult, particularly as
is the case with land in the rural areas of Kenya,
where numerous people have an interest in such land.
As was shown in Chapter Seven of this thesis a
purchaser may have a problem purchasing co-owned land.
-While he may pay the purchase money to those whose
names are on the register, he may find himself subject
1	 [1987] 2 W.L.R. 1266.
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to the rights of those whose names are not on the
register, if they are held to have an overriding
interest by virtue of being in actual occupation, their
interests arising behind either a resulting, customary
or constructive trust.
This thesis has gone on to show that the
Registered Land Act 1963 provides an unsatisfactory
regime for land that is subject to co-ownership.
Section 101(3) of the Act provides that a maximum of
five people can be registered as proprietors of land.
The problem arises where more than five people own land
but only a few of their number are registered as owners
jointly or in common. The original solution in section
120(7) of the 1963 Act was to provide that the land was
to be sold and the proceeds of sale shared between the
co-owners. This was clearly an unsatisfactory solution
and the provision was scrapped. However, no
satisfactory provision replaced section 120(7).
It has been argued that three types of trusts may
arise to protect the interests of those not on the
register. First, a resulting trust either where the
parties have contributed to the purchase of the
property and have agreed to register it in the name of
one of their number, or where property is voluntarily
transferred in the name of another. Alternatively, a
customary trust may be asserted where, as is usually
the case, the co-owners all were entitled to a share of
the land - usually family land - under customary law,
but when land adjudication took place, many of the co-
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owners were not present to assert their rights of
ownership and the land was registered in the name or
names of those who were present. Once those who are
registered deny the existence of the co-ownership
arrangement prior to registration, then the courts may
be prepared to infer a customary trust. Thirdly, a
constructive trust may be asserted, particularly where
the land has been matrimonial property. The English
authorities on the constructive trust were compared,
since this is an area of law in Kenya that has not been
the subject of much judicial pronouncement. In England
the orthodox view that a constructive trust can be
inferred where there is a common intention between the
parties that they are beneficially entitled to the
property, and one of the parties who is not the legal
owner acts to his or her detriment, holds sway over the
'new model constructive' trust inferred where justice
and good conscience requires it. A Kenyan court could
be persuaded to apply the 'common intention
constructive trust' on the basis that it leads to
greater certainty in the law, particularly where
property rights are involved.
The solution which the Kenya Parliament put
forward to eradicate the problem of registering land
co-owned by numerous individuals was the enactment of
the Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968. The Act,
however, has been a disaster. There is widespread
dissatisfaction with the provisions of the Act and the
fact that the Group Representatives appointed to take
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care of the interests of members of a group or society,
have misused the large powers given to them by the Act.
Moreover, group members under the 1968 Act do not have
the same rights as joint proprietors or proprietors in
common of land under the Registered Land Act 1963. It
is virtually impossible for a group member to sever his
interest or order a sale of the land. In any event, if
group land is sold it is unlikely that members can
assert overriding interests against a purchaser, if the
land was sold without their consent.
The widespread dissatisfaction with the Land
(Group Representatives) Act 1968 has led to a call by
the Government to groups to endeavour to start sub-
dividing their land amongst the members in order to get
out of the shackles of the 1968 Act.
Clearly, this is an area where legislative reform
is necessary. In England co-owned land is subject to
the trust for sale, whereby the trustees are under a
duty to sell the land although they have a power to
postpone sale. The interests of the beneficiaries are
in the proceeds of sale under the doctrine of
conversion. However, the trust for sale has been
criticised as an artificial concept since, as is the
case in a matrimonial home situation, property is
acquired for the purpose of setting up a home, rather
than as a commercial interest.
The English Law Commission has therefore proposed
that the trust for sale should be abolished and
replaced by a trust of land whereby the trustees have a
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power to retain the land, rather than merely postponing
sale. A purchaser would still be able to overreach the
equitable interests of the beneficiaries if payment was
made to two trustees for sale, such overreaching only
taking place where the beneficiaries have given their
consent.
This recommendation has merit since it strikes a
balance between the protection accorded to a
beneficiary behind the trust, and a purchaser who
wishes to purchase the land free from the interests of
the beneficiaries. It is a recommendation which may
have practical application in Kenya in solving the
problem created by the co-ownership provisions of the
Registered Land Act 1963.
It has been questioned whether the provision in
section 143(1) of the 1963 Act preventing the
rectification of first registrations should remain in
the statute book. This provision was inserted for
political reasons, to prevent those who were caught up
in the Mau Mau civil war and lost their land as a
result of sympathising with the Mau Mau, from
subsequently seeking rectification of the register and
in the process rouse up the animosities that had been
the cause of the civil war. Moreover, since
adjudication was done in a hurry, many inaccuracies
resulted, and the colonial government at the time was
determined that the adjudication programme was not
undermined by a flood of rectification claims, when
people, such as Ethan Njau discovered inaccuracies in
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their registered titles.
It is submitted that section 143(1) should be
repealed and first registrations should be capable of
being rectified. Many years have passed since the Mau
Mau war, and the old political animosities have since
faded out of sight. Moreover, many of those who were
displaced by the war have been resettled on the land
settlement schemes that the present government set up
immediately after independence. Section 143(1) has
prejudiced those whose claims for rectification have
had nothing to do with the war, for it has meant that
the Act can be used as a very effective instrument of
fraud since a first registration obtained by fraudulent
means cannot be rectified. Such a provision should
have no role to play in a system of registered land.
Nonetheless, the courts have endeavoured to go round
this problem through the development of the customary
trust. Despite the view to the contrary in Elizabeth
Wanjohi v The Official Receiver (Continental Credit 
Finance) 2 the customary trust is now well established,
and forms a convenient way of protecting the interests
of those who failed to have them protected on the
register during land adjudication.
It was further shown in Chapter Eight that section
143(2) of the 1963 Act may prejudice an innocent
purchaser of land who, unaware of the fraudulent
transfer committed by the vendor or even a mistake,
2	 The Nairobi Law Monthly, February 1989, p. 42.
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presents the transfer documents for registration and is
registered as proprietor. Rectification may be ordered
against him 'since he will have substantially
contributed' to the fraud or mistake 'by his act' or
presenting the transfer documents for registration.
This is evident from English authorities such as
Chowood Ltd v. Lya11, 3 Re 139 High Street, Deptford4
and Re Sea View Gardens.5
Rectification against the proprietor would be
unfair in view of his innocence. A similar provision
was contained in section 82(3)(a) of the Land
Registration Act 1925 but was discovered to prejudice
the innocent registered proprietors and has since been
amended to provide that the proprietor loses his
protection where he "has caused or substantially
contributed to the error or omission by fraud or lack
of proper care ...". This indicates that there would
have to be fault on the part of the registered
proprietor before he loses his protection from
rectification. It is recommended that similar
protection ought to be given to an innocent proprietor,
thereby making the protection against rectification
truly effective.
Lastly, it has been shown in Chapter Nine that the
panels of elders created by the Magistrates'
3	 [1930] 1 Ch. 426.
4	 [1951] Ch. 884.
5	 [1966] 3 All E.R. 935.
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Jurisdiction (Amendment) Act 1981 have undermined the
provisions of the Registered Land Act 1963. These
panels of elders are, in a similar manner to the
adjudication committees, composed of lay individuals
recognised as having a good knowledge of customary law.
Although they have jurisdiction to determine certain
disputes concerning land registered under the
Registered Land Act 1963 by virtue of section 159 of
the same, none of the elders have legal training and
thereby equipped to apply registered land law
principles. They do not seem to be aware of the
provisions of the Registered Land Act 1963, or other
provisions of the law which have a bearing on
registered land. To compound the problem, lawyers are
not permitted to represent the litigants that appear
before the panels, and neither are the panels guided by
a chairman who is a lawyer. This has meant that the
panels have made numerous decisions where they have
applied customary law principles which are in conflict
with the written law as well as those in the Registered
Land Act 1963. Such application of customary law is in
danger of undermining registered land law, thereby
endangering the security of registered proprietors.
It is submitted that the Act should be repealed.
In the first place it is badly drafted. For example it
is unclear from section 159 whether the jurisdiction of
the High Court is limited to determining disputes where
the subject matter of the land is not less than 500,000
K shs. This was certainly the intention of Parliament.
650
Nevertheless, limitation of the High Courts
jurisdiction in such a manner would be contrary to the
Constitution which provides in section 60 that the High
Court has unlimited jurisdiction, and it has been shown
that the High Court would be entitled to exercise
jurisdiction over land below that value.
Moreover, section 9 of the 1981 Act which confers
jurisdiction on the panels of elders to determine
boundary disputes, conflicts with the power of the Land
Registrar to determine the same where the land is
registered under the 1963 Act. It is evident from
several decisions that the panels often direct the Land
Registrar to effect a transfer of the property, even
though the title may be subject to a first registration
which would prevent it from being rectified under
section 143(1) of the 1963 Act. It was shown in
Chapter Eight that decisions of the superior courts
have held that such a transfer can only be effected
where a customary trust situation arises. A
rectification of a first registration in any other
situation would therefore be a clear breach of section
143(1).
But many of the decisions of the panels where they
have ordered rectification of land subject to a first
registration, have had nothing to do with a customary
trust. This has put Land Registrars in a difficult
position as to whether to accede to the order or refuse
to effect such a transfer. It has frequently been the
case that a transfer in breach of section 143(1) is
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made. It is to the credit of the Chief Land Registrar
to have instructed Land Registrars to determine
boundary disputes with the panels of elders thereby
preventing the elders arriving at decisions which
conflict with the 1963 Act. Unfortunately, this is
mainly confined to the determination of boundary
disputes. Many of the problems associated with the
decisions of the panels could have been prevented if
the provision was made for the chairman of the panel to
be the Land Registrar.
The aim of the Registered Land Act 1963 was to
introduce a new code of property law that was to apply
throughout the country and that would eventually
replace the substantive law contained in the Indian
Transfer of Property Act 1882, as well as creating new
registration machinery of registration that would
replace the systems existing under the Registration of
Documents Act 1901, the Land Titles Act 1908, the
Government Lands Act 1915 and the Registration of
Titles Act 1919. Moreover, land formerly subject to
customary law would now be governed by the 1963 Act.
This thesis shows that this has not been achieved.
There is a long way to go before all land in Kenya is
finally governed by the Act. The Kenya Law Reform
Commission admitted that the aim of converting all land
onto the Register under the Act has not been achieved.
The Commission revealed that the problem has been
a lack of adequate resources, which has made it
difficult to recruit enough personnel to do the work of
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converting all the titles under the Act. This means
that conversion will take a long time to achieve. Many
of the problems revealed by this thesis can only be
solved if adequate resources are made available. For
example, the provision of extra Land Registry staff to
assist the adjudication committees, as has been
proposed in this thesis, can only be done if there are
enough funds to pay salaries. Substantial funds would
be necessary to effect improvements to the Land
Registries, such as the Kiambu District Land Registry,
and build new extensions. The answer may lie in
allowing the Registries to be self-financing, so that
fee income derived from registration can be ploughed
back in order to improve services.
However, many of the problems highlighted in this
thesis can be solved by legislative reform. Purchasers
of land ought to have greater safeguards when
purchasing registered land. On the other hand, the
interests of registered proprietors and those with
third party interests in the land ought to be well
protected. The difficulty is striking a balance
between these conflicting demands.
It is of interest to note that the English Law
Commission has actively reviewed the Land Registration
Act 1925 and has produced several reports making
recommendations to improve the system of registered
land. In its Third Report on Land Registration, the
Commission recommended that the categories of
overriding interests in section 70(1)(g) of the 1925
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Act should be reduced to five categories, but more
importantly, that a proprietor may apply for an
indemnity if an overriding interest is asserted against
him and the register is rectified to give effect to the
overriding interest. This recommendation is contained
in clause 45(1) in the Bill drafted by the Law
Commission to replace the Land Registration Act 1925.
It is indeed an important provision, for
overriding interests are the bug bear of registered
land; a registered proprietor's title can be undermined
by an overriding interest particularly where he was
unaware of it. If enacted, this provision will repair
the crack in the mirror, and it can truly be said that
a registered title is State guaranteed. This would
also be the case in Kenya were this recommendation to
be made and implemented.
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Date received for registration 	 Presentation Book
	 Registration Fees: Sh. 
	
	 , 19 	 	 No. 	 /19
	 	 paid. Receipt No.
R.L. I
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
THE REGISTERED LAND ACT
(Cap. 300)
TRANSFER OF LAND
TITLE No 	
I/WE
in consideration of 	
(the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged) HEREBY TRANSFER to
of 	
the land comprised in the above-mentioned title.
The Transferees declare that they hold the land as joint proprietors/as proprietors in
common* in the following undivided shares:—
Dated this 	  day of 	 , 19......
Signed by the Transferor
in the presence of :_
I CERTIFY that the abore-named 	
appeared before me on the 	  day of 	 , 19 	 s
and, being known to me/being identified by* 	
of 	
acknowledged the above signatures or marks to be his [theirs] and that he [they] had freely
and voluntarily executed this instrument and understood its contents.
Signature and Designation of
Person Certifying
'Delete whichever is not ti plicable.
lease attach your Postal Order, Money Order or Cheque (if you have made prior
eangements to pay by cheque) in payment of fees here.
R.L.28
• For Official Use Only •
RECEIVED:
ORIGINAL
The Conditions on the Back of this Form shall be Complied with
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
THE REGISTERED LAND ACT
(Cap. 300)
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
Ihereby apply for the registration of the undermentioned instruments in the following order of priority:—
Date of
Instrument
.	 -
Description Title Number Fee For Official
use only
•
.
.	
.
.
,
•
_
-	 '
.
,
Please issue Land Certificate/Certificate of Lease.
Additional fee at *Sh. 5, Sir. 25' edch: .
,	 P.O./M.0./Cheque attached hereto. the .value of Sh. •
The following documents are enclosed:—
,
tand Certificate
Certificate of Lease
Ledse (duplicate and triplicate)
Charge (duplicate and triplicate)
Clearance Certificate
Estate Duty Certificate
Lessor's consent in terms of the lease
'Divisional Land Control Board Consent
Chargee's consent in terms of the charge
Special instructions, including in appropriate cases the name and address of the person to whom the
documents ire to be sent if other than the presentor:—
Signature 
	
Name in Block Capitals
	
Postal Address	
Date	 , 19.. 	
(The conditions on the back of this form muSt be complied with)
rn
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Signed by the Transferee
	  }
in the presence of :—
I CERTIFY that the above-named 	
appeared before me on the 	  day of 	  19 	
and, being known to me/being identified by* 	
of 	
acknowledge the above signatures or marks to be his [theirs] and that he [they] had freely
and voluntarily executed this instrument and understood its contents.
Signature and Designation of
Person Certifying
REGISTERED this 	  day of 	 ,19......
Land Registrar
'Delete whichever is not applicable.
*Delete if not applicable.
To: The Land Registrar, Search No. 	
CP la 7
R.L. 27
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
THE REGISTERED LAND ACT
(Cap. 300)
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL SEARCH
TITLE No 	 	 SEARCH NO. 	
On the 	  day of 	 . , 19 	 , the
following were the subsisting entries on the register of the above-mentioned title:
PART A—Property Section (Easements, etc.)
Nature of title 	
Approximate area 	
PART B—Proprietorship Section
Name and address of proprietor:
Inhibitions, cautions and restrictions—
PART C—Encumbrances Section (leases, charges, etc.)
The following applications are pending:
The certified copies requested are attached.
The fees now payable are Sh. 	 	 ; please detach the form below,
and attach to it Postal Order/Money Order/Banker's Cheque/Cash for that amount and
return to me within seven days of today's date.
*A stay of registration has been noted in the register.
Date 	 , 19 	
Land Registrar
	 District Land Registry,
P.O. Box 	
Postal Order / Money Order / Banker's Cheque! Cash for Sh. 	
For official use only
Fee debited
For official use only
Record of
Fee paid
Form 
11
(Rule 4 Land Registration (Open Register) Rules 1990)
1 Title number (if known)
11111111111
(Use one character per box)
Name and Address of applicant
Daytime Telephone No 	
Reference (If not a credit account holder)
670
Application for a Personal	 HM Land Registry
Inspection of the Register.
Notes
1. A fee is payable for inspection of a title. An additional fee is payable if
you do not enter in panel 1 in Part A below the title number of the register
of the property you wish to inspect. However, if you are the registered
proprietor of the title that you wish to inspect then neither of these fees is
payable and the service is free.
2. Complete the appropriate numbered panels in Part A below - a separate
form must be used for each title to be inspected.
3. Any writing at the public counter must be in lead pencil only and one will
be provided on request. The use of any kind of ink or ball pen is strictly
forbidden. The documents produced must not be marked in any way (Rule
291 of the Land Registration Rules 1925).
nrply in make a personal inspection of the register of the property referred to below;-..
4
Property description - provide as much information as is
available.
Postal number
or description
Name of road
Name of locality
Town
Post code
District or
London Borough
Administrative
County
Enter X in the appropriate box:-
I am the registered proprietor.
I II am not the registered proprietor.
Signed
Date
box:-
this
below
Land
appropriate
accompanies
current
Alm maw	 4
Where a fee is payable, please
Elthe Land Registry fee of
application.
El
or
please debit the Credit
with the appropriate fee
Registration Fee Order.
enter X in the
f. 1
Account mentioned
payable under the
. OR iiiiittrinv
1404;114\1i
tiofiRkicari1i r.
YOUR KEY NUMBER:-
YOUR REFERENCE:-
ealAtitilliiiir
B For official use only
Pending applications Application dealt with by
Date
Enter X in the appropriate box:-
Signed
	 Eli Title number supplied by the applicant.
Date 	 Time 	
 CI Title number not supplied by the applicant
7
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(6) The vendor does not give any covenant which would make him liable to the purchaser for a subsist ng br ach of any coven nt
concerning the state or condition of the property of which state or condition the purchaser has nofce under Condifon 12.
Freeholds
11. Where the title is freehold and held under the Registration of Titles Act or under the Land Titles Act title shall be shown either to the
Certificate of Title or to the Grant, and in all other cases title shall be shown to the original conveyance under the Government Lands
Act 1902.
Identity and Conditions of Property
At the purchaser's request the vendor shall point out to him the survey beacons delimiting the property.
Any beacon found to be missing or misplaced on inspection shall be replaced at the expense of the vendor but the fact that
a beacon is missing or misplaced is not a ground either for rescission of the contract or for delay in its completion.
Where the beacon has not been replaced on completion the purchaser may deduct from the purchase-money either the cost
estimated by a licensed surveyor of its replacement or if no estimate has been made Shs. 1,000/- in respect of each missing or
misplaced beacon.
Any excess of the replacement cost over the amount deducted under sub-clause (3) shall be paid to the purchaser and the
purchaser shall repay to the vendor any sum by which the amount deducted under sub-clause (3) exceeds the replacement cost.
No claim may be made by the purchaser in respect of any beacon found to be missing or misplaced after completion.
Subject to this Condition and after he has had an opportunity of inspecting the property the purchaser has notice of the identity
of the property and of its actual state and condition and he takes it subject to such state and condition.
Easements, Liabilities, etc.
13, (1) Before contract the vendor must disclose to the purchaser the existence of . all rights privileges latent easements or other liabilities
which are known by him to affect the property and all present and contingent liabilities in respect of road and sewerage charges
in respect of which liability is to be borne by the purchaser.
(2) The property is to be conveyed with the benefit of and subject to liability for all matters revealed under sub-clause (1).
(3) Where before completion the purchaser discovers any matter which should have been disclosed to him under sub-clause
(1) and has not been so disclosed he may by notice in writing to the vendor rescind the contract whereupon the provisions of
Condition 9 (3) and (4) apply.
Consn nts, etc.
14. (1) The property is sold subject to all necessary consents being obtained. The vendor is responsible for obtaining all consents and
the purchaser shall where necessary join in making any application.
(2) The vendor is responsible for obtaining the discharge of any encumbrance to which the property is not sold subject.
Subdivision
15. Where the sale requires the subdivision of any property immediately on the signing of the contract the vendor shall at his own
expense—
(a) apply for approval to the subdivision; and
(b) cause a survey to be carried out and deed plans issued by the Director of Surveys.
klisdoscription and Compensation
16. (1) No compensation is payable nor may the contract be rescinded in respect of any description measurement or quantity which
is substantially correct nor in respect of any matter of which the purchaser has notice under Condition 10(2). 12(6) or 18(1).
(2) Subject to sub-clause (1) where any misdescription. error, omission or misstatement in the contract is pointed out before
completion the purchaser may either—
(a) rescind the contract by notice in writing to the vendor delivered within Fourteen days of the discovery of the misdescription,
error, omission or misstatement in which case the provisions of Condition 9(3) and (4) apply; or
(b) by notice in writing to the vendor require the payment or allowance of compensation.
(3) Where the compensation under sub-clause (2) cannot be agreed between the parties it shall be referred to a sole arbitrator
agreed between the parties or in default of agreement appointed by the Chairman or the Vice-Chairman of the Law Society of
Kenya.
(4) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Condition where the property differs substantially from the property agreed to
be sold and purchased the purchaser cannot compel the vendor to convey if the vendor would be prejudiced thereby.
Local and other Authorities' Requirements
17. (1) Where before the date of the contract the vendor had notice of any requirement proposal or request (whether or not subject to
confirmation by any court or authority) made by or on behalf of any local or public authority compliance with which would
involve the expenditure of money on the property the vendor shall indemnify the purchaser against all liability in respect thereof
and if any liability is outstanding on completion the vendor shall covenant for indemnity in the conveyance.
(2) Where after the date of the contract notice of any such requirement proposal or request is given to the vendor he shall forthwith
give notice in writing thereof to the purchaser.
(3) The purchaser will indemnify the vendor against liability in respect of any requirement proposal or request of which he has
received notice under sub-clause (2) and will on completion pay to the vendor all sums which the vendor has had to pay in
respect thereof together with interest thereon.
